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This thesis examines the political and ideological struggles within 
Tswana chiefdoms in the Rustenburg district of the Western Transvaal 
in the period 1920 - 1940. This period was characterized by a spate 
of struggles against tribal chiefs which took on similar forms in 
most of the chiefdoms of the district. These challenges to chiefly 
political authority reflected a variety of underlying material 
interests which were rooted in the process of class formation 
resulting from the development of capitalist relations of production 
within the wider society. Despite the variations in material 
conditions in the different chiefdoms of the district, the forms of 
political and ideological resistance were very similar. The thesis 
examines the extent of the influences of Christian missions and 
national political organisations in these localized struggles, and 
also explores the relationship between chiefs, Native Affairs 
Department officials and the rural African population in the context 
of developing segregationalist ideology during the inter-war period.
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PREFACE
This thesis was originally born out of a desire to extend and expand 
on the research which I did in the course of my B.A. (Hons.) 
Dissertation. (Simpson, G.N., 'The Political and Legal 
Contradictions in the Preservation and Dissolution of the 
Precapitalist mode of Production : The Fokeng Disturbances, 1921-6', 
B.A. (Hons.) Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand (1981).) 
Whilst doing research into the Fokeng chiefdom in the 1920s, I 
became aware of a massive correspondence within the Native Affairs 
files (N.T.S.) which dealt in some detail with other remarkably 
similar disputes in other chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district. 
This then, was the first basic reason for undertaking a study of 
Peasants and Politics in the Western Transvaal, 1920-1940; the raw 
material was readily available, (well not quite - the fact that the 
N.T.S. files are closed after 1934 meant that I had to ask 
permission to see most of the relevant material, and this took some 
time in coming) and indeed had hardly been explored. From that 
point on, I simply allowed the documents to dictate the direction.
Although it is not always explicit, this thesis provides a 
comprehensive critique of my earlier work. Not only does it offer 
very different interpretations of the events at Phokeng, but the 
method and analytical framework are different to, and critical of, 
those which I used before. The absence of much secondary literature 
on Rustenburg district, other than Relly's short thesis (Relly 1978) 
and the occasional reference in some of Bradford's work, meant
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firstly, that this thesis would fill a gap in the rural history of 
South Africa, but that the study would face the difficult problem of 
'isolation' and a lack of source material as a basis for 
comparison. As a result the source of comparative analysis tended 
to shift to internal comparisons between chiefdoms within the 
district. This proved to be very fruitful.
In the process of examining the correspondence, I happened upon the 
court evidence of two cases in the Supreme Court, one dealing with 
the Fokeng dispute and one with the Kwena ba Mogopa struggle. This 
court evidence provided an extremely rich and detailed insight into 
the consciousness of some of the leading protagonists in the 
struggles of the district, and formed the basis of the case studies 
of these two chiefdoms in chapters four and five. Coming out of 
these two court cases was a particular emphasis and focus on the 
questions of political authority and legal process and the 
relationship between, politics, law, ideology and 'customary' 
control over material resources. This particular emphasis provided 
the second main intervention of this thesis in its discussion of the 
relationship between political struggle and the legal process. 
Although in this respect there was some excellent anthropological 
work to refer to, (Comaroff (1977) and Comaroff and Roberts (1981)), 
I am not familiar with any previous examination of these processes 
in concrete struggles, (except perhaps in the works of Snyder
(1981)). This factor has made the work very interesting and
exciting for me, but has also severely limited the basis for
comparison between the Rustenburg struggles and struggles elsewhere
in the country.
V .
A detailed comparative approach has therefore been less possible in 
some of the chapters than others. As a general rule, the comparison 
between localized peasant studies, although interesting, is not 
always useful, except to prove that local circumstances varied 
considerably in rural South Africa in almost every period.
Nonetheless, in this context I would like to mention the works of 
William Beinart on Pondoland (1982) and the Herschel district (Feb. 
1984). I found these works to be inspiring as well as practically 
useful. They have informed both the method and analytical framework 
which I have attempted to apply to the analysis of the Rustenburg 
district. Although the material circumstances and political 
struggles in Pondoland and Herschel were distinct from those in 
Rustenburg, Beinart's approach is one which I found particularly 
fruitful. Obviously, only I can be held responsible for the final 
product, however.
Extensive reading in the Journal of Peasant Studies and the Journal 
of South African Studies has also provided a source of comparison 
(and a means of assessing my analytical method) which is not always 
explicit within the text itself. However, I have attempted in the 
introductory chapter to situate this thesis in the context of the 
wider literature, both in order to develop a theoretical framework 
which embroiders the historical analysis which follows and in order 
to specify the method which is being applied in the later chapters.
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Ultimately, the particular focus on traditionally rooted legal 
disputes does limit the extent of my comparative analysis of the 
empirical data, especially in chapters four and five which deal most 
thoroughly with these disputes themselves. However, the centrality 
of chiefly control within these disputes, and the relationship 
between chiefs and the state administration, does facilitate broader 
discussion in the context of developments in other parts of the 
country and in relation other secondary literature, such as Rogers 
(1933) and Dubow (1986).
The vast bulk of empirical information and arguments presented in 
this work are drawn from primary sources, in particular the large 
quantity of unexplored correspondence in the Native Affairs files 
which relates to the Rustenburg district.
This thesis tells a story of political struggle. The background and 
underlying motivating forces are provided in the material conditions 
analysed and explained in chapter two. Chapter three examines the 
early struggles in the district and briefly discusses the influence 
(or lack of it) of national poliical organisations on the local 
politics in the Tswana chiefdoms and draws some comparisons with 
other areas of the Transvaal. Chapters four and five follow a 
general chronological pattern and tell the tale of the struggles in 
the Fokeng and Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdoms. These chapters contain a 
great deal of narrative history which in many respects 'speaks for 
itself' in outlining the complex and intriguing conflicts between 
rural peasants,, chiefs and white administrators. The second last 
chapter examines the particular influences of Christianity and 
mission education on the politics of the Rustenburg chiefdoms and
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draws some comparisons with mission involvement in Pondoland. The 
brief conclusions in chapter seven are founded on an interpretation 
of the information in the intervening chapters and are based on the 
analytical framework developed in the introduction.
The overall product is hoped to be a contribution to the very 
extensive literature on the nature of peasant politics. This thesis 
does not attempt to develop generalised conclusions from the very 
specific local circumstances examined. If anything, the 
contribution of this study is in its attempt to examine the local, 
introverted politics of an understudied region of rural South Africa.
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1CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
X. Peasants. Politics and Production
The subject of 'peasants and politics' has been the source of 
considerable debate in historiographical and anthropological 
writing. This debate has focussed primarily on the analytical 
definition of 'the peasantry', as well as attempting to unravel the 
definitive features of 'peasant' relations of production in 
capitalist societies and the nature and potential of 'peasant' 
political movements. It is not my intention to delve in any detail 
into these debates, but merely to extract some of the most basic 
features which inform the use of the term 'peasant' in the pages 
which follow, and which offer some analytical clarity to the 
discussion of specific groups of African rural producers in the 
Rustenburg district of the Western Transvaal during the 1920s and 
1930s. ~
Frederick Cooper, in his review of some of the literature on peasant 
societies, notes the varied (and often completely opposite) 
interpretations of what the term 'peasant' implies.
Some scholars consider the peasant response to 
expanding markets for produce since the 
nineteenth century to be the great success story 
of African economic history. To others, 
peasantry means poverty. To some, peasant 
society is hopelessly backward-looking and 
politically fragmented; to others peasants 
represent the one real hope for revolution. An 
occasional scholar is bold enough to generalise 
about the economic well being or political values 
of peasants all across Africa, while a few 
writers have recently wondered if peasantry is a 
very useful category after all".(D
2Cooper goes on to conclude that the notion of a 'peasantry’
"... embraces the wretchedly poor and moderately 
prosperous, the progressive and the reactionary.
Its only specificity is its ambiguity."(2)
It therefore appears that the only appropriate definition of the
peasantry is a broad one which does not attempt to conceptualize
'peasants' as a single interest group. Thus, Saul offers a
definition wide enough to include agriculturalists, pastoralists and
migrant labourers with differential involvements in the cash
(3)economy. Wolf simply states:
"I define peasants as populations that are 
existentially involved in cultivation, and make 
autonomous decisions regarding the processes of 
cultivation."(4)
He notes that this definition includes tenants and share-croppers as 
well as owner-operators, but excludes landless labourers and 
cultivators ('farmers') who participate fully in the market.
This definition of the term 'peasant', therefore, includes a broad
spectrum of productive relations. Cooper asserts that the ambiguity
f 6 ^of the concept of a peasantry is its most valuable feature. '
However, the danger of allowing such a conceptualisation to obscure
the very real differences in the relations of production in
different communities and time periods (as well as within any single
community) is noted by Beinart who consequently avoids the use of
(7)the term.
There are two basic analytical features utilized in defining ’the 
peasantry' which are common to all the works referred to thusfar. 
The first is that the peasantry is historically defined in the 
interaction between mercantile or industrial capitalism and 
'traditional' socio-economic systems. The second, is the key role 
attributed to the dependence on family labour in defining peasant 
production. Nevertheless, beyond these basic assertions there is 
little wider agreement, and debate once again rages. This debate 
has tended to focus on conflicting interpretations of the historical 
effects of the interaction of capitalist and pre-capitalist 
relations of production, (and the analytical tools most appropriate 
to interpreting this) but is more fundamentally rooted in the nature 
and consequences of peasant involvement in the capitalist market and 
in wage labour. All of these aspects of peasants' relationships to 
the capitalist economy had a fundamental influence on the rural 
African politics of the Rustenburg district in the 192Us and 1930s. 
It is therefore important to frame some conclusions from within the 
debates so as to develop an analytical framework which will inform 
the discussions of political struggle which follow.
Karl Marx has argued that
"As capitalist production develops, it has a 
disintegrating resolvent effect on all older forms of 
producton."(8)
In the African context this implies that penetration by mercantile 
capitalism, followed by colonisation and the establishment of 
industrial capitalist centres in the midst of pre-capitalist African
4societies, tended to dissolve pre-capitalist forms of production. 
However, this general comment does not adequately explain the 
complex processes of proletarianization or class formation in 
African peasant societies. In particular the process whereby 
African substistence producers were integrated into the wage labour 
market demands further explanation.
W.A. Lewis argues that proletarianization was the consequence of 
market forces a l o n e L e w i s  suggests that participation in the 
wage-labour market was dependent only on the wages being offered, 
providing that remuneration equalled that available to peasants 
operating in the 'subsistence sector' . He goes further to 
suggest that in African societies, the agricultural sector "is 
characterized by substantial 'disguised unemployment' where ... the 
marginal productivity of labour is negligible, zero or even 
negative" Lewis isolates the capitalist sector from what he 
calls the 'subsistence sector' and suggests that it is exclusively 
the former that provides the potential for development. It is the 
capitalist sector which, through its utilization of the disguised 
unemployed in the wage labour market, will carry development, (and 
presumably the benefits thereof), to the undeveloped pre-capitalist 
e c o n o m i e s . T h u s  Lewis arrives at his 'dual economy thesis': 
the capitalist sector on the one hand, and the subsistence sector on 
the other, the two being linked through the labour supplied by the 
latter to the former through migrancy and by the 'inevitable’ 
benefits of development which this entails.
5Lewis does, however, recognise the potential threat to this
development process which the peasant economy may pose, and
conceptualises it in the general relationship of agriculture to 
industry. The growth of industry generates a growth in demand for 
agricultural foodstuffs. If the peasant economy accommodates this 
demand and is not stifled by the development of capitalist 
agriculture, this will serve to undermine Lewis' unlimited labour
supply and force the capitalist to pay wages above the subsistence 
C13)level v . Lewis therefore suggests that it may be in the 
interests of the capitalist sector to inhibit the growth and
technical advances of the peasant economy, in the interest of
maintaining a cheap and plentiful supply of labour, but that this 
needs to be complemented by the development of alternative sources 
of food.^^
Arrighi, in applying the Lewis model to the concrete Rhodesian 
experience, provides both a thorough critique of Lewis, and a 
periodized study of 'labour supplies in historical 
perspective’ . Arrighi suggests that in Rhodesia, the 
'disguised unemployment', identified by Lewis, was itself the result 
of the process of capitalist development and colonisation, which 
served to restructure and disrupt 'traditional' African societies. 
He argues that the establishment of white rule and 'Pax Brittanica' 
prevented Ndebele men, belonging to the upper castes, from engaging 
in martial pursuits, whilst the simultaneous alienation of cattle 
and land prevented them from "reallocating labour time to productive 
activities within the peasant s e c t o r " . Arrighi goes on to 
assert that through extra-economic coercion on the part of the
6colonial rulers, and the economic slumps of 1921 and 1929, the
independence of the peasant economy was irreversibly
undermined/17  ^ Arrighi does, nevertheless, recognise that for
the majority of the Rhodesian labour force, proletarianization was
anything but a complete process. Hie wages earned in the industrial
sector were well below those required for the full reproduction of
the worker and his family, and particularly in the cost-sensitive
gold mining industry, these 'bachelor wages’ were crucial to the
(18)profitable extraction of surplus. 1 Arrighi therefore concludes
that Lewis’ 'subsistence wage' is based on the premise of ongoing
production in the 'subsistence sector' and the independent
reproduction of the family of the wage earner within the peasant
economy. Accordingly, surplus extraction in the 'capitalist
sector', is viewed by Arrighi as inextricably linked to the ongoing
(19)production of the 'subsistence sector'.v
Frank points out that Arrighi's arugment constitutes a comprehensive 
criticism of Lewis who treats the different sectors of the economy 
as being almost independent of each other in their development (or 
lack of it), except through the utilisation of labour available 
through disguised unemployment. Frank asserts that this 'dual 
economy' must in fact be seen as a unitary system and a capitalist 
one at that. Reproduction within the peasant economy is crucial to 
the profitability of the capitalist system as a whole and therefore
/ d  A N
must be seen as a part of it ^  '. Thus the process underlined by
Arrighi is not so much the destruction of the pre-capitalist mode of
production, as the destruction of /subsistence\wholly independent of
(21)the wage-labour market.
7In his pioneering work on the emergence and decline of the South
African peasantry, Colin Bundy applies a similar analytical method
(22)to Arrighi and arrives at similar conclusions. ' Bundy begins
by critiquing the 'dualist' analysis of the South African economy as
(23)expounded in the works of Hobart Houghton. y He goes on to
suggest that this critique is in fact appropriate to 'the liberal
(24)tradition of South African historiography’ as a whole. ' Bundy 
concludes his critique as follows:
"... the crucial post-mineral period was one in 
which non-market forces predominated; in which 
discriminatory and coercive means were utilized 
by the wielders of economic and political power 
to disadvantage the African peasantry; and that 
an economy was created whose structure was such 
as to render 'market forces' highly favourable to 
the white capitalist sector. The decline in 
productivity and profitability of African 
agriculture - and the corollary of greater 
dependence by Africans on wage labour - is in an 
important sense the outcome of the nature of 
capitalist development in South Africa."(25)
Bundy goes on to identify the broad features of African 
proletarianization in South Africa. He claims that after the 
initial 'shock' of colonisation, farmer-pastoralists adapted 
considerably and attempted to meet their requirements through 
participation in the produce markets. Bundy asserts that this was 
initially encouraged by imperial and colonial authorities, as well 
as by missionaries.^*^ He suggests that in the period prior to 
mineral discoveries African peasants avoided wage labour on white 
farms. Bundy also notes that the labour needs of white farmers, who 
were themselves "only shallowly involved in market production' were
bbest served by establishing 'quasi-feudal relations’, which in many 
instances guaranteed absentee landlords a rent income and which
simultaneously provided African rural dwellers with various forms of
(27)tenure on white farms.
In the period after mineral discoveries, Bundy claims that the 
expansion of produce markets resulted in the spread of peasant 
production and entrepreneurial activities. This saw the development 
of greater innovation and diversification within African peasantries 
and in turn the emergence of a small group of ’well-off' 
peasants/28  ^ However, Bundy suggests that the gradual 
commercialization of agriculture and the ’intensification’ of white
political authority, combined with increasing demands for wage 
labourers, resulted in an assault being launched upon peasants' 
participation in the cash economy as sellers of produce rather than 
as sellers of labour. He suggests that there ensued a concerted 
attempt to coerce more wage labour, whilst simultaneously 
undermining Africans' participation in the produce market. Thus, 
Bundy identifies the early twentieth century as a period 
characterised by the extension of various extra-economic means to 
coerce the African peasantry into wage labour and the consequent 
increasing reliance by peasants upon migrant labour for a cash 
income/29  ^ Bundy quotes Arrighi suggesting that during this 
period "political mechanisms became of crucial importance in closing 
gaps between supply and demand.
Bundy concludes by pointing out that the destruction of the peasant 
economy was by no means complete. In explaining why this was the
9case Bundy argues that by the second decade of the twentieth
century, the African peasantry was so reliant on migrant labour and
so patently incapable of local development, that an adequate supply
(31)of labour was ensured. Bundy does, however, note the
competing needs of white agriculturalists and industrial capitalists
for available labour. He points out the continued reliance of white
farmers on 'squatter* labour and suggests that even the 1913 Land
Act, rather than resulting in immediate proletarianization, resulted
(32)in increasing labour-tenancy relationships on white farms. 
Nonetheless, in view of the dominance of mining capital within the 
capitalist state, Bundy's central explanation for the partial 
survival of the peasant economy and the entrenchment of the migrant 
labour system is that:
"For urban employers, it meant labour was kept 
cheap, unorganised, and rightless, that overhead 
costs were kept to a minimum and the formation of 
an urban proletariat was restricted."(33)
Bundy draws the conclusion that by the second decade of the
twentieth century the decline of the African peasantry in South
Africa was well under way and that this was reflected by the shift
from labour migrancy as a discretionary means of earning a cash
(34)Income, to a necessary one. ' The central element in this 
process is identified by Bundy as being the process of land 
alientation, and following Frank he characterises the shortage of 
land as
"the key to the status of inferiority, 
exploitation, poverty, lack of culture, in a word 
the status of underdevelopment ... of (peasants) 
who participate all to fully in the social 
process of capitalist development."(35)
1U
thus, Bundy asserts that the structural underdevelopment of the
peasant sector in South Africa was the 'other side of the coin' of
, , (36)capitalist development.
In both the examples discussed, Arrighi and Bundy assert that the 
peasant economies proved adept at responding to the market economy, 
through expanding their production and meeting their initial cash 
requirements by selling their surpluses. They both claim that it 
was only with the simultaneous exertion of extra-economic methods of 
control on the part of the conquerors, and the development of 
successful settler agriculture, that it became possible to restrict 
the independence of peasant subsistence, and create a dependency on 
wages earned in the industrial sector. This latter process is, 
described by both authors as a prolonged and often drawn-out one, 
partly due to the halting development of capitalist agriculture.
Both Bundy and Arrighi also note that proleterianization was only a 
partial or incomplete process, and claim that the peasant economy 
(until at least the 1930'.s) appears as much to have been 'preserved' 
as it was 'dissolved'. More specifically both authors assert that 
the very basis of surplus extraction through the migrant labour 
system, rested on the supposed reproductive functions carried out by 
the pre-capitalist sector. It is in this assertion that their 
analyses move beyond the crude dualism of Lewis and acknowledge the 
exploitative nature of capitalist domination in the colonial 
context. However, their conclusions are in turn based on a limited 
and often functionalist perspective of the peasant economy within 
the capitalist mode of production.
11
Firstly, toth Bundy and Arrighi attempt to explain the processes of
•peasantization' and 'proletarianization* through the concept of
'peripheralization', or the incorporation of independent producers
into the world system and the consequent 'development of
(37)underdevelopment'. In so doing they attempt to explain the
direction of change through the relationship of the household to the 
market, without any specific analysis of relations of production
/ OQ\
within the household or the 'peasant economy'. J Thus, Bundy 
locates the origins of the poverty of South African peasants in 
their initial prosperity in responding successfully to developing 
markets. He claims that these people became locked into the market 
and were therefore vulnerable to any attempt (by capital or the 
state) to change the form in which their contribution to the world 
economy was to be made.
Although Bundy acknowledges differentiation among peasants and 
points to the existence of a priveleged 'class’ of peasants, who had 
preferential access to land and markets, produced more than others 
and who acquired better capital resources, at no point does he 
explain how this distinct 'class' maintained and reproduced their 
privileged access to resources and how they controlled and utilized 
labour. Bundy barely discusses the peasant household and hardly 
considers the impact of the market on relations of production within 
it.(39) Nonetheless, Bundy presents the stratification of peasant 
communities as a "predictable feature of the underdevelopment of a 
peasant community as a whole” of which the barometer was
increasing involvement in wage labour.
12
The second essential criticism of Bundy and Arrighi is closely
linked to the first. The failure to root their analyses within the
transition of relations of production within the peasant community,
results in a rather stultified and static description of the peasant
family (or household) - the key unit of production in peasant 
(41)society. As Cooper points out:
"The identification of the household as the key 
unit of peasant production does not tell us how a 
household head can actually maintain control over 
family labour and the very forces that turned 
relatively subsistence-oriented households into 
peasantries - access to markets [and migrant 
earnings - G.S.] - sometimes undermined elders'
control of young men and sometimes strengthened 
the family unit.”(42)
Both Bundy and Arrighi present entry into the wage-labour market as 
a linear process which is generally associated with the inevitable 
process of underdevelopment. However, their failure to analyse the 
relations of production within the peasant household and indeed 
within the peasant community limits their perceptions of the 
reorganisation of family labour in order to use the migratory 
system. Migration was often discretionary rather than coerced and 
the proceeds often utilized to enhance rural production. Equally, 
the migrant system offered the potential for individual economic 
action and the possible withdrawal from large households and a 
degree of accumulation by new household units. The point is that 
migrant wages introduced a variable dynamic into the exercise of 
power in the peasant production process. Failure to come to terms 
with the transition of these productive relations within particular
13
peasant communities 
understanding of class 
Cooper points out that
can only result in an oversimplified 
formation within peasant communities. Thus
"Class formation looks different when viewed from 
inside. Rather than equating differentiation 
with class formation and reducing it to a 
universal characteristic of underdevelopment ... 
this should make scholars wary of a monolithic 
view of the relationship of agriculture and 
migrant labour as a slide from the former to the 
latter."(43)
This criticism appears to be of particular significance in the 
Rustenburg context. It will be shown that by the early 1920s, 
although some chiefdoms in the district displayed the symptoms of 
rural decline outlined by Bundy, others did not. The larger 
chiefdoms in the district were able to maintain some degree of 
continued access to land through land purchase, with the result that 
a high degree of migrant involvement in the wage labour market 
appears to have remained discretionary rather than coerced, at least 
until the 1930s.
The final criticism of Bundy and Arrighi is one of the most
fundamental. Both authors present a functionalist and
oversimplified interpretation of the relationship of production to
reproduction, through which production is presented as the sphere of
capitalism, while reproduction is that the Atrophied' peasant
(44)community pushed into the reserves. This functionalist
interpretation of the role of African rural economies is
characteristic of much of the revisionist history of the South 
African social formation and indeed of many other parts of
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C45)Africa. In this view, the peasant economy is seen to
subsidise the subsistence wages of the individual migrant worker by 
providing for the reproduction of the worker's family, thereby 
'rationalising' low wages in the industrial sector.
Claude Meillassoux's work provides an excellent example of this
analytical method and displays perfectly the functionalist and
structuralist assumptions associated with i t . ^ ^  He claims that
organic relations between the capitalist mode of production and the
'domestic economy' (or pre-capitalist mode of production) are
established through the reproductive functions provided to the
former by the latter. He goes on to suggest that the supply of
labour and the low cost of that labour is due to the location of the
reproduction of labour power within the domestic sector.
Meillassoux suggests that this process is facilitated, by the
incomplete process of primitive accumulation and the establishment
of 'reserves' in many African colonies which, by maintaining limited
access to productive means, in turn services the exploitation of the
domestic economy via the process of forced partial
(47)proletarianization. '
Meillassoux's explanation is located in the distinction between 
'direct' and 'indirect' wages and the application of labour rent, 
basing the ultra-exploitability of migrant labour on the 
reproduction of labour power outside of the capitalist sphere, the 
costs of which are not accounted for in the wages paid in the 
capitalist economy . It is through this analysis that
Meillassoux arrives at 'the articulation of modes of production' as
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a mea"« of explaining continued production and reproduction in the 
domestic sector. He sees these functions as being performed 
primarily within the family which he identifies as a 'residue’ of 
the domestic mode and which remains functional to capitalism. Thus 
Meillassoux asserts that the disintegration of 'the domestic 
pre-capitalist mode’, or its dissolution, would result in the full 
costs of reproduction falling on the shoulders of employers in the 
capitalist sector. However, he suggests that the disintegration of
peasant production in the reserves is inevitable, and so points to
/
the contradictory trends of 'preservation' and 'dissolution' of
pre-captialist relations of production, in which the attempts to
develop and 'preserve' domestic production are mainly undertaken by
the colonial state. In somewhat conspiratorial terms, Meillassoux
also notes the fact that these reserves cannot be developed too
extensively either, as that would equally threaten the reproduction
(49)Of a partially proleterianized wage labour force v ' .
Meillassoux's work tends, on the basis of the distinction between 
production and reproduction, to return to a somewhat crude dualistic 
approach. O'Laughlin criticizes the ambiguity of Meillassoux's 
distinction between production and reproduction where production is 
determinant, by quoting Marx on the question.
"... every social process of production is, at 
the same time, a process of reproduction".
She suggests that Meillassoux's dualistic approach hangs on his
narrow interpretation of reproduction as the 'biological
reproduction of labour-power. ' As O'Laughlin points out, this
16
assigns the same determining role to the production of human energy 
as is assigned to production of the means of subsistence in Marxist 
theory. She goes on to note that under capitalism, the quantity, 
quality and value of the labour-power employed in capitalist 
production, are constantly altering with the evolution of the 
technical conditions of production and the state of the class 
struggle, and thus the capitalist mode of production is not 
organised in such a way as to assure the biological reproduction of 
a given supply of workers . Furthermore, Meillassoux fails to 
distinguish between the reproduction of 'labour' and 
'labour-power'. Yet this distinction expresses the basic class 
relations of capitalism: labour alienated from the means of 
production. (In fact Meillassoux even re'fers to labour power within 
the 'domestic mode’). Therefore, as O'Laughlin points out, it 
cannot be assumed that the biological reproduction of the working 
class as individuals is a precondition for the reproduction of 
capital.
"Capitalism can reproduce labour-power and the 
biological reproduction of workers is not a 
boundary condition for the accumulation of
capital”(53)#
This substantially undermines the analysis of pre-capitalist forms 
as purely functional to capitalism and goes further to suggest that 
capitalism is not simply able to 'organise' and order all social 
relations of production to its advantage.
Much of O'Laughlin's critique of Meillassoux is, however, rooted in 
a somewhat monolitic sense of the dominance and logic of capitalism,
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often to the exclusion of the recognition of resilient 
pjg^apitalist social relations of production - particularly in the
politico-ideological realm.
"If one does attend to the reproduction of the 
means of production, (rather than biological 
reproduction -G.S.), then the conceptual unity of 
the domestic community as a theoretical object is 
rent by the diversity of forms of land use in the 
pre-capitalist modes of production which 
Meillassoux groups in a single evolutionary 
category ... These differences, as well as the 
logic of capital, are important if we are to 
understand the uneveness of capitalist develop­
ment” (54) #
O'Laughlin tends to limit the meaning of reproduction in response to 
Meillassoux, and as a result, restricts 'reproduction' to an 
exclusively economic process. Thus she fails to incorporate within 
this notion a sense of politico-ideological reproduction, which 
itself maintains a certain dynamic of its own and resilience in the 
face of capitalist development. As a consequence, class definition 
under capitalism - defined in terms of relations to the economic 
means of production - is crudely transported into O'Laughlin's 
analysis of pre-capitalist modes of production.
Banaji's crucial contribution lies in his assertion that each mode 
of production is defined by its own laws of motion, and, in keeping 
with historical materialism, he asserts that the ultimate laws of 
motion of any mode of production must be class struggle . 
Whilst the laws of motion of capitalism are defined at the level of 
productive relations, there is nothing to suggest that this is 
common to all modes of production. Indeed, control over ideological
and political reproduction may well serve in pre-capitalist 
societies to define classes in concrete struggle/56^
In conclusion, the analyses of Meillassoux, Bundy and Arrighi are 
severely limited by their functionalist bias. Their analyses ot 
peasant society (or pre-capitalist or domestic modes of production) 
are restricted to the reproductive functions which these relations 
perform for capitalism. This denies the most dynamic feature of 
these peasant communities - their autonomous internal struggles and 
power relationships. Thus there is little analysis of why the 
migrant labour force is composed the way it is, particularly, as 
Bozzoli points out, with reference to the sexual and familial 
division of labour.
"The reproductive 'function' or 'place' is filled 
by someone, but who that someone is cannot be 
explained by reference to the internal nature of 
the concept 'reproduction'."(58)
The crucial consequence of this structuralist and functionalist 
methodology is that the complex and resilient processes of class 
formation and the establishment of political authority, as well as 
the ideological dynamic of peasant social formations are neglected. 
Without these considerations it is impossible accurately to analyse 
the effects of capitalist development on African social relations. 
The assumption of the reproductive functions performed by peasant 
production for capitalism, and the associated assumptions (as 
Bozzoli points out) that it is women who largely perform these
reproductive functions within the African peasantry, cannot .be
v
Verified or denied without an examination of the transition of
8ocial relations of production within particular peasant societies.
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It is only through such an understanding of class struggle, rooted
within the peasant community, that the resilience of 'peasant'
social relations can be explained, giving a sense of reality to the
ways in which forms and modes of production and reproduction
interrelate. Indeed, this is the central assertion of Robert
Brenner's exceptional article, in which he fundamentally challenges
(59)the functionality of all relations of production to capitalism.v
P.P. Rey’s work promises a greater sensitivity to these processes of 
struggle and class formation within precapitalist relations of 
production. Rey, like Meillassoux, conceptualizes the peasantry 
through the 'articulation of modes of production'. However, unlike 
Meillassoux, he focuses his examination more microcosmically within 
tile 'colonized pre-capitalist forms of production', specifically in 
Congo-Brazzaville.
Rey focuses his discussion at the 'point of articulation': in the 
concrete class struggles and alliances within the 'pre-capitalist 
social formation'. Rather than seeing pre-capitalist modes of 
production as necessarily serving the ends of capitalism, Rey sees 
their continued functioning as a crucial hindrance to the expanded 
reproduction of capitalist relations. Conversely, he also makes the 
point that these pre-capitalist forms of production are
Indispensable to capitalist growth in the provision of both wage 
labourers and the agricultural means of subsistence - the latter, 
•Pacifically because of the slow development of capitalist 
•RTiculture. Rey thus identifies the contradictory nature of the 
••pansion of capitalist relations in the simultaneous tendencies of 





Brewer notes that Rey's originality is in insisting 
state of affairs takes so long, that despite the 
dominance of the capitalist mode over time, "transition
is the normal state of affairs" (61)
gey's analysis does not fulfil its promise to elucidate the 
struggles internal to peasant relations of production. He merely 
implies that the maintenance of pre-capitalist political and 
economic relations is to some extent the result of the resilience of 
these relations and is not exclusively dependent on the relative 
strength or weakness of the dominant capitalist classes.
Ihere are further problems with the analysis provided by Rey, the 
most notable being the tendency to return, through the notion of the 
two modes of production ’articulating' with each other to a 
dualistic m o d e l T h i s  tendency towards ’dualism’ is implicit 
ip much of the literature which falls within the 'articulation of 
■odes' debate, as noted by Foster-Carter:
"... capitalism neither evolves mechanically from 
what precedes it, nor does it necessarily 
dissolve it. Indeed, so far from banishing 
pre-capitalist forms, it not only co-exists 
within them, but buttresses them, and even on 
occasion devilishly conjures them up."(63)
Within this theoretical formulation two modes of production are 
identified as ’articulating' with each other, one establishing its 
domination over the other. It is even suggested that capitalism 
conjures up non-capitalist forms and social relations. This kind of 
argument assumes capitalism to possess some general mechanism which
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identifies in exactly what direction 'its' interests lie, and 
calculates precisely how to fulfill them.
Horray asserts that the 'articulation of modes’ paradigm merely 
reproduces the functionalist bias outlined earlier.
"The dissolution/conservation contradiction is an 
expression of the articulation of the capitalist 
mode of production with a pre-capitalist mode of 
production. Aspects of ’customary’ behaviour in 
the labour reserve are identified as residual 
elements of the pre-capitalist mode which happen 
to be functional to the needs of capital. So 
long as they persist, it is difficult to discern, 
following this argument, at what point it would 
be possible to assert that a pre-capitalist mode 
no longer existed and that social relations were 
fully subsumed under capitalism. The suspicion 
remains, therefore, that advocates of this sort 
of theoretical dualism have implicitly endorsed 
an ’economisin' that derives from ’the prior 
offense of capitalism in defining all relations 
in economic terms.'”(65)
A further criticism of Rey (and indeed much of the other literature 
reviewed here) is that he tends to deal with the process of 
’articulation’ almost exclusively at an economic level and is 
narrowly concerned with the economic implications of capitalist 
’penetration'. Yet as a number of authors suggest, it is vital to 
acknowledge the importance of political, ideological and legal 
contradictions inherent in this process. For just as the economic 
infrastructure of these peasant societies is undermined, so too are 
the political relations and systems of law in these communities. 
Hence, O’Meara argues that
"... the rich concept of mode of production must 
not be reduced to a much narrower one of an
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economic 'instance' or 'level', as (ultimately) 
the most significant of a number of other levels 
- a reduction which precisely renders inoperative 
the central assumption of historical
materialism."(67)
Both Bradby(68) and more specifically Meillassoux(69) note the 
relatively autonomous politico-ideological dynamics of the 
•pre-capitalist mode’ and in particular the extent to which kinship 
operates as an ideology, often instrumental in the transformation 
and class stratification of these societies with the penetration of 
capitalism. Any analysis which fails to take cognisance of the 
revolutionary effect of capitalist development on existing forms of 
political and ideological control cannot come to terms with the 
transformation of class relations in their entirety.
In this vein, Wolf simply asserts that the development of capitalism 
had the effect of transforming both the politics and economics of 
subsistence producing communities. Hence he characterizes the 
expansion of capitalist relations as a "large-scale cultural 
encounter"(70) and suggests that capitalist development produced a 
crisis in the exercise of political power in these communities.
"[Capitalism] creates 'free-floating' resources 
previously held fast by a tissue of social and 
political connections. It mobilizes economic 
resources and renders them amenable to new forms 
of allocation and use; yet in so doing it also 
cuts the tie between these resources and any 
connection they may have had with traditional 
social prerogatives and political privileges. It 
proves a powerful solvent of the integument of 
power, exacerbating tension not only through its 
own action, but freeing also tensions and 
contradictions previously contained by , -the 
traditional system of power."(71)
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Hie complexity and contradictory nature of class formation within 
peasant communities under capitalism is inextricably tied up with 
the equally complex and contradictory nature of peasant politics. 
As Beinart suggests, the economic processes of the rise and decline 
of the South African peasantry, cannot be thoroughly understood in 
isolation from the nature, form and content of the political 
organisation and ideological expressions within particular peasant 
communities/72  ^ Indeed, in the rest of this thesis it will be
argued that in the Rustenburg district of the Western Transvaal, the 
complexity of the social and economic dislocation wrought by the 
development of capitalist relations, can only be fully appreciated 
in the light of the particular political and ideological battles 
waged within the chiefdoms of the district. These struggles are 
themselves not reducible to either the ’effects’ of conflicting 
modes of production or the assertion of control by the capitalist 
state. Rather, they have a less easily discemable dynamic ana
momentum of their own.
In the South African context, it takes little more than a 
superficial glance to identify the conflictual relationship between 
capitalist and non-capitalist economies - as witnessed by the Native 
Economic Commission Report in 1932.
"The continued existence of a primitive 
subsistence economy in such close contact with an 
advanced money economy, as the two systems are in 
South Africa, must be expected to create serious 
maladjustments ... The conflict between the two 
must result either in the extermination or the 
absorption or the development of the backward 
race ... the Native economic question is 
therefore how best the Native population can be 
led onwards step by step in an orderly march to 
civilization ... The question is not primarily a 
problem of a small vocal, dissatisfied,
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semi-civilized group of urbanized Natives : it is 
primarily a problem of millions of uneducated 
tribal Natives, held in the grip of superstition 
and of an anti-progressive social system. The 
former group must be fairly considered and room 
must be found for them in the body economic. But 
their articulateness must not obscure the fact 
that they represent a less important part of the 
problem; that the real problem lies with the 
non-vocal millions; and that in many respects the 
approach to the problems of the former must 
proceed by way of the latter."(73)
Ihe power of the ruling classes and their exclusive access to state 
power relative to the African majority, is equally easily visible. 
Yet the resilience of pre-capitalist social relations cannot simply 
be reduced to the exercises of ’conservation' or 'preservation' by 
the state or a monolithic self-interested capitalism. Indeed, it is 
only through an examination of struggles located within African 
peasant communities themselves that it is possible to come to terms 
with both their productive and ideological resilience, flexibility 
and adaptability. In the context of increasing dominance of 
capitalist social relations, it is necessary to explain why 
'millions of uneducated tribal natives' were ostensibly 'held in the 
grip of superstition and an anti-progressive social system'.
Ihis appears to be of particular relevance in explaining the 
politics of Tswana peasant communities in the Rustenburg district of 
the Western Transvaal during the first half of the twentieth 
century. In the discussions which follow, it will be argued that 
the processes of economic dislocation and class formation wrought 
Within these peasant communities by the development of capitalist 
relations, found expression in political struggles which were rooted 
la the resilient cultural, legal and ideological framework of these
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chiefdoms. It will also be asserted that these struggles, rather
than being merely the by-product of manipulation by the ominpotent 
capitalist classes or the colonial state, were in fact expressions 
of vibrant processes of class formation internal to these peasant 
societies and were to play an important role in forging both state 
policy and indeed the particular form of capitalist development in 
South Africa.
II "Molap Sefofu, Obile Otle Oje Mong Waone - Ihe Law is
(7 4)Blind, It Eats Even its Owner"v : Politics, Law and
Ideology
It has been strongly asserted above that the effects of capitalism' 
in the rural areas of South Africa cannot be thoroughly understood 
without examining its influence on the politics and law of rural 
communities. This in turn demands some understanding of political 
and legal organisation and power within pre-capitalist social 
formations, and of course, of the localized struggles within and 
around political and legal institutions.
It is surprising that changing legal forms and the transformation of 
legal ideas in the context of ’conflicting modes of production’, is 
such an understudied area. Ihe close correlation between political 
and legal authority in pre-capitalist African societies has been 
widely acknowledged in anthropological works (^5). Yet, the 
’legal sphere’ as one of the principle arenas of politics and 
ideological struggle has been neglected. Indeed, the frame of 
reference of ’legal anthropology’ has itself been questioned,
2b
firstly on the basis of the claim that cross-cultural comparison 
offers very little; and secondly, because almost all of the studies 
in this field are based on a comparative analysis of Western legal 
concepts and arrangements Comaroff and Roberts suggest that
it is only when we challenge the 'normative' or 'rule-centred 
paradigms reflective of the positivist orientation of Anglo-American 
legal theory, that it is possible to understand the politically 
contested nature of precapitalist politico-legal mechanisms .
This 'rule-centred' approach conceptualizes social life as
rule—governed, and normal behaviour as the product of compliance 
with established normative precepts. Dispute acquires a 
pathological nature; it signals deviance or malfunction. Linked to 
this is a notion that societies do not cohere effectively in the 
absence of centralized authorities which formulate rules and ensure 
conformity with them. Thus 'law' is directly tied to authoritative 
social control. This approach is epitomized in Schapera's works on
/ 7g'\the Tswana '
In his 'Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom' as well as in Tribal 
Legislation Amongst the Tswana ... , Schapera presents ricnly
detailed inventories of recorded rules in categories corresponding 
closely with those found in Western systems. These normative 
statements are presented as legal rules in that they constitute a 
code employed by judicial agencies to determine the outcome of 
disputes. Thus he refers to laws and customs as 'rules of conduct' 
} and goes even further to suggest that it is judicial 
enforcement which defines Tswana law:
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"Hie rules of conduct distinguished from the rest 
by this ultimate sanction of judicial enforcement 
may for all practical purposes be regarded as the 
laws of the Tswana."(81)
It is in this context that Schapera describes the "Tswana chief as 
'law giver'"^82^. This 'rule-centred’ paradigm limits Schapera's 
analysis of the flexibility of Tswana law to a functionalist 
perspective of its 'usefulness'. Hence:
"... among the Tswana tribes the chief has the 
acknowledged power to issue orders and frame 
regulations which, while in force, are part of 
the tribal law, but which may subsequently be 
changed, withdrawn or even neglected, when the 
need for them has passed.”(83; (empashis added 
- G.S.)
Schapera does recognise that 'rules of conduct' must be popularly 
accepted before they become operational, but this is viewed only in 
formalistic and structural terms and ignores the political nature of 
the process of dispute within accepted legal norms. As a 
consequence Schapera interprets the influence of western 
civilization on Tswana legal culture through the view of formal 
chiefly legislation as the major agent of legal change.
Neither Gluckman nor Fallers are quite as mechanistic in their 
interpretation of the relationship between 'rule' and outcome in 
African legal systems.^8^  Gluckman in particular stresses the 
flexible quality of Lozi rules, although in the final instance he 
does accord the indigenous normative order considerable significance 
in the determination of disputes. Both, however, continue to view 
'law' as an irreducible phenomenon, rather than as an expression of
relative political power.
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The problem with the approach outlined thus far lies primarily in 
its postulation of an unproblematic relationship between ’rule' and 
’decision' in the settlement process. This ignores the fact that 
the values attributed to stated rules, typically vary widely within 
any system and cannot be treated as homogenous ’rules of law’ . 
Schapera presents the Tswana as a prime example of a small scale 
legal system markedly similar to western models in its conceptual 
foundations. But, as Comaroff and Roberts point out, the stated 
rules found in Tswana communities, known collectively as 'mekgwa le 
melao ya Setswana' constitute an 'undifferentiated repertoire’, 
ranging from standards of polite behaviour to rules, the breach of 
which is taken extremely seriously Schapera, therefore, 
fails properly to identify or explain the complex relationship 
between existing rules of various kinds and the determination of the 
dispute process. Finally it should be noted that the ability of any 
party to effect a particular settlement, may rest on a legitimacy 
that varies over time and depends on political factors rather than 
on any non-negotiable jural authority.
"The analysis of dispute settlement as an 
essentially legal activity may, in some contexts, 
obscure its political nature."(86)
In contrast to Schapera’s structuralist perception, it is argued 
here that law in pre-capitalist African society should be viewed as 
a dynamic set of political procedures rather than static and 
rule-centered. In this view, dispute is seen as normal ana 
inevitable rather than pathological or dysfunctional. In a similar 
vein, Comaroff and Roberts suggest that it is in social processes
and not institutions, that the analysis of 'social order' is 
ultimately to be grounded (thereby identifying a convergence of 
legal and political anthropology). They argue that 'laws' do not 
determine the outcome of disputes in a straightforward manner and 
that an understanding of the dispute process therefore requires a 
description of its total political and social context. Referring to 
the Tswana example, Comaroff and Roberts go on to make a crucial 
observation:
"... rules may themselves be the object of 
negotiation and may sometimes be a resource to be 
managed advantageously. This fact in turn 
reiterates the self-evident need to regard the 
cultural logic of such rules and precepts, in 
whatever manner they happen to be expressed, as 
problematic."(87)
Thus, within this 'processual paradigm' the settlement process is 
viewed as an organisational and conceptual framework for competitive 
bargaining, transaction and compromise. In the marriage of 
political and legal anthropology, law is vindicated as a central 
arena for the expression of political struggles.
The critique of rigid jural determinism presented here, is central 
to an understanding of politico-legal struggle within pre-capitalist 
Tswana society. It remains true, however, that one can not simply 
lose sight of structures, institutions and socio-cultural order in 
any full understanding of social processes. It would be nonsensical 
to deny the normative element of social life. Comaroff and Roberts 
therefore identify the analysis of the relationship between rule and 
process as the central problematic in an understanding of African
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It is not in his identification of rules or norms affecting everyday 
Tswana life, that Schapera's analysis falls short. Rather, it is 
where these norms or rules are presented as an internally coherent 
set, suggestive of a causal relationship between rule and outcome, 
that the political process and dispute in Tswana law and custom are 
denied. By contrast, Comaroff and Roberts described these rules as 
consisting of a 'loosely constructed repetoire' rather than an 
internally consistent code. They suggest that whilst Tswana people 
themselves share the view that their 'normative repetoire’ governs 
the regularity of daily life, they were not unaware of these rules 
occasionally contradicting one another nor, in fact, that almost any
conduct or relationship was potentially susceptible to 'competing
f 89^normative constructions'.
This has crucial implications for an understanding of Tswana 
politics and ideology. Comaroff and Roberts claim that the Tswana 
social universe is both rule-governed, yet highly negotiable, 
ordered yet ambiguous, constrained yet competitive. The legal
dispute process is associated with social control yet is an 
appropriate context for confrontation. It is such an understanding 
which informs Barkun's assertion that law.
"... ought to be seen as a system of manipulable 
symbols." (90)
The understanding of legal negotiability presented here is also 
reflected in some analyses of the actual legal procedure 
characteristic of African justice. Van Velsen and Bohannan both
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identify the informality and 'nonchalance' of African court
procedure, as well as a preoccupation with reconciliation ratner
than the niceties of legal procedure, especially in the local
(91)headmen’s courts as opposed to the courts of appeal.
According to Van Velsen, this notion of reconciliation is defined in
a broad social context, in which court judgement is open to
'expediency and non-legal desirabilities' resulting in flexible
(92)judgement and often depending on overlapping political claims.
Ihis seems an appropriate explanation of Tswana pre-capitalist law 
and politico-legal dispute processes. Thus Comaroff and Roberts 
conclude:
"Most of them (dispute processes - G.S.) involve 
confrontation either over the construal of facts 
in relation to agreed norms or over the normative 
evaluation of agreed facts; but whichever it is, 
value and meaning are negotiated, ana this 
negotiation is predicated on shared symbolic 
categories and ideological assumptions 
themselves ... analytically comprehensible only 
by virtue of their relationship to the 
constitution of the socio-cultural order at 
large”. (93)
In twentieth century South Africa, the 'wider socio-cultural order' 
which gives clarity to an understanding of the dynamic of Tswana 
legal systems, can only be properly explained in the context o± the 
development of industrial capitalism in the midst of pre-capitalist 
African societies. The resultant pervasive processes of political 
and economic transformation cannot be isolated from the legal sphere 
as an arena of political struggle within Tswana peasant 
communities. In other words, it is argued here that it is within
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the wider context of capitalist development, and the intrusion of 
historically derived capitalist legal precepts that African 
’customary law’ during the twentieth century (amongst the Tswana at 
very least) can be most fruitfully analysed as an historical site of 
political and ideological struggles. It therefore appears logical 
that these struggles within resilient traditional legal systems 
cannot be thoroughly understood in isolation from the jural 
processes under capitalism.
Pashukanis attempts to explain the form and content of these jural 
processes. He argues that to understand the role of law in 
capitalist society thoroughly, it is necessary to examine not only 
the content of laws (itself an important process) but the material 
derivation of the form of law itself. He suggests that the basic 
and peculiar character of law must not simply be dissolved into some 
notion of social control. Pashukanis argues that law cannot be seen 
simply as an 'external authoritarian regulation’, but that it has a 
specific application and derivation in any specific epoch. He 
argues that historically:
"the juridical element in the regulation of human 
conduct enters where the isolation and opposition 
of interests begins."(94)
He ties this closely to the emergence of the commodity form in 
mediating material exchanges. His basic materialist concern is to 
correlate commodity exchange with the time at which man becomes seen 
as a legal personality - the bearer of rights (as opposed to 
customary privileges). Through the material development of
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commoditization, Pashukanis identifies the ideological development 
of the legal subject - a bearer of rights. Thus Pashukanis 
identifies the historically specific derivation of the form of law:
"For production to be carried on as production of 
commodities, suitable ways of conceiving social 
relations, and the relation of men to their 
products, have to be found, and are found in the 
form of law.”(95)
Pashukanis claims that it is only the constant transfer of property 
rights in the market place that creates the idea of an immobile 
bearer of these rights. In this way everyone becomes characterized 
by their abstract capacity to be a bearer of property rights and. it 
becomes difficult to see anything other than subjects of rights. 
'Legal fetishism' complements 'commodity fetishism’.
Thus Pashukanis provides a theoretical basis from which it is 
possible to derive the form of law as specifically capitalist, 'iet, 
while he does this, he fails to develop his theory of law beyond tne 
developmental phase. In the views of Jessop^96) and Binns^97), 
this restricts his understanding of the role of law as capitalism 
itself develops and changes. His definition remains technical and 
he fails to grasp the changing political function of the legal 
form/98)
In a similar vein to Pashukanis, Louis Althusser identifies the 
basic function of ideology as being to transform individuals into 
'subjects' through a process of interpellation. However, 
Althusser's analysis is distanced from Pashukanis' through the 
former's understanding of the relationship between law and ideology
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under capitalism/99  ^ Althusser treats the problems of the 
subject and the 'imaginary' as equivalents - subjects exist in the 
imaginary. This ignores the fact of the juridical conception of the 
subject (of specific importance here), the simplest example of which 
is the concept of the legal subject. Legal subjects are entities, 
created through legal recognition, which are capable (in the form of 
law) of initiating actions and of upholding certain statuses 
(possession, responsibility etc.). Thus the existence of 
ideological subjects cannot legitimately be seen as merely part of 
an abstract imaginary relation, but must be seen to have a real and 
concrete effects. This would suggest that ideology, rather than 
being crudely determined in its function by the 'needs of the 
infrastructure’, has a certain independent dynamic.
Cohen breaks down the simple 'base-superstructure' model which is 
implied in Althusser's analysis, only insofar as he suggests that 
ideology, rather than being crudely determined by economic forces in 
both form and content, serves in a 'relatively independent' way to 
reproduce social relations of production. His conclusion, however, 
is merely that 'bases need superstructures'/100  ^ and as such he 
returns to a somewhat functionalist perspective. He approaches the 
subject of law in this way:
"The content of the legal system is dictated (in 
the final analysis) by its function, which is to 
help sustain an economy of a particular kind."dOD
O'Meara, following Poulantzas, challenges this functionalist 
conception of ideology and suggests that it fails inherently to:
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"... transcend the fetishishized categories of 
economics and politics."(102)
Rather O'Meara suggests that:
”... it (our analysis of ideology - G.S.) must 
begin with the historical development of 
capitalist production relations - the concrete 
process of class formation in class struggle, and 
the political and ideological forms this 
took, "fa-03)
Poulantzas himself suggests that ideological formation takes place 
at the level of specific relations of production under specific 
historical conditions. Ideology comes to represent social relations 
embodied in "real material institutions" . Elsewhere he
argues that any ideology contains within it elements of heterogenous 
'class ideologies'. In other words, it is always possible to 
identify the class belonging of any ideology, or the elements of 
class belonging contained within it . He goes further to
suggest that any dominant ideology, can contain within it elements 
of all the class-based ideologies of the different classes within 
the social formation. This notion seems however to approach another 
extreme, ignoring the complexity of the ideological relation and 
reducing it to a purely economically determined and essentialy
class-based notion.
Laclau criticises Poulantzas as being class-reductionist in this 
respect. He acknowledges that class struggle is crucial to the 
transformation of ideologies and therefore their reconstitution, but 
he notes that this may be at the level of classes, which although
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engaged in struggle, are not constituted as antagonistic classes 
strictly in terms of their position at the level of the mode of 
production . In other words, Laclau posits that this 
antagonism is not apparent at the abstract level of the mode of 
production but only at the level of the concrete social formation. 
This is particlarly useful in understanding the nature of ideology 
in the context of conflicting modes or forms of production, as it 
implies that, although particular ideologies when regarded in 
isolation, do not display a specific class derivation, when involved 
in concrete discourse, this discourse will have a class base.
This notion elevates the analysis of ideology from a simple 
superstruetural distortion of infrastrucutral 'realities', to a more 
concretely based manifestation of classes in struggle. This is 
crucial to on tinderstanding of ideological transformation in the 
process of capitalist development in the midst of precapitalist 
modes of production. It also tends to attribute greater autonomy to 
ideological forms of struggle. It is in this light that we must 
examine changing legal ideas and legal forms within the dominant 
capitalist mode of production, with specific reference to the 
imposition and consolidation of the capitalist state.
Snyder, in examining the example of Senegal, develops four theses on 
how capitalism affected legal ideas and institutions in formerly 
precapitalist social formations . Firstly, he identifies the 
general subsumption of pre-capitalist production within the 
capitalist relations of production. He claims that this process was 
accompanied by a transformation of rural legal ideas, related to,
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yet distinct from changes in legal forms at the level of the state. 
Secondly, he points out that the penetration of different forms of 
capital had quite different effects on legal concepts in similar 
precapitalist formations. Conversely, the distinctive features of 
different precapitalist social formations shaped the effects of 
capitalist penetration and thus of legal change. Thirdly, Snyder 
makes an analytical distinction between changes in rural legal 
forms, and the ’creation of customary law’, although the two 
processes were historically connected .
"Contrary to widely held notions that customary 
law represents indigenous African law, 'folk law 
in the process of reception' or a neo—traditional 
ideology stemming from primarily political 
interests during the colonial period, customary 
law is not only relatively recent in origin, but 
also derived specifically from the subordination 
of African social formations to capitalist 
relations and was articulated through the 
state."(109)
Thus, 'customary law' was an ideological and legal form, which 
originated in the transformation of precapitalist social relations 
and the consolidation of the 'colonial' state. Snyder therefore 
depicts 'customary law' as an ideology of colonial domination, which 
supplied a framework for the insertion of rural classes into 
peripheral social formations.
"Simultaneously, it expressed the subordination 
of these social forces to the dominant local 
classes and metropolitan legal ideologies 




Fourthly, and finally, Snyder points out that despite the 
fundamental nature of these changes, the transition from one 
historical form of production to another, did not necessarily entail 
the replacement of rural legal concepts by legal forms often 
considered ’typical’ of ’mature’ capitalist formations, although 
many such forms are incorporated into the law of the state. Indeed, 
he suggests that this process of transition was usually accompanied 
by the 'conservation' of many precapitalist legal ideas. Snyder 
suggests that any appearance of continuity is misleading, because it
conceals the changes in historically specific, concrete legal
. (Ill) forms.
In the South African context, Suttner, like Snyder, makes a 
distinction between 'customary law' and original African 
law/ 112) He furthermore identifies the former as a specifically 
colonial phenomenon and reflects Snyder's suggestion that 'customary 
law' was a creation of the colonial state. Thus he notes that the 
'benign policy of customary law' was only implemented after 
conquest, in an attempt to 'breathe new life into discredited 
chiefdoms and pseudo-tribal structures.' 1^13  ^ Suttner describes 
'customary law’ and the segregated South African legal system in 
terms of their functions, which were to entrench the ideology of 
tribalism, thereby undermining the development of a 'national 
consciousness'/114  ^ Suttner goes on to argue that through the 
rigid application of 'tribal law’ (based ostensibly on 'immemorial 
usage’), traditional family life and the oppression of women were 
entrenched, thereby securing the indispensable subsidization of the 
wage levels of migrant workers/115  ^ 'Customary law' is therefore 
also described in its functionality to capitalism.
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A further indicator of the 'colonial status’ of African law, has 
been widely identified in the 'repugnancy clause' which conditioned 
its implementation. In the South African instance this generally 
meant that African law was only recognized if its implementation was 
not 'repugnant to the general principles of civilization'/116  ^
Schapera, describing traditional African law as essentially 
'backward-looking' and reactionary, suggested that 'customary law' 
acted potentially as a brake on the development of western 
civilization’. He identified the 'repugnancy clause' relating to 
customary law in British Bechuanaland, (under Government
Proclamation No. 75 of 1934) as a potentially progressive measure of 
reform (117). By contrast, Richardson and Suttner have identified 
both the culture-bias and colonial state expediency characteristic 
of such measures 1^18\  The inferior status of customary law, as 
well as the courts responsible for implementing it, are seen by both 
these authors to be reflective of the power of the colonial state 
over the African majority.
There are a number of problems with the analyses summarized 
thus-far. Firstly, both Suttner's and to a lesser degree Snyder's 
works provide little understanding of pre-capitalist legal systems 
from which to draw their analysis of cusomary law under capitalism. 
The suggestion that customary law is simply the 'creation' of the 
colonial state, denies completely the autonomy and resilience of 
traditional legal forms in the face of capitalist penetration and 
the intrusion of capitalist legal precepts. This denial is also 
reflected by both authors’ largely functionalist explanation of the
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process of ’conservation’ of African law. Rather, in both form and 
content, the traditional legal system demanded ’recognition’ due not 
only to its functionality to segregation or capitalism, but because 
of its centrality within the ideology of rural African communities. 
Secondly, pre-capitalist law is presented in these works as an 
undifferentiated unity, ignoring the crucial importance of its 
negotiability and flexibility. However, it is not possible properly 
to understand the insertion of pre-capitalist legal forms into 
capitalist social relations without acknowledging the political and 
ideological struggles taking place within 'this realm of social 
interaction’. To do so is to present pre-capitalist African 
societies as undivided and undifferentiated, or at least to suggest 
that the struggles within these communities have little or no 
bearing on the nature of their incorporation within capitalist 
social relations. Urns, African rural societies are presented only 
in relation to the omnipotent and manipulative colonial state.
Finally, it is not denied here that 'customary law’ under capitalism 
takes on disfigured or degraded forms, nor that it is implemented in 
a rigid and often expedient manner, nor even that it serves to 
entrench many of the most oppressive and exploitative relations 
characteristic of pre-capitalist rural social relations. Yet all of 
these processes are merely described in 'terms of the needs of the 
colonial state or even, in Suttner's case, their functionality to 
the colonial ideology of segregation. None of these features can be 
properly explained without an analysis of developing class 
stratification within rural communities, which is specifically 
related to the increasing dominance of the capitalist mode of
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production, and which is organically rooted within these 
communities. There is nothing specifically capitalist about the 
colonial state which Suttner describes, nor even the forms of law 
which he examines • The result is that, in the context of 
conflicting modes of production, Suttner is merely presenting 
description as explanation. He presents the ’tribalism’, expressed 
in the segregated legal system, as an explicit counter to developing 
'national consciousness', without ever examining the ideological and 
material rifts within African communities which give 'tribal 
identity' and indeed, 'tribal law', a dynamic of their own. In the 
political and legal struggles within the chiefdoms of the Rustenburg 
district in the 1920s and 1930s it is argued below that such a 
functionalist approach denies the very ideological dynamism and 
resilience which makes these struggles remarkable.
Just as Suttner presents the oppressed in a fairly undifferentiated 
way f go too does he present the colonial state as an 
undifferentiated unity of interests. It is through exclusive access 
to the state apparatuses that the ruling classes are seen to wield 
power. It is therefore suggested that control over the legal 
apparatuses of state, facilitates the entrenchment of ideologies 
which attempt to divide the colonized masses. It is precisely such 
functionalist and instrumentalist analyses of the state, that have 
been the focal points of criticism in recent literature on the 
subject(12°). More specifically, in his conceptualization of the 
state, Suttner provides only a superficial discussion of the 
structures and institutions which compose the state as such.
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It is to precisely this neglected area that Wolpe addresses himself 
in his critique of both the 'neo-Poulantzians' as well as their 
critics such as Clarke and Innes and Plaut^2"^. He attempts to 
resuscitate the analyses of political and ideological structures of 
the state, freeing them analytically from the simplistic objective 
reproduction of predefined economic interests which reflect 
specific, structurally defined class interests.
According to Wolpe, Clarke's, critique of the neo-Poulantzians, is 
equally guilty of an oversimplified homogenization of the state into 
a simple integral instrument, and the simultaneous reduction of 
politics to economics. He claims that it is precisely this 
analytical error which that denies the state its complex, 
contradictory specificity/112) The central point in Wolpe's 
objection is the denial of state structures as potential sites of 
political struggles and class conflict.
"The object of the political struggle is to take 
the state/ instrument out of the hands of the 
dominant class, but since the state apparatuses 
(however conceived) do not consitute the sites of 
struggle, that struggle takes place only in 
'society'. The state is exclusively the object 
of the class struggle, it is never a site of that 
struggle. ”0-2 3)
Wolpe is asserting here, the Poulantzian notion that the state and 
its apparatuses reflect a 'condensation' or 'concentration' of the 
totality of class relations in society.
Wolpe offers an interesting refinement to this argument, through 
asserting the limitation of access, or even exclusion from the
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state, of particular classes or fractions of classes under certain 
circumstances. This in fact, he regards as indicating the 
'materialization of specific class powers within the apparatuses of 
the state'. However, Wolpe notes that this process of 'access or 
exclusion’ operates in an uneven way, changing over time and varying 
from one state apparatus to another. Thus Wolpe emphasizes the 
notion that access to the state apparatuses is at least potentially 
open to the dominated c l a s s e s . B u t  although he indicates 
that different state apparatuses or structures are not equally 
accessible to organization of contending classes, Wolpe does not 
provide any systematic analysis as to why, or as to the features 
which define the differential 'accessibility' of different state 
structures.
In addition to this Wolpe tends to confuse the contradictions 
between different state apparatuses, and those within a single state 
apparatus. The result is that we are left with a rather conflated 
and generalised picture of competing classes or fractions of 
classes, organized within various state structures. The most 
important point to draw from Wolpe's analysis seems, however, to be 
the fact that it provides the basis for a detailed conception of 
state apparatuses as operating potentially, for a shorter or longer 
period, and to a greater or lesser degree, so as to contradict 
certain conditions of reproduction of the capitalist social 
formation.
This is of obvious relevance to the South African social formation 
as the process of access to and exclusion from the various state
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apparatuses, has taken a particular racial form and has historically 
had far-reaching consequences. Kaplan presents the differentiated 
access to different juridico-political structures, as being based on 
continued black access to land, which provided the :
”... material basis for the maintenance and 
transformation of the South African State, of a 
differentiated juridico-political ^structure, 
broadly under the rubric of 'tribalism’”.(12o;
jn this manner Kaplan identifies the isolation of black workers from 
access to the state. Wolpe significantly points out that this 
differentiated position cannot be seen exclusively in terms of the 
statutory rights of blacks as opposed to whites, but nonetheless, 
notes that the specific category of the 'black subject' is a 
condition of access to certain types of state apparatuses, such as 
local councils for example, or even the local sources of legal 
authority - the chieftaincy, the 'tribal' court or council and the 
Native Commissioners courts. Of particular importance here would be 
the relationship between rural communities and local bureaucratic 
state administration (in the 1920s and 1930s, the Native Affairs 
Department (N.A.D.)).(127) In the chapters which follow, it will 
be demonstrated that in the Western Transvaal during the 1920s and 
1930s the primarily point of contact between the state
administration and the rural African population, was through the 
institution of the chieftaincy. Whilst chiefs were increasingly 
incorporated within the N.A.D. bureaucracy in the era of 
segregationist ideology, they simultaneously remained 'accessable' 
to their subjects as a product of the imperative that they remain 
'popular' in order to carry out the needs of the administration
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effectively. This same period also witnessed substantial
dislocation and conflict in the activities and administrative 
priorities of the Department of Justice as opposed to the N.A.D. As 
a result, access to the 'white courts' during the 1920s and 1930s 
provided a loophole for challenging the legal jurisdiction and the 
political authority of chiefs and consequently of the N.A.D. 
administration itself.
However, Wolpe's analysis remains generalized. As mentioned, at no 
point does he define the terms of 'accessibility' to particular 
state apparatuses. He merely distinguishes between 'ideological 
state apparatuses' and 'repressive state apparatuses’, failing to 
provide a conceptual analysis for this distinction, whilst 
suggesting that the latter institutions of state are inclined to be 
more exclusive. He asserts the autonomy of local state institutions 
to the extent of almost completely ignoring the role of the 
centralized state in co-ordinating, organising and controlling the 
operations of its various branches. Indeed, the altering functions 
of particular branches of state over time, visible only through 
historically specific analyses, tends to belie the distinction which 
Wolpe makes between ideological and repressive apparatuses, 
especially when considered in the context of broader initiatives of 
the central state. In the 1920s and 1930s for example, the N.A.D. 
employed several methods which entailed a blend of both 
ideologically co-optive and repressive strategies. Despite this, 
his analysis refines the understanding of the state provided by 
either Suttner or Snyder, and it remains to situate our analysis of 
'customary law' in South Africa within this framework.
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In twentieth century South Africa, 'customary law’ was neither 
universally recognised nor applied within the country. The varied 
application of 'customary' legal systems depended in large part on 
differential patterns of colonization. In the Cape Colony where all 
legal power was in the hands of the magistrates, 'tribal law' was 
outlawed and considered contrary to the interests of civilization. 
In Natal, where Africans were ruled through their hereditary chiefs, 
African customary law was recognised and codified, whilst still 
elsewhere, although customary law was recognised, it was based on 
the precedents of case histories rather than being codified. 
Whether on the basis of codification, or through case histories, it 
is apparent that the application of customary laws within the white 
courts tended to entrench crude and often completely outdated 
'traditions', generally gauged from the practices of the oldest 
generations of tribespeople and denying any flexibility in the 
application of law in a transformed social environment. The result 
was often an incongruence of 'customary law' with new forms of 
participation in the economy, and with a transformed socio-cultural 
environment resulting from the development of capitalism. Many 
material developments in the rural African economy were simply 
foreign to Africans prior to the penetration of capitalist relations 
and as such, were simply not covered by pre-capitalist tribal law.
It is evident that stated rules which traditionally have their roots 
in pre-capitalist social relations, cannot simply be seen to have 
had the same relevance in determining the course of the
politico-legal process in 'a straight forward manner in the period
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of capitalist penetration.'^128  ^ This is precisely what gives 
rise to Snyder's suspicion of any apparent continuity in legal forms 
across this transitionary period. It is useful here to note 
Burman's notion of the 'symbolic dimensions of law'. Burman claims 
that laws often symbolise conflicts in society apparently 
unconnected with the exact subject matter to which they 
refer.^129  ^ He suggests that in a colonial situation, the law,
supposedly cognisant of the social alterations resulting from 
colonization, is nominally to act as an agent of change, but serves 
rather as an assertion of domination.^188  ^ Thus, the concept of 
'the symbolic dimension of the law' is of some importance in 
understanding the manipulative nature of the process of legal 
transformation, in particular reflected by the 'official 
recognition’ of tribal law (where it did not conflict with civilized 
principles) in the era of developing segregationalism.^121  ^ The 
fact that 'tribal law’ was in some instances recognised but not 
specifically codified, did not limit the extent to which it was 
manipulated by state officials entrusted with applying it, nor did 
it mean that its application was any less disfigured. In fact, the 
lack of formality of applied customary legal systems provided for 
greater fluidity in their application by the state, as well as 
allowing for greater ambiguity in defining the role of traditional 
legal authorities such as chiefs. In the Rustenburg district during 
the 1920s and 1930s the 'elasticity and flexibility' of customary 
law was consequently regarded by N.A.D. officials as its most 
valuable asset in controlling the rural African population.
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However, Comaroff identifies the ’jural determinism’ which 
characterised the application of Tswana law by state officials in 
the Western Transvaal during this period. He suggests that these 
laws were interpreted on the basis that stated rules configure the 
basic facts of political life"(132). Particulary, in terms of the 
rules associated with access to political and legal power, it was 
assumed that these rules actually determined the recruitment and 
functioning of incumbents in the public arena. This jural
determinism is reflected within Schapera’s 'rule-centered 
paradigm. Whilst accurately pointing out that social and
territorial organisation amongst the Tswana was functional to the 
delegation of matters of more local concern to sub-ordinate 
authorities, Schapera goes considerably further in asserting that:
"The Chief is the central figure around whom the 
tribal life revolves, and through whom the 
activities of the tribe are ordered and 
controlled. He is at once its rule and its 
judge, maker and guardian of its law, and 
director of its economic life, and in the olden 
days was also its leader in war and its principal
priest and magician."(134)
He also suggests that it is primarily through allegiance to the 
Chief, that members of the Chiefdom express their unity. This view 
was clearly reproduced within state strategies in the period under 
review, as witnessed in the report of the Native Economic Commission
of 1930-32:
"In view therefore of the position of the Chief 
in Bantu psychology he can become a strategic 
point in the governments dealings with the 
Natives."(135)
In view of the developing state strategies of segregation and 
'retribalisation*, and the central strategic importance of tne 
chiefs as a source of political and ideological control within these 
strategies, it is hardly surprising that from the mid 1920s state 
officialdom attempted to assert a rigid control over the laws of 
accession and incumbency.
Indeed, as will be demonstrated in the chapters which follow, the 
Chief was to become a salaried state official - a junior partner in 
the political and legal administration of rural African 
communities. Yet the application of such narrowly interpreted 
’traditional rules' attempted to preclude any competition for 
chiefly power, and reflected manipulation by the state and the 
disfiguring of traditional legal forms themselves. The 
interpretation of these laws was rooted in the assumption that 
access to power, and the political control of a particular Chief, 
was strictly dependent on hereditary factors. Comaroff suggests 
that this was not at all in keeping with the realistic functioning 
of the Tswana political process . This is not to dispute the 
fact that the Tswana held a high esteem for the position of chief, 
but merely to assert that they made a clear distinction between the 
office and its incumbent 1^37 .^ Comaroff argues that although tne 
Chief's position was hereditary, his power depended both on his 
individual ability as well as his accessibility in consultation and 
popular participation in the affairs of the Chiefdom. This demanded 
that the Chief take guidance from his immediate advisors who made up 
his council or 'legotla', and that he remained susceptible to views
and sentiments expressed both at this more executive level, as well
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as at public meetings or 'pitsos', at which important matters of the 
Chiefdom were discussed with the broader community. Ultimately, as 
supreme judicial body, the Chief’s decisions were expected to 
reflect the majority views. None of the Chief's rights were totally 
irreversible. Rather, should the Chief have consistently abrogated 
the formal responsibilities of his office, he stood to lose those 
rights/138’
The rules of accession, incumbency and regency in Tswana legal 
systems can be seen to have provided a rather fluid framework within 
which the process of competition for political-legal power was 
articulated. Therefore, as pre-capitalist mechanisms of political 
and legal authority such as the chieftaincy were increasingly 
incorporated within capitalist state institutions, so too were the 
resilient politico-ideological struggles which historically 
characterized these institutional forms. This does not mean that 
the form of law remained unaltered. The rigidity and inflexibility 
which characterized the state's application of 'customary' laws of 
accession in African communities, has been noted and does, despite 
the critique of Suttner, reflect the organised power -of the 
capitalist state. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
absolute powers accorded to the institutional officialdom
responsible for its application - from the Governor-General or 
Minister of Native Affairs in his capacity as 'Supreme Chief', to 
the local Native Affairs Commissioners or local Chiefs themselves. 
Through the 'preservation' of so-called traditional legal and 
political systems the ideology of 'tribalism' does appear to have 
been perpetuated and even appears to have facilitated developing
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state segregationalist strategies as Suttner claims. Furthermore, 
the apparent threat of developing national conciousness was 
explicitly recognised by the Native Economic Commission Report of 
1930-32:
"Hie growth of a Native nationalism or race 
consciousness is a factor which ... cannot safely 
be ignored or suppressed."(139)
Hie role which 'traditional tribal' institutional forms were to play 
in the co-optive state strategy of retribalisation, was equally 
explicit in the Commision report. It was described as foolhardy ...
"... to disregard the institutions which they 
(Africans - G.S.) understand, which they prize, 
which can be used with the least friction and 
cost ... By using Native institutions as part of 
the administration of the country, we shall give 
the Native a pride in the administration. By 
rejecting his institutions as worthless, or by 
giving them a European complexion even if we use 
them, we create in the mind of the Native the 
feeling that he is an outsider. Instead of 
enlisting the co-operation of the natives such 
action leaves them indifferent ... it even at 
times stirs up their active opposition."(140)
Hiis appears to vindicate Suttner's perspective on the ideological 
function of 'customary law'. This ideological role was, however, 
neither uncontested nor uncontradictory. Firstly, the apparent 
'attempt to breathe life into discredited pseudo-tribal structures', 
often tended to contradict the N.A.D. rhetoric of 'adapting and 
civilizing the Native' as expounded in the same Native Economic 
Commission Report More importantly, the internally 
contradictory ideological struggles within resilient pre-capitalist 
politico-legal institutions should not be ignored. The disfigured
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forms which characterised these institutions under capitalism did 
not necessarily alter their centrality within the ideological 
framework of rural Africans. Nor for that matter did the historical 
struggles within Tswana politico-legal systems, already outlined, 
simply disappear. On the contrary, these struggles had a dynamic of 
their own and, within a changing socio-economic environment, 
continued to give political expression to ever-increasing, complex 
class formation. The very 'flexibility and elasticity' of applied 
customary law which was 'essential' to the N.A.D. control over 
politico-legal processes within rural African communities provided a 
loophole for the ideological expression of competing material and 
political claims within the Tswana chiefdoms of the Rustenburg 
district in the first half of the twentieth century. Furthermore, 
it will be argued in the chapters which follow that the often 
conflicting administrative and political priorities of the N.A.D. 
and the Department of Justice opened this loophole even wider with 
the result that these struggles were often finally fought out in the 
highest courts in the land.
It is only as the historical product of these struggles that state 
initiatives towards formal political segregation can be thoroughly 
understood. This in no way compromises the analysis of the 
capitalist state as an expression of class power, but through 
situating such power in the context of political class struggles, 
our analysis is delivered from functionalist and structuralist
illusions.
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In conclusion it is clear that the increasing dominance of 
capitalist social relations over resilient and dynamic economic, 
political and ideological relations in peasant society is a process 
fraught with contradictions. These operate not only at the level of 
relations of production but of reproduction as well. It is 
essential that we recognise that capitalism does not simply organize 
all social relations to ’its' own advantage under these 
circumstances. The ongoing existence of certain ’pre-capitalist* 
institutional forms and social relations, is often a product of 
their own internal dynamic, rather than merely being ordered or 
'preserved' by the dominant classes under capitalism. It is this 
perspective which accords dynamism to the localized political and 
ideological struggles within rural African communities and which 
illuminates the particular forms of resistance, conciousness ana 
struggle in these communities.
The form and content of these struggles cannot be interpreted in 
isolation from the dominance of capitalist social relations and the 
intervention of the state, both at a local and at a centralised 
level. Nonetheless, in analysing these latter processes, it is most 
important to guard against teleology and the use of labels and terms 
such as 'peasantization', 'proletarianization' or 
'peripheralization', which carry an implication that these things 
simply happen, and delude us into thinking that we understand the 
nature and causes of processes which are merely described rather 
than explained. Ihe uniformity which terms such as these sometimes 
suggest, blurs the relationship between rural African communities 
and the wider capitalist system. The consequence is an implicit 
assumption that
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"... all Africans, however much they have 
resisted and however much they have bent the 
nature of agriculture and work in particular 
directions, are all headed into a unitary 
category."(142)
The word 'peasant' is, at best, useful as a descriptive term, which 
makes no pretence at conceptualising specific relations of 
production. It is therefore pointless to pursue a 'peasant' 
political conciousness in general terms or in a social formation 
that has not been specified. It is only as a part of (and as 
reflective of) the complex and often contradictory processes of 
class formation within particular rural African communities, that it 
is possible to fruitfully examine the political and ideological 
struggles within these communities. This is not to suggest that all 
such struggles can be reduced to a 'class discourse', but rather to 
assert that the political and economic priorities of particular 
'peasant' groupings are best exposed through the perception of the 
overlapping interests and concerns of rural cultivators, rural 
workers and urban workers, rather than through the isolation of the 
culture and politics of supposedly unitary categories. It is 
therefore with this in mind that our attention is now turned to the 
specific material conditions experienced by the peasants of the 
Rustenburg district during the 1920s and 1930s.
As Cooper points out :
"We must be careful of seeing change as a roadway 
i ’ ‘ J ~tant changes are taking place
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labour tenancy represent a particular type of 
solution to the problems of control and 
supervision of farm labour, made essential by the 
resistance of cultivators to their total cut-off 
from the land and to capitalist work discipline. 
Its abandonment went along with an escalation of 
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'The Sharecropping Economy'; Keegan, T., 'The 
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'articulation of modes of pro d u c t i o n ’ formulation 
are dealt with in the following pages.
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'Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception 
of History’, Capital and Class, Vol. 3 (Autumn 
1977)
Part of the problem here is the complex and multi-faceted meaning
of 'reproduction’. Meillassoux has treated it
simply as biological reproduction of the species, 
whilst 0'Laughlin has defined it as the 
reproduction of the means of production, or of 
the differentiated forms of labour power specific 
to particular modes of production. V/hilst 
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an understanding of 'reproduction', neither are 






reproduction of the social formation in its
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W., and Bundy, C., ’State Intervention ana kural
Resistance in the Transkei, WOO ' 19^
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I S  Africa, Johannesburg : University of the
Witwatersrand, 1978; Saul, J., '^fricaa ®asaa 
and Revolution’; Saul, J., and Arrighi, ** 
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: Monthly Review Press (1973); Shanin, !., («*.), 
Peasants; Shivji, I., ’Peasants and class 
Alliances'; and Wolf, E.R., Peasant Wars.
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Tswana proverb Ruotedin S^apera, ,
(eds.) Politics and Society In Botswana, UBLS 
Readings, Vol. II, Department of Government and 
Administration, University of Botswana, Lesot o 
and Swaziland (1974), p. 153.
„  havp in fact based their assessment of relativeMany authors have i n ^ a c t ^  ln these societies on an
anamination of the ^
institutions and legal practices. »is “ s “ “  
the result of a focus, both on localized court 
proceedings and the sources of legal appeal fro 
any particular courts. It is in large part from 
his position as the final legal arbitrator and 
iudgeV that the chief is seen to draw much of his 
political authority. I refer to some of th.
anthropological works which politicaltraditional law as central to to politics^ 
authority in the communities they examine. 
Bohannan! P., Justice and Judgement among 
Tiv London: Oxford University Press £, 
l & m l t i o n a l  African Institute (2nd edition 
1968); Fallers, L., Law Without Precedent ,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press (19 )> 
™  M., tod.) Marriage in Tribal Society,
Cambridge University Press U*o z;,
M The TnM Cial Process Among the Barotse ox
t r J ™  Rhodeili;----ManchesteTi Manchest^F
University----pI ^  C^nd edition, 1967),
Hammond-Tooke, W.D., Bhaca Society, Cape Town.
Oxford University Press (1962); Gluc£ ^ >
The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence, London. Yale
university--- Press” (1965); Pospisil, L.,
Ani-hrrmoloev of Law : A Comparative Theory, New 
^rk: C p e yr and Row (19^2); Kadclrii r -Brown 
I.R., and Forde, D., (eds.) African Systems o± 
Kinship and Marriage, London: Oxford University 
Press P for tEe international African Insitute 
(1950)' Ramolefe, A.M.R., 'Sesotho Marriage, 
Guardianship, a n d ’the Customary Legal heir’, in 
ri linkman M (ed.) Ideas and Procedures— in 
African*1 Customary Law, London: Ortord University 
Mess for the W ^tlonal African Institute 
(1969), PP- 196-209. A number of works by 
Schapera, I., specifically on the Tswana, will be 
discussed in more detail below.
Comarof f , J.L., ^  ^ ^ “ t e T  »n “  ^  conte^.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press U-981), PP. 
3-4.
77. ibid., p. 5.
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78. I am referring to the following works: Schapera, I., AH^dbook I am rere g nf Tswana Law and Custom, London: Oxford
University Press for the International African 
Institute (1938); Schapera, I., ’The Old Bantu 
Culture' in Schapera, I., (ed), Western 
Civilization and the Natives of South Africa, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. (Reissued 
1967).; Schapera, I., 'Contract in Tswana Law , 
in 'Gluckman, M., (ed.) Ideas and Procedures, pp.
318-332; Schapera, I., Tribal--- Legislation
Amongst the Tswana of the___ Bechuanaland
Protectorate, London School of Economics an 
Science^ Monographs on Social Anthropology, No. 
9., London:Percy Lund, Humphries and Co. Ltd. 
(1943); Schapera, I., The Tswana, International 
African Institute Ethnographic Survey of Africa, 
Southern Africa, No. 3 (1953); Schapera, I., 
government and Politics in Tribal— Societies, 
London : Watts; (1956); Schapera, I., The
Political Organisation of the Ngwato of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate’, in Cohen, D.L., and 
Parsons, J.P., (eds.) Politics and Socie_^,
op.cit., pp. 137-154; and Schapera, I., Ibe
Nature and Sources of Tswana Law’, in Cohen, 
D.L., and Parsons, J.P., (eds.) Politics and 
Society, pp. 137-154. Although I will not oe 
discussing all of these works in detoil, they 
all to a greater or lesser degree, display tne 
characteristics already discussed and the 
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83. ibid., p. 5.
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00 Op.cit., see
'The Nature and Sources of Tswana Law' in Cohen 
D.L. and Parsons, J.P., (eds.) Politics—  
Society, p. 137.
>and
'Tribal Legislation Amongst the Tswana', pp. 3-26
footnote (63). Of particular interest here, is the
debate between Gluckman and Schapera on the 
appropriateness of 'contract' as an analytical 
tool in the analysis of African pre-capitalist 
legal systems. Schapera, I., 'Contract in Tswana
Law' in Gluckman, M., (ed.) Ideas---
Procedures, pp. 318-322, and Gluckman^ 
'Property Rights and Status in African 
Traditional Law', ibid. Ideas and Procedures, 
pp. 252-265. Schapera argues that in Tswana 
society there exists a formal contracting 
procedure with associated obligations enforceable
68
in the 'tribal' courts. On the basis of the 
diversity of ways in wich a single rule may be 
applied, Schapera argues the existence of a 
formal idea of contract amongst the Tswana. 
This, Gluckman claims, differs from the Barotse 
amongst whom 'each transaction is regarded as a 
specific complex of rights and obligations, and 
there is no general model of contract.' Gluckman 
challenges Schapera's westernized notion of a 
model of contract, suggesting that whilst there 
may be common ideas present in different types o 
transaction, these are not worked into a 
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CHAPTERJWO t A«n Awn T.ABfflIR IN THE RUSTENBURG DISTRICT
•me complex processes o£ class formation In the Chlefdoms of the 
Rustenburg district gave rise to distinctive and unique forms of 
political resistance and ideological challenge in the first half of 
the twentieth century. It has been asserted in the previous chapter 
that there is little point in attempting to pursue the political 
consciousness of peasants without first examining the specific 
relations of production operating within particular peasant 
communities. this is particularly evident in the Rustenburg 
district during the 1920s and 1930s, asJLt_will_ be _demonstrated_in 
the chapters which follow that fundamentally different material 
interests gave vent to very similar forms of political struggle. 
For this reason it is necessary, to document and explain the 
particular material conditions prevailing in the district and to 
attempt to illuminate the impact of developing capitalist relations 
on rural African production, before embarking on an analysis of 
peasant politics in the area.
The material conditions experienced by peasant communities in the 
Rustenburg district during the 1920a and 1930s began to take shape 
ia the developments and social processes of the preceding ninety 
years. This chapter examines this history and the factors which 
shaped the fluctuating fortunes of different Tswana communities up 
to the end of the 1930s. Firstly, it will describe the ecological 
features of the district which were an important determinant on the 
resilience of the socio-economic structures of the various 
chlefdoms. Thereafter it will turn to an examination of the 
nineteenth century history of the district, documenting the various
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chiefdoms responses to colonisation - their relationships to the 
Boers and the missionaries - which were in turn partly premised on 
their relationship to the Ndebele during the difaqane.
The chapter will then go on to map out the varied fortunes of 
different chiefdoms, their access to land and their differing 
abilities to expand their production bases, the effects of 
population growth, and the processes and periodisation of economic 
stratification within different chiefdoms. It will examine the
expanding involvement of migrants in the wage labour market and will 
briefly refer to the development in 'white’ capitalist agricultural 
and the bearing which this had on squatters and tenants access to 
land on 'white' farms in the district. Finally, it will turn to an 
examination of the crisis within the rural economies of the district 
during the drought-ridden period of the 1930s and the intervention 
of the state at the end of the decade, in an attempt to rehabilitate 
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X The Ecology of The Rustenburg District
The Rustenburg district was first defined b, proclamation in the 
government gazette 50/1909. Thereafter Its boundaries were altered 
by proclamation No. 197 of 1913 and again in G.G. 125 of 192b when 
the Brits district was created. the magisterial district of 
Rustenburg was divided into two Native Affairs districts, Pilansberg 
le the North and Rustenburg in the South/1’ This study is 
primarily concerned with the African communities of the Rustenburg 
Native Affairs district, although references will be made to the 
magisterial district as a whole as well as to African chiefdoms of 
the Pilansberg Native Affairs district.
The Rustenburg Magisterial district as defined above was 9020 square 
miles in extent in 1936 (slightly smaller than prior to the 
alteration of the boundaries in 1928). Of this area, the Rustenburg 
Native Affairs district constituted 3 320 square miles, while the 
Pilansberg Native Affairs district made up the remaining 5 700
square miles.(2)
The area that was defined as the Native Affairs district of 
Rustenburg is situated mostly in the Bushveld area of the Transvaal, 
although its south-western and south-eastern comers are virtually 
highveld. Most of the eastern part of the district is hilly and 
includes part of the Magaliesberg range of mountains. In the 
western part of the district there is another broad chain of hills, 
the Zwartruggens, running from east to west and down south to the 
The southern part of the district is dissected bytown, of Koster.
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kloofs which peter out further to the north. The town of Rustenburg 
lies at the foot of the Magaliesberg range from whence stretch 
northwards the plains which develop into bushveld. The altitude of 
Derby in the southern highveld section of the district is 
approximately 5 500 feet above sea-level, as compared with the 
average altitude of the bushveld regions which is between 3 000 and
, i (3)3 500 feet above sea level.
The climate of the district differs sharply according to the
topography of the area. The 1936 commission of enquiry into farming
conditions in the district described the summers as very hot and the
winters as mild in the north, but very cold in the highveld regions
to the south. The generally warm climate was described as conducive
to harsh and pervasive agricultural and pastoral diseases. The
district was, however, widely regarded as having enormous
agricultural potential.(5) The 1936 commission, concerned
primarily with white farming interests, expressed surprise that only
86 477 morgen out of 1 475 029 morgen of arable land (black and
white) was under cultivation - a mere 6% of the total. Of that
( 6 )
86 477 morgen, only 9 143 morgen, or 11%, was under irrigation.
The area was characterized by two primary soil types. Red lateritic 
soil predominated, with intrusions of black turf soil in various 
parts. The latter, regarded as particularly rich soil, required 
little manuring and relatively infrequent watering in order to offer 
viable agricultural yields. By contrast the red soil type was less 
resilient and successful farming demanded a more regular water 
supply and was best achieved with the use of fertilizers.
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Because of the predominance of red turf in the district, successful 
agricultural production depended heavily on a regular vater supply, 
glthough the mountainous parts of the bushveld as »ell as the 
highveld were dissected hy numerous small streams, most of these 
were dry ercept during the rainy season.(8) As a result 
agricultural production during the 1920s and 1930s depended almost 
entirely on regular and substantial rainfall. Brents suggests that 
as a rule, precipitation tended to decrease to the northwest of the 
magisterial district as a whole.(9) However, the variations in 
rainfall across the district over a number of years appear not to
have been substantiale
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Nonetheless, the rainfall in the Rustenburg district was irregular. 
Although the 1936 commission into farming conditions in the district 
estimated the average annual rainfall to be between 22 and 27 inches 
a year over a number of years, the annual statistics show that the 
figures were at various periods consistently below this average, as 
demonstrated in Table II below.
TABLE II




Place +years 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Wendover 25,5 24,9 15,6 23,1 26,7 22,2
Vogelfontein 21,5 17,5 14,0 14,7 20,4 9,2
Ganskuil 21,7 15,8 19,5 21,6 29,7 15,1
Syferfontein 25,2 20,3 17,7 25,7 36,9 22,4
Cumberland 16,3 22,7 11,2 10,6 16,5 6,8
Mebani 21,7 (*) (*) 20,1 23,8 10,7
Pilansberg 25,8 21,8 15,0 20,0 30,3 15,7
Rustenburg 24,6 25,4 15,9 22,3 28,4 20,5
Derby 27,5 34,3 23,1 27,8 2b,2 30,3
Buffelspoort 25,7 27,0 21,4 32,2 26,6 18,6
(*) Figures not available for the entire year.
(+) The number of years was not specified in the commission report.
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The commission report concluded that when compared with the average
rainfall over a number of years, three of the five years between
(12)1931 and 1935 could be considered drought years. In this
chapter, it will be argued that throughout the 1920s and 1930s, on 
white owned farms as well as within the African reserves, 
agricultural output varied drastically according to rainfall.
The 1936 commission also described the district as well suited to 
stock farming. The grasses of the bushveld plains in the lower
altitudes of the district were largely sweet and well suited to 
cattle grazing, whilst in the higher areas the grass types were 
better suited to small stock farming, and in particular to sheep 
farming. These conditions also varied in different areas and were 
subject to the limitations of water supply and storage
(13)facilities. '“L '
II Colonization and Capitalism - Buying Time and Land.
The ecological features that have been described above had a lasting 
effect in shaping the fortunes of peasant producers in the 
Rustenburg district during the twentieth century. However, the 
bearing which these features had on the circumstances of different 
communities in the district, was itself dependent on a number of 
variables such as the political cohesion of the different communities 
and their abilities to secure access to fertile lands. These
prevailing political and economic conditions were influenced by the 
particular processes of colonisation in the district, but also
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began to take shape in the period prior to white colonisation. 
Indeed, the effects of the difaqane appear to have shaped both the 
processes of colonisation and the responses of various chiefdoms to 
it. It is therefore necessary briefly to examine this pre-colonial 
period before turning to an examination of the processes of
colonisation.
When Mzilikazi fled from Shaka in the course of the difaqane, the 
Ndebele raided the Rustenburg area of the western Transvaal and the 
majority of ' the chiefdoms residing there were scattered. Kinsman 
has pointed out that the superior military might of the Ndebele and 
their stronger centralized state, made conquest and raiding of the 
southern Tswana communities relatively easy. However, the
degree to which the Tswana chiefdoms in the Rustenburg area were 
scattered, varied, as did the duration of their dispersal and 
absence from the area. The Fokeng, for example, having fled to 
various areas in the Orange Free State, began regrouping at Phokeng 
under Chief Mokgatle Mokgatle just six or seven years after the 
first Ndebele raids in 1828.(15) Thereafter, according to Breutz, 
Mokgatle acknowledged his subordination to Mzilikazi until the 
latter was driven out by the Boers, to whom Mokgatle then instantly 
transferred his allegiance.(16) The Kwena ba Mogopa appear not to 
have fled ’en masse’ during this period, and were reportedly 
impoverished by the difaqane and were ’starving and without cattle’ 
when the Boers under Potgieter settled in the district in the late 
1830s.(17) Breutz suggests that both the Fokeng and the Kwena ba 
Mogopa were paying tribute to Mzilikazi.
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Kwena ba Modimosana ba Matlhaku and Kwena ba Modimosana ba Maake 
were widely scattered in the course of the Ndebele raids of lb27 
30. The former fled into the Orange Free State whilst the latter 
found sanctuary in Bechuanaland. These chiefhorns only began 
regrouping in the Rustenburg district during the 1850s and 1860s
(18) Thesome time after Mzilikazi had been defeated by the Boers.
Tlokwa ba ga Bogatsu also began returning to the district only in 
the mid 1860s, whilst the Phiring had begun to regroup about twenty
years earlier. (19)
Those groupings which remained in the district, although often 
forcibly relocated and compelled to pay allegiance to Mzilikazi, 
were nonetheless able to maintain some degree of social cohesion. 
Kinsman suggests that the presence of the Ndebele amongst the 
southern Tswana, ushered in a kind of 'uneasy peace’ which allowed 
the Tswana to consolidate chiefdoms dispersed by 'brigands' during 
the earlier phases of the difaqane.(20) This often meant that 
these chiefdoms were at least able to maintain some productive 
agricultural base. By contrast, those groupings who fled the 
district were forced to abandon their lands and usually lost most of 
their livestock in the process. These people could only survive the 
destruction of their agricultural base by adopting a more scattered 
settlement pattern (often a nomadic existence) and subsisting on 
hunting and gathering.(21) Kinsman observes that:
"The Difaqane was not just a series of 
devastating raids which scattered established 
settlements on the highveld. Rather, it was a 
period of dramatic transformation, when
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communities were stripped of their agricultural 
base - the source of their subsistence and were 
forced to seek alternative means of 
survival." ^ 2)
Kinsman does qualify this picture of complete devastation, and her 
comments appear to have some applicability to those chiefdoms of the 
Rustenburg district which remained under Mzilikazi’s rule. She says:
"Though the Southern Tswana remained intimidated 
by the growing Ndebele state, they manipulated 
the modicum of stability granted them to 
reconstruct their communities,"Ud;
Possibly the most significant consequence of Mzilikazi’s dominance 
in the Rustenburg area, was the ’buffer’ which it provided for the 
Tswana chiefdoms as Boer conquerors began to penetrate the 
district. The fact that the Boer conquest was primarily concerned 
with subduing Mzilikazi, who was exploiting the local inhabitants 
through tribute and terrorizing them through raiding, meant that 
that the brunt of the violent penetration of white colonizers was 
not borne specifically by the local Tswana chiefdoms themselves. In 
fact, the Kwena ba Mogopa, the Fokeng and the Ba Po all quickly 
transferred their allegiances and joined the Boers in driving the 
Ndebele from the district.(24) Relly suggests that this
facilitated ’tenuous treaties’ or ’alliances’ between local Tswana 
chiefdoms and trekker society.(25) She claims that some Tswana 
communities were thus able to maintain a degree of autonomy and were 
often spared the immediate dispersal and enforced disintegration of 
their social structures, which might have resulted from such violent 
(26)conquest.
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The first Voortrekker to settle in the Rustenburg district was
Hendrick Potgieter. In 1839 the Boers founded the village of
'Magaliesburg' which in 1850 became Rustenburg. In return for
the support given against the Ndebele, Potgieter rewarded the Fokeng
chief Mokgatle by giving him a farm, Kookfontein 337. Thereafter
the Fokeng lived in relative peace with the Boers who upheld and
recognised Mokgatle's chieftainship. In 1883 President Paul Kruger
(28)paid a visit to the tribe.
However, these alliances between Boer and T3wana chiefdoms (if they 
existed) were very tenuous indeed, and Relly acknowledges that few 
chiefdoms in the Rustenburg area were able to resist Boer claims to 
land or demands for labour and tribute.(29) Those chiefdoms, such 
as the small Taung ba ga Selale, which offered some resistance to 
Boer colonisation, were beaten into submission and forced to flee 
the district.(30) Even the Ba Po, who had fought alongside the
Boers against the Ndebele and who resided on some of the best 
watered land in the district, eventually faced coercion at the hands 
of the Boers when the former resisted claims on their land and
l a b o u r . A l o n g  with the Tswana chiefdoms which were settled in 
the district prior to Boer colonisation, those groupings who only 
returned to the district during the 1850s and 1860s (some time after 
Ndebele were defeated) were coerced into fighting alongside the
Boers during both the Sekhukhune wars and the campaigns in the
Soutpansberg/32  ^ On one occasion, in 1867, these events were 
described by the Lutheran missionary at Bethanie, the headquarters
of the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom:
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"On the 28th of May, the situation was restless 
and warlike at Bethanie. The farmers (Boers) had 
put together a commando to go to war with the 
people of the Soutpansberg. A part of the 
commando crossed Bethanie. The veldkornett, 
Herkules Malan, ordered all able-bodied men, 
including those of the congregation, to go to war 
with them. There was a big to do and a running 
about as each one got his weapons and other 
things together and said farewell 
the men except three were taken away
In October of the following year the missionary again complained 
that:
"Even though we don’t live in the middle of the 
war zone of the war that the Boers are fighting 
in the north-east, we are still affected by the 
war unrest, especially when the men of the 
station are forced to accompany the farmers 
against the enemy tribes. This naturally costs 
them a lot and robs them of a lot of time to do 
their work at home."(3^)
However, the nature of Boer colonization was such that it did not 
directly threaten the social and political cohesion of the Tswana 
chiefdoms of the district and did not fundamentally challenge the 
ability of many of these communities (especially in areas not 
densely settled by Boers) to maintain their access to land or even 
to acquire additional farms.
"When the Boers conquered the Tswanas they were 
not very concerned with the natives, they left 
them to their habits and customs. The chief 
ruled his tribe as before, in a despotic manner; 
he just had to be careful not to come into 
conflict with the law of the whites."^3 '
Evidence suggests that the ’relatively peaceful’ relationship 
between the Boers and many of the Tswana chiefdoms, was partly the 
result of the early establishment of Christian mission stations
amongst the Tswana of the district and the mediating role which many 
missionaries played between the two parties.(36) However, it was 
in the purchasing of land on behalf of the various chiefdoms that 
the missionaries played possibly their most significant role during 
this period.
As early as 1853 the Kwena chief Setshele asked President Pretorius, 
then at Potchefstroom, to send him a missionary. In response the 
government invited the Hermannsburg Lutheran Mission to establish 
itself in the area/37  ^ The first permanent mission station was 
established in 1864 at Bethanie, the headquarters of Chief Mamogale, 
and this was also by invitation.(38) By 1885 there were twelve 
similarly established, fully-fledged Hermannsburg Lutheran Mission 
stations in the district/39  ^ The co-operative relationship 
between chiefs and the Lutheran Mission during this period, 
facilitated the purchase of land by the mission on behalf of the 
various chiefdoms. As Ernst Penzhorn, the Lutheran missionary at 
Phokeng noted:
"Vroeger deur die sendelings, deur my vader en 
deur ander mense is daar baie grond gekoop vir 
die naturelle; hulle het plase gekoop vir die 
volk en oorspronklik was die plase op naam van 
die sendelinge of van ander wit mense 
geregistreer gewees; dit was in die dae gewees 
toe die swart mense nog nie die gereg gehad het 
nie om grond op hul eie naam te besit . .."(^0)
Particularly amongst the small chiefdoms, there was often a 
dependence on mission purchases for access to any land at all. In 
the period 1868-9 the Lutheran mission bought substantial tracts of 
land on behalf of chief Mosome of the Kwena ba Modimosana ba 
Matlhaku.^1  ^ Similarly in 1882 the mission purchased the farm
Grootwagendrift 743 on behalf of the Kwena ba Modimosana by 
Mmatau(42) and in 1889 Rev. Fuhls bought Hartebeesfontein 514 on 
behalf of the Kwena ba Modimosana ba Maake. In the latter two 
cases, these were the only lands of which these chiefdoms were able 
to secure ownership. The respective chiefs' reliance on the 
Lutheran mission was therefore considerable.
The missionary at Bethanie described the process whereby land was 
purchased by the mission on behalf of the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom, 
and pointed out some of the implications of such purchase.
"... the Lord has blessed us in that the station 
has been able to purchase another grazing field, 
40 minutes long and 40 minutes wide. Because the 
owner wanted cattle for his land, each inhabitant 
of Bethanie had to provide one cow. As a joint 
owner, I paid the few pounds sterling that were 
demanded. This is how we managed to buy the land 
by the 4th May and pay for over half of it. This 
has been another step towards the survival and 
physical maintenance of the community of 
Bethanie. I am very pleased about these 
successes and praise the Lord. If the 
congregation is able to buy more land in the 
future, I shall encourage it greatly ... because 
it is owning their own land which keeps the 
people together and attracts more families from 
the farmers' places. It also encourages 
constructive work towards independence. 
Previously, for the use of the land just 
purchased, the women had to work for the owner. 
But they have now been freed from this duty. 
They can now work for themselves.”(44)
Some Tswana chiefdoms of the western Transvaal, situated on highly 
productive land were able not only to generate a substantial 
surplus, but also appear to have succeeded in maintaining a high 
degree of political and social cohesion during the late 19th 
century. This facilitated the communal collection of funds, used 
primarly for the purchase of more land.^4^  Land purchase in turn
sustained chiefly authority to distribute resources and thus 
facilitated the maintenance of existing forms of political
organisation and social cohesion. In fact, land buying in and 
around the Rustenburg district became the focal point of Tswana life 
during the last decades of the nineteenth c e ntury/^
Not all the chiefdoms in the district were able to expand their 
productive base in this manner. Firstly, not all of them were 
situated on equally productive land. Whilst the Fokeng, Kwena ba 
Mogopa and Ba Po were able to derive high yields from drought
resistant black turf and were thus ensured of a regular surplus from
agricultural production, other chiefdoms were situated on less 
favourable l a n d s I n  particular the small Kwena ba Modimosana 
ba Mmatau chiefdom, which was situated on mission-purchased
Grootwagendrift, was subject to particularly harsh conditions. Xhe 
northern section of the farm was extremely stoney and unsuitable for 
cultivation, whilst the southern portion was covered by dense brush 
and was poor grazing land. As a result the people of the chief dom 
were forced from a very early date, to rely on access to land on 
neighbouring white-owned farms, both for grazing and cultivation 
p u r p o s e s . O t h e r  chiefdoms such as the Kwena ba Modimosana ba 
Maake situated in the centre of the district, and the Kwena ba 
Modimosana ba Matlhaku, situated in the north western corner of the 
district, were primarily reliant on red soils for their 
cultivation.^9  ^ This meant that they were much more dependent on 
regular rainfall and more vulnerable to fluctuating weather
conditions.
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Furthermore, the Kwena ba Modimosana ba Maake, Kwena ba Modimosana 
ba Mmatau and Phiring chiefdoms were all initially settled on 
isolated lands which were soon completely surrounded by white owned 
farms. This meant that even if they were able to generate means for 
land purchase, the practicality of expansion onto easily accessible 
lands was often limited.
The distinctive processes of white colonisation in the Rustenburg 
district, and the simultaneous allocation and resettlement of 
African lands, obviously played a fundamental role in dictating the 
long term fate of the rural economies of the various Tswana 
chiefdoms. However, the variations in the geology, topography, 
demography and climatic conditions across the Rustenburg district 
which have been described earlier in this chapter, also had a 
considerable bearing on the fluctuating fortunes of self-sufficient 
peasant producers, especially in smaller chiefdoms with greater 
limitations on access to land. This was evident well before the 
1920s. In January 1891, the Lutheran missionary at Bethanie, the 
capital of the Kwena ba Mogopa, reported on the year's harvests as 
follows:
"In many places of this land, especially outside 
the Transvaal the natives have harvested very 
little or nothing at all. This can be seen by 
the many people that come from Bechuanaland to 
buy corn for gold and cattle, from the indigenous 
tribes. Others that cannot afford anything, try 
to earn some corn by obtaining work, particularly 
harvesting and threshing. Our own people are 
very happy that they have harvested such a lot, 
enough not only to feed themselves, but also to 
sell. One can honestly say that everything here 
is plentiful. First the people had a rich maize 
harvest and following that an even richer co m  
harvest ... The people's wealth in mielies and 
c o m  is seen in the local store. They trade so 
much of it for clothing and such like, that the 
shopowner has to take freight after freight of 
the stuff to the goldfields and white towns. In
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addition those that have their own span of oxen 
often go to the market to trade ... The people 
are learning to use the world and are nearly 
living like whites."^-^^
Just two years later in October 1893, the same missionary reported 
that floods had destroyed large areas of cultivated land and had 
drowned whole herds of cattle. Shortly afterwards a plague of 
locusts in huge swarms had destroyed over half of the remaining corn 
crop/52  ^ He went on to say:
"Without a doubt the kaffircorn will be very rare 
and expensive in South Africa this year; the 
Lord only knows when the locusts will go away 
again. We hear reports from all sides that South 
Africa is still full of them. Whether we will 
have -a maize harvest this year, the Lord alone 
knows. The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not 
want."(53)
In 1896 huge cattle losses resulted from the Rinderpest pandemic in 
the area(54) and the 1897 report of the Bethanie missionary 
documented continual plagues, locusts, Rinderpest, fever and 
drought/55  ^ In 1898 he reported that:
"Many fields are lying barren and uncultivated, 
because there is no rain and the rivers and the 
streams are drying up. Springs that are usually 
abundant in water are drying up, and the 
surrounding inhabitants have to move backwards 
and forwards to where they can find drinking 
water for people and cattle. There is no talk of 
sowing and harvesting ... The Rinderpest has 
spread throughout the land like a windstorm and 
has knocked cattle over like trees and no 
strength or wisdom of people could stop it ... It 
will be a long time until Africa rebuilds its 
cattle stocks.’ w6)
The post Boer War period in Bethanie could generally be described as 
one of increasing improverishment and by 1908 the Lutheran
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missionary in the area claimed that • • • such times as now we have 
never known in the p a s t " H e  went on to say:
"It is as a result of this economic misery that 
not only men, but now also girls, are starting to 
run to the towns to earn their money there."(58)
It is evident that natural disasters were responsible in just six or 
seven years for transforming a highly successful peasant community 
into an impoverished one. The Rinderpest pandemic of the 1890s was 
exceptionally disasterous, and Relly notes that it served to shift 
the emphasis in Tswana communities of the Western Transvaal from 
cattle farming to the production and sale of agricultural 
c r o p s T h e  generally favourable geographical and 
topographical conditions eased the situation for agriculturalists in 
many parts of the district, and even facilitated rapid recovery once 
climatic conditions were normalised. Although an ecological 
disaster of the proportions of the Rinderpest pandemic during the 
1890s did not recur^60^, the 1900s and particularly the late 1920s 
and the 1930s were characterized by persistant drought and locust 
invasions. Under these circumstances, the resilience of the various 
chiefdom’s productive capacities and the ability to recover from 
such natural disasters, depended on a number of variables such as 
the quality and extent of the land available, the population 
strength and density and the availability of various forms of land 
tenure on ’white-owned' farms outside of the scheduled tribal 
reserves. Possibly the most important of these variables, was the 
capacity of the different chiefdoms to expand their productive base 
through the purchase of additional land.
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Some chiefdoms in the district proved to be more capable than others
of expanding their landed resources in this manner. One factor
which was particularly enduring in its effect on the land buying
potential of the different chiefdoms, was their respective
population strengths. In the Rustenburg area in the period before
the turn of the century, land purchase was generally undertaken
through communal means, rather than by individuals/61  ^ For
example, soon after the discovery of diamonds, the Fokeng chief
Mokgatle Mokgatle, sent about five hundred young men to work on the
Kimberly diamond mines, in order to earn £.5 each so that the chief
(62)could buy farms in the name of the local Lutheran mission.
This process of communal purchase was dependent on the ability of a 
chiefdom to generate the necessary funds. Smaller chiefdoms with 
limited person power were less able to do so, and this severely 
constrained their ability to expand their productive base and extend 
their access to land. For many people in these chief doms the only 
alternative means of gaining access to land was through labour or 
rent tenancy on neighbouring farms owned by white landowners.
Amongst the larger chiefdoms, however, land purchasing continued and 
appears to have been further encouraged by the opportunities for 
capital accumulation presented during the Anglo-Boer War and through 
the settlements of claims and receipts issued during the War. In 
the years immediately following the war, the necessity to register 
all African owned land in the name of the Commissioner of Native 
Affairs, revealed that much of the land ostensibly bought by 
missionaries was in fact owned by Africans/  ^ In 1905 the South 
Native Affairs Commission suggested that African landAfrican
purchasing be restricted to specific areas 'defined by legislative 
enactment' and that tribal or communal ownership of land should be 
prohibited. However, in the same year the Supreme Court overturned 
the ruling which made it necessary for Africans to register their 
land holdings in the name of the Commissioner of Native Affairs. 
Thus, although there were restrictions on the areas where Africans 
could buy land, the ongoing process of land purchase, both inside 
and outside the reserve areas, was not completely prevented.
In the course of his chieftainship (1896 - 1938) August Mokgatle 
bought no fewer than nine farms - nominally on behalf of the 
Fokeng.^^
It remains something of a mystery how chiefdoms which were so 
recently impoverished by the effects of the Rinderpest pandemic were 
able to generate the funds necessary for land purchase. I have been 
unable to find evidence to explain this phenomenon and can therefore 
only speculate about solutions. There are three factors which may 
throw some light on this rapid accumulation of funds. Firstly, 
although Relly does not document the actual amounts of remuneration 
received in settlement of claims and receipts during the Anglo-Boer 
War, she does suggest that this was sufficient to encourage land 
purchases. Secondly, there is evidence that funds were communally 
accumulated on various occasions through widespread entrance into 
the wage labour market (as in the case of the Fokeng during the 
1860s). Finally, the Rinderpest pandemic does not appear to have 
devasted agricultural production as much as pastoral production. It 
is possible that with the shift in emphasis to agricultural 
production, greater surpluses were produced, (especially by those
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groupings farming on the richer soils) which were communally 
appropriated for the purpose of land purchases. The fact that 
particular chiefdoms were able to secure access to land through 
purchases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, did 
not necessarily imply that the entire chiefdom benefitted. Chiefly 
control over the allocation and distribution of resources often 
enabled chiefs to dictate which members or sections of the chiefdoms 
received access to communally purchased land. The resultant process 
of differentiation or stratification within particular chiefdoms 
laid the foundation for the political and ideological struggles 
against chiefly control in the 1920s and 1930s. For this reason it 
is essential to examine these developing processes of material 
differentiation within the various chiefdoms of the district.
Relly claims that for most of the nineteenth century Tswana 
chiefdoms propagated an ideology of communal land'holding. She 
suggests that this supposedly meant that land purchased would be 
equally distributed, irrespective of the differing contributions of 
any particular party to the purchase price. Relly concludes that 
land was therefore of limited importance in determining the social 
stratification of Tswana society/66  ^ However, the urgent need 
for arable land,^^ reflected by the growing importance of the 
purchasing and hiring of land, tended to undermine this ideology. 
Access to land became an increasingly dominant feature of economic 
and social statification within these Tswana chiefdoms. Central to 
this process were the developing notions of private property in land.
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These developments were clearly Identifiable in those chiefdoms 
which were able to engage in the process of land purchase, 
especially after the turn of the century. A close examination both 
of the land deals themselves and the ensuing distribution of land, 
demonstrates the frequent breakdown of the structures of communal 
ownership. It is also evident that resilient and cohesive political 
structures in Tswana society proved to be functional to the 
development of unequal land distribution.
Relly notes that after the Anglo-Boer war, chiefs were frequently 
buying land in their own names. J August Mokgatle, for example, 
bought some land in 1906 along with a few members of his chiefdom. 
He later repaid to the people involved the original sum they had 
contributed and was left with the land to himself. ' Even after
the passage of the 1913 Land Act and the application by the Native 
Affairs Department of a blanket prohibition on individual purchase 
of land by Africans in the area^*^, chiefs were clearly
attempting to manipulate their control over distribution of land in
order to effect unequal access to ’communally’ purchased productive 
(71)resources.
By the 1930s increasing landlessness, even amongst the 'wealthier' 
chiefdoms with more extensive access to land, was being attributed 
to the corrupt administration of chiefs in the district. In 
evidence to the Native Economic Commission of 1930-2, Ernst Penzhorn 
identified this as the main contributing factor to unequal land 
distribution amongst the Fokeng.
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"Daar is mease wat al sedert 1888 betaal het vir 
plase. Hulle betaal aog; hulle is van die 
eerstes wat betaal het, maar hulle het nie land 
om te ploeg nie.”(72)
Chief J.O.M. Mamogale of the Kwena ba Mogopa was quite explicit 
about his interests in 1905:
"I was surprised and disappointed to hear from 
you that chiefs have no 'private money' ... I 
again mention that the tribe has nothing to do 
with the 'erf' as it was bought with 'private 
money' ... Sir, this disappointment will not be
blotted out till I am given right to my own 
property. Every man in the world has private 
money.”(73)
However, to suggest that it was only chiefs who were individually 
benefitting from the manipulation of communal purchase, would be 
misleading. In the larger chiefdoms with fairly dispersed 
settlement patterns (such as the Kwena ba Modimosana ba Matlhaku 
chiefdom, and especially the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom which had 
outlying branches in the Pretoria, Brits and Ventersdorp districts), 
arable land which was purchased by means of contributions from the 
entire tribe, was often utilized by just one section of the chiefdom 
and was inaccessible to others.
In addition, whole groupings of people who had bought land 
communally began to attempt to shed the restraints and 
responsibilities of communal ownership. This became apparent in the 
Fokeng chiefdom with the discovery of minerals on some of the 
'tribally owned' farms. Although the resultant revenues eventually 
accrued to the chiefdom as a whole, this was not before a protracted 
legal dispute in which some individuals claimed to have exclusive
9b
rights to these revenues as a consequence of their private ownership 
of the land.^7^
Not only was the distribution of communally owned lands no longer 
'truly communal', but occasionally communally bought lands were not 
'truly communally purchased'. Evidence suggests that groupings of 
individuals, either with the sanction or with the direct 
participation of their chiefs, would pool their resources in order 
to purchase a tract of land which would then be divided up among the 
buyers according to the amount contributed by them. This land would 
effectively be controlled as private property and would merely be 
registered as 'tribally-owned' land/76  ^ Formally constituted 
communal purchase of land did not, therefore, necessarily guarantee 
members of a chiefdom secure access to a viable means of 
agricultural subsistence. In fact it appears that the Native 
Commissioner for the Pilansberg area, T.R. Emmett, was more 
concerned with the imperatives of segregation than with African 
access to land when he suggested (to the Native Economic Commission 
in 1930) that the purchase of land under 'tribal conditions' (with 
all the advantages of greater communal purchasing power) 'would 
obviate the landless native question'/77^
The fact that land purchase had become the 'focal point of Tswana 
life' by the early twentieth century, certainly did not necessarily 
imply universal access to land. It has been demonstrated that 
certain chiefdoms, particularly the small chiefdoms, were unable to 
take advantage of the availability of purchaseable land and 
throughout the period under review were restricted to just one or 
two relatively small tracts of land.
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Although Relly claims that the options to purchase land remained 
relatively open in the district after 1913v ' communal purchase 
was not as practical an option for the smaller chiefdoms which were 
less capable of generating communal wealth. Futhermore, by the 
1920s the availability of purchaseable land within scheduled 
location areas was severely limited. Ernst Penzhom was adamant 
that the 1913 Lands Act was perceived as restricting Africans'
(79)access to land. Chiefs demonstrated their resentment of this
and expressed their desire to buy farms outside of the African 
reserved areas. Their objections were usually couched in the
political rhetoric of the time, and hence chiefs in the Rustenburg 
district expressed their frustrated aspirations through open 
opposition to any notions of segregation.
However, despite the expressed desire to purchase more land, even
the more 'affluent* chiefdoms of the district experienced severe
financial problems as a consequence of the rapid process of land
purchase both before and after the 1913 Land Act. By the mid 1920s
virtually every single chiefdom in the district was heavily in debt
(81)and owed large sums of money on mortgaged lands.v In many of
these chiefdoms this indebtedness was exacerbated by the financial 
maladministration of chiefs and the increasing refusal of members of 
various chiefdoms to contribute to tribal levies for land to which 
they did not themselves have access.
Therefore, although the growing African population in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century had provided the larger
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chiefdoms with the potential to generate funds for the purpose of 
land purcahse, by the 1920s the limitations on available 
purchaseable land combined with the unwillingness of large numbers 
of people to contribute to communal purchases meant that population 
pressure began to take its toll. By the 1930s growing African 
population pressure proved to be one of the central strains on the 
productive capacity of the available land.
In 1904, the combined African population of the Rustenburg and 
Pilansberg NAD districts was estimated at 23 652. By 1921 this
number had risen to 60 276 and by 1936 census figures showed the
( 83*)African population to number 87 700. ' Approximately two thirds
of the population were situated in the Rustenburg NAD district, and 
of the total of 109 000 reported in the 1946 census, 68 000 were 
located in this area.v® ^  Of this number 27 650 were estimated to 
live on ’tribally-owned' farms, 1535 were permanently resident on 
trust farms, a mere 930 resided on 'privately-owned native farms', 
and 25 110 were reportedly resident on farms owned by 'Europeans, 
Asiatics and Coloureds' By 1936 all the chiefdoms of the
district were experiencing the problem of overpulation on tribal 
land and the consequent effects of overstocking and severe soil 
erosion. These problems generally appeared to be most severe in the 
smaller chiefdoms with greater population density in relation to 
available land.
Table III below provides a breakdown of the population on the 
various 'tribally -owned' lands of the nine chiefdoms, and the extent 
of these lands and the livestock population of each chiefdom, as 
they stood in 1936.
TABLE III 8^6)

















Fokeng (August Mokgatle's 
location) 62 764/380 10 720/406 73 485/186 11 641 13 309 6 695 ± 14 648
Kwena ba Mogopa (Mamogale's 
location) 22 097/259 2 065/441 24 163/100 3 742 2 493 1 768 ±  2 847
Kwena ba Modimosana ba 
Matlhaku (Pella's location) 12 129/120 13 422/10 25 551/130 8 000 7 220 8 190 ± 6 860
ba Po ba Mogale
(Darius Mogale's location) 9 511/575 1 641/487 10 153/462 4 204 1 611 2 335 ± 2 078
Tlokwa ba ga Bogatsu 
(Tlolwe's location) 4 150/182 8 296/351 12 447/431 4 165 5 354 5 508 6 467
Phiring (Mabalane's location) 5 252/21 none 5 252/21 1 500 1 583 1 665 1 916
Kwena ba Modimosana ba 
Mmatau (Selon's location) 3 103/223 none 3 103/223 720 976 794 1 134.
Kwena ba Modimosana ba 
Maake (Ratsegae's location) 4 945/111 none 4 945/111 400 1 090 560 ±1 200
Taung ba ga Selale 
(Sefanyaskraal) ± 1 000 none ± 1 000 60 families --unavailable—
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It is evident from the preceding pages that these material 
conditions had their roots in the varied responses of different 
chiefdoms to the processes of white colonisation. To some extent 
the fluctuating fortunes of the different chiefdoms were determined 
by ecological factors beyond their control, such as Rinderpest, 
drought, floods and plagues of locusts. Beyond that, the differing 
capacities of various Tswana communities to recover from these 
ecological disasters was to some extent predetermined by the 
fertility of the particular lands on which they were settled. 
However, in their varied responses to colonialism, Tswana chiefdoms 
in the Rustenburg district were actively involved in determining the 
terms of their interaction with the developing capitalist economy, 
and in particular were able to stave off rural decline for shorter 
or longer periods of time.
Despite sub-ordination to the Ndebele, the extensive influence of 
Christian missionaries and colonisation by the Boers, most of the 
chiefdoms of the district were able to maintain a significant degree 
of social and political cohesion even after the turn of the 
century. In the larger chiefdoms this facilitated the generation of 
funds for communal land buying. However, even in these larger and 
more affluent chiefdoms the consolidation of the colonial state, the 
expansion of capitalist relations of production and the consequent 
limitations imposed on access to land, resulted in developing 
processes of social and economic stratification rooted in the 
control over landed resources. As a result, by the 1920s there was 
a growing landless population in the Rustenburg district. For those
1 0 4
with insufficient access to land within the 'locations' the 
alternatives were twofold: they either had to enter the wage labour 
market or secure one of various forms of tenure on neighbouring 
white owned farms.
Ill Land of 'Sunshine and Milk' - Migrants and Labour Tenants
For those peasants who had managed to acquire access to fertile 
lands, the 1920s proved to be a fairly prosperous period. Rains in 
the first five years of the decade were better than average although 
the period from 1925 - 1930 was characterised by drought.
Penzhorn claimed that amongst the Fokeng more land was brought under 
cultivation, farming schemes were growing, and the average plot of
/ C O Nsix morgen was producing 50 - 75 bags of grain annually.v ' Some
peasant producers were growing as much as 500 bags a year and many
more between 100 and 200 bags. By 1930, even wheat and tobacco were 
being cultivated.^®^
In evidence to the Native Economic Commission in 1930, the 
missionaries Penzhorn and Stegmann, as well as N.C. Emmett, 
indicated that agricultural production in the eastern and central 
northern chiefdoms of the N.A.D. district of Rustenburg was highly 
successful and that almost without exception farmers were able to 
produce a surplus over and above their immediate needs.
"Daarvan kan hulle heelmaal goed leef en bestaan
en wat hulle oor het verkoop hulle vir hul
behoeftes in klere en huisraad en so v o o r t . " ( 9 0 )
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Emestina Mekwe who lived at Phokeng during this period, described
(91)farming as 'really profitable ... farming was number one'v ' She 
claimed that her family reaped 100 bags of sorghum annually and no 
less than 80 bags in a bad year. She went on to complain that they 
used to sell their surplus 'cheaply to the boers in Rustenburg at 5 
shillings a bag.'^^
In these chiefdoms, (the Fokeng, Kwena ba Mogopa and Ba Po) the soil 
was mainly black turf, was extremely fertile, mostly arable and 
required little or no manuring. Even during periods of water
shortage, this land remained productive for years if ploughed
(93)properly. As a consequence many peasant small holders were
able to produce the yields mentioned for most of the 1920s. In
addition to this, although it was not a universal characteristic
throughout the region, many of the African farms were adopting
modernized methods of farming, such as deep ploughing with double
(94)furrow ploughs. Penzhorn suggested that these methods were
(95)learned through temporary labour on white farms.
The conditions prevailing in these three chiefdoms differed 
substantially from others in the district. The starkest contrast 
was with the Kwena ba Modimosana ba Mmatau. By the early 1920s this 
small chiefdom had the greatest population in relation to its land, 
was overpopulated, overstocked and incapable of supporting even half 
of its population. As a result, two thirds of the chief dom was 
already either resident on neighbouring white-owned farms or 
involved in wage-labour on the Rand. ' No statistics are 
available for the agricultural output on the farm Grootwagendrift on
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which the chiefdom lived during this period, but Breutz claimed that
(97)there was no surplus at all produced during the 1940s.
Agricultural production in the Fokeng chiefdom also contrasted with 
that in large chiefdoms in the Pilansberg district. N.C. Emmett 
noted that agricultural production in these northern parts was not 
as 'progressive' as it was in August Hokgatle's location, and he 
identified an urgent need for the development of intensive
/ Q O N
scientific farming methods. ' However, the extent of
advancement of agricultural methods amongst the Fokeng, and indeed
in the district as a whole, should not be overstated. Penzhom
noted that in 1930 there were only three metal double furrow ploughs
(99)in the Fokeng chiefdom.v ' Even the most advanced African
farmers (who took their products to agricultural shows organised in 
the district) were not engaging in such practices as seen 
selection. They seldom bought seed but instead relied on the seed 
they grew themselves which was extensively cross-pollinated due to 
the lands they cultivated being 'on top of one another'. 1^<J°) 
There was also little or no selective cattle breeding prior to the 
1940s and most cattle were scrub herds.^101)
As a solution to these shortcomings, Emmett recommended to the 
N.E.C. that the establishment of more agricultural demonstrators in 
the district be encouraged. ^10 )^ Although it is difficult to 
explain, there appears to have been initial resistance to 
agricultural demonstrators and some suspicion of them. Even chiefs 
were initially reluctant to provide land for demonstration plots, 
and often refused to contribute towards the costs of establishing 
such plots/103)
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The Tlokwa ba ga Bogatsu and the Kwena ba Modimosana ba Matlhaku 
chiefdoms in the north-western corner of the Rustenburg NAD district 
also appear not to have developed more advanced farming methods 
during this period. Breutz has argued that these chiefdoms suffered 
this fate as a consequence of being ruled by chiefs and councillors 
which were either inactive or 'unprogressive'. ^ ^4) However, the 
people of these chiefdoms, which were settled on scattered pieces of 
land, were often unable to manure the red lateric soil which they 
cultivated due to the distance between their grazing lands and their 
crop fields. Similar circumstances prevailed in the smallest 
’locations' (the Taung ba ga Selale at Sephanyaskraal, the Kwena ba 
Modimosana ba Maabe in Ratsegae’s location and the Phiring in 
Mabalane’s location) where almost all of the cattle owned by members 
of the chiefdoms were being grazed on neighbouring white farms or on 
trust farms in the Pilansberg district, as was the case for Kwena ba 
Modimosana ba Mmatau residents on Selonskraal.^^^
Members of the chiefdoms in the northwestern comer of the district 
also experienced greater difficulty in marketing whatever surpluses 
they did produce. Bnmett noted that close proximity to Rustenburg 
itself and accessible transport, enabled members of the Fokeng, 
Kwena ba Mogopa and Ba Po chiefdoms to sell their surpluses 
profitably. However, these conditions were not duplicated in the 
outlying areas, where peasants were generally limited to trade and 
barter on a local basis.
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Relly, in her examination of Tswana communities in the Western 
Transvaal in the first three decades of the twentieth century, 
argues that the generally favourable farming conditions outlined 
here and documented by the 1936 commission of enquiry, enabled black 
peasants who maintained access to land to meet their cash 
requirements and thereby resist the pressures of proletarianization, 
at least until the 1930s. she argues that patterns of land 
ownership within Tswana chiefdoms were therefore fundamental in 
shaping patterns of labour migration and proletarianization during 
this period. Hiere is much evidence to support Relly's contentions, 
but her failure to undertake a comparative examination of the 
contrasting conditions within different chiefdoms in the district, 
results in a somewhat unilinear picture of proletarianization for 
the district as a whole.
Part of the problem lies in Relly's loosely defined use of the term 
proletarianization. 'Proletarianzation' or even 'partial 
proletarianization', implies at least the partial demise of 
independent subsistence production and hence a lasting dependence on 
wage labour. However, under circumstances such as those prevailing 
in the Rustenburg district; where fluctuating conditions in the 
rural economy (and particularly a vulnerability to changing climatic 
conditions) may have resulted in equally fluctuating trends to enter 
the wage labour market; the capacity of the rural economy to recover 
from periodic decline suggests that temporary dependence on wage 
labour was by no means irreversible.^®®^ Therefore, to simply 
treat levels of migrancy as an index of 'proletarianization' (as 
Relly tends to do), is potentially misleading.
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Relly, it should be emphasized, does recognise that the 
vulnerability of peasant producers to the pressures of 
proletarianziation varied within chiefdoms, according to their 
access to crucial material resources. Hence, she identifies the 
crucial distinction between dependence on cash earnings to 
supplement limited rural subsistence production on the one hand, and 
discretionary entrance into the labour -market so as to enhance rural 
production capacities on the other. However, she fails to take 
sufficient cognisance of the distinctions between different 
chiefdoms, such as their geographical location, their population 
strength and their respective degrees of social and political 
cohesion, all of which profoundly affected the resilience of 
self-sufficient peasant production. Relly consequently fails to 
perceive that whilst many members of some of the larger chiefdoms 
were able to resist a dependence on wage labour until at least the 
1930s and were therefore able to enter the labour market in a more 
discretionary manner, for members of some of the smaller chiefdoms 
migrancy was already a 'necessity' by the early 1920s.
Despite these differences, there were, nevertheless, certain 
developing trends common to the African rural economies of the 
Rustenburg district during the 1920s. Ihe rapid growth of the 
population in the district as a result of both natural increase and 
of migration to the western Transvaal, combined with 
narrowing access to land, were resulting in a general problem of 
overstocking and overpopulation and the consequent development of 
soil erosion. Growing landlessness was a principal concern
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of all those who gave evidence to the Native Economic Commission of 
1930-2 - missionaries, N.A.D. officials and chiefs alike. By 1930 
Relly suggests there was a large and growing number of Africans who 
owned little more than two or three morgen of ground - insufficient 
to support them without an independent cash income.
Poor rains between 1925 and 1930 critically affected the already 
inadequate water supply on reserve lands and African cattle had to 
travel huge distances to obtain drinking water. A further problem 
was the increasing exhaustion of even the most fertile of arable 
lands. Despite the positive reports about agricultural 
successes and advances among the larger chiefdoms in the eastern 
half of the region during the 1920s, it is clear that by the 1930s 
the productive capacity of the soil in these regions had been 
severely undermined. Even those peasant families who were 
able independently to produce surpluses during this period were 
becoming increasingly vulnerable to unfavourable climatic conditions 
and to the pressures to enter the wage labour market. Ultimately it 
was the ensuing years of virtually continual drought during the 
1930s which broke the resilience of independent peasant production 
in the Rustenburg area.
However, throughout the decade prior to this ecological disaster, 
rates of migrancy appear to have been on the increase, even amongst 
the larger chiefdoms of the eastern part of the district. In 
evidence to the Native Economic Commission in 1930, Ernst Penzhorn 
stated that male migrancy had become a necessity for the survival of 
most Fokeng rural family units. He claimed that by that time,
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almost every unmarried young man spent at least a few years in wage
(115)labour on the Rand But the partial decline of the rural
economy during the late 1920s, although contributing substantially 
to the increase in migration from the district, does not in 
isolation explain this trend. It remains to examine to what extent 
material stratification and differentiation within the various 
chiefdoms were responsbile for forcing increasing numbers of 
landless people to enter the wage labour markets.
The processes of economic stratification on the basis of access to 
land within the chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district, did not amount 
to a simple division between those who had access to a means of 
surplus production and those who did not. Rather it resulted in a 
complex spectrum of material interests, which in turn gave rise to a 
variety of motivations for entry into the wage labour market. In 
the absence of a general quantitative statistical breakdown of the 
income distribution and productive capacities of family units within 
African reserves during the late 1920s, it is extremely difficult to 
substantiate any generalisations about the increasing dependence on 
wage labour such as that made by Penzhom. Ihere are, however, a 
number of identifiable trends which led to young men entering wage 
labour during the 1920s, which throw considerable light on the 
differing material conditions experienced by peasant producers in 
the region. If migration to the towns was universal amongst young 
unmarried men by 1930, then the reasons for entering wage labour 
varied considerably according to the stake which different men had 
in the agricultural base of the rural economy.
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The immediate distinction which can be drawn and which has been 
noted above, is that between those who took up migrant labour to 
complement or enhance their capacity as agricultural producers, and 
those for whom limited agricultural production was merely a 
supplement to their migrant earnings. In other words, for some, 
wage labour represented an investable cash income, invariably 
invested in agricultural production, whereas for others migrant 
wages were crucial for their day to day subsistance. In addition, 
many peasant producers, although able to subsist off the land, were 
unable to meet their cash requirements through lack of access to 
markets or because of an insufficient surplus. Let us examine each 
of these in turn.
Unquestionably growing landlessness and rapidly developing land 
exhaustion had resulted in more people becoming dependent on wage 
earning in order to survive. This Penzhom noted amongst the 
Fokeng, and it was definitely the case from a very early date 
amongst the Kwena ba Modimosana ba Mmatau.^^^ Evidence suggests 
that these migrants were conscious of those factors which determined 
their lack of access to land. Increasingly, they reneged on their 
obligations to contribute to tribal levies, and to contribute 
thereby to the communal purchase of land (or to meet the debts 
already incurred in this r e s p e c t ) R e l l y  suggests that:
"It seems likely that, in part, the recalcitrance 
of migrant labourers reflected the extent to 
which their stake in the rural economy had 
diminished."(118)
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However, there Is also considerable evidence to suggest that many
other migrants were entering wage labour in order to meet their cash
requirements - not only to enable them to pay their taxes, but also
to meet the costs of their 'tribal obligations', such as tribute,
levies and bridewealth costs. Penzhorn claimed that the
majority of those either temporarily or semi-permanently living in
the urban areas, still saw themsleves as 'part of the
tribe*.^20) jn fact, Penzhorn said that amongst the Fokeng in
the last years of the 1920s there were an increasing number of
migrants who were returning to 'their tribal roots' and farming in
the 'location'. Penzhorn also pointed out that many migrated
as target workers with the object of making money in order to buy
(122)ploughs or a span of oxen. He suggested that even those who
developed a trade, such as shoemakers and carpenters, eventually
returned to farming and re-invested their earnings in agricultural 
(123)production. y Naomi Setshedi who lived at Phokeng during this 
period, described how her brother had made a considerable amount of 
money working in Johannesburg and selling home brewed beer. He 
spent all the money he made buying cattle, until by 1938 he had a 
herd of over fifty cattle in the 'location'. Setshedi tried to 
convince her brother to sell the cattle and buy some freehold land 
in the urban area, but he refused to do so.
"His thoughtlessness made me angry. Really God 
can give you all material things you desire but 
not give you the brains you require to work those 
things or decide what to do with them."(-*-24)
Many of the chiefs of the district complained to the Native Economic 
Commission that migrants who had been away from the reserve for a
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number of years, would suddenly arrive back with money to spend on 
farming activities and would demand their 'customary' rights to 
certain pieces of land. Hiey would often leave again and their land 
would lie unused until they chose to return.(^25) jj.C. Emmett 
pointed out that most male migration was seasonal and that men as a 
rule returned to the rural areas to plough and to harvest.
It appears that for most of these people, at least the needs of
immediate reproduction (that is production of subsistence
requirements) were met by agricultural production. However,
reproduction from one generation to the next demanded a surplus
product in a specific form - money. For many migrancy was thus
determined by various increased needs for cash, (either to pay
taxes, to meet 'tribal obligations' or to expand agricultural
production) rather than by the declining productivity of the
reserves or the loss of access to land. It should be mentioned here
that both the missionaries Penzhom and Stegmann pointed out the
higher standard of living amongst Christians in the district. This
they suggested involved the development of new needs for 'luxury'
items such as furniture, sewing machines, bicycles, etc. As a
result the cash 'requirements' of the average Christian family could
often not be met even with the sale of an agricultural surplus.
Stegmann estimated that the average Christian family required £40 -
£50 per year to meet their n e e d s . T h i s  he suggested would
demand that such a family produced at least 100 bags of grain a 
(128^year. in this vein Penzhorn stated :
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"I am not prepared to say that the conditions are 
getting poorer and poorer but I am prepared to 
say this: that the requirements of the natives 
have increased so that it has become necessary 
for them to go out to work."(129)
These circumstances appear to have given some latitude to migrants
as to when and where they entered the wage labour market, which in
turn enabled them to avoid the most exploitative forms of
employment. As a result very few of the migrants from the district
took up wage labour on neighbouring white farms^3^  and very few
were prepared to work in the mines. ^ 31  ^ As late as 1950 Breutz
estimated that less than 10% of the migrants from the Rustenburg
(132)district worked down the mines. Migrants from Phokeng
clearly preferred to work in secondary industry, where possible, or 
in domestic labour as ’kitchen boys', 'store boys' and the
like.<133)
There was another motive for labour migrancy which overlapped with 
those already discussed, and which reflected migrants' tendencies to 
renege on their 'tribally-defined responsibilities'. In the 
communities of the Rustenburg district, where the obligations 
associated with communal ownership of land were increasingly being 
challenged, migrancy also offered both a means of escaping these 
responsibilities, as well as an opportunity to gain individual 
control over an independent income. Penzhorn pointed out that many 
young men were migrating to avoid the autocratic rule, and in 
particular the labour demands, of chief s . ^ 3^  Emmett also drew 
attention to the fact that these young men, when faced with having 
to contribute to tribal levies, would simply 'clear off to the 
towns'^33  ^ The chiefs themselves were very outspoken about this
116
trend. Chief Pilane recognised that 'people leave' because of their 
'tribal dues and tributes' - but he could not explain this:-
"But these fees are just fees."(136)
Chief Mogatle explained that these young men migrated 'in order to 
be free' and to avoid tribal rule and authority .(137) 
particular he claimed they left to avoid 'tribal j u s t i c e J
Stegmann explained the 'desertion' of these young men in more 
general terms.
"Op die lande en in die lokasies is daar baie
werk wat hulle moet doen, in die dorpe en in die
stede is hulle meer vry.” 1^^ )
Indeed, it appears that it was not just an avoidance of 'tribal' 
obligations, but of family obligations as well, which stimulated
'desertion' to the towns. In these peasant communities, where 
agricultural production was based on the allocation and division of 
household labour, it was primarily the family which imposed
obligations and demands on the allocation of young men's labour. As 
a consequence the relative freedom of the towns and the access to 
independently controlled individual wealth, presented an appealing 
option to young migrants and even very young boys. Naboth Mokgatle 
relates how at just twelve years old, out of resentment of having to 
spend all day herding, he 'ran away' to Kroondal (a missionary
settlement in the Rustenburg district) in order to earn some money 
of his own. He said that runaways of his age and older were 'well 
known' for their avoidance of family obligations and for defying 
their elders.
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Chief Shongoane bemoaned this tendency to migrate 'to be free' and 
identified the source of the problem as the 'desire for money' which 
'came with the white man's cash e c o n o m y I n  most instances 
this trend was associated with a breakdown of parental
control ,(^ 2 ) but the desire for independently controlled 
individual wealth was more specifically noted by some N.A.D. 
officials during this period and was identified as symptomatic of a 
'growing individualism'.
A final factor which potentially contributed both to growing
pressure on reserve lands and increasing rates of migrancy, was the
apparent pressure being brought to bear on African tenants on
white-owned farms. For many peasant families the alternative to
buying land was to rent it on nearby white farms. This usually took
the form of labour tenancy. Penzhorn suggested that Africans
realised they could make a better living off the land than they
could as wage labourers. He therefore claimed that various forms of
tenure on neighbouring privately owned farms provided a means of
(144)resisting wage-labour migration. However, Penzhorn said that
from the early 1920s the effective implementation of anti-squatter 
legislation meant that this hiring of property on nearby white farms 
was on the d e c l i n e . R e l l y  summed up what she identified as 
the combined effect of the 1913 Land Act and the implementation of 
anti-squatter legislation:
"Poor people were not only forced off white farms 
or into tenancies which more and more tended 
towards full time wage-labour, but they were also 
having a difficult time maintaining their access 
land within the locations."(146)
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However, the Impact of the Implementation of anti-squatter measures 
Is rather ambiguous and should not be overestimated. If there was 
any systematic pressure brought to bear on 'squatters' then it was 
primarily focussed on those occupying tracts of land owned by 
'absentee landlords'. In this respect it was largely tenants who 
were farming on the half or who were grazing their cattle on these 
lands rather than labour tenants who suffered. This would explain 
Penzhorn's claim that by 1930 tenants were increasingly returning to 
the reserves. Emmett, in evidence to the N.E.C., was
particularly outspoken against this 'absentee landlordism',
suggesting that it should be prohibited as this would be 'in the 
interests of segregation' and would force the Africans back into the 
reserves thereby 'freeing' a large amount of labour. 
However, it is extremely difficult to assess the quantitative effect 
of this pressure as once again no statistical evidence is 
available. It is, however, clear that labour tenants were not 
simply driven off the white farms.
The main reason for this was the snails -pace development of 
capitalist agriculture during the 1920s and 1930s which was 
reflected by the complete inability of white farmers to secure 
sufficient supplies of labour. a reSult, white farmers
were heavily dependent on labour tenants to meet their labour 
requirements.
This snails-pace development of capitalist agriculture was also 
reflected by the very small percentage of arable land which was
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under cultivation in the district The 1936 Commission oi 
Enquiry into farming conditions in the district further noted the 
detrimental effect of continued subdivision of white farms, which 
resulted in the majority of white farms being extremely small and as 
a consequence they were often uneconomical and overpopulated. The 
majority of white farms were described as 'tiny' and were more often 
than not occupied by more than one white family. By 1936 
drought and soil erosion had taken their toll on white farmers as 
well, and the foremost concern in the district was over growing 
white indigency.^^3) The priority during this period, according 
to the Commission of Enquiry, was to instigate relief schemes and a 
social welfare programme for white f a r m e r s . I t  was strongly 
asserted by the Commission that "unless preventative action is taken 
then within the next 15 years the entire district will be poverty 
stricken.”^155^
The commission did note the exceptions to this failure in ’white 
agriculture'. By the late 1930s both citrus and tobacco concerns 
were prospering and growing, and the establishment of farming 
cooperative societies further facilitated the developing economies 
of scale in these sectors of a g r i c u l t u r e . H o w e v e r ,  shortage 
of labour on white farms was generally reinforced by the inability 
of unsuccessful white farmers to attract African wage labourers onto 
their land.
Little more needs to be said about the general conditions on 
white -owned farms in the district, but the problems and demands of 
these farmers, where they related to the questions of African
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tenancy on white farms, deserve some attention. With the
exception of the citrus and tobacco farmers, all the farmers giving 
evidence to the 1936 commission expressed their reliance on labour 
tenants to meet their labour requirements. Their inability to 
recruit wage labourers was based on a number of factors. The 
primary problem experienced by white farmers was that they could not 
afford to pay wages which were competitive when compared with wages 
available to Africans in easily accessible urban areas in Pretoria 
and the Rand. This was exacerbated by the generally poor prices 
being received for agricultural goods during the period under 
r e v i e w . T h e s e  factors coupled with the harsh conditions of 
labour on white farms and the self-acknowledged widespread 
maltreatment of African labourers by white farm owners, made wage 
labour on white farms the least appealing option for Africans 
entering the wage labour market.
As a result Africans who were entering the labour market were 
inclined to migrate to the urban areas rather than take up wage 
labour on white farms. This was a practice which was noted with 
considerable concern by white farmers who almost unanimously 
appealed to the Commission to advise that measures be implemented to 
prevent the mines from recruiting labour from the Rustenburg 
area.^^^ Many white farmers even appealed that they be allowed 
to use ’illegal' labour from ’Nyasaland' and 'Blantyre* and 
complained that the local mines were continuing to utilize this 
’cheap’ labour despite it being illegal, whilst farmers were 
prohibited from doing so.^^^ White farmers appealed to the
Commission for state assistance in recruiting labour and many 
suggested the establishment of 'labour depots'.
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Another central thrust of the farmers' evidence was an appeal that 
the Masters and Servants laws, the pass laws and the Urban Areas Act 
be more rigourously a p p l i e d . T h e y  even suggested that some 
new law be framed forcing 'natives' into the reserves and onto the 
white farms, that no Africans under the age of eighteen be granted 
passes to leave the rural areas and that no further land be granted 
to the chiefdoms of the area either by purchase or in the form of 
trust land available for r e n t i n g . F i n a l l y ,  it was commonly 
asserted by white farmers that the state should do more to encourage 
Africans to take up farm labour through offering such concessions as 
the remission of tax for 'reliable' farm labourers.(165)
Quite apart from their own interests, white farmers claimed that 
their recommendations were in the best interests of the 'native 
population’ as well. They bemoaned the 'unruly nature of rural 
natives' who had been exposed to the influence of 'communist 
propaganda' in the towns^^^ and suggested that farm life was 
better for both the morale and health of the 'tribal natives'.
"We maintain that owing to the overcrowing of 
natives in the towns it is undermining their 
health. The two essential things for a native is 
sunshine and milk, and they get neither in the 
towns.”(167)
White farmers giving evidence to the Commission estimated the farm 
labour shortage during the late 1930s to be at least 5 0 % . ^ ^ )  
The most significant effect of this continued labour shortage was 
the bargaining power which it afforded to rural Africans in the
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district. It was only when offered considerable inducements that 
these Africans would take up residence on white farms rather than 
enter the urban wage labour market. To this factor can be 
attributed the main reason for the maintenance and extent of the 
system of labour tenancy throughout the period under review.
Relly is not incorrect in identifying increasing pressure on labour 
tenants in the district during this period, but the very 
vulnerability of white farmers limited the extent to which they 
themselves could afford to embark on this process. The 
implementation of 'anti-squatter measures' during the 1920s and 
1930s did not have the immediate effect of driving labour tenants 
off the white farms or into migrant labour. Rather the process was 
a gradual one which prevented, wherever possible, the formation of 
new tenancy arrangements (in particular on a rent paying 
basis), but which also gradually pressurised established 
labour tenants more and more into full time wage labour on the farms 
by continually increasing their obligations to white employers. 
Even this process, however, was not systematically embarked upon by 
the end of the 1930s.
Emerging out of the Native Farm Labour Committee of 1937, a local 
committee was established in the Rustenburg area to assess whether 
or not Chapter 4 of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 should be 
applied in the d i s t r i c t . T h i s  chapter of the Act ...
"... whilst developing residential and 
territorial segregation, recognises that natives 
must of necessity continue to reside on 
European-owned farms so as to provide the 
requisite supply of farm labour to the 
owners. "(171)
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Chapter 4 dealt with three categories of Africans on these farms: 
(1) 'Servants'; that is full-time 'servants' continuously employed
by the farm owner under contract; (2) Labour tenants, also obliged
to serve under contract and (3) 'Squatters'; Africans who were 
neither 'servants’ nor labour tenants; for example, rent payers or 
those farming 'on the half'.^^^ The Chapter placed no
restrictions on the numbers from the first category that could be 
resident on white farms. However, all labour tenants had to be 
registered with the Native Commissioner at the registration fee of 
one sixpence per tenant, and provision was made for the
establishment of a Labour Tenants Control Board to ensure that only 
the number of labour tenants necessary were registered on any farm. 
This was based on the assumption that ordinarily 5 labour tenants 
were required by a land owner on each farm, and on the further 
assumption that every such labour tenant was under contract to 
render service to the landowner for a minimum of 4 months a
year.<173)
The primary aim of the legislation, however, was to eliminate 
category 3 altogether. All 'squatters' had to be registered with 
the Native Commissioner and an annual fee was payable for each 
squatter. This fee increased over time.^^^
"It will be realised, therefore, that the act 
contemplates that the fullest freedom should be 
allowed farm owners as regards the employment of 
native servants, that labour tenants should be 
permitted subject to regulation and control for 
the prevention of abuse and that squatting should 
be permitted as a necessary evil for a limited 
period, but should be eliminated after thirty 
years."(175)
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Hie Committee established to investigate the appliation of Chapter 
four to the Rustenburg d i s t r i c t , o n  the basis of evidence led 
by white farmers in the area, recommended that the chapter be 
applied to the entire district, and claimed that there were no white 
farmers opposed to the measure.^^7) Committee recommended
that service by labour tenants should be set at four months per year 
(one month more than was the 'usual practice') and asserted that 
this would not lead to tenants leaving the farms in great 
n u m b e r s . T h e  Committee stated that there were still large 
numbers of tenants in the area which fell into category 3 and could 
be defined as 'squatters'. However, it was claimed that if Chapter 
4 was applied, many of these would enter wage labour on the farms, 
or labour tenancy c o n t r a c t s . F i n a l l y ,  the committee noted 
that white farmers in the district were unable to assert any control 
over the labour supply in the area and that this would to some 
extent be remedied by the application of Chapter 4 . (1^0)
Despite the recommendations of the Rustenburg Committee, Chapter 4 
of the Natives Trust and Land Act of 1936 was not applied to the
district.^®^ In fact, Rogers notes that by 1949 Chapter 4 had
( 182 ')not been implemented anywhere in the Union. ' Consequently 
various forms of tenancy on white-owned farms remained available to 
African agricultural producers in the region until at least the end 
of the 1930s, and white farmers themselves recognised their 
dependency on these forms of labour during this period.
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In conclusion, it is apparent that migrancy to the towns and labour 
tenancy on neighbouring white farms during the 1920s, although often 
the product of land shortage and over-crowding in the Rustenburg 
reserves were not the exclusive product of the irreversible decline 
of the rural economy. Indeed, the complex reasons for both migrancy 
and labour tenancy can only be properly understood through an 
examination of the comparative material conditions experienced by 
and within different chiefdoms in the district. In particular, the 
reasons for entrance into the migrant wage -labour market were varied 
and complex, and are only tinderstandable in the context of struggles 
revolving around the social and economic stratification within these 
communities. Rather than representing a unilinear response to the 
irreversible decline of the rural economies of the Rustenburg 
district, labour migration and labour tenancy on white farms 
probably did more to actually stave off the deterioration of peasant 
communities. However, the general vulnerability of the majority of 
peasant families has been noted, and the drought period from 1925 
until 1930 (when the Native Economic Commission took evidence in 
Rustenburg) was clearly beginning to take its toll. The
continuation of the drought over the next seven years reached 
critical proportions, and resulted in something of a crisis in the 
rural economy of the Rustenburg district.
IV Rural Decline and State Intervention
By 1932 Rev. Stegmann wrote of the Pilansberg N.A.D. district that:
'things have never been worse, for the last twenty six years at 
(183}least'. He pointed to the fact that for three years running
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crops had failed due to drought and that there had been a drastic 
reduction in the size of herds of cattle. Having two years earlier 
pointed out to the N.E.C. that the Bakgatla of Saulspoort were 
amongst the most advanced tribes in the Union, he wrote in 1932:
"The idea that the Bakgatla tribe is rich is a 
fallacy."(184)
Writing at the beginning of April, Stegmann warned that if it did 
not rain within ten days, the entire crop, of which 80% had already 
been lost, would be written off completely. He claimed that
numerous families were already without food and depended on wild 
fruits for their livelihood. He noted that the drought on white 
owned farms was also driving people back into the reserves, as white 
farmers could no longer employ them. The remaining cattle hah 
depreciated in value and Stegmann recounted that people were 
exchanging an oxen for two bags of mlelies when they had the 
opportunity, stegmann concluded that:
"I am afraid that unless something is done to 
remedy to some extent the present state of 
things, numbers will perish and thousands of 
others will drift to the towns."(186)
By February of 1933 the situation had become even more disasterous. 
The Rustenburg Herald reported as follows:
"Although the whole of the Union has had to 
suffer during the last few years, in no part have 
the conditions been more felt than in
Rustenburg. This has been caused chiefly by 
either decreased or irregular rainfall and many 
of the country people have been brought down to 
the verge of starvation ... Not a bag of maize
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should leave the district, in fact supplies 
should be augmented if necessary, and the 
government should buy, or even commandeer 
foodstuffs required ... It may soon be too 
late."(187)
By March of 1933 there were reports that in areas of the Fokeng
chiefdom there were no crops at all and numbers of people were
either starving or living off melons and b e r r i e s N o  crops
were reaped at Bethanie either, and the Rev. Behrens reported that
by mid-1933 all stored grain in the village would be exhausted. He
reported that a number of people were already taking up employment
(189}and accepting just a plate of food as payment.' ' By the end of
April Behrens reported that there were 356 families in Bethanie 
alone who did not have a single bag of g r a i n H e  estimated 
that 4 272 bags of grain would be the minimum required to tide these 
people over till May of 1934.
By June of 1933, any trade in grain had completely ceased in the
district and the entire area was described as destitute.
Famine relief measures were instituted, but were provided only for
those in the 'locations' and not for those on white owned 
(192)farms. By 1935 although there was a mild recovery, rainfall
(193)remained poor. Nonetheless conditions were sufficiently
Improved to hold a 'Native' agricultural show during 1935.^^^ 
However, similar proposed shows were called off during 1937 and 193H 
due to continuing drought, and in 1939 the show was again postponed 
because of locust invasions By this time the long term
effects of the drought were becoming manifest and for the first time 
extensive anti-soil erosion measures were initiated in the African 
reserves of the Rustenburg district
The effect of the ten years of almost continual drought between 1925 
and 1935 had by the end of this period fundamentally undermined the 
peasant economies in the district and had seriously impaired their 
abilities independently to recover from these circumstances. At the 
end of 1936 this was clear to N.A.D. officials and a commission of 
enquiry was established to examine appropriate ’rehabilitation' 
measures under the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act.^^^ This act 
was viewed by government as a complement to the 1913 Land Act and 
represented formal acceptance of the principal of segregation. 
Under the Act certain areas of land were to be 'released' and were
/  T Q Q  \available either to be owned or held in trust for Africans. 1 
In the Transvaal 4 753 992 morgen of land were to be released out of 
the national total of 6 729 853 m o r g e n . R o g e r s  asserts that
the priority of the Act was remedial measures designed to 'give the
, . ( 200)reserves an opportunity to recover.'v
The commission established in Rustenburg took evidence from white 
farmers in the district with the object of establishing where 
purchaseable land was available in the area. The majority of these 
farmers proved willing to sell their lands provided they received 
adequate compensation.^^1) However, it is the evidence of tne 
African chiefs which reflects both the prevailing conditions in the 
reserves, as well as their central concerns. Most of these chiefs 
complained about overcrowding and overstocking on their 'locations' 
and, with the exception of Chief Mogale of the BaPo, they complained 
about the lack of water facilities on their l a n d s . M o g a l e  
stated that although there was a reasonable water supply on his
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lands there was a substantial shortage of available 'ploughing 
(203)lands'. ' As well as requesting extensive additions of arable 
land, chiefs also made requests for land which they had historically 
occupied:
"We have made a list of farms we want the 
• government to buy for us. They are all lands
where our ancestors are buried. Our location is 
very congested. Many of the people are away at 
work. Some have been away for a long time. 
Others come home for visits ... If land is bought 
for us some of the people would like to come home 
for good.”(204)
In a similar vein chief Ramakoka of the Pilansberg district 
suggested that if land was bought for him 'the tribe would be 
willing to come together.'^05) ^ number of the chiefs from the
smaller chiefdoms pointed out that their chiefdoms were deeply in 
debt and requested that they be given the land as they could not 
afford to purchase it.^^^ These smaller chiefdoms were also 
apparently more concerned with gaining access to extended grazing 
land rather than ploughing land and this suggests their diminished 
stake in cultivation activities.(207)
By contrast Chief Mogale of the BaPo asserted that his people were 
not concerned with land which could be rented, but were only 
interested in land which they could purchase.(206) chief 
Mokgatle's land requests were motivated by concern to gain 'control
over one concrete block' of land, his concern being to consolidate
(209)all the lands of the Fokeng chiefdom into a single unit. 
Furthermore, Chiefs Mabe, Mokgatle, Pilane and Mamogale all 
expressed a desire that land be made available for individual
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purchase and specifically that chiefs be allowed to buy land for 
themselves.
"I would like the Commission to consider my 
request that a chief should be able to buy land 
for himself if he is able to do so."(2 1 1 )
Evidence to the Commission reflects that despite the general 
impoverishment of the rural reserves during the 1930s, conditions 
still varied considerably in different chiefdoms. This fact is 
reflected both in the differing priorities of the chiefs giving 
evidence, as well as in the report of the Commission which 
followed. In the course of taking evidence, the Commissioner Mr. 
Nichols, gave some indication of this differentiation when he 
encouraged the chiefs of the small and isolated Phiring, Kwena ba 
Modimosana ba Mmatau and Kwena ba Modimosana ba Maake chiefdoms, to 
give up their isolated reserves and accept new lands in exchange, or 
consolidation into one of the larger chiefdoms. When told by Chief 
Mabalane of the Phiring that his people would refuse to move, 
Nicholls responded thus:
"Nobody can force you to move, but you will no 
longer be able to hire the ground you have been 
hiring for years ... and the need for expansion 
will grow bigger."(2 1 2 )
Nicholls was much more explicit in the Commission Report. he 
identified the three smallest isolated chiefdoms as "little black 
spots without any possibility of expansion" which should "coalesce 
with larger locations in order to provide for the legitimate wants 
of the natives inhabiting them."^^'^ In view of this, he
131
suggested that Mabalane's location, Ratsegae's location and Selon's 
location be ' liquidated'
"If a fair and generous exchange is offered with 
due regard to tribal affinities and ethnical 
considerations, the Committee is of the opinion 
that the exchange can be effected with little 
trouble."(215)
The broad recommendations of the Committee were based on four stated 
factors which were regarded as 'economical and physical 
necessities.': Firstly, the congested condition of the locations; 
Secondly, the unproductive state of the locations as a consequence 
of overcrowding and overstocking; Thirdly, the resultant drift to 
the towns of 'whole families of natives' and finally, the need for 
'giving the department ample scope for effective planning both in 
the reallocation of land purchased and in making provision for 
future purchase.
In its report, the Commission was at pains to assert that it had not 
been influenced by the demands of chiefs who inevitably 'asked for 
more land than they need'.^"^ It was also asserted that 
released land should be rented and not sold or handed over to the 
chiefs ...
"... to do what they liked with and thus give 
them an opportunity of reducing it (released land 
G.S.) to the same condition as the 
locations."(218)
Finally it was noted by the Commission that transfer of ownership of 
land to the trust did not mean automatic or immediate settlement by
Africans. the Commission recommended that ...
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”... Proper plans must be made with 
agriculturalists, land settlement officials and 
skilled anthropologists ... Concurrently with the 
actual settlement of Natives on these lands 
should go the study and development of Native 
government; for, in the opinion of the Committee, 
we are set out to build up a new Native society 
for the future in which all sections of the 
native people must play their part."(219)
The Committee recommended:
1. The excision from the scheduled native Area of 17 031
morgen of land. This amounted to the removal of the three 
small chiefdoms mentioned above. It was, however,
acknowledged that the disestablishment of these scheduled 
areas could only be achieved by an act of parliament if the 
chiefdoms involved would agree to a land exchange.
2. The inclusion in the released area (involving purchase) of 
white-owned farms to the extent of 55 614 morgen; and
3. The immediate purchase of additional farms offered to the 
trust, to the extent of 60 459 morgen.(220)
By 1938 a large amount of this land had already been bought by the
trust. At this point it was made clear that the majority of the
Commission’s recommendations had been accepted and that it was "...
intended to effect the settlement of trust land, as far as possible,
( 221)on a tribal basis • • •
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Hie following lands were due to be allocated to the Chiefdoms of the




Kwena ba Modimosana ba Matlhaku 
Ba Po
Tlokwa ba ga Botasu 
Phiring
Kwena ba Modimosana ba Mmatau 
Kwena ba Modimosana ba Maake










These rehabilitation measures reflect to some extent the contrasting 
conditions in the various chiefdoms by the end of the 1930s. Those 
chiefdoms which were still considered to be 'viable' and capable of 
recovery were allocated the land seen to be necessary to this 
process. Hie smaller more isolated chiefdoms were, however, given 
the option of removal or stagnation. These smaller chiefdoms were 
identified as 'black' spots' which would eventually 'have to be 
removed’.(223)
The settlement of newly released land on a 'tribal basis' was 
accepted by the N.A.D., thereby further frustrating any individual 
purchase of land, although individuals were able to rent these 
lands. This was acknowledged by the N.A.D. officials as being 
slightly problematic, as the large number of 'detribalized natives' 
were seen to be unlikely to return to the land on this basis (224).
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"The particular needs need to be emphasised also 
of the large and growing classes of rural Native 
who aspires to live on and cultivate his own plot 
of ground. If evidence is wanted of the 
existence of this class, I need only refer to 
innumerable applications with which the 
Department has had to deal in recent years made 
by Natives individually and in communities, 
varying in number from two or three to scores of 
Natives, to buy land in their own right. They 
form a particular class among location residents, 
and I feel that the Committees, in dealing with 
the locations and the extra ground which they 
consider necessary for the needs of the 
locations, might have borne these particular 
classes in mind and have made provision for them 
by earmarking farms in released areas upon which 
these Native might have been settled. In my 
opinion this type of Native is to be encouraged.
To settle them contentedly now is to build up a 
class of Native who will be of infinite value to 
the administration of the future, when the clash 
comes, as I believe it will come, between the 
settled forces of law and order and the 
subversive forces now being inculcated through 
industrial influences among the Native 
population."(225)
Furthermore, it was identified by N.A.D. officials that
increasingly ...
”... the chiefs have very little control of their 
tribes and it would be fatal to expect that they 
will be able to control overstocking of trust 
property."(226)
State intervention through the 'rehabilitation programme' of the 
late 1930s, appears from the above to have been as concerned with 
the political imperatives of segregation (the removal of 'black 
spots' the entrenchment of communal rather than individual 
ownership, and the development of 'Native government') as it was 
with the resuscitation of the reserve economies in the wake of the
disasterous drought.
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The process of land allocation under the 1936 Trust and Lands Act 
can clearly be seen to have benefitted the more affluent chiefdoms 
whilst further depriving the small and more vulnerable ones. As 
such, the state's 'rehabilitation' programme reinforced the 
stratification within and between chiefdoms in the district, further 
complicating the complex processes of socio-economic stratification 
in these Tswana communities. It would therefore be simplistic 
merely to identify the collapse of rural Tswana economies in the 
Rustenburg district during the 1930s, as a consequence of ecological 
disaster. Rather, it is necessary to trace the effects of tnese 
developments on the processes of political and economic 
stratification within these communities and the extent to which this 
was manipulated by the capitalist state. However, it is nigh 
impossible neatly to classify the economic interest groups or 
different class interests which were developing within these 
chiefdoms. Indeed, throughout the 1920s and 1930s these differing 
and often conflicting material interests were only identifiable 
through the expression given them in political and ideological 
struggles being waged within the various chiefdoms of the district. 
In each of the chiefdoms of the district the particular material 
conditions experienced, and which have been described in this 
chapter, gave expression to political and ideological struggles 
largely focussed on a challenge to chiefly control over vital rural 
resources. The remarkable feature of these struggles was that 
despite differing material conditions within the varius chiefdoms, 
and despite the contrasting periodization of rural decline in the 
different communities, these struggles took similar forms and
13b
Ideological expressions in every instance. In order to identify and 
interpret the complexities of rural African class formation in the 
Rustenburg district during the 1920s and 1930s, it is therefore 
necessary to now turn to these concrete political struggles.
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land according to census of 1946. Although the 
figures from the 1946 census are only of limited 
use in gauging the population distribution during 
the previous two decades, and despite Breutz's 
suggestion that the census figures were slighty 
inaccurate, the 1946 census is the only detailed 
demographic breakdown available for the district 
which is within a reasonable time-span of the 
period under review.
8 6 . The statistics provided in this table have been drawn from a
wide range of sources. The central sources were 
two volumes of files in the N.T.S. collection I 
N.T.S., 10219, 10/423/1 to 10/423/14, and N.T.S., 
10220, 10/423/15 to 10/423/17. These 17 files 
dealt with ’rehabilitation and land reclamation' 
in seventeen chiefdoms of the Rustenburg 
magisterial district between 1931 and 1947. All 
the figures on the table, were accurate in 193b. 
These figures were also reproduced with only 
insignificant variations in N.T.S., 3644,
1227/308, Native Trust and Land Act 1936, Native 
Affairs inspection (1936-41). However, none of 
these references dealt with the tiny Taung ba ga 
Selale chiefdom which only owned two portions of 
the farm Kafferskraal 805 which were bought in 
the name of the chief and 7 and 14 individuals 
respectively. The incomplete statistics provided 
here were drawn from Breutz, P.L., The Tribes, 
pp. 159-74 and N.T.S., 3438, 51/308, Farm
Kafferskraal or Sefanyaskraal (1911-48).
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The figure given for cattle units in the last column in the
table, represents a standard in which five small 
stock equals one cattle unit. Therefore, No. of 
cattle units =* No. of large stock + (no. of small 
stock divided by 5). Also see N .T.S., 3941,
241/311(a) Livestock Returns (1936-1942).
Hie single dubious statistic included in the table is that
provided for the population of the Kwena ba 
Modimosana by Matlhaku chiefdom. This same 
figure was given both in N«T»S., 10219, 10/423/4, 
Rehabilitation Pella's Location, and N.T.S., 
3644, 1227/308. However, Breutz quoted the 1946 
- census figure for this chiefdom’s population as 
3860. In 1950 he suggested that the population 
in the district was ± 4,300 strong and that the 
total population of the tribe at that time was 
between 5 300 and 5 800. Breutz, P.L., The
Tribes, p. 22d, Table IV. Breutz's statistics
bppih more realistic, although in Rex versus 
Finias Moroane and 23 others (1941) the chief of 
this chiefdom, David Moshome Gasebone gave 
evidence that he ruled 8  0 0 0  people of which 
1 500 were registered tax payers. N.T.S., 3792, 
2483/308, BaKwena -Ba -Molimosana (Chief Moshome 
Rustenburg) Secession of Certain Natives from 
(1935-42); Rex vs. Finias Moroane and 23 others 
(1941), p.6 . It is possible that the number of 
8  000 quoted in N.T.S. 10219, 10/423/4 and
N.T.S., 3644, 1227/308 was also based on the
estimation of the chief, although this is
unlikely. Breutz suggests that in 1950 the
population density of the land owned by the Kwena 
ba Molimosana ba Matlhaku was much the same as 
that on land owned by the Kwena ba Mogopa (50 - 
51 persons per square mile). As both chiefdoms 
had approximately the same amount of land, it can 
be assumed that the population on these 
respective tribal lands was much the same. 
Breutz, P.L., The Tribes of, p. 22d.
87. L.D.B. 2082, R3701, Commission of enquiry into farming
------ conditions (1930 - 7), Report of investigation
(5th - 6th/3/1930).
8 8 . S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhom to N.E.C., pp. 964 - 6 .
89. Relly, G., 'Social and Economic Change', pp. 43-4. Sorghum
was generally the most preferred crop in the 
district due mainly to its drought resistant 
qualities. Maize was produced as well and was 
more widely traded than sorghum.
90. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhom to N.E.C., p. 965.
91. Interview with Ernestina Mekwe (undated), pp. 2 - 4.Acknowedgements and gratitude are due to 
interviewer M.B. Nkotsoe, who conducted this and 
all the following interviews referred to below; 
to the African Studies Institute of the
University of the Witwatersrand, which made these 
interviews available to me and to Belinda Bozzoli 
who kindly drew them to my attention.
92. ibid. The figure given was produced on 3 fields
totalling 28 acres (+ 13 morgen). The
statistics provided by other interviewees from 
Phokeng vary considerably but no indication was 
given as to the size of the fields cultivated. 
Interview with Evelyn Rakola (undated), p. 5, 
claimed 15 - 20 bags per annum. Interview with 
Naomi Setshedi (24/11/81), p. 37., claimed the 
same figure.
93. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to N.E.C., p. 981.
94. ibid.
95. ibid., pp. 1018 - 1019. Hie development and use of
'progressive farming methods during the 1920s, 
particularly amongst the Christian majority of 
the entire district, was noted by Penzhorn, 
Emmett and Stegmann in their evidence to the 
N.E.C. One of the commissioners, Major Anderson 
concluded from their evidence that "... the 
Native here seems to have got a considerable 
degree of advancement beyond other districts in 
South Africa". Evidence of N.E.C., S.A.B.A.,
K/26, p. 1026. Penzhorn attributed this fact to 
the longer exposure to 'white civilization’ which 
African inhabitants of the district received, 
ibid.
96. Breutz, P.L., The Tribes, pp. 119-121.
97. ibid., p. 121. He claimed that the average family produced
between 3 and 8 bags of grain in a good year, for 
most of this period.
98. S.A.B.A., K/26, Emmett to N.E.C., pp. 1071 - 2.
99. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to N.E.C., p. 966.
100. N.T.S. 7360, 222/327, Native Shows: Rustenburg.
101. N.T.S., 7219, 96/326, Cattle Sales Rustenburg (1933-51). Also 
  see N.T.S., 7367, 235/327, Rustenburg Bull Camp
(1931-1945).
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102. S.A.B.A., K/26, Emmett to N.E.C., p. 1073. Penzhorn disagreed
suggesting that these demonstrators were 'a waste 
of time'. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to N.E.C., p. 
967.
103. This resistance and suspicion was generally expressed through
concern at the removal of 'tribal land' from the 
control of members of the 'tribes' themselves. 
See N.T.S., 7344, 146/327, Demonstration Plots, 
Rustenburg (1930-4); and N.T.S., 7430, 403/327, 
Fodder Plots, experimental and Nursery Plots. 
However, from at latest 1935, every chief in the 
district had been won over to the idea of 
demonstration plots and most were providing land 
for this purpose themselves. N.T.S., 6811, 6/318 
Meetings of Chiefs (1925-37): Minutes of Meeting 
in December 1935, pp. 18 - 23; 25 - 32.
104. Breutz, P.L., The Tribes, p. 17.
105. N.T.S., 3644, 1227/308, Evidence of chiefs Selon, Mabalane,
Tlolwe and Mosome to Native Affairs Commission Re 
Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 (14th
16th/9/1936), pp. 6 - 9; 15 - 17. Also see
Breutz, P.L., The Tribes, p. 119.
106. S.A.B.A., K/26, Emmet to N.E.C., pp. 1089-90. It should be
noted here that the extent of the sale of
agricultural goods for cash was limited even
amongst the Fokeng. Penzhorn claimed that most 
of the agricultural surplus produce was bartered 
or exchanged for goods in kind, and this was
usually done with the stores and mills in the
immediate vicinity. Penzhorn said that barter 
was the 'Fokeng form of trade' ... ”Dit is hulle 
geld, want hulle het nie kontant nie; of as hul 
lets wil koop, dan ruil hul die produkte wat hul 
in die mandjies dra vir die goed wat hulle wil 
koop.” S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to N.E.C., p. 
982. He went on to claim that Africans received 
approximately the same value for goods bartered 
as they might have if they were sold. ibid., p. 
982. However, most of the chiefs of the area 
complained of being 'forced* by local
storekeepers to barter, and bemoaned the fact 
that they received much less in this manner than 
their produce was actually worth. S.A.B.A., 
K/26, Ramokoka to N.E.C., pp. 1145-6 and
S.A.B.A., K/26, Pilane to N.E.C., p. 1126.
107. Relly, G., 'Social and Economic Change'. This argument is also
reproduced in Simpson, G.N., 'The Political and 
Legal Contradictions'.
108. The lack of accurate statistics documenting levels of migrancy
from the district during the period under review, 
means that it is only possible to identify some 
of the general trends.
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109. Population statistics are cited in the first section of this
chapter. As late as 1924 Chief Zibi arrived in 
the Rustenburg district where he established his 
independent amaHlubi chiefdom. The tribe
migrated from the Transkei with the consent of 
the N.A.D. Breutz, P.L. , The Tribes, p. 22.
110. By 1930 over half the Africans in the Rustenburg district were
grazing their cattle on nearby white-owned 
farms. S.A.B.A., K/26, Emmett to N.E.C., pp.
1065-1068.
111. Relly, G., ’Social and Economic Change’, pp. 3 2 - 7 .
112. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhom to N.E.C., p.966; S.A.B.A., K/26,
Emmett to N.E.C., pp. 1067 - 9. Relly noted that 
the water supply on white farms in the district 
was considerably better than in the 'locations'. 
Relly, G., 'Social and Economic Change' pp. 32 - 
3. See footnote 110 above.
113. N.T.S., 9513, 138/400 (31), Soil Erosion : Rustenburg (1935 -
------ 41); N.T.S., 9533, 138/400 (74), Soil Erosion
Works : Rustenburg (1937-8); and N.l.S., 9535,
138/400 (80), Social Erosion Reports : Rustenburg 
(1938-9).
114. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhom to N.E.C., pp. 1016-7.
115. ibid., p. 1016. "Dr. Roberts: 'Your people would perish if
---- they did not go forth (enter wage labour -
G.S.)' .
Penzhom : 'Yes, the boys have to go out
to work, but I do not think 
it is absolutely necessary 
for the girls to go out.'" 
ibid.
116. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhom to N.E.C., p. 974; Emmett to N.E.C.,
p. 1070.
117. Evidence of chiefs to N.E.C., S.A.B.A., K/26, pp
Also N.T.S., 1372, 1/213(5),
Rustenburg (1913 - 1928).
1104-1134. 
Tribal levies,
118. Relly, G., 'Social and Economic Change', p. 39.
119. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhom to N.E.C., p. 1001; Emmett to N ,E.C.,
pp. 1065; 1075.
120. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhom to N.E.C., p. 1024.
121. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to N.E.C., pp. 965; 1002, He suggested
that as a result, farming acitivities were 
actually expanding during this time.
122. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to N.E.C., p. 979.
123. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to N.E.C.. p. 1022. Stegmann also
noted this in evidence to the N.E.C.. p. 1048.
124. Interview with Naomi Sets'nedi (17/6/83), pp. 11 - 13.
125. S.A.B.A., K/26, Chiefs Mogale and Pilane to N.E.C^., pp. 1104 -
1106.
126. S.A.B.A., K/26, Emmett to N.E.C., p. 1087.
127. S.A.B.A. K/26, Stegmann to N.E.C., p. 1038.
128. ibid., p. 50. Also S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to N.E.C., p. 964.
129. ibid., p. 1017.
130. The conditions and circumstances on the neighbouring white
farms are dealt with in the next few pages.
131. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn, Stegmann and Emmett all noted this
fact in their evidence to the N.E.C., esp. pp 
1 0 1 0  - 1019.
132. Breutz, P.L., The Tribes, p. 76.
133. ibid.; S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to N.E.C., p. 1010.
134. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to N.E.C., p. 972.
135. S.A.B.A., K/26, Emmett to N.E.C., p. 1084.
136. S.A.B.A., K/26, Pilane to N.E.C,, p. 1111.
137. S.A.B.A., K/26, Mokgatle to N.E.C., pp. 1100 - 03.
138. ibid., pp. 1113 and 1131-2.
139. S.A.B.A., K/26, Stegmann to N.E.C., p. 1033.
140. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, pp. 102-11.
141. S.A.B.A., K/26, Shongoane to N.E.C., p. 1107.
142. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to N.E.C., p. 1016; Stegmann to
N.E.C., p. 1048.
143. See the discussion of the Selonskraal dispute in chapter three,
144. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to N.E.C., p. 965.
145. ibid., pp.993-1004.
146. Relly, G., ’Social and Economic Change’, p. 38.
147. S.A.B.A., K/^6, Penzhorn to N.E.C., p. 1000.
150
148. S.A.B.A., K/26, Bnrnett to N.E.C., pp. 1067*9; and Stegmann to
N.E.C., p. 1040.
149 L D.B., 2082 R3701, Investigations into farming Conditions
------ (1936*7). Also see S.A.B.A., K/356, Native Farm
Labour Commission (1937-8), Correspondence and 
Evidence at Rustenburg. (December 1937).
150. S.A.B.A., K/26, Emmett to N.E.C., p. 1078.
151. Refer back to p. 78.
152. L.D.B., 2082, R3701, Investigation into Farming Conditions,
Report, pp. 25-6. Ihe commission estimated that 
for a farm to be 'profitably run' it should be at 
least 2 000 morgan in size. By 1934 only 195 












































- 35; Also JUS., 443, 3/304/28, Indigency and 
Malaria, Rustenburg district (1927-34).
154. This was to involve the establishment of experimental farming
plots, provision of boreholes, establishment of 
white agricultural demonstrators, provision of 
educational improvements and the establishment of 
joint church and state social welfare 
committees. In addition it was strongly 
recommended by the Commission that the law 
preventing relatives from buying land from each 
other be waived in the area, to facilitate the 
buying out of the uneconomical small holders, 
ibid., pp. 35-41.
155. ibid., p. 24.










This section is drawn from evidence of white farmers to the
S.A.B.A., K/356, Native Farm Labour Commission
(1937-8), at Rustenburg on 2/12/1937. Altogether 
18 different farming cooperatives were 
represented in the evidence to the Commission. 
In addition numerous statements were submitted by 
individual farmers.
ibid., pp. 6 - 1 0 ; 19.
ibid., pp. 5 - 31. In evidence the various farmers claimed to
-----* pay their farm workers different amounts. The
average wage according to the evidence of white 
farmers, was between 20/- and 35/- a month. 
Chiefs Mogale and Selon, however, claimed that 
the average wages received by their subjects were 
between 10/- and 30/- a month. One labour 
tenant, L. Tlhong, stated that he was paid 5/- 
plus rations each month.
"The wages as paid to natives on farms are on the 
whole lower than that of any other mining or 
commercial industry. Housing is poor, hours of 
work necessarily longer. Food adequate but lacks 
variety. Sources of amusement non-existent. The 
younger natives therefore flock to larger 
centres.” Submitted by Add. N.C., ibid., 
Questionnaire No. 2.
This concern was expressed not only in evidence to the Farm
Labour Commission, ibid., pp. 7 - 10; 15 - 18,
but was a characteristic appeal of white farmers 
throughout the period of the 1920s and 1930s. 
See N.T.S., 2036, 40/280, Native Labour
Recruiting, Rustenburg (1922-39). In this case a 
prospective native labour recruiter’ was refused 
a licence to recruit for the mines on the basis 
of appeals from white farmers in the area.
N.T.S., 2138 247/280 Rustenburg Tropical Natives (1924-38);
------ N.T.S., 2205, 335/280, Labour Supply - Iron,
Chrome and Platinum Mines, Rustenburg (1937); 
S.A.B.A., K/356, Evidence to Farm Labour
Commission, pp. 7-10; 11; 15; 18.
ibid., pp. 15-18.
ibid., pp. 4-11, 17-19.
ibid., pp• 5; 17; 6-7. Also see N .T.S., 3718, 715/323,
Complaints about Squatters and Kaffir Farming. 
(1932).
165. ibid., pp. 15; 17.
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166. ibid., pp. 7; 9; 19.
167. lb**.> P*1*
168. Ibid., pp. 8 ; 1 0 .
169. 41 applications for 'squatters’ rights on various farms in the
district were reviewed in the N.T.S. 
correspondence between 1919 and 1935. Of these 
32 were applications to 'squat' on white farms. 
All 32 applications were turned down unless they 
constituted the renewal of an established
arrangement. Even single individuals were 
refused these rights to 'squat' on lands that 
were not within a scheduled area, e.g.'s N.l.S., 
7134, 619/323. Natives of Kameelhoek 45 (1930); 
and N.T.S., 7131, 552/323, Natives on Brakvlei 
(1928). By contrast applications to 'squat' 
(this was usually on a rent paying basis) on 
scheduled land were granted in all cases. For 
example N.T.S., 7134, 619/323, Natives on
Groenfontein (1929-39). On this farm within the 
scheduled area the number of 'squatters'
increased from 27 people in 1929 to 14 families 
in 1935. By 1938 there were 30 families
'squatting' on the farm. Possibly the most
significant example is that in N.T.S., 7097,
118/323, Natives on Vlakfontein 892 (1922-26).
Here a group of twenty Africans had lived on the 
farm on a rent paying basis for 18 years when the 
farm was sold in 1922. They remained on the farm 
as labour tenants under the new owner for two 
years until the farm once again changed hands. 
At that point the twenty occupants put in an 
application to return to a rent paying basis of 
occupying the land on the farm. Their 
application was turned down on the basis that 
white farmers on other portions of the farm 
complained that: 1 . this was 'against the law'; 
2 . was a threat to white farmers and their 
crops; 3 . would depreciate the value of the white 
farms and 4. that 'native' labour would be 
impossible to procure if rent tenancies were 
allowed. The twenty Africans were informed that 
they were not allowed to change their 'squatting' 
status - that they would be allowed to stay on as 
labour tenants but not as rent paying tenants and 
that this depended on the requirements of the new 
owner.
170. N.T.S., 8840, 97/362 (25), Native Trust and Land Act 1936;
Application of Chapter 4, Rustenburg (1938-9).
153
171. Rogers, H., Native Administration In the Union of South Africa,
Second edition, Revised on behalf of the Native 
Affairs Department by Linington, P.A., Pretoria : 
Government Printer (1949), p. 152. Chapter 4 
related specifically to Africans on white-owned 
farms and attempted to coordinate the various 
laws of pre-Union legislatures ”... so as to 
guard against the establishment of uncontrolled 
native locations ... and to prevent the obnoxious 
practice of kaffir farming." ibid., p. 152.
172. ibid.
173. ibid., pp. 152-3.
174. Thus for the first 2 years 10s per squatter was charged, for
the next two years £ 1  per head was required, the 
following 2 years £2, then £3 and from the 1 0 th 
year onwards £ 5  per squatter had to be paid by 
the landowner, ibid., p. 153.
175. ibid.
176. Hie application of Chapter 4 was not a foregone conclusion, but
was only applied to such areas as it may have 
been extended to by proclamation of the 
Governor-General ibid., p. 152.




181. The reasons for this are not explicit in the Rustenburg
District, but it appears that the combined 
effects of the reliance of white farmers on 
labour tenants to meet their labour requirements 
and the dangers of growing over-population in the 
reserves, made the application of chapter IV both 
redundant and undesireable.
182. Rogers, H., Native Administration, p. 154. For other areas of
the country it has been argued that the active 
resistance of squatters and rent paying tenants 
as well as labour tenants actually made it 
impossible for the state ot apply chapter 4 
despite some attempts. See Morris, M.L., 'Ihe 
Development of Capitalism in South African 
Agriculture : Class Struggle in the Countryside', 
Economy and Society, 5 (1976), pp. 292-343; and 
Hirson, 17^ 'Rural Revolt in South Africa',
institute of Commonwealth Studies Seminar Paper, 
No. 8 , London : University of London (1977).
154
183. N.T.S., 7851, 50/336, Famine Relief : Rustenburg (1932 - 42);
Stegmann to S.N.C. (Pilansberg) (1.4.1932).
184. ibid.
185. ibid.
18 6 . ibid.
187. The Rustenburg Herald, 'Famine at Rustenburg' (17/12/1933).
188. N.T.S., 7851, 50/336, Add. N.C. to S.N.A. (3/3/33).
189. ibid., Behrens to Add. N.C. (10/3/33).
190. ibid., Behrens to Add. N.C. (25/4/33). He suggested that the
actual number was much higher, because many 
families were refusing to give details as they 
were suspicious that it was for tax collection 
purposes.
191. ibid., Add. N.C. to Director Native Agriculture (b/6/33).
192. ibid., This involved both relief in kind as well as the
provision of employment in road and dam
construction works. Chiefs were also advised to 
convince their people to sell large numbers of 
scrub cattle which were 'likely to die at any 
rate' ibid. Between 1932 and 1935 large numbers 
of cattle were being sold at cattle sales in 
Rustenburg. These cattle were generally in a 
very poor condition and were fetching on average 
£2 a head. N.T.S., 7219, 96/326, Cattle Sales : 
Rustenburg (1932 -51).
193. See Table II on page 80 above.
194. N.T.S., 7360, 327, Native Shows : Rustenburg.
195. ibid.
196. N.T.S., 9513, 138/400 (31), Soil Erosion : Rustenburg (1935 - 
41);
N.T.S., 9533, 138/400 (74), Soil Erosion VJorks : Rustenburg
(1937-8);
N.T.S., 9535, 138/400 (80), Soil Erosion Reports : Rustenburg 
(1936-9).
197. N.T.S., 3644, 1227/308, Native Trust and Land Act 1936:
Rustenburg.
198. Rogers, H., Native Administration, pp. 147-8.
These 'released areas' were based on the 
recommendations of various land committees such 
as the Beaumont Committee.
199. ibid., pp. 148-9.
155
200. ibid., p. 155. In practice, Rogers admitted that much of the
'released' land was already occupied by Africans 
and was therefore of little value for 
reallocation. ibid.
201. N.T.S., 3644, 1227/308, Evidence to N.A.D. Commission of
Enquiry on the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936,
pp. 1 -6 .
2 0 2 . ibid., pp. 6 -1 0 .
203. ibid,, p. 6 .
204. ibid., Evidence of Chief Mabe, p. 6 .
205. ibid., Evidence of Chief Ramakoka, p. 7.
206. ibid., Evidence of Chiefs, pp. 7-8.
207. ibid., Evidence of Chief Selon, p. 15; Evidence of Chief
Mabalane, p. 15.
208. ibid., Evidence of Chief Mogale, p. 10.
209. ibid., Evidence of Chief Mokgatle, p. 8 .
2 1 0 . ibid., pp. 6-17.
211. ibid., Evidence of Chief Mabe, p.8 . Also see N.T.S., 3637, 
1211/308, Offers of Land for Native settlement, Rustenburg 
(1936-1961).
2 1 2 . ibid., p.16.
213. ibid., Commission Report, p.l.
214. ibid., p.3.
215. ibid.
216. ibid., pp. 8-9.
217. ibid., p. 9.
218. ibid., p. 10. Also see N .T.S., 3767, 2320/308 (16), Disposal
of Improvements on Trust Farms, Rustenburg 
(1939-1943).
219. ibid., pp. 11 - 12.
220. ibid., Report Schedule, p. 5.
221. ibid., S.N.A. to N.C. (1/2/38).
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222. These figures are drawn from N.T.S., 10219, 10/423/1 to
10/423/14 and N.T.S., 10220, 10/423/15 to
10/423/17. The comparatively small amount of 
land allocated to the Kwena ba Mogopa was 
complemented by land given to sectors of the 
chiefdom outside of the Rustenburg district.
223. N.T.S. 3644, 1227/308, N.A.D. Commission of Enquiry on the
Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, Minister of 
Native Affairs to S.N.A. (10/5/1938). By the 
1950s these chiefdoms were still situated in 
exactly the same position as during the 1930s.
224. ibid., Add. N.C. to Chief N.C. (19/3/38).
225. N.T.S., 20219, 10/423/1. Rehabilitation : Rustenburg (1937-40),
Chief N.C. to S.N.A. (10/6/37).
226. ibid.
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CHAPTER THREE ’STRUGGLES FORSHADOWED AND STRUGGLES FORGOTTEN*
POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN THE RUSTENBURG DISTRICT IN 
THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
In the previous chapter the prevalent material conditions in the 
various chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district were traced through the 
century before the 1920s. In the period immediately after the turn 
of the century conflicts related to these material conditions began 
to give vent to political and ideological discourses which 
crystallised more fully in the struggles of the period 1920 - 40. 
Although sporadic and often individualized, the struggles during the 
early decades of the century - focussed on chiefly rights to tribute 
and labour services, control over the acquisition and distribution 
of land and the legitimacy of chiefly legal authority - anticipated, 
in both form and content, many of the political and ideological 
conflicts which were to follow. Not only did these struggles give 
expression to the material grievances and experiences of African 
rural dwellers in the district, but they also took distinctive and 
particular forms of resistance to both white government and 'tribal' 
authorities. Furthermore, the responses and strategies adopted by 
both N.A.D. officials and chiefs after the turn of the century also 
anticipated, to some degree, patterns during the 1920s and 1930s.
Objections to chiefly authority were expressed from a number of 
quarters. They included conflicts between chiefs and tribal 
legotlas, complaints about chiefly maladministration and financial 
mismanagement, objections to chiefs' claims to tribute in the form 
of migrant earnings and labour services, and challenges to chiefs'
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’customary' legal authority and power over the allocation of
material resources, especially land. This chapter will briefly 
describe some of the struggles which manifested themselves within 
the Rustenburg chiefdoms in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, and will draw attention to some of the forms of struggle 
which were common to the later period/1  ^ Thereafter, it will 
turn to an examination of significant aspects of these struggles 
which were noticeably different from the political and ideological 
disputes of the 1920s and 1930s. In particular, the struggles of 
the later period were remarkable for their introverted focus and the 
absence of any influence of broad or national political
organisations. However, in the second decade of tne twentieth 
century there is some evidence which suggests that such
organisations may have had some bearing on the struggles within the 
district.
I. The Ba Po, Rwena ba Mogopa and Fokeng
The forms of political wrangles between chiefs and tribal legotlas
which were to become widespread during the 1920s and 1930s, and the
challenges to chiefly autocracy in the district, were signalled at
least as early as 1908 in the BaP6 chief dom, then under tne
( 2 )chieftaincy of Darius Mogale. A number of councillors of the
BaPd legotla petitioned the Native Commissioner requesting the 
removal of Darius from the office of chief. On enquiry, the Native 
Commissioner established that Mogale was frequently drunk, had 
repeatedly been guilty of assaulting members of the chiefdom and
that the • • t
"... affairs of the tribe are practically at a 
standstill owing to the strained relations 
between the chief and his council."(3)
It was further established that the chiefdom was £2 000 in debt on 
farms mortgaged to the Hermansburg Mission Society, largely as a 
result of the costs of two legal actions regarding the land, which 
were lost in the Supreme Court.^ The chief was unable to
account for a large sum of money raised from members of the chiefdom 
through levies of £ 1 0  and £ 6  for the purpose of offsetting the 
d e b t . ^  As a result of these findings the councillors' petition 
was upheld and Darius Mogale was deposed as chief by the 
Governor-General acting in his capacity as Paramount Chief under law 
number 4 of 1885 and was replaced by his cousin Filius Mogale/6  ^
Darius Mogale was also removed from the district.
At the time of his removal, Darius Mogale had a son, Edward, who was 
still a minor. It was recognised by the N.A.D. officials that 
Edward Mogale was the 'legitimate customary heir’ to the 
chieftainship. As a consequence, Filius Mogale was appointed as 
regent until Edward (who left the district with his father) reached 
his majority.
In 1917 the issue of the Ba Po chieftaincy again became the source 
of conflict within the chiefdom. Darius Mogale had dearly not
accepted his deposition and requested that he be allowed to return
(& )to the Rustenburg district and that he be reinstated as chief.
A meeting of the Ba Po was called by the Native Commissioner on the
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farm Wolhuterskop in the Rustenburg district in August 1917 at which 
the question of Darius' reinstatement was discussed.K J A vote 
was taken and according to the Native Commissioner, the majority of 
those present were opposed to Darius' reinstatement, but were in 
favour of Edward 'taking his place as chief. The Native
Commissioner suggested that the support for Edward was based on a 
'loyalty to customary practices irrespective of the consequences for 
the tribe. '  ^ He claimed that the continuation of Filius' rule 
was in the best interests of the chiefdom and that it would be 
contrary to 'native law and custom' for Edward to become chief 
during the lifetime of his father. In conclusion he recommended 
that Filius Mogale remain acting chief at least until Darius' 
death.(12>
Throughout the following year Darius continued to request his
reinstatement and made several appeals to be allowed to convene a
(13)meeting himself in the Rustenburg district. y During this
period Darius Mogale appears to have lobbied the support of Chief
Mamogale of the Kwena ba Mogopa who wrote on his behalf to
(14)representatives of the government. ' Furthermore, he also
secured the support of some members of outlying branches of the 
Ba Po Chiefdom in the Orange Free State and the Southern 
Transvaal.Representatives of these groups sent a deputation 
to the Secretary for Native Affairs requesting a joint meeting with
/I
the Rustenburg section to discuss Darius' position. ' The
Secretary refused their request asserting that
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"... Filius Mogale who was appointed to act as 
chief, has pulled the tribe out of the 
difficulties in which it had become involved and 
the government cannot lightly decide now to risk 
probable further division among the people at 
Wolhuterskop (Rustenburg district) in order to 
satisfy those ... who are not living on the 
tribal property.”(17)
D.K. Gabashane, a representative of the Southern Transvaal grouping, 
protested against the Secretary for Native Affairs' ruling on the 
basis that
"... although these men had been away from 
Wolhuterskop for a long time it does not follow 
that they no longer have interests and vested 
interests there. A man might be staying in 
Johannesburg and yet be domiciled in Pretoria, 
but the fact that he is in Johannesburg does not 
deprive him of the right to control his home 
affairs in Pretoria. When the fathers of these 
men from the Orange Free State went there they 
did so in order to obtain work among the Boers 
and earn money to pay for the farms at 
Wolhuterskop, the tribal headquarters. 
Therefore, they have a good claim to share in the 
management of the affairs of the tribe as those 
living at Wolhuterskop. The same applies to the 
members of the tribe in the Southern 
Transvaal."(18)
Over the next two or three years Darius continued to petition the
officials of the N.A.D. either on behalf of Edward or himself. he
employed legal representatives in order to further pressurize the
department. Eventually the Sub-Native Commissioner wrote to
Filius Mogale assuring him that no application on behalf of Darius
would be entertained, but reminding him that Edward had a legitimate
claim to the chieftaincy .^0) Qn the 17th of March 1921 yet
another meeting was convened at Wolhuterskop to canvass the opinion
(2 1 )of the members of the chiefdom resident there. ' Once again a 
vote was taken and once again the chief dom voted in favour of
162
Edward's succession/22  ^ However, the Sub-Native Commissioner 
made it clear that he did not support this resolution.
"I beg to place on record that I will be
exceedingly sorry to lose Filius Mogale as
chief. In spite of the opposition of a section 
of the tribe, who were in favour of the 
reinstatement of Darius and now in favour of the 
appointment of Edward, he is the most capable and 
trustworthy Chief I have in the district, and 
there is not the slightest doubt that he, by his 
personal efforts and hard work, has saved the 
tribe from ruin. If it had not been for the 
promise of the government, at the time of the 
expulsion of Darius from this district, that 
Edward would be appointed chief on his reaching 
his majority, I would most strongly have 
recommended that in spite of the result of the 
voting, Filius be appointed as chief, as unless 
Edward is a very strong and just man, I fear that 
the tribe will be broken up and cease to exist
"(23)• • • x #
The N.A.D. conveniently allowed the issue of the Ba Po chieftaincy 
to remain in abeyance for the next few years despite the fact that 
Darius Mogale continued to write letters appealing to be allowed 
back into the district.(24) In December 1926 a further meeting 
was held at Wolhuterskop and this time Filius was voted ahead of 
Edward/25  ^ However, the N.A.D. effectively carried out the 
recommendation of the Native Commissioner in 1917 when he had 
suggested that no action be taken until after Darius' death/
The problem was that Darius outlived Filius who only died in May 
1936/ 27  ^ Even then Edward did not immediately take over the 
chieftainship as Filius' brother Daniel Mogale was temporarily 
instated by the N.A.d / 28  ^ It was not until the end of 1936 that 
Edward finally took over/29  ^ Three years later, at the age of 
seventy five, Darius Mogale was finally allowed to return to the 
Rustenburg district/^8^
Ib3
Although the dispute in the Ba Po chiefdom continued at least until 
the end of the 1930s, from as early as 1908 there were discernable 
features of this struggle which were to characterise the conflicts 
in many other chiefdoms during the 1920s and 1930s. Although the 
removal of Darius Mogale as chief was uncharacteristic of the less 
liberal N.A.D. during the 1920s and 1930s the subsequent defence by 
the N.A.D. of the acting chief, Filius, foreshadowed the 
department's later strategy of bolstering chiefly authority whilst 
maintaining tight control over the rule of 'acceptable' or 
'well-behaved' chiefs. The absolute powers of the Governor-General 
under Law No. 4 of 1885 or the Minister of Native Affairs under the 
Native Administration Act of 1927, both acting in the capacity of 
'Supreme Chief', were to be regularly invoked in the 1920s and 
1930s, although seldom for the purpose of deposing a chief. Under 
these legislative measures, the N.A.D. interpreted customary law in 
the often varied and manipulative manner (in this case the laws of 
succession) to meet the exigencies of 'Native Administration' as 
perceived by officials in the Department.
The actual removal of Darius Mogale in 1908, itself reflected the 
repressive application of the 'customary' power of the N.A.D. which 
was later entrenched under the 1927 Native Administration Act. 
Indeed, this method of solving conflict by removing the leadership 
of dissenting groups was widely resorted to, and even more 
frequently threatened, in most of the chiefdoms of the district 
during the 1920s and 1930s.
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The initial opposition of Darius by members of his legotla and by 
members of the chiefdom was centered on the chief's financial 
mismanagement, accusations of embezzlement, and claims that he was 
exploiting members of the Rustenburg chiefdom for his own benefit. 
Hiese complaints became prolific amongst other chiefdoms during the 
1920s and 1930s and reflected the growing challenges to chiefly 
control over increasingly inaccessible material resources. Some of 
the sources of later challenges to chiefly control, which
crystallized in the 1920s and 1930s, were also anticipated in these 
early years in the Ba Po chiefdom. Darius Mogale's apparent ability 
to win the support of members of the outlying branch of the chiefdom 
in the Orange Free State as well as migrant workers in Johannesburg, 
hinted at the wide spectrum of material interests which were 
expressed in the challenge to chiefly control over material 
resources during the later period.
Amongst the Kwena ba Mog6 pa, one of the central sources of conflict
during the 1930s was the Chief's control over land in the outlying
branches of the Chiefdom at Hebron and Jericho in the Pretoria
district. As early as 1913 the Chief J.O.M. Mamogale attempted to
(31)remove one of the headmen at Jericho. There was some defiance
of Headman Obed More and it appears that the malcontents appealed to 
Mamogale to remove him. However, the Sub-Native Commissioner of the 
district suggested that Mamogale was taking advantage of the 
situation ...
"... to assert authority over those of his tribe 
resident in the Hebron and Jericho locations ... 
in a manner which is highly resented by the 
Natives concerned. These people recognise him as 
their Chief, but in name only and are desirous of 
being controlled by their headman, to whom they 
look for assistance and advice in tribal and 
other matters concerning their w e l f a r e .”(32)
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The Sub-Native Commissioner went on to point out that:
"The Chief wishes to dispose of timber growing on 
Jericho for his own benefit and upkeep at 
Bethanie [the headquarters of the Kwena ba 
Mog6 pa-G.S.] and it is known that he has taken 
this step without consulting the Lekhotla at 
Jericho. This location being quite bare enough 
at present witho “ ’ ’ ' , I have
The Native Affairs Department attempted to stamp its authority on 
the situation and Mamogale was warned not to interfere with Headmen
subordination of Chiefs to local officials of the Native Affairs 
Department (N.A.D.) was one of the fundamental tenets of Chiefly 
rule during the 1920s and 1930s.
These early developments within the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom were in 
many respects typical of those that ensued during the period which 
followed, although the entrenchment of this relationship between 
chiefs and the N.A.D. generally facilitated the bolstering of 
chiefly authority during the 1920s and 1930s, rather than the 
undermining of such authority as was the case in the above example. 
Nonetheless, these struggles and the political and ideological forms 
which they took, reflected the same controversies over control of 
material resources which were to become more intensified in the 
third and fourth decades as access to such resources became
refused to allow
(34)'directly responsible to the Sub-Native Commissioner' The
increasingly restricted.
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It has already been noted that in the period after the Anglo-Boer 
war, chiefs were frequently manipulating land purchases so as to 
secure private control over 'communally purchased' land.v y The 
example of August Mokgatle of the Fokeng, who bought land with the 
financial aid of some of his subjects in 1906 and later repaid them
so as to be left with the land to himself, is an excellent
(36^demonstration of this process. J However, it has also been 
mentioned that other members of the Fokeng chiefdom who were also 
trying to shed the • restraints and responsibilities of communal 
ownership were less successful. In 1907, the group of Fokeng 
individuals who claimed exclusive rights to the revenues from 
minerals on the basis of their private ownership of the land on 
which the minerals were discovered, lost their claim after a lengthy 
legal dispute/37  ^ It was precisely these activities and 
conflicts over communal as opposed to individual land tenure which 
began in the first decade of the twentieth century, and which shaped 
the political and ideological disputes in Fokeng society (and indeed 
in the district as a whole) during the 1920s and 30s.
Ihe Fokeng example also demonstrates from a very early date the 
willingness of certain members of the chiefdom to challenge the 
legal authority of the Chief through resort to the civil courts of 
'white South Africa'. 'Native' administration during the early 
decades of the century was characterized by considerable uncertainty 
over the legal jurisdiction of Chiefs and Headmen, not least on the 
part of the N.A.D. administrators in the Transvaal. In particular 
there was confusion about the exact relationship between the Chiefs' 
courts and those of the local Native Commissioner or the
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Magistrate. Questions as to how to handle appeals against the 
decisions of Chiefs' courts regularly found their way on to the desk 
of the Secretary for Native Affairs from Native Commissioners
/OO)throughout the Western Transvaal. ' Despite attempts by the 
Secretary for Justice to clarify these issues (39), the uncertainty 
of local officials of the N.A.D. continued throughout the period 
prior to the 1920s and beyond.
For many members of the chiefdoms in the Rustenburg district, this 
lack of clarity and uniformity of the legal system appeared to offer 
a loophole for evading the tribal administration of justice. In the 
relatively literate communities of the Rustenburg district, the 
early legally orientated challenges to chiefly authority anticipated 
the frequent resorts to 'white' civil jurisdiction which were a 
feature of rural black politics in this district during the 1920s 
and 1930s.
In both form and content, the embryonic struggles of the first two 
decades of the twentieth century foreshadowed the material and 
ideological conflicts which crystallized and came to dominate 
'tribal life' in the chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district in the 
years which followed. Various features of the early struggles 
within the Ba Po, Kwena ba Mogopa and Fokeng chiefdoms have been 
highlighted here because they proved to be common in many of the 
Rustenburg chiefdoms in the later period. However in every instance 
these struggles expressed specific material conditions experienced 
in each chiefdom and took particular political and ideological 
forms. It would therefore be misleading to imply any simplistic
16b
uniformity in the struggles within the various chiefdoms. For this 
reason it is essential to examine the particular conflicts, material 
conditions and ideological discourses in each chiefdom 
individually. In the years prior to the 1920s, the struggle within 
the small Rwena ba Modimosana ba Mmatau chiefdom is one of the best 
documented and it is to this chiefdom in the years 1918 - 1920 that 
we now turn our attention.
II The Chief and the ’Mother of the Tribe * : Selonskraal 1918 - 1920
For a number of years prior to 1918, Chief Herman Selon (Maselwane)
had been having marital problems. His wife, to whom he was married
according to Christian rites, had left him and was living with
another member of the Chiefdom by whom she had apparently had a
c h i l d . T h e  Chief 'retaliated by living with a concubine' with
whom he in turn had children. He also instituted proceedings for a
divorce on the grounds of adultery, but before the case came to
court, he withdrew it, 'as he realised that he had no hope of
(42)succeeding owing to being as guilty as she was'.
A number of members of the chiefdom met with the sub-native 
commissioner about the matter.
"They affected great indignation at the Chief's 
action, and stated that if he did not treat his 
wife with all due respect as the 'Mother of the 
Tribe', although he did not treat her as his 
wife, they would not recognise him as their 
Chief ."(43)
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Shortly thereafter the sub-native commissioner received complaints 
from the Chief that his people were not obeying his orders and were 
ignoring him as Chief.
From this point on, it became clear that Selon's marital problems
were merely a pretext for deeper-rooted objections to the chief.
The leaders of those who complained to the sub-native commissioner
were Marcus Maselwane and Benuele Nong, the former being the Chief's
cousin and the latter the secretary of his legotla and headman of
(44)the Maithufi clan, second in authority to the chief's clan.
When, on the 27th May 1918, the sub-native commissioner convened a 
meeting at Selonskraal, a number of underlying grievances were 
revealed. The Chief complained that his subjects had adopted a 
disobedient and non-cooperative stance, almost ignoring him as chief 
altogether. He complained that members of the chiefdom were
refusing to go to him for a pass and were leaving his stad and going
(45)to work in the towns 'illegally'. The chief went on to
complain that the leaders of the 'rebel' faction, which the S.N.C.
acknowledged to have been a clear majority of the chief dom, were
undermining him and had usurped his authority by setting up a
legotla of their own advising people not to recognise Selon as
c h i e f . C o m p l a i n t s  levelled at the chief during this meeting
were that he was 'cruel* and was imposing exorbitant fines on the
people which he was keeping for his own use. He was also accused of
embezzling large amounts of the taxes levied and forcing people to
(47)plough his personal lands without food or payment. It appears
that central to these grievances was the 'tax' levied by the chief
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on the cash earnings of migrant w o r k e r s / ^  Finally, Selon was
also accused of issuing the rights to open a trading store without
(49)first gaining the consent of the people of the chiefdom.
Benuele Nong claimed to have been elected by the people to represent 
them to the N.A.D. in their grievances about the chief, and was 
responsible for voicing many of the above objections. In his 
defense, Chief Maselwane claimed that by custom he was entitled to 
all the court fines for his own support. He also defended, on the 
basis of traditional law and custom, his right to have his fields 
ploughed for him by his subjects. Finally, he insisted that the 
legotla had been consulted before the issuing of any trading rights.
Nong's final words returned to the issue of the chief's wife:
"The chief spends the court fines on his 
concubine and not on his legal wife and 
children. We cannot forgive the chief, even if 
he begs us to. A land belonging to the chief's 
wife has been taken from her and given to his 
concubine."(50)
The meeting, despite Selon's defenses, unanimously decided to depose 
the chief and replace him with his fourteen year old son. S.N.C. 
Griffiths suggested that this was engineered by the chief's cousin, 
Marcus, who was himself expected to act as regent. On this basis 
Griffiths suggested that the chief's marital problems were merely 
being used to stir up popular discontent and that he could see no 
reason for the chief's deposition. He did, however, suggest that 
the 'agitators' be threatened with some punishment for their 
unruliness or even with expulsion from the tribe (this was despite
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the fact that Griffiths acknowledged the meeting to have been a 
representative one).^^
At the end of July 1918, a number of chiefs from neighbouring
chiefdoms in the district went to Selonskraal in order to convene a
meeting to try to arbitrate in the dispute. The malcontents,
however, refused to speak to these chiefs and the meeting never took
place. Thereafter, on the advice of these chiefs, chief Selon
'confessed* to the tribe and asked to be forgiven for anything 'he
(52)may have done', but this was adamantly refused. Despite the
overwhelming opposition to Selon, Chiefs Mokgatle, Mamogale, 
Ramakoka, Motzatsi and Tlholwe reported to the S.N.C. that they 
could find no reason why the chief should be deposed and went on to 
say:
"The (malcontent) natives should be warned of the 
dangerous position in which they could place 
themselves by defying the chief's orders ... We 
sincerely hope that our action according to our 
native law in this case will be acceeded to by 
and please the hon. Minister for Native 
Af fairs."(53)
The state of unrest continued into the middle of the year 1920 when 
open conflict again broke out, involving many of the same leaders 
and the rival legotla. In this instance there was widespread 
defiance of the chief's authority, a number of people having 
cultivated lands set aside for 'other' purposes by Selon. Each ot 
the dissidents was fined £.5 or a beast by the chief's court, but 
they defied him to carry out his judgement. Selon appealed to
the S.N.C. to support him and although S.N.C. Griffiths was quite
clear that ...
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”... it goes without saying that it is an old 
established native custom that the chief points 
out where the gardens shall be and anyone making 
a garden elsewhere is liable to punishment by the 
chief ...”(55),
he was still uncertain of how to respond. He continued:
"In view of the fact that the power of chiefs to 
hear cases and inflict fines, is questioned owing 
to their not having been properly appointed, I am 
at a loss what advice to give him."(56)
When in 1918 S.N.C. Griffiths had suggested that the 'ringleaders’ 
in opposition to the chief be removed from the tribal land, his 
suggestion had been vetoed by both the N.C. and the Secretary for 
Native Affairs. On this occasion it was suggested to S.N.C. 
Griffiths that he renew this threat and that if the dissidents 
ventured on to the prohibited land or attempted to clear the land 
for cultivation again, they were to be taken by the chief to the 
magistrate’s court and charged with tresspass, damage to tribal 
property, or some such criminal c h a r g e . I t  appears that the 
renewed threat of removal was taken seriously as there is no further 
evidence of co-ordinated opposition to Selon's authority 
thereafter. Ultimately the chief's authority was reinforced, and 
the central importance of this to the N.A.D. officials was made 
quite explicit by the Secretary of Native Affairs himself:
"Whether the chief was appointed by Executive 
Council under law 4, 1885 or not seems immaterial 
in the matter. He is a chief recognised by us 
(vide Blue Books) even if he be not a judicial 
officer ... by Native Law he has the right of 
assigning lands and the farm [Grootwagendrift 743 
- G.S.] is registered to the minister in trust 
for him and not for the tribe ,.."(58)
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The distribution and allocation of lands on this farm was of vital 
concern to members of the chiefdom. It was noted in the previous 
chapter that the farm Grootwagendrift was the only farm owned by the 
Kwena ba Modimosana ba Mmatau. It was completely surrounded by 
white-owned farms and the entire area, including the tribal land, 
lay outside of the area scheduled as ’native reserve land' by the 
1913 Land Act. Ihe chiefdom was the second smallest in the 
Rustenburg district but was one of the most densely populated, 
having twice as many inhabitants in proportion to available land as 
any of the larger chiefdoms . The limited size of the 
chiefdom's population made it more difficult to generate funds for 
the sake of land purchase and after the passing of the 1913 Land Act 
there was no land available for purchase anywhere near the existing 
tribal ground. As a result, this small chiefdom, most desperately 
in need of expanded access to land, was least able to secure any.
The land shortage amongst the Kwena ba Modimosana ba Mmatau resulted 
in a higher degree of labour-migrancy earlier in the century than 
was the case in many other chiefdoms of the district. Whereas the 
relatively discretionary migrancy of members of some chiefdoms 
allowed many people to avoid the harsh conditions and poor wages on 
the Rand mines well into the 1940s, a number of migrants from 
Selonskraal were employed on the gold mines of the Rand, even as 
early as 1918.^^
The dispute over the chieftaincy at Selonskraal reflects these 
material conditions. The central concern with the chief's right to 
tribute in the form of migrant earnings indicates a substantial
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degree of migrant participation in the dispute, as does the 
rejection of the chief’s role as a 'pass officer'. The effects of 
severe land shortage and the consequent dependency on migrant 
earnings, were evidenced in the increasing pressure brought to bear 
on the chief's 'customary' rights to dues accruing therefrom, and 
attempts to appropriate a greater proportion of these earnings 
within the family or on an individual basis. The Secretary of 
Native Affairs was particularly aware of this feature of the 
conflict at Selonskraal, and in his last correspondence on the 
subject he expressed this:
"It would be interesting to know whether the 
repudiation of Selon's authority, which is 
analogous to certain happenings in Pretoria 
locations, is symptomatic of a growth of 
individualism or is merely a tribal
squabble.”(61)
The severe shortage of arable land within the chiefdom was also 
clearly the motivation behind the challenge to the chief’s 
allocation of land for purposes other than cultivation. Once again, 
Selon attempted to defend his position on the basis of his customary 
right to do so. The N.A.D. in turn .supported Selon's actions on the 
basis of the need to maintain the system of communal
/co\pasturage. ' Yet if the N.A.D. officials were concerned at the
potential breakdown of 'communalism' in the face of growing 
'individualism', then their own actions can be seen as somewhat 
contradictory. In asserting that it was the chief's customary right 
to allocate land for different purposes, it was also pointed out 
that the land was 'registered in trust for the chief and not the
/ C O Ntribe'. ' Selon as an individual was regarded as the controller
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of the resources of the chiefdom. 'Customary' chiefly control was 
effectively manipulated and disfigured as the system of communal 
tenure was subject to Selon's individual authority and control over 
resources.
The farm Grootwagendrift had originally been purchased in 1882 by 
the Hermannsburg Lutheran Mission for the Chief dom and was paid off 
through tribal l e v i e s . i t  was only transferred to the chief's 
name after 1913. It seems, therefore, that the N.A.D. officials 
attempting to resolve the dispute at Selonskraal were choosing in 
this instance to interpret the 'letter' rather than the 'spirit' of 
the law.
In many instances the opposition to Selon was fostered by resentment 
of his individual accumulation of wealth at the expense of members 
of the chiefdom. Objections to his personal appropriation of court 
fines and the exorbitant fines levied, were amongst the central 
problems raised with his chieftaincy. Once again Selon insisted 
that it was his customary right to appropriate these funds for the 
sake of his personal upkeep. Similarly Selon ardently 
defended his right to demand free labour services from members of 
the chiefdom for the cultivation of his personal fields. In every 
instance the N.A.D. supported Selon's appeal to 'traditional' law 
and custom.
Those in opposition to the chief were, however, equally determined 
in their appeal to customary institutions and traditional 
practices. Their opposition to Selon's authority was itself rooted
in their own interpretations of the role and functions of tribal 
institutions and specifically the chieftaincy. They established a 
rival legotla, identical in form to the pre-existing one. Ihe 
opposition also focused around a long-standing succession dispute. 
Finally, popular support was secured through an ideological appeal 
to a symbol of customary morality - the chief's wife, 'the mother of 
the tribe'.
Ultimately the political struggles at Selonskraal between 1918 ana 
1920 gave expression to the prevalent material grievances of the 
chiefdom. However, these struggles were fought out at an 
ideological level through conflicting interpretations of the 
constitution of 'tribal law and custom’ in much the same manner as 
that suggested by Comaroff and Roberts in their anthropological 
work.^^^ Competing traditional symbols were thrown up by both 
Selon and the opposition in an attempt to legitimise their standing 
within the chiefdom and ratify their demands. In the final 
instance, the superior authority of the N.A.D. and its role as 
arbitrator held out, with the result that it was white officials of 
government who had the final say in defining legitimate customary 
laws and practices, and ultimately in dictating the sources of 
political and material control.
However, if the particular organizational forms of ideological and 
political resistance at Selonskraal during 1918 - 1920 were in any 
way typical of struggles which were to follow in the Rustenburg 
district, then there were also other characteristics of the same
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time period which were conspicuous by their absence in the years
which followed. I refer here especially to the arguable (but by no 
means proven) influence of ’national political organisations' such 
as the Transvaal Native Congress (T.N.C.).
Ill Rumours of Revolt, 1917-20
One characteristic common to the disputes in the Rustenburg 
chiefdoms in the 1920s and 1930s, was the lack of any apparent
connection between these struggles and the activities of any broad
political organisations. Indeed, the influence of any such
organisations appears to have been negligible, with the exception of 
the period 1917 - 1920, during which there was a flurry of rumours 
of open, organised revolt. This fact is of some importance in 
interpreting the nature of 'peasant' political conciousness in the 
Rustenburg district and demands some explanation.
In July 1917 the T.N.C. held a meeting in Fhokeng in the Rustenburg
district^^. Two police informers, Paul Mokgatle and Pitsoe
Magano attended the meeting and submitted reports to their police
contact P.C.C. Freddy Hicks. Both informers noted the presence of a
number of the chiefs from the district including August Mokgatle,
Diederick Mogale, Herman Selon, Chief Mosume of Pella Location,
J.O.M. Mamogale and Abraham Mamogale of Hebron as well as
representatives of Chiefs Mabe and Motzatzi. Both informers also
noted the presence of Sol Plaatje and S.M. Magato, at the time
president of the South African National Native Congress 
f 68^(S.A.N.N.C.). The main focus of discussion at this meeting
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was the 1913 Land Act and the voicing of objections to the unfair 
division of the land. From this point the two informers' reports 
diverge in emphasis and tone. Paul Mokgatle claimed that some 
clandestine plans were being made. He quoted Chief Mogale:
"... if we cannot get our ground back we must be 
ready to die, not I alone but all the chiefs must 
hear the word - life or death ... I hope there is 
no informer amongst us. We must not let any 
outsider know."(69)
He apparently went on to call for the collection of funds 'so that 
when trouble comes we will be ready
This clandestine element was completely absent from Magano's report 
on the meeting. He claimed that the central objection to the Land 
Act and to segregation was its effect in undermining the chiefs. 
J.O.M. Mamogale was quoted as saying:
"Our chiefs are to be chiefs no more, we will not 
be able to act for ourselves except through the 
Commissioner, all our rights are being taken away 
and we are being left with nothing at all”C71)
Magano went on to relate that certain complaints were made at the 
meeting about funds having been collected to send a chief to 
England, but that these funds had disappeared. Another meeting was 
called for Sunday, August 7th at Hamanskraal.
On this occasion only Paul Mokgatle reported on the meeting. He 
estimated between three and five hundred people to have been in 
attendance including a number of additional chiefs from various 
districts in the T r a n s v a a l * O n c e  again Mokgatle's report was 
conspiratorial:
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"Botomana Manoshi the Interpreter at the N.A.D. 
office spoke: 'We will fight against the
government against the man who wears government 
buttons and has got a big stomach and we will cut 
his belly open and take the fat out of him for 
the hardship he has imposed upon us' (cheers) 
and out came the money and the meeting quickly 
dispersed, he made it clear that the money was 
for war purposes."(73)
The following day a further meeting was convened at Leeuwkraal, in 
the Pilansberg district, and according to Paul Mokgatle was 
attended by over 900 people. Most of the chiefs from the Rustenburg 
district were in attendence as well as chiefs from Pretoria, 
Sekhukhuneland and the Pilansberg, Pietersburg and Waterberg 
districts. In a heavily rhetorical opening address, Magato 
tiraded against the Land Act and the involvement of thousands of 
Africans in the first World War. He ended by saying:
"You chiefs must know that the English government 
did not make these laws but that big-stomached 
man - the boer ... We have no rifles and nothing 
ready, we must all understand every man in South 
Africa who is black, if we unite or work together 
our dust is enough to suffocate them all to death 
Cloud cheering and enthusiasm)"(75)
Paul Mokgatle concluded that 'the whole talk of the meeting was 
« r . ’<76>
Police officer Hicks of the Rustenburg police was certainly 
convinced by Mokgatle's reports and noted that his informant was the 
secretary of Chief August Mokgatle's legotla and was therefore
clearly well-informed. In his report Hicks stated clearly that
”... the natives are talking war and saying if 
the boers can rebel they can also rebel ... There 
can be no doubt at all that the natives mean to 
rise and murder the white people of the
country."(77)
Hicks' fears were soon reinforced by further informers reports that 
local Africans were purchasing and secreting guns and ammunition. 
The weapons were reportedly being sold at ’a Jew's store' at the 
Saulspoort location in the Pilansberg d i s t r i c t . E v e n  more 
alarming in the context of the boer rebellion during the first world 
war, were reports that boer rebels along with German Lutheran 
missionaries were assisting the African population in securing arms.
”... certain well known rebels and Germans are 
co-operating with the Natives and guaranteeing 
ARMS, AMMUNITION AND FIGHTING MEN. One Nicolaas 
Johannes Rudolf Roets of Palmietfontein in this 
District, a well-known agitator and rebel, Field 
Cornet and who was captured under arms in the 
late rebellion is one of the principal men who is 
assisting the native Chiefs stir up 
rebellion."(79)
It was reported to Hicks that Ernest Penzhorn, the German missionary 
at Phokeng, was 'praying and preaching' for the success of Germany 
in the war. It was noted that Penzhorn and chief August Mokgatle 
were 'very intimate'.
Hicks saw the gravest danger as being the white farms in the 
district and the employers of 'native labour'. In view of the 
T.N.C.’s opposition to the 1913 Land Act, Hicks claimed that it was 
the white landowners who would soon be subject to physical 
attack.(®^ His views were soon being articulated by white 
farmers themselves and rumours of a 'native-boer rebel-German'
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alliance spread through the district. Within a month of Hicks' last 
quoted report, at least twelve different farmers wrote urgent 
letters to either the N.A.D., the S.A.P. or even the Prime Minister 
requesting protection, usually in the form of arms or a greater 
police presence in the area. Three such letters were written by Mr. 
D. Allam of the Rustenburg Orange Export Company. Allam, a 
self-appointed guardian of all that was proper and British, warned 
against the influence in the district of 'Native lawyers' from 
Johannesburg. He went on to reinforce all of P.C.C. Hicks' worst 
fears:
"The insolent bearing of the natives in the last 
week or two is very noticeable, and the number of 
strange natives about is also noticeable ... 1 
saw a truck of arms and ammunition going through 
to Rustenburg under escort on Monday, and I 
suppose these are for issue in case of trouble; 
but with the Huns and Rebels we have in the 
district the arms are liable to get into the 
wrong hands in a good many cases. In my opinion 
if the government was at once to make a clearance 
of all these missionaries they would nip any 
movement in the bud, for they are the root of all 
the agitation and under the cloak of education 
and religion carry on their propaganda without 
check. One thing is certain, if trouble does 
come, we out here will not get much chance of 
putting up a fight”(82)
The extent of the paranoia of white farmers in the district was 
reflected in a letter written by another prominent Rustenburg farmer 
to the Prime Minister, General Botha.
"I have used my influence and kept the people 
from trekking from their farms. I have told the 
people and assured them that I have written to 
the government and we await to hear from the 
government, which if unfavourable the whole 
people around me are going to trek to
Rustenburg."(83)
Ib2
Ihese alarmist reports soon found their way into the commercial 
p r e s s . D e s p i t e  the fact that from as early as September, the 
Native Commissioner for Rustenburg had stated that reports of unrest 
in the district were completely e x a g g e r a t e d , i t  was felt that 
the South African Police should take some action. The 'Jew's shop' 
was raided for arms and it was discovered that not only was the 
proprietor licensed to sell firearms, but that he was only in
/ O C \possession of one revolver and one shotgun. ' Chief Mamogale 
was interviewed by none other than the Prime Minister and reportedly 
laughed at rumours of an uprising. The following day articles 
appeared in Ons Vaderland and the Rand Dally Mail writing off the
( 87 )unrest as rumours of dubious origin. J
Further police investigation appears to have borne out this view:
"... the rumours appear to have originated from 
hearsay or on the other hand have been engineered 
by the National Party people ... as they are the 
only persons in the neighbourhood amongst whom 
uneasiness and unrest exists."(88)
In his November report the Rustenburg Native Commissioner 
categorically stated that all 'native unrest rumours' investigated 
'proved to emanate from whites Despite this, both Freddy
Hicks and his informant Paul Mokgatle continued well into 1916 to 
submit reports that the chiefs of the district, in cahoots with 
T.N.C. leaders, were planning an armed r e b e l l i o n . T h e  Native 
Commissioner described Hicks’ latest statements as 'ludicrous' and 
suggested that his informants, who were being paid for the
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information they supplied, were merely feeding him the information
(91)which they saw him 'to be feeling after.
The influence of the T.N.C. in the Rustenburg district was at best 
sporadic and haphazard. It cannot be disputed that chiefs in the 
district were in regular contact with T.N.C. officials for at least 
the year 1917, but thereafter there is little evidence to support 
any ongoing relationship. Available evidence strongly suggests that 
the implementation of the 1913 Land Act formed the basis for a 
tenuous and short-lived alliance between T.N.C. leaders and 
land-hungry chiefs in the Rustenburg district, who were concerned at 
the threat to their power to purchase and distribute land.
It is difficult to identify any single reason for the subsequent
rather abrupt decline of the influence of the T.N.C. over local
chiefs. It may have been the consequence of the radicalization of
(92)the T.N.C. on the Rand as described by Bonner. Beinart found
this to be the case in Pondoland after the first World War. He 
suggests that the radicalization of the organisation opened gaps 
between Congress and the Chiefs - even those who sat on the Council 
of Chiefs.^^ By 1919 the gaps between the T.N.C. and chiefs in 
the Rustenburg district were fairly wide. At the very time when the
T.N.C. was supporting a campaign against passes, Chiefs hamogale and 
Mokgatle urged the government to enforce the pass laws and arrest 
the ringleaders of the 'pass strike'.
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It is ironic that at the end of 1919, at the point at which Bonner 
identifies renewed T.N.C. overtures being made to c h i e f s , i t s  
relationship with the Rustenburg chiefs was in its final phase of 
decline. This should be seen in the light of the fact that it was 
also during this period that the anti-chieftaincy sentiments in 
various of the Rustenburg Chiefdoms were beginning to gain momentum 
and find organisational expression. It is abundantly clear that the 
T.N.C. never acquired a substantial degree of popular support in the 
district and as the localized political struggles of the 1920s and 
1930s played themselves out, Congress and particularly the Council 
of Chiefs, remained entirely peripheral to them. Naboth Mokgatle, 
who grew up in Phokeng during the 1920s and who was later to become 
a card-carrying member of the African National Congress, never 
encountered the T.N.C. during these years and presented it as a 
phenomenon of the t o w n s . E r n e s t  Penzhorn presented a similar 
if somewhat more prejudiced perspective.
"Daardie 'Native Organisations' en 'Native 
Societies' het almal ontstaan op die dorps 
lokasies en dit is die dinge wat baie moeilikhede 
veroorsaak. Mens kry dit nie hier op die 
platteland nie; hulle dra mooi klere en hulle 
denk hulle self te goed om onder die naturelle in 
die stad te kan leef.”(97)
When questioned about the state of race relations in the Rustenburg 
district in 1930, Penzhorn was even more explicit.
"The mutual understanding between the white 
people and the black people Is good ... I may say 
that the chiefs here will not have anything to do 
with these Native Congresses, and these native 
meetings, of which we hear such a lot. When they 
come here they send them away, and they take up 
the attitude that these agitators are trying to
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spoil our people. The I.C.U. will never come 
here. The chiefs would not allow them for one 
minute. The Chiefs do not want them, and they 
simply kick them out. They had meetings of 
Native Congresses here on one or two occasions, 
congresses of people coming from the towns. The 
natives in these areas at one time used to give 
them money, but they could never account for that 
money, and the result is that they do not want 
them now. As a matter of fact, our people do not 
see the use of that kind of thing."(98)
The comparative experience of the I.C.U. in the Western Transvaal, 
referred to here by Penzhorn, is also of some interest. There is no 
indication of any penetration of the I.C.U. into the region before 
1928.^^ However, Bradford suggests that from 1928 the I.C.U.
won some support in the South-Western Transvaal (particularly from 
rural wage labourers) through its 'reformist trade unionism' and its 
focus on working conditions rather than land issues/100  ^ This, 
she claims, was the consequence of these South-Western Transvaal 
communities having by this time effectively lost the battle to
maintain 'quasi-peasant relationships to the means of
, . , (101) In the reserves in the Rustenburg districtproduction’.
during this period, this battle was barely beginning and the 
resilient peasant economies in most chiefdoms enabled the majority 
of rural producers to avoid wage labour on white farms. As a
result, therefore, of its failure to articulate the local material 
concerns of Tswana peasants in the area, the I.C.U. never gained any 
significant foothold in the Rustenburg district.
Bradford makes the important observation that in many areas the
I.C.U. was unable to combat the political influence of 
' tribal 1 s m '  (102) and this factor appears to be of some
significance in the Rustenburg district where many of the chiefdoms 
were characterised by resilient and cohesive tribal political 
structures at the centre of rural political relationships. However, 
rather than merely being subject to the 'influence of tribalism' the 
political struggles of the Rustenburg district are better analysed 
as 'introverted' or internally focused and localized. Far from 
being focused on exploitation by white farmers, or national 
oppression by white government, these struggles were rooted in the 
challenge to material control consequent upon particlar forms of 
local 'tribal' political control. It was the consequence of 
national political organisations' failure to articulate these local 
concerns within .their political discourses, which best explains 
their negligible influence in the district during the 1920s and 
'308, and this appears to be borne out by the I.C.U. experience.
The feared rebellions of 1918 - 1920 never materialized. White 
farmers in the district were never threatened by insurrection in 
this part of the country which, when first colonized, was called 
Rustenburg due to the fact that the 'Kaffirs' of the area were 
unusually peaceful, allowing the Boers a more restful existence on 
their lands. The very absence of influence or popularity of 
any national political organisation is one of the remarkable 
features of the history of this district between 1920 and 1940.
If the 'rumours of revolt' in the area proved to be no more than a 
storm in a tea-cup, then the eruption of violence and bloodshed at 
Bulhoek in 1920 certainly fed directly into the worst nightmares of 
Native Administrators, police officials and white farmers in the
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Transvaal. The millenarian influence of 'one of these fantastic 
religions which have been imported from A m e r i c a ' p r o v i d e d  a 
basis for continued paranoia, at least during the early 1920s.^-^5)
In the years and struggles which followed, N.A.D. officials were 
regularly warning of 'another Bulhoek' and threats of 'impending 
bloodbaths'. Foremost in their minds were often the ostensible 
threats to the white community in the district. However, like the 
rumours of revolt and the rumours of hidden arms caches during the 
earlier period, these threats proved to be unfounded. As a rule, 
the struggles in the district stopped short of violence at least 
until 1941, and where there were sporadic outbursts these were 
strictly contained within the chiefdoms and were directed at 
immediate local enemies. In fact, the only traceable evidence of 
gunshots being fired at police in the entire period under review, 
proved to be a case of mistaken identity.
The dispute at Selonskraal, rather than any of the 'rumours of 
revolt', was typical of the struggles which were to develop in the 
chiefdoms of the district in the years which followed. Varying 
material concerns were to find expression through the ideological 
manipulation and transformation of resilient forms of 'traditional' 
law and custom as rural producers fought against the control of 
chiefs over dwindling material resources. As these chiefs were 
increasingly Incorporated within the bureaucratic structures of the 
capitalist state during this era of segregation, the refutation of 
their authority tended to spill over into often unintended challenges 
to the authority of the state administration.
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The disturbances at Motzatzistad are notable, if for no other
reason, than because of their violent 
tendencies. The dispute in 1923 involved a 
relatively small group of 40 - 50 dissidents 
who were disputing the authority of the 
chief Motzatzi Tlolwe. On the twenty first 
of July, after a vicious fight and several 
injuries, armed with sticks and assegais, 
the 'rebels' besieged the chief and members 
of his legotla in the chief's house. The 
Rustenburg police were called out to put an 
end to the disturbance and after being shot 
at by the chief's son who mistook them for 
the malcontents, they arrested twenty one 
'rebel ringleaders' who were pointed out by 
the chief's followers. They also 
confiscated 'all sticks and knives'. 
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The dispute centred around the absence of a 
certain individual in the chiefdom from his 
'working regiment' responsible for doing 
some work for the chief. Other workers 
objected and were intending to flog the man 
involved but decided to fine him instead. 
The Chief, however, insisted that the fine 
be repaid on the basis that only he and the 
legotla could impose such a fine. A few 
days later the same thing happened and the 
circumstances were repeated. The Chief then 
arranged a council meeting and ordered the 
entire regiment to receive a flogging. The 
melee described above then ensued. It is 
finally of some interest to note the 
response of District Commandant on the issue:
"I consider the action of the police in going out 
is perfectly justified; it showed that in the 
event of a disturbance a number of men can be 
quickly on the spot, and will have a good effect 
on the native mind. in this instance, it no 
doubt put a stop to what would have developed 
into a serious rupture between the parties and 
consequent further disturbances." ibid.
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CHAPTER FOUR STRUGGLES IN THE FOKENG CHIEFDOM - THE CRISIS OF
CONTROL
The most central and best documented struggle which took, place in 
the Rustenburg district during the 1920s was the challenge to Fokeng 
chiefly control between 1921 and 1926.^^ This struggle was 
initially rooted in the challenge to chief August Mokgatle's control 
over the allocation of landed resources, and was characterised by a 
high degree of factional maneuvering. However, the struggle gained 
an ideological momentum of its own which provided the basis for a 
popular alliance in opposition to the chief. The Fokeng struggle is 
important in that it provides not only a great deal of insight into 
the relationship between material interests and culturally rooted 
ideological struggles in the peasant communities of the district, 
but also illuminates the ’crisis of control’ which these challenges 
to chiefly authority presented to the South African state in the era 
of increasingly dominant segregationalist ideology.
I Land Buying and Factionalism Amongst the Fokeng
In examining the Fokeng chiefdom, it is immediately striking that 
its material conditions contrasted sharply with those experienced by 
the community at Selonskraal. The latter chiefdom has been 
described as one of the most impoverished of the district whilst the 
Fokeng have been identified as one of the ’wealthiest' tribes, both 
in the Rustenburg district and in the country as a whole, however, 
the political and ideological forms of resistance amongst the Fokeng
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had much in common with those examined in the Selonskraal episode 
discussed in the preceding chapter. The methods and strategies 
employed in opposing chiefly authority were similar, although the 
struggles at Phokeng were more intense and enduring.
The dispute amongst the Fokeng came to the fore at approximately the 
same time as resistance to Chief Selon was dissipating. In a letter 
from the 'Bafokeng tribe and legotla* to the Sub-Native Commissioner 
at Rustenburg in June 1921, complaints were brought against chief 
August Mokgatle for breaking a 'tribal law' which imposed the
boycott of a store and a threshing mill on a neighbouring
(2)white-owned farm. ' It was also alleged that on two occasions
the chief had refused to appear before the legotla when called on to 
account for his actions. As a result the legotla had apparently 
taken a decision to depose the chief, whom they also accused of 
being continually drunk. J Describing the situation the
Sub-Native Commissioner noted that:
"Feeling is running very high against the Chief 
August Mokgatle among his people ..."(4)
Hie origins of this conflict were rooted in attempts to purchase 
land, specifically the farm Kookfontein 337, which adjoined
Bierfontein 432, on which was situated Phokeng, August Mokgatle's 
capital. The Fokeng were negotiating with the white owner of the
farm, a man by the name of J. Kruger, who asked for £27 000 for the
sale. The Fokeng negotiators ruled this price out of the question 
and Kruger lowered his price to £23 000. This was still considered 
exorbitant and certain of the Fokeng were prepared to offer no more
than £8 000. The chief, however, made an offer of £15 000, but at 
that point Kruger refused to negotiate any further. He indicated 
that the land would no longer be available to the Fokeng for grazing 
or watering their cattle or for collecting wood. He warned against 
trespassing and gave the Fokeng people eight days to remove 
themselves altogether from his land. After this cattle still 
trespassed on Kruger’s land and on two occasions were impounded and 
only released at a cost of £12.^^
It was in response to this that the question arose of a possible 
boycott of two stores on Kruger's farm, and a mill owned by a Mr. 
Seichel, who appears to have had a part ownership of the farm 
Kookfontein. Ihe boycott was decided on with the consent of the 
Chief, despite his defense afterwards that he had tried to 
discourage the move on the basis that it interfered with the liberty 
of others and would incur the disapproval of the government.
It was agreed by the legotla that no threshing would be done at 
Seichel's mill and no purchases made from the stores on Kruger's 
land. In addition it was agreed that anyone who broke these 
regulations would be subject to a fine of £5. Ihe Chief, with the 
approval of his legotla, signed a document to this eftect.^^ 
Because of the prohibitive costs of transport for milling in 
Rustenburg itself, a regulated charge was also set for those with 
the capacity to fulfill this service. In contravention of this
regulation, August Mokgatle's son, Reuben, was found to be
/ 8 }overcharging. He was fined £2 and paid his fine. ' However, on 
the 4th of June 1921 and then again on the 11th of that month, 
August Mokgatle, chief of the Fokeng, broke the boycott to which he
himself had been signatory, by threshing his grain at Seichel's
mill. He also made a purchase to the value of £5 at one of the two
(9)stores covered by the boycott.
There had already been considerable tension between the chief and 
his legotla during the negotiations over the farm Kookfontein. 
Members of the chiefdom opposed to August, claimed that he had 
'taken the white man's side' over the negotiations and suggested, 
that he would drive the chiefdom to bankruptcy Members of
August's legotla claimed that because the farm was to be purchased 
communally through a tribal levy, the chief was unconcerned about 
the purchase price and was ignoring the needs and wishes of the 
majority of the chiefdom, many of whom would not themselves benefit 
from the land thus purchased. Levi Kotane, one of the
opposition grouping claimed that the chief had said:
"... 'if you won't pay £15 000 then you don't
want to buy the farm, and if you don't want to 
buy the farm then I am going to break the
boycott.' He did and broke his own
resolution."C12)
The conflict over Rookfontein was not the first such instance of
dissension over land purchase. In 1919, the chief and four others
attempted to purchase the farm Welbekend 738 privately. Initially
the Secretary of Native Affairs (SNA) refused to approve the deed of
sale unless the farm was transferred to the Minister of Native
(13)Affairs 'in trust for the tribe.' August Mokgatle then
proposed that the farm be transferred to the Mininster of Native
Affairs, but that the names of the purchasers appear on the title
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deed.^^ Permission was once again refused, and the SNA made it 
clear that private purchase would not be considered.
"The policy of the government being to carry out 
the intention of section 22 of the Native Affairs 
Administration Bill of 1917, there is little 
likelihood of the application being approved in 
its present form unless special circumstances can 
be advanced in its favour. The tribe will 
probably be well advised therefore, to give 
further consideration to the tribal purchase of 
the farm ..."
The chief then proposed a tribal levy of £.5 per head in order to pay 
for the farm. The size of the farm was 2 705 morgen, and a number 
of the chiefdom objected as they claimed that such a levy would work 
out to much more money than the farm was worth. More than 200 
members of the chiefdom then appealed directly to the SNA through 
their attorney in an attempt to buy the land on their own behalf 
without the c h i e f . M a n y  of these people already had cattle 
posts established on Welbekend and some had even cultivated land on 
the farm. Furthermore, the company owning the land was threatening 
to press charges for trespassing and to claim damages of up to £.200 
against each of these individuals. The prospective group of 
purchasers was described as being "well able tb pay the purchase 
price, being wealthy in cattle, and all connected by family 
ties"^17  ^ The farm Welbekend was situated within a 'scheduled 
native area' recommended by the Beaumont Commission.
At this stage August Mokgatle claimed that 'he and the tribe' were 
definitely intending to purchase the farm, but would not purchase it 
if it was to benefit the 200 independent buyers as he claimed they
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were 'rebels' and 'openly refused to recognise him as their chief'. 
Ihe SNC confirmed that the 200
"... are complicated in the complaint against the 
Chief and are styled as rebels by the Chief.
Several councillors, headmen, and followers are 
in favour of the purchase of the farm Welbekend, 
but the chief being vindictive will not approve 
of a tribal purchase ... "(18)
By this stage it was clear that the conflict over the purchase of
both Kookfontein and Welbekend were closely interelated, ana
opposition to the chief was coming from the same quarters in both
cases. Yet suddenly, in January 1922, the sale of Welbekend was
resolved and it was announced that the farm was transferred to the
Minister of Native Affairs "in trust for chief August Mokgatle and
the Bafokeng tribe" at a cost of £6 086.^^ Although the SNA
considered this price to be "fair and reasonable", the £2:5:0 per
morgen paid for the farm was almost double the £1:15 per morgan
originally a s k e d . I h e  deed of sale stipulated that £2 000 be
paid within 3 months and the balance in 4 annual instalments with 6%
interest/21  ^ By September 1923 it was clear that the tribal
finances necessary to pay off the farm were simply not forthcoming,
and after a series of extensions, the tribe was threatened with
(22)legal proceedings. It was suggested by the SNC that other
tribally owned farms be mortgaged in order to raise funds and stave 
off legal proceedings. He went on to note that:
"The tribe is numerous and rich but full of 
dissension which is paralysing their business 
affairs."(23)
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Similar problems were experienced in raising money for other farms
including Kookfontein and the farms Diepkuil and Boschfontein. This
was due to the dissenting section's refusal to contribute to tribal
finances including tribal levies, quit rents, fencing costs and a
variety of other forms of payment. This campaign of resistance will
be detailed below. As far as SNA Godley was concerned, it was clear
that solving the problems of the tribe's liabilities, was synonomous
(24)with the need to resolve the dissension within the chiefdom.v
The dispute over land purchase in the Fokeng chiefdom lay at the 
root of the dissension within the community in the years which 
followed. It was ultimately a conflict over access to, and control 
over, resources. The method of purchase of both Kookfontein and 
Welbekend reflect the chief's attempt to maintain control over land 
distribution as well to secure the private benefits which could be 
derived for himself and certain members of the chiefdom. Hence, 
when the chief's attempt to purchase Welbekend privately failed, the 
farm was bought 'tribally'. However, this method of tribal purchase 
was still subject to manipulation by the chief who, due to his 
authority to distribute land, was able to allocate it
independently. Thus communal purchase often did not amount to
communal access to these crucial resources.
In outlining the grievances against chief Mokgatle, one of the
leaders of the dissenting section claimed that the so-called rebels
(23)had been denied any rights to land on Welbekend. He went on
to point out that when the farm was purchased, the dissenting 
section had offered to contribute to the purchase price but were not
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allowed to do so and that they were kept in the dark about the
tribal liabilities with respect to the purchase. He complained that
in spite of this, if the chief were sued in the Supreme Court, the
tribally owned land on which they resided was liable to be
confiscated in lieu of p a y m e n t . I t  was in this context, that
the dissenting section of the chiefdom claimed they had no
responsibility for the liabilities for land and fencing from which
(27)they derived no benefit.
In this instance land was 'tribally owned’ only in name - in 
practice access to such land was exclusive. The grouping opposed to 
August's rule were themselves eager to gain exclusive rights to 
land. In the opinion of the SNC, this grouping was relatively 
affluent and had themselves attempted to secure collective ownership 
of Welbekend in order to parcel out privately controlled
shares
Whilst the challenge to chiefly authority in Selonskraal was largely 
the product of a desperate bid to maintain continued access to 
increasingly dwindling resources, in Phokeng this was rather the 
result of competing interests in the privatisation of land. In 
refusing to contribute to any tribal asset from which they did not 
privately benefit, the dissenting section was explicitly shirking 
any 'traditionally' defined communal responsibilities.
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II Politics and Economics : The Forms of Resistance to August 
Mokgatle
Opposition to August Mokgatle found organisational and institutional
expression in the legotla of Phokeng. With one exception, all the
members of the legotla were opposed to the chief, and it was these
legotla members who provided the bulk of the leadership of the
dissenting section within the chiefdom. It was through the
legitimacy of the legotla that a challenge was posed to the chief's
political power, and hence to his authority to administer and
control material resources within the chiefdom. Both prior to and
after the Chief's breach of the trading boycott, he was accused of
(29)an habitual abuse of chiefly authority.
Complaints against the chief were varied and extensive. Apart from 
the conflict over land purchase the chief was also accused of 
inefficient financial management and failure to account for certain 
sums of money.
"We would like to know from the chief what has 
become of all the tribal monies? Has he kept an 
account of the tribal receipts and payments? and 
if so is he prepared to show them to his
legotla?"(30)
Leaders of the dissenting section accused him of misappropriating 
funds such as those accruing from site rents for trading stores, and
challenged the chief's tendency to grant trading concessions without
( 31)consulting the legotla.
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"We do not know what becomes of the site rents, 
we never see them. There are three blacksmith 
shops and we do not know on whose authority they 
are there. These are grievances."(32)
Even more explicitly the chief was accused of misappropriating money 
collected for fencing. Complaints in this regard dated back to
1905, when two levies of £3 and £1 were collected for this
(33)purpose. Again in 1911 it was alleged that the chief
embezzled over £.100 left over from a levy once fencing costs had
been c o v e r e d . T h i s  issue became a source of conflict in 1922
when members of the dissenting section were called on to pay for
fencing on three of the farms they occupied, because the chief had
refused to do so. 'Rebel' leaders were particularly angry that the
receipt for the fencing costs was passed to the chief rather than to
(35)the legotla members who had paid. 1
Legotla members also complained that the chief had contracted an 
engineer to build a dam on the farm Boschfontein at an exorbitant 
cost, despite the assertion by members of the chiefdom living on the 
farm that they could do the construction themselves. When residents 
on the farm refused to contribute to a levy for this purpose, the 
chief placed an armed guard on the drinking water supply at 
Boschfontein ...
"... with the result that little children who had 
done him no wrong were crying for water ..."(36)
The legotla members also claimed that the chief was abusing the 
authority to issue passes, using it as a mechanism of control, and
in his own factional interests.
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"We have been badly treated in regard to the 
pass -laws, and some of our section have had to 
suffer prosecution by reason that the chief has 
refused to issue passes for no other reason but 
that we do not belong to his section."(37)
There was also considerable discontent over August's continued claim 
to tribute, especially the 10/- claimed from migrants returning from 
labour c e n t r e s . T h i s ,  along with the salary he was paid, and 
certain quit-rents which he was alleged to have used for his own 
purposes, was offered as evidence that the chief was corrupt and
that he was using his office to advance his personal 
(39)interests. To cap everything, the malcontents added that the 
chief was widely regarded as a drunkard, was personally responsible 
for a number of bad debts, and was prone to using foul and abusive 
language as well as flogging his subjects.^^
"He is not a fit and proper person to be our 
chief and yet we are told that we must be 
satisfied with him and act loyally under him and 
obey all his commands."(41)
The central issue raised by the malcontents was the autrocratic 
nature of Mokgatle's rule and the extent to which it undermined 
their own roles and duties within the chiefdom.
"The legotla of Phokeng (the Royal Stad) which is 
the name by which we prefer to be known, feel 
that our administrative functions in all tribal 
affairs have been over-ridden, disregarded and 
totally ignored by our Chief, who has taken upon 
himself the autocratic control of the tribe, and 
who now refuses to listen to us or seek our 
advice. This is a state of affairs which we, in 
all honesty of purpose, feel that we cannot 
submit to and this grievance is the first of the 
many that must be removed."(42)
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Hie legotla members went on to assure the Native Commissioner that 
it was their committed intention at all times to "submit to properly 
constituted and lawful authority", and that they had no desire to.
”... rebel against the laws of the land ... We 
abhor all forms of lawlessness and therefore 
resent the word ’rebel' which has so 
indiscriminately been applied to our 
Section ..."C*3)
An additional ingredient in the dispute was the fact that the
majority of the dissident leaders were closely related to the chief
and were descendants of royal blood. This is of particular
significance as the splits within the chiefdom appear to have
followed the lines of division which emerged in succession dispute
(4 4 )amongst the Fokeng in the early 1890's. One of the leaders of
the opposition faction was in fact Bartolomia Monnafela Mokgatle, an
uncle to August and one of the original malcontents removed from
(45)Phokeng during the disupute in the 1890's. ' Two of the other
leading voices of opposition, David and Simon Mokgatle, were both 
first cousins to Chief August and although they had not personally 
been involved in the earlier succession dispute, they were regarded 
as sympathizers with the original malcontents.
Many of the members of the chiefdom who remained loyal to August 
Mokgatle, claimed that the grievances of the 'rebels' were either 
fabricated or irrelevant, and suggested that the entire conflict was 
simply the re-emergence of the old succession dispute, and that 
David Mokgatle merely wanted to take over the reigns of government
h i m s e l f . T h e  outspoken loyalists, most of whom were headmen 
from outside of Phokeng, defended August's actions in breaking the 
boycott of Seichel's mill. They defended his customary right to 
tribute from wage- earners returning to Phokeng, and his traditional 
rights to labour duties such as ploughing and wood collection. 
Failure to comply with these duties was described by one of the 
loyalists as the result of the 'rebels' having 'lost all 
r e s p e c t A u g u s t ' s  appropriation of funds was also regarded 
as a legitimate customary practise and even his right to quit-rents 
was accepted as a replacement for the £5 that men returning from the 
diamond mines of Kimberley used to pay to the chief - a practice no 
longer in operation.^^ August Mokgatle himself defended his 
customary right to money collected from store site rents, on the 
basis that this was the practice in his father's time. August
denied very l i t t l e , e x p l a i n i n g  each grievance away by claiming 
almost complete immunity on the basis of his customary and 
traditional privileges On similar grounds, the 'loyalists'
unanimously denied that the legotla had the right either to fine or 
depose the chief and added that it was not even entitled to instruct 
him to appear before it.
August Mokgatle was completely intransigent. Despite the fact that
almost his entire legotla was opposed to him and that the vast
(5 0 )majority of Phokeng was loyal to the disaffected legotla, ' he
refused point blank to pay the £5 fine imposed on him or even to 
meet with the legotla. In response, the legotla raised the fine to 
£500. When the dissident section's lawyer and the Rustenburg 
magistrate went out to Phokeng in an attempt to mediate in the
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dispute, Mokgatle simply refused to discuss the matters arising with 
the so-called rebels saying:
"Go to the devil, I'm not going to buy my 
chieftainship."(53)
The lawyer, a Mr. A.S. Benson, claimed that the people of Phokeng 
'wanted peace', but that a combination of August's intransigence and 
a lack of diplomacy on the part of the Native Affairs Department
officials, had exacerbated rather than ameliorated the
(54)situation. J By contrast, the magistrate claimed that the
'rebels' were not interested in peace and he defended the chief by 
asserting that it was the exclusive right of the government to 
appoint and depose chiefs. He said that August was recognised by 
government as having jurisdiction under Section 4 of law 4 lbb5 
(TVL) and therefore, if the 'rebels' did not like the chief it was 
suggested that it was they, rather than August, who should be 
removed from Phokeng. In this the magistrate received the support 
of the SNA.(55)
The suggestion that the 'rebels' be removed stood, and information 
was collated on the 'ringleaders', but no further action was taken 
for the next ten months. In October 1922, the SNC again warned of 
the danger of 'serious trouble' if the department did not intervene 
more f i r m l y . D e p a r t m e n t a l  action was, however, delayed once 
again pending the outcome of a court case being brought against the 
members of legotla.
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At this stage, the legotla was still meeting and performing its 
usual functions without either the attendance or consent of the 
chief. This was held to be illegal by the Native Affairs 
Department, and after collecting evidence that the legotla was still 
trying cases and fining the guilty parties, the Department brought 
the evidence before the attorney general claiming that as the 
legotla was no longer recognised by the government, it had no right 
to exercise civil or criminal jurisdiction. The 
Attorney-General, however, suggested that no offense had been 
committed, as the man fined had voluntarily submitted to the 
authority of the legotla. This decision was of particular 
significance as it served to enhance the prestige and standing of 
the 'rebel' legotla within the community. Nor was the signficance 
of the decision lost on the Native Commissioner.
"I do not wish to challenge the 
Attorney-General's decision, but if it is 
correct, I do wish to say and to say very 
emphatically that the fundamental principles of 
native administration throughout the union are 
undermined and all attempts to exercise a system 
of tribal discipline or control must 
collapse."(59)
At this point it was clear that the officials of the Native Affairs 
Department had already decided to uphold Chief August Mokgatle's 
authority. While he had little or no support in Phokeng itself, it 
was claimed that he had almost full support of the headman in the 
outlying districts of the chiefdom. The Native Commissioner claimed 
that it was out of the question to depose Mokgatle without it 
resulting in 'a great deal of consternation' outside of 
P h o k e n g . T h u s ,  despite acknowledging that the chief was
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'weak, lacked control and was prone to drinking too much', it was 
still through August Mokgatle that the Native Affairs Department 
hoped to administer and exercise control over the Fokeng community. 
The standing of the 'rebel' legotla was seen not only to be 
undermining Mokgatle, but the Native Affairs Department officials as
»en.<61)
The Department immediately hardened its attitude to the disaffected 
section and became more threatening in its approach. In March 1923 
the SNA wrote:
"Under these circumstances the tribal authority 
will be supported, and if agitation and fermented 
dissension continue, those responsible will be 
charged under the authority of the Paramount 
Chief and will be liable for the consequences of 
their action ... If necessary, remedies can be 
ensured by Departmental action, but the exercise 
of his (David Mokgatle's - G.S.) self-constituted 
authority will surely and shortly result in his 
expulsion from the location ... In peaceful 
agricultural districts such as Rustenburg, the 
Government will not tolerate a disquieting 
atmosphere and a menacing attitude among the 
Native tribes who are permitted as a matter of 
grace to continue to squat in tribal conditions. 
Anarchy is a certain means of ensuring unpleasant 
consequences not only to David and his friends, 
but to the entire tribe.”
On August 27, 1923 the SNC called a pitso in yet another attempt to 
resolve the dispute. It was attended by approximately 800 people 
and was addressed by Chief Mamogale from the neighbouring Kwena ba 
Mogopa chiefdom. Mamogale appealed for unity and suggested that the 
fine of £500 imposed on the chief be reduced to £5, and that August 
pay the reduced amount. The meeting was described as rowdy and 
disinterested and the Native Commissioner gave the tribe one week to
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make peace, failing which Departmental action was threatened.
No noticeable changes took place and the malcontents reportedly 
continued to defy the chief's authority. The SNC then advised Chief 
Mokgatle to call another pitso in order to depose the legotla. This 
Mokgatle did on September 6, 1923. The deposed legotla members 
walked out of the meeting and took their followers with them, after 
which August Mokgatle nominated a new tribal legotla.
Hie deposition of the legotla had no effect. The old legotla 
continued to meet and conduct tribal business despite the fact that 
they were now flying directly in the face of what was officially 
considered to be the 'properly constituted tribal authority'. On 
September 14, 1923 the 'rebels' held a meeting and ignored an order 
by the chief to disperse.(65) Eight of the dissident 
'ringleaders' were then arrested and charged with contravening 
Section 4 of the recently promulgated location regulations.
These developments provided the Native Affairs Department with an 
important opportunity to reassert its control over the situation. 
Hie Transvaal Location Orders had been promulgated on May 7, 1923. 
Section 4 of the Orders stated that:
"No public gathering nor assembly shall be 
convened or held in any location without 
permission of the Chief and council."(6&)
However, this was not the only clause which had direct relevance to 
the disturbances in Phokeng. In fact the Location orders could have 
been tailor-made to meet the challenges posed by the dissent in the 
Rustenburg district.
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Section 2 of the Orders vested In the Native Commissioner the 
power to represent the Minister of Native Affairs in his 
capacity as 'Supreme Chief of all the natives’.
Section 13 Structured and formalised the accountability of 
chiefs to the Native Commissioner.
Section 3 Stipulated that residential rights in any 'location' 
were subject to the observation of Native law and custom, as 
defined by Law No. 4 of 1885;
Sections 5 and 6 gave chiefs and headmen the authority to 
regulate the presence of non-residents in the 'location' and 
empowered them to order any non-resident to leave the 'location'.
Sections 7, 8 and 14 effectively made contempt of the chiefs 
court a punishable offence. This had not previously been 
established as a rule in African customary law.
Section 9 prohibited any trade in a 'location' without the 
permission of both the chief and the council;
Section 15 made all the offences under the Location Orders 
punishable by a fine of up to £20, except when section 12 was 
applied.
Section 12 had the most far-reaching implications. It stated
that:
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" The commissioner may, at the instance of the 
chief and the council, after due enquiry, 
recommend the removal from a location of any 
resident thereof whose continued presence can be 
shown to be undesirable on account either of the 
wilful breach of these orders, trespass against 
recognised native law and custom, sustained 
contumacy to tribal discipline and control, or 
such conduct as is contemplated by V.R.R. Article 
1066 of 31 August 1895."(°7)
The trial of the eight Fokeng ringleaders was the first application 
of these Location Orders. Seven of the eight were acquitted as 
there was no proof that any of them had convened the meeting. Ihe 
eighth member of the group, Kefas Magano, was convicted and took the
/ C O \case to the Appellate division. ' Magano's appeal was upheld 
and the Location Orders were ruled by the Supreme Court to be 'ultra 
vires'.(69)
The finding of the Supreme Court was a Signfleant blow, both to the 
Native Affairs Department and to the cause of August Mokgatle. The 
dissenting section of the tribe had demonstrated its willingness to 
challenge the powers of both the chief and the department in the 
civil courts of 'white' South Africa. Through employment of skilled 
lawyers such as Benson and Strange (who fought Magano's case in the 
Supreme Court), the legotla leaders effectively curbed the ability 
of either the chief or the department to act arbitrarily. Anyway, 
whilst August Mokgatle may have officially exercised civil 
jurisdication in the chiefdom, he simply did not have the power or 
means to execute his decisions in Phokeng - a dilemma experienced by 
numerous chiefs in other parts of the Transvaal in this period.
21b
As a result of intensifying opposition to August Mokgatle, it is 
therefore not surprising that he appealed to the government to come 
to his aid and to re-establish unity within the chiefdom. Ihe terms 
in which he did this reflected his trepidation at having to deal 
with the legal expertise of the opposition:
"Ihe rebels have their attorney, and now we wish ours
to act for us."(71)
The Location Orders were designed to strengthen the hand of the Native 
Affairs administration. However, the Supreme Court's decision to declare 
the Orders 'ultra vires', served quite the contrary end, and severely 
curtailed the department's ability to offer immediate assistance to the 
chief. This was acknowledged by the SNC:
”1 must confess to a degree of sympathy with 
Native chiefs under present-day conditions, 
though admittedly a number of them are weak and 
dissolute. Their old-time powers and authority 
have to a great degree been circumscribed by the 
government. On the one hand tribal traditions 
and discipline have gradually broken down with 
the advance of European methods and civilisation, 
while on the other hand the government has 
provided no adequate substitute for these 
agencies .”(72)
He went on to say:
"Something must be done to restore the prestige 
of the Department which has undoubtedly suffered 
in the eyes of these people owing to the failure 
of the action taken under the Location 
Re gula tons. " 3 )
The question of 'departmental prestige' was felt to be of particular 
importance in view of the extent of dissension within other 
chiefdoms of the Rustenburg District. At this stage the SNA
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suggested that there was a degree of conflict in almost every 
chiefdom in the district. He went on to assert that it was 
necessary for the department to take positive action, and suggested 
his own direct involvement through a commission of enquiry and the 
eventual removal of the malcontents from the area.^^
In the month which followed the Supreme Court's decision the 'rebel' 
faction was more active than ever. They staged regular 
demonstrations and disrupted a pitso called by the chief to organise 
the collection of quit-rents. At the pitso the dissenting section 
publicly refused to pay, suggesting that chief August Mokgatle 
should pay them himself with all the money he received from site 
r e n t s . T h i s  was soon followed by a near-hysterical appeal 
from the chief who claimed that the 'rebels' were on the verge of 
open war and claiming that his life was in danger.
"David Mokgatle wanted to follow me into the 
house and kill me but my people caught hold of 
him. He was standing in the doorway of my 
house. They had chased me from my big 
office."(76)
On March 10th 1924, SNA Godley embarked on a departmental enquiry 
into events at Phokeng. By this stage, the dispute also began to 
find its way into the commercial press. Two days after Godley went 
to Phokeng, an article appeared in The Star which noted the decision 
of the Supreme Court to declare the Location Order 'ultra vires' and 
quoted the entire dealings over the farm Kookfontein. The article
went on to say:
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"The whole question of the authority of native 
chiefs is at stake ... Matters are very serious 
and other tribes with grievances are watching the 
progress of events. Two Rustenburg magistrates, 
the Native Commissioner and the sub-Native 
commissioner have at different times been 
instructed by the government to hold enquiries, 
each being held with abortive results ... it is 
no exaggeration to say that on this enquiry (of 
SNA Godley - G.S.) the thought not only of the 
Natives of Bafokeng, but of every native within a 
hundred miles is set ... Not only the authority 
of the Chief is questioned, but the authority of 
the Native Affairs Department, of the government 
itself, is being strained to its utmost; the 
loyalty of the natives to the decrees of the 
department is in jeopardy ..."(77)
Godley's report after the commission of enquiry included a schedule
documenting the activities of the 9 leaders of the dissenting
section. It also provided a list of the names of 36 headmen which
had supposedly been appointed by the ’rebel* leaders. The report
provided details regarding the collection of dues by the dissidents,
including the imposition of fines by the 'rebel' legotla and tde
imposition of a levy of 50/-8. per head upon their supporters to
provide funds for the prosecution of a campaign against August 
( 78}Mokgatle. ' Finally, it also documented the obstruction of
payments by the 'rebels' noting
(1) the refusal of 'rebels' to contribute towards quit-rents 
due in respect of 'tribally owned' property;
(2) the refusal of the 'rebel section' as a body to pay their 
tax and
(3) the refusal of the 'rebel section' to contribute towards
(7Q)'tribal* liabilities in respect of land purchase.
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It was clear from the outset what Godley's findings were to be. 
Even in his references to the different factions, his bias in favour 
of the chief was clear. He referred to the dissenting grouping as 
'rebels’ or as 'rebel headmen' whilst referring to the loyalists as 
'responsible hereditary h e a d m e n G o d l e y  also refused to meet
the 'rebel' section with their attorneys Benson and Strange, and was
(81)only prepared to report back to these lawyers. ' It is worth
(82^documenting Godley's findings in some detail. 1
Firstly, Godley disputed the right of the legotla to fine or even 
charge the chief for breaking the boycott and suggested that this 
was contrary to the 'custom of the tribe'. He went on to suggest 
that the chief had been 'ill-advised' in supporting the boycott in 
the first place and had acted wisely in eventually breaking the 
boycott, especially since the outlying sections of the chiefdom had 
not approved it.
Godley also justified the chief's appropriation of certain funds as 
his 'customary right'. He said that as old customs of tribute broke 
down, so modified customs came into effect to replace them. Godley 
did, however, note
"the desirability of dealing with the tribal 
finances on a different footing so as to protect 
the Chief from charges such as those being 
investigated and also to satisfy the requirements 
of the more advanced and educated members of the
tribe."(83)
He went on to say, however, that
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”... the chief must be exonerated from blame for 
continuing a system which obtained in his 
father's time, and which met with the approval of 
a large majority of the tribal headmen and their 
followers."(84)
Godley further rejected the allegations that the chief had singled 
out members of the opposition to pay for or to provide labour to 
effect fencing repairs, suggesting that such labour requirements 
were in keeping with 'tribal custom' and that the farms involved 
were almost entirely occupied by members of the 'opposition party.'
"In these matters the chief was merely carrying 
out a system which conforms to the customs and 
usages of the tribe and which, moreover, appears 
to be a very sensible one. No blame attaches to 
him under these charges."(85)
Fourthly, on the question of the chief’s general conduct, it was 
acknowledged by Godley that August was 'addicted to drink' and that 
he was a 'weak and useless individual'. This was overlooked, 
however, as he still carried the support of the majority of the 
chiefdom outside of Phokeng itself. On the issue of abusive 
language, Godley simply stated that this had not been confined to 
the chief but had been freely indulged in by the opposition party. 
Lastly, Godley barely commented on the central issue of control over 
land, but merely exonerated the chief of any responsibility for 
alledged encroachments on tribal territory.
Godley's conclusions indicated his failure even to vaguely 
understand the material grievances underlying the conflict. He 
relegated the causes of dissent almost entirely to two slightly
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contradictory ideological influences. Firstly, he suggested that 
the dissension was largely the product of the re-emergence of the 
old succession dispute. He said:
"I am definitely of the opinion that the present 
trouble is really to a great extent a 
continuation of the old dissension which had been 
rankling all these years and has only been 
waiting for a suitable opportunity to manifest 
itself. This opportunity occurred over the 
boycott affair."(86)
This view he based on three factors: firstly, the 'unanimous view 
of the responsible headmen' that the opposition was merely concerned 
with replacing August as chief, with one of their own members; 
Secondly, an 'unguarded statement' by one of the opposition 
spokespeople, who agreed that the present dissension dated back to
'older troubles'; and finally, the fact that the opposition was
(87}unearthing grievances that went back over twenty five years.
The second contributing influence which Godley identified was that
of the "general Native Congress spirit, which pervades a section of
(88}the more enlightened members of the tribe". In regard to this
latter issue, Godley had already noted with concern the fact that:
"the storm-centres ... (in the Rustenburg 
district - G.S.) ... are locations situate at no 
great distance from the Rand, whereas these 
inter-tribal difficulties are not in evidence in 
the more remote locations where tribal traditions 
and customs still prevail."(89)
The issues identified by Godley were those which found their way 
into the commercial press. Hence in October 1924 The Star reported
that:
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"It is a remarkable fact that the rebel section 
contains several members of the 'blood royal*. 
As a section they claim to be the original 
Bafokeng, and they contend that the 'loyalist* 
section of the tribe is another race."(90)
Likewise, slightly earlier in the month an article on 'Rustenburg 
Natives' noted that:
"Ihe Native tribes in the Rustenburg district are 
known to be on the verge of disintegration 
because of their proximity to the Rand and the 
influence of democratic ideas emanating from 
there ..."(91)
Godley's solutions to the situation were quite simple. He asserted
that 'the authority of the chief and the customs of the tribe'
(needless to say, as he understood them) had to be respected. Any
further failure to do so on the part of the 'rebels' should, Godley
suggested, result in their immediate removal from tribal property
under an order of the Supreme Chief .(92) Godley's conclusions
were duly presented to all concerned. However, the resistance
campaign of the malcontents continued to gain momentum. By May
1924, through continued refusal to pay quitrents, fencing costs,
taxes and tribal levies, the financial administration of the
chiefdom was effectively brought to a standstill. Bad debts on land
purchased amounted to more than £7 000 and there was a deficit of
over £250 in taxes not paid. The dissenting section were blocking
everything, from the extension of mineral and prospecting contracts
(93)to the allocation of trading rights. ' The 'rebel' legotla also 
continued to hold meetings in defiance of the chief and continued to
conduct trials.
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In frustration the SNA acknowledged that although it was desirable
forcibly to remove the malcontents from the tribal property, their
’passive resistance' did not provide sufficient tangible evidence to
warrant the issuing of a removal order by the Governor-General. He
suggested that only once the 'rebels' had been proved to be
criminally responsible for 'refusing to meet their obligations',
(94)would it be possible to remove them. Within just over a
month, 31 members of the opposition grouping were arrested, charged
and convicted for failure to pay tax. One of the 31 was 'rebel'
(95)leader David Mokgatle. Less than two weeks later, Lucas
Mokgatle, another central figure in the opposition to the chief, was 
convicted for assaulting one of August's court messengers.
This was the first and last instance of violence resulting in
bloodshed to take place in Phokeng.
The conviction of one of the rebel leaders on a criminal charge
provided the opportunity that N.A.D. officials had been waiting
for. On October 3, 1924, on the basis of this conviction, a removal
order was issued by the Governor-General in his capacity as Supreme
Chief. Nine 'rebel' leaders were singled out and ordered to remove
from any property belonging to the Fokeng Chiefdom. By this stage,
there had already been a total of six departmental enquiries into
the events in Phokeng, numerous threats of impending violence, the
'always imminent' danger of 'another Bulhoek'v ' and finally a
warning that the 23 000 white residents in the district could become
(98)the target of attack. ' None of these dangers materialised and 
it does not appear that there was any real basis for fearing that 
they might.
The conflict in Phokeng remained very much a localised and 
internally focussed affair. The focal point of opposition was the 
chieftaincy which represented the source of political power and 
control within the politics of the chiefdom. Even the effective 
discrediting of the Native Affairs Department was less by design 
than it was the unintended consequence of the challenge to the 
sources of chiefly authority through which the department saw itself 
as controlling and governing the rural 'locations'. Ultimately the 
Native Affairs Department could not afford to accept any compromise 
over the form of tribal government as it was through these 
mechanisms that 'in the last resort its sole power of control was 
based.'
Although the powers vested in the chief therefore remained subject 
to the prerogative of the institutions of the central state, for his 
subjects, the chief's authority to allocate and distribute land, his 
'customary' rights to tribute and dues and his administrative 
control over the issuing of pass laws, all effected a substantial 
degree of control over access to material resources within the 
chiefdom. Whether August Mokgatle was appropriating a 
disproportional amount of these resources for himself, or merely 
ensuring that 'traditional and customary' methods of communal tenure 
continued to be practised (as the Department of Native Affairs would 
have it), he was ultimately acting as a brake on the material 
aspirations and demands of the dissenting sector. The exact nature
of these material concerns needs to be elaborated on.
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Although mlgrancy was still relatively discretionary amongst the 
Fokeng during this period, increasing pressure on squatters on 
neighbouring 'white’ farms, coupled with increasing limitations on 
the availability of purchaseable land, stimulated a growing urgency 
to gain private control over resources amongst a large sector of the 
Fokeng community. On the one hand, those relatively affluent 
members of the chiefdom who aspired to own land p r i v a t e l y a n d  
to expand the base of their peasant production, identified the 
chief's prerogative and supposedly enforced 'communal tenure', as a 
brake on their aspirations. On the other hand, those migrants who 
were forced to supplement their income from rural productive 
activities through participation in the wage labour market were also 
becoming increasingly determined to challenge the chief's rights to 
tribute and 'tribal dues' as well as his power to administer the 
selective issuing of passes.
It is therefore clear that opposition to chiefly authority amongst 
the Fokeng had its origins in differing material interests within 
the community. The material ambitions of the leadership have been 
outlined above in the discussion of land purchases. At the same 
time, a substantial degree of migrant involvement in opposition to 
chiefly control, is witnessed by the challenges to the chief's 
allocation of passes and his rights to part of the earnings of wage 
earners returning to the district.
The involvement of migrants in the dispute does, as Godley claimed, 
suggest the influence of 'urban' or 'Europeanized' ideas, and quite 
possibly did effect the increasing demands for the democratisation
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of tribal government. However, to infer from this the general 
influence of the 'congress spirit', was stretching the imagination 
somewhat. The only evidence of any Congress involvement in the 
events at Phokeng came after the removal order had been issued by 
the Supreme Chief. This took the form of a letter from the 
Transvaal Native Congress which appealed to the SNA to desist from 
removing the malcontent leaders, and was a response to reading about 
the events at Phokeng in the newspapers.
"Having seen from the daily papers that the 
government intends to take drastic measures in 
the Phokeng case, I am instructed by the 
executive of the Transvaal African Congress to 
humbly ask you that before such steps are taken, 
to allow native chiefs and the heads of native 
organisations to intervene in this matter and see 
if they cannot bring this trouble at Phokeng to a 
peaceful settlement.”(101)
The correspondence appears to have been duly ignored by all parties 
involved. It does not seem likely in the context of the growing 
anti-chieftaincy movement in the district, that the mediation of 
chiefs in the dispute would have been too warmly received by the 
malcontents.
The rural community of Phokeng was widely acknowledged to have a 
large number of well educated and 'enlightened' or 'advanced' 
members within it. This, it is argued in chapter 6 below, was 
largely the result of the extensive availability of mission 
education within the chiefdom, and in particular, the consequence of 
the influence of education in English provided by Kenneth Spooner, a 
black Jamaican missionary who established the Pentacostal Holiness
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Church in Phokeng in 1913. It is therefore arguable that the 
influence of 'European' ideas, was as much the product of 
educational advancement within the rural area, as it was reflective 
of the transportation of urban-based ideology. Indeed, Spooner 
himself was singled out in somewhat conspiratorial terms as being
responsible for 'fermenting revolution' within the Fokeng
(102)community.
The second ideological influence by which Godley laid great store, 
was the re-emergence of the old succession dispute. Although some 
of the 'rebel' leaders claimed that the dissension in Phokeng was 
related only to contemporary events and not to this historical 
conflict over succession,(^^ Godley was not entirely wrong. The 
involvement of many of the dissenting section in the events of the 
1890's suggested that the history of the succession dispute was 
providing a rallying point for members of the chiefdom. The 
testimony of Bartolomia Monnafela Mokgatle, supported this.^1^ ^  
However, once again Godley failed to understand the material 
interests underlying the re-emergence of this form of 'tribalist' 
politics.
The revival of the old succession dispute was very important in 
situating the different sources of opposition to August Mokgatle, 
within a common framework of socially recognisable customary norms. 
In other words, the succession dispute, despite having a dynamic of 
its own, served to provide an ideological rallying point for 
groupings with different material interests. It facilitated an 
ideological basis for common opposition to the chief which remained
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within the frame of reference of ’traditional tribal politics'. 
Similarly, the central role played by the tribal legotla in 
opposition to the chief, provided a legitimate organisational form 
with which members of the chiefdom could identify. It was via these 
institutional and politico-ideological struggles that differing 
material interests within the Fokeng community, found common 
expression in opposition to chiefly authority and control.
One of the central elements of the struggle in Phokeng was over 
contested ideological interpretations of how ’traditional' African 
law and custom was constituted. It is ironic that this expressed 
itself most explicity in the Supreme Court when the ’rebels' 
appealed against the right of the Supreme Chief forcibly to evict 
them from the Chiefdom. It was ultimately at the discretion of a 
white judge to decide what constituted legitimate 'customary' 
processes and norms. This, however, was clearly identified by the 
'rebels' as a potential loophole which, to a limited extent enabled 
them to challenge the arbitrary powers of both the chief and the 
Native Affairs Department. It was apparent that members of the 
rural communities of the Rustenburg district were sincerely looking 
to the courts of 'white' South Africa, both in order to attempt to 
push back the frontiers of control over their lives, as well as for 
justice in the resolution of their political and material grievances.
Ill 'Pele ga phatle go itaea mong - Our Talk is Simply Advice 
to You'
The initial appeals against the removal order in the Transvaal 
Appellate division of the Supreme Court failed.(-^5) ihe case was
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then taken on further appeal to the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein, 
where it was heard by Judges Curlewis and Kindall.
The formal legal questions on which they had to decide were: 
Firstly, whether or not the paramount chief had the right to expel 
members of a chiefdom and forcibly remove them from any tribal 
property; Secondly, whether or not such a removal entailed the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction (the defendant claimed that it was 
merely administrative rights being exercised under customary law); 
Thirdly, whether or not such punishment could be meted out under 
customary law, without any recourse to a trial; and finally, whether 
or not such a removal order was contrary to the principles of 
civilization and therefore contradicted the repugnancy clause which 
regulated the application of 'Native customary law' in the 
Transvaal. In practice this meant that the court was effectively 
expected to define what customary law stipulated in each of these 
instances, often without any established precedent and in the 
absence of any customary legal code as existed in Natal. In passing 
judgement, Judge Tindall acknowledged that this was actually 
impossible, especially in the light of the contradictory evidence 
submitted to the court.(^6) -j^ g court was forced to assess the 
legitimacy of autocratic chiefly powers within African customary law 
as well as the relationship between the chief and his legotla. 
Completely different interpretations of customary law in relation to 
these issues were submitted in the evidence of the plaintiffs and
the defendant.
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For the Native Affairs Department the case was seen as a crucial 
means of asserting its authority and establishing the authority of 
chiefs appointed by the department. It was of considerable
importance to the department that it should win the case and thereby 
re-establish its prestige and authority within the communities of 
the Rustenburg district. More than half the witnesses called for 
the defendant were either formerly, or at the time in the employ of
the Native Affairs Department. The first of these into the witness
stand was Henry Melville Taberer, 'native' labour adviser to the 
Chamber of Mines and former assistant SNA. He regarded himself as 
an expert on 'native custom'.
"I have almost all my life studied native
custom.”(107)
Taberer asserted unequivocally the paramount chief's right to remove 
unruly subjects. He said that this was an indispensable power if 
any chief was to perform his main function, which was to preserve 
the the 'unity of the tribe'. As far as Taberer was concerned, 
almost any action was justified under customary law if it had as its 
objective the preservation of tribal unity and identity he
went on to say:
"It is quite impossible to conceive that rival 
sections of a tribe can set up rival legotlas.
Rival sections or recalcitrant members would not 
be allowed to arrive at this stage ... unity must 
be preserved at all cost".(^09)
Taberer's evidence, however, was based on his experience of Zululand 
and Rhodesia. He acknowledged having had no experience of the
Tswana, and could not supply any examples In his own experience of 
these powers of removal being exercised. Nonetheless, he was 
adamant:
When questioned further about the legotla, Taberer classified it as 
an advisory rather than decision making body. He stated that 
members were nominated by the chief and although many members of the 
legotla were of royal blood, this was not automatic. Positions on 
the legotla were not hereditary. The chief had the right to remove 
any one, or all members from the legotla. Taberer suggested that 
the popularity of a chief would depend on the support of his 
legotla. The chief would therefore be wise to consult his legotla 
regularly, but the legotla had no powers without the chief. They 
could not call meetings or hold trials. They could not depose the 
chief and in general the legotla's wishes were not 'automatically' 
adhered to, but this rather relied on the discretion of the
"I say the chief has 
got it from the natives
expulsion. 1
chief.(Ill)
”... legotla members are there to interpret the 
will of the tribe as represented in their laws 
and customs. If one of them ceases to do that, 
the chief will have to remove him . .."(H2)
Taberer continued
”... the natives look upon any headman or 
sub-chief who is persistently recalcitrant, and 
persistently disobeys the laws of the tribe and 
the chief, as being a rival to the throne."(113)
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Ultimately, Taberer pointed out, the chief was accountable only to 
the tribe as a whole through the pitso, and not to the legotla. He 
did, however, acknowledge that by the 1920's the chief's powers 
remained subject to those of the government and recognised that 
where the chief no longer had the power to enforce his decisions he 
relied on the 'paramount chief' in the form of the Governor-General 
to execute his decisions under customary law/11^
Implicit in Taberer's evidence, as was the case with the other 
representatives of the Native Affairs Department, was the 
recognition that any challenge to chiefly authority which threatened 
the 'unity of the tribe', also threatened 'tribalism' as a source of 
political, ideological and material control by government over rural 
Africans. This informed a manipulative understanding of 'customary 
law’, which dictated that there was no room for conflict within the 
processes of tribal government. This Taberer eventually stated 
explicity:
"In regard to what are nowadays called political 
offences, the natives hardly had politics - they 
only had offences against the tribe
In a similar vein, John Glen Leary, a former magistrate at Zeerust 
stated in evidence that ...
"... the tribal system is based on unity ... as 
soon as a faction sets itself up against 
government, it is subversive of government as a 
unity"
l e n t ,
.(ll£)
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In particular, Leary pointed out that the establishment of any 
alternative to the chief's legotla would constitute an 'act of
rebellion”. Leary supported Taberer’s evidence on the
limitations of the legotla's powers and suggested that the chief was 
subject only to the higher authority of government officials. It 
was only the Supreme Chief who could not be called to task by
anybody. This, however, did not mean that chiefs did not have to
endeavour to be popular.
Harry Denton Hemsworth, an SNC in the Transvaal, was probably most
explicit in the manipulative, rigid and formalistic way in which he
presented the application and functioning of customary law.
Hemsworth stated that traditionally the chief was an autocrat with
absolute powers to fine, flog or expel anyone who opposed him. If
customs had been modified then it was only to the extent that the
chief had lost some of his absolute authority and had become
accountable to government and the Native Affairs Department.^^^
Hemsworth claimed that the legotla was a purely advisory body and
largely administered the chief's decisions. In a situation where
the chief was facing opposition, Hemsworth claimed that the chief
would simply take the entire government of the chiefdom into his own
hands, in the interest of 'maintaining u n i t y T h u s  the
chief could depose a legotla at will and the legotla had no rights
to challenge, charge, fine or depose a chief.^^1) gy contrast,
when threatened the chief would, according to Hemsworth, often
(122)remove malcontents without a trial or hearing.
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Having thus presented a rigidly undemocratic method of government as 
the traditional 'norm', Hemsworth suggested a similar application of 
tribal government in the changed circumstances of the 1920's. 
Hemsworth under cross-examination by Malan, the attorney for the 
'rebels' responded as follows:
"Malan: The safest way of ascertaining what the
customs are would be to find out how 
they are practised at the present day 
by a particular tribe?
Hemsworth: No, not as regards ancient customs.
Malan: Do they not regard their law and 
customs to be what they practise today?
Hemsworth: No, they continually refer to the
ancient laws of their fathers.
Malan: Yes, but in order to find out what the 
law is today one must see how the law 
is applied today?
Hemsworth: I do not think so”.(123)
SNC for Rustenburg from May 1923, Donald Rolfe Hunt, largely 
corroborated the evidence of Taberer, Leary and Hemsworth. Having 
only been in the district for a short while, Hunt, like the others, 
was forced, when substantiating his evidence to rely on examples 
from outside of the district. None of the witnesses thusfar could 
quote examples from Tswana chiefdoms to substantiate what they were 
saying. Hunt relied mainly on examples drawn from Pedi chiefdoms in 
Sekhukhuneland. He did nevertheless provide a more sophisticated 
breakdown of 'tribal government' identifying distinctions between 
various forms of the legotla and different sources of advice to the 
chief. Hunt distinguished the legotla from the headmen, and noted
that each headman had his own local legotla. The chief had his own
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legotla which was the last source of appeal from any of the 
headmen’s decisions. However, the chief consulted different people 
to different degrees. There were always a number of blood relatives 
in the chief's legotla who were the closest advisers to the chief. 
These people were referred to by Hunt as the bana ba legotla.
Hunt went on to claim that even the bana ba legotla members were 
merely advisors to the chief and that he was in no way obliged to 
accept their opinions. The chief could remove anyone from his 
legotla if he so desired. The legotla, however, could not remove 
the chief, and traditionally only a pitso of all the members of the 
tribe would have been able to depose a chief, but Hunt claimed that 
this could traditionally be done without a trial. He went on to 
complete his evidence by saying:
"I am not favourable to rebels, white or 
black"<126)
All the officials of the department presented both customary legal 
processes, as well as customary law itself, in rigid, formalistic 
and legalistic terms. They provided a picture of autocratic 
chieftaincy unrestrained by the sentiments of the chiefdom as a 
whole and subject only to the mediation of officials of the central 
state. These views reflected the central strategic concerns of
senior Native Affairs Department officials, that chiefly authority\
had to be upheld as the central means of controlling the African 
population of the rural areas.
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Similar views were also reproduced by a missionary George Theodore 
Schwellnus who had been resident in Louis Trichardt for 41 years. 
Schwellnus suggested that love and respect for the chief was a part 
of 'native psychology'. He testified:
"It is wonderful what troubles and tribulations 
even the Christian will endure for his chief ... 
That is why in cases of people going against him, 
he would not be deposed according to native law, 
because he is the legislation of the tribe, and 
of course he has not provided for a law to do
away with himself. If they do away with him, it
is without the law and is lawless and rebellion. 
The chief is the only person who can make or give 
a law to meet the circumstances of the tribe as 
necessary. There is no other power to make or 
give laws. So there could not be a law to
discard him; in such a case it would not be
native law".(127)
Probably the most important witness for the defense, however, was 
Chief Isang Linchwe Pilane of Mochudi, the paramount chief of the 
Kgatla.^^®^ Pilane was specifically asked to go to Bloemfontein 
in order to give evidence, at the expense of the Native Affairs 
Department. Pilane was described as a chief who 'ruled his people, 
including the Rustenburg section resident at Saulspoort, with a firm 
hand'. y He had expressed, interest in the case before the
Supreme Court and five months earlier had provided written evidence 
asserting the paramount chief's right to remove recalcitrant 
elements. He provided a number of historical precedents to prove 
this. He ended his correspondence by saying:
"I have been watching this case and am greatly 
interested with it. It would be better for me to 
be invited to attend to give evidence in Pretoria 
personally as the decision of this case will be 
future ruling of the Supreme Court. I wish to 
attend".(130)
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Pilane was slightly less concerned to provide an abstracted, 
normative account of African customary law. His position as chief 
meant he experienced directly the waning influence of his status - 
as much in relation to the Native Affairs department, as to his own 
subjects. Implicit in his evidence was the recognition of the 
inferior status of customary law:
"... the custom changes according to the law of 
the country. The customs still remain in the 
tribe, only, of course, the government issues 
laws against the practise of the customs ... The 
natives will continue to exercise their customs 
until the government under which they live, make 
such customs illegal by law. That is what I 
mean."(131)
This clearly affected the standing of chiefs who were traditionally 
the highest legal authorities and sources of appeal in any 
chiefdom. Pilane acknowledged this to have limited his own abilitiy 
to act independently. When asked whether or not it was his 
'ambition' to rule 'without interference', Pilane answered thus:
"lhat is the ambition of all the chiefs. I like 
to rule to the best of my ability, to keep the 
tribe together .. A chief likes to rule as he 
sees fit, but he must remember that he lives 
under a white man's government and cannot do what 
he did before."(132)
Pilane expressed the contradictory experiences of most chiefs in the 
Transvaal during this period. On the one hand, the subservient 
status of chiefs in relation to the Native Affairs Department 
severely diminished their status and prestige in the eyes of their 
subjects. On the other hand the department itself was attempting to
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rule through the chiefs and was attempting to bolster their 
authority to this end. Customary law and the institutions through 
which it was practised, were at one and the same time being devalued 
while being expected to serve the ends of political and ideological 
control of the rural reserve population. It therefore became a 
primary concern of chiefs to assert the ideological hegemony of 
customary practices as they defined them. Thus Pilane claimed:
"The customs which were in the tribes before 
still prevail; I mean the customs in big matters; 
there may be a change in small matters."(133)
Hence when 'customary practices' had broken down, or had been 
'changed', this was identified by Pilane as the product of 'contact 
with Europeans' and the influence of westernised i d e a s . H e  
presented pre-colonial 'tribal politics' as disciplined and 
harmonious, if a little harsh, and claimed that: "in the old days 
there were no drastic m a t t e r s " . B y  contrast he also said ...
"It is only now that our young people come from 
the towns that we find injustices done."(136)
For the rest Pilane's evidence focused on the powers of the chief 
relative to the legotla. His central assertion was that the legotla 
members were simply advisers who were nominated by the chief on the 
basis of their intelligence. This did not at any stage mean that 
the legotla could exercise the same powers as the chief.
"They show this by always saying, after they give 
advice to the chief, 'Pele ga phatle go itaea 
mong', meaning 'our talk is simply advice to 
you".(137)
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Pilane claimed that the legotla members were chosen by the chief 
because he could trust them. If this trust was felt to be broken 
the chief could remove the legotla. Because of their responsibility 
to the chief, Pilane claimed that under customary law the legotla 
had no rights to fine, depose or even challenge the chief. This was
a reserved right of the pitso - a meeting of the entire
( 138^tribe. ' In regard to the Fokeng example, Pilane claimed that 
the legotla had breached customary law by calling and holding 
meetings - a privilege which he said was reserved for the chief. He 
also refuted the right of the legotla to administer justice without 
consulting and receiving the approval of the chief. J
In sharp contrast to this evidence, Pilane claimed that chiefly 
government was not really autocratic, as a good chief was likely to 
take the advice of his people.
”... We have to take into consideration the 
wishes of the people ... it would not do to bump 
up against the tribe on every conceivable 
occasion.”(140)
The clear conflict which Pilane was identifying was between the 
chief's accountability to his people and his dependency on 
government. Ultimately the chief depended on the government for the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction, for the physical means to enforce 
their decisions or punitive measures, and indeed, for their very 
positions as« chiefs. In practice, this often manifested itself in 
the increasingly arbitrary exercise of power, which shifted away 
from any basis of accountability to the people of the chiefdom.
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'Customary law', governing the rights and powers of chiefs, was 
ideologically interpreted by Pilane to accommodate, this process.
Hie only witness called for the state who had any direct experience 
of the conflict of Phokeng, was Reuben Mokgatle, the paternal uncle 
to the chief August Mokgatle. Under examination, Reuben merely 
re-stated the chief's exclusive rights under customary law to call 
and depose a legotla and to expel any member of the chiefdom who was 
either insulting or disobedient to him. He also asserted that 
no-one, including the bana ba legotla consisting of the blood 
relatives closest to the chief, had the right to impose a fine on 
the chief. When presented with an example in which August's
father Tumagole was fined an ox for allocating some land to white 
farmers contrary to the wishes of his legotla, Reuben claimed that 
the chief had simply accepted the 'advice' of his legotla and had 
paid the ox as compensation.
"Nobody has any authority to try the
chief."(143)
By contrast, most of the witnesses led by the plaintiffs were
themselves directly involved in Phokeng. They challenged at every
level the interpretation of customary law outlined above. Petrus
Mokgatle, the half-brother to Reuben offered a completely
conflicting interpretation of the Tumagole incident. Petrus was on
the legotla at the time and claimed that Tumagole was tried and 
Cl 44)punished. ' Petrus went on to challenge the right of the chief 
to banish one of his subjects suggesting that under customary law 
this was not a recognised form of punishment. This he did through
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reference to the 'greatest Fokeng chief', August's grandfather 
Mokgatle Mokgatle.
"No one would have been disrespectful to him and 
call him a dog to his face, because he was a 
great chief ... If anyone did say it ... they 
might have killed him. They would not have sent 
him out of the country. They could not. They 
might kill him, but not eject him, because 
expulsion is a bad thing, a man has to live on a 
dog's flesh if he is an outcast."(145)
Petrus also challenged the chief’s absolute authority over the 
legotla. He claimed that the chief did not customarily nominate the 
bana ba legotla, but that the members were selected by 'the people’, 
who were represented in this process by the headmen. Only those of 
royal blood had the right to be elected. In this process, Petrus 
claimed that the chief had no greater right than anyone else 
p r e s e n t . o n  this basis Petrus went on to claim, that while 
no individual could criticize the chief, the bana ba legotla could, 
"because the legotla has the power”. He claimed that the 
bana ba legotla was defined as "the men who try cases" and 
claimed that they had the right to convene and try cases without the 
chief being present. Petrus concluded that 'tribal government’ nad 
to be based on the joint operation of the legotla and the chief; 
neither could legitimately operate completely independently of the 
other. In principle, however, he said that ...
"The legotla is above the chief, but if the chief
discusses a certain matter the people will listen••(149)• • • ' '
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The evidence given by Petrus was reiterated by Masilo Bogobane who 
was adamant that the chief was 'not above the law'.
"The law has been laid down and the chief must 
obey. He would have to pay (a fine - G.S.). The 
chief is under the law and the law is to pay 
fines. That is by native custom."(150)
Similarly, Robert Ngabedi, a 78 year old man from Mafeking, claimed 
that the chief could be tried by the legotla. He said that the 
chief could not act without the consent of the legotla and claimed 
that traditionally banishment as a form of punishment was unheard 
of.<151) Exile, he claimed was rather the product of white rule:
"I can remember before the white man governed the 
country. No-one was ever smelled out or killed 
in those days. No-one ever disappeared without 
people knowing what had become of them."(152)
Abraham Paetele supported this evidence claiming that not only was 
banishment contrary to customary practices, but that no punishment 
could be meted out without a trial before the legotla. Paetele was 
one of the original malcontents who left Phokeng during the 
succession dispute in the 1890s. Paetele claimed that those who 
left at that time did so of their own accord. He said that they had 
had their cattle confiscated - the most serious punishment which 
could be inflicted by the c h i e f . p a e t e l e  clearly identified 
this succession dispute as the root of all the conflict, and 
bemoaned the fact that the old chief Mokgatle Mokgatle had not been
listened to:
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"All the trouble we have today is due to the fact 
that some of our tribe wanted Tumagoola and 
others wanted Bloemhoef. The old chief pointed 
out to us that Tumagoola was not the right person 
as he was a drunkard. We have not lived 
peaceably since."(154)
Paetele, having asserted that removal was contrary to customary law, 
went on to acknowledge that the government had assumed this power 
for itself. Having listed his reasons for rejecting August Mokgatle 
as chief, he then referred to the deposition of Chief Darius Mogale 
of the Ba Po in 1 9 0 8 and appealed to the Native Commissioner 
to remove August. He claimed that under customary law ...
”... if we were not under the European government 
we would have killed a man like August."<>136)
Finally, Paetele expressed his disappointment in the court, 
suggesting that it was actually August who was on trial and not the 
'rebel' leaders.
"Although August is such a bad man, 1 do not know 
that the Governor can throw him off the tribal 
property without trying him. I thought today we 
would bring him to trial. We generally appeal 
from the smaller courts to the chief's courts and 
if the judgement is delivered there we are 
satisfied. I want August to go away. 1 want him 
to be thrown out. I do not know that it is 
necessary to try him first. I thought we were 
trying him today. We have been suffering for the 
last five years. Today we have brought him 
before the court. The commissioners are not 
helping us at all.”(157)
David Mokgatle, one of the central figures in opposition to August, 
reiterated many of the points made by other witnesses for the 
plaintiffs. David was a member of the bana ba legotla and was
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therefore involved daily in applying 'customary law'. He claimed 
that the chief could be tried and punished by the legotla, that the 
legotla had the right to call meetings and that during the 
dissensions these rights remained. He rejected the right of the 
chief to remove anyone from the tribal property.(158) David, went 
on to assert that under customary law, the legotla was effectively 
the most powerful body in the chiefdom. In so doing he also cast 
some aspersions on the authority of the 'Supreme Chief' in the form 
of a representative of government:
"There is no paramount chief over him (August - 
6 .S.). The only one that is paramount chief is 
the legotla ... The legotla is the paramount 
chief over our chief. The chief has to obey what 
we decide. The legotla is powerful. If the 
chief does anything wrong it has to try him. My 
contention is that the chief is under the 
legotla. That is our law."(159)
David Mokgatle went on to challenge the extent to which the 
government was sincerely concerned with the exercise of customary 
practices. He warned that ...
"According to native custom we could have killed 
our chief ... We know today that we are under 
European government. That is why we have the 
right and like to report to the administration. 
According to Native custom we would simply have 
killed him."(160)
He clearly identified that the 'rebels' considered themselves 
'civilized' and their application of 'tribal custom' was modified in 
keeping with this fact. Hence, David claimed that 'freedom of 
speech' was a part of 'tribal custom', suggesting that anyone was 
free to express his or her views, even if they were in 'opposition'
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to the chief. In a similar vein, the dissenting leaders
claimed throughout the dispute that they were law-abiding citizens 
who respected the 'laws of the land' and those of the government. 
Angry and frustrated at being deemed a 'rebel', David painted a 
picture of what the exercise of 'uncivilized customary law' would 
entail:
"August ought to know it is the legotla which 
makes him a chief. The legotla have only the
right to cut his throat. We cannot expel him. 
We cut his throat. The Almighty will look after 
his soul. We cannot send him out of the 
country. The only thing to do is cut his
throat. We give him a short cut to heaven. As 
to whether we should send him into the Pretoria 
district, who would look after him there? We 
send him to his creator. According to the law of 
the Transvaal, Mokgatle is not a paramount 
chief. The government is the paramount chief. 
Now do the government want us to carry out our 
business according to Native law?”(162)
Hie evidence submitted by the various witnesses in the course of the 
appeal, is extremely revealing of both the form and content of the 
struggles of the preceding four years and court evidence offers 
considerable insight into the consciousness of the protagonists. 
The Native Affairs department officials' presentation gi African 
customary law as a rigid set of norms, dictating autocratic and 
absolute control of almost every aspect of rural African's lives, 
reflects little more than the Imperatives of departmental 
politico-ideological control. The implied unquestionable authority 
of the chief under these circumstances serves the department's 
purposes in the context where the chief himself is completely 
dependent on the department for his position. From the chief's 
perspective this authoritarian definition of his powers through the
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entrenchment of rigid customary legal processes, facilitated both 
his ongoing political control, as well as his ability to regulate 
and manipulate material relations within the chiefdom. It was 
precisely these powers that were being challenged by the dissidents.
SNA Godley in his report on the enquiry he conducted into the 
dissensions at Phokeng, noted that the majority of the aggrieved 
section were "of the more advanced and educated members of the 
tribe." Alternatively he referred to them as the more 'enlightened' 
members. (^63) was in£jeed a largely educated and generally 
affluent 'rebel' leadership that was challenging the particular form 
in which customary law and legal institutions were being 
constituted. Yet is is of crucial importance to note that this was 
being done not through the rejection of customary law, but through 
its ideological reinterpretation. Hence, in an affidavit submitted 
to the Supreme Court by the 9 'rebel' leaders, they stated:
"That the dissenting section of the tribe, of 
whom your petitioners constitute a portion, is 
really a body which seeks to uphold the tribal 
laws and customs, and not to oppose them, and 
where they have been in opposition to the chief 
it has been where the chief has himself violated 
the ancient customs and laws of the tribe and has 
taken upon himself the arbitrary and autocratic 
government of the t r i b e . " (164)
The 'rebel' leaders were demanding the democratisation of tribal 
government, not in an arbitrary manner, but via the already 
established, culturally and ideologically identifiable sites of 
struggle. Through the established legitimacy of the legotla, and 
the status and standing of members of royal blood, the 'rebels'
challenged the particular form in which customary law was socially 
constituted. However, in so doing, the 'rebel* leaders' reference 
points were often 'westernised':
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"We respectfully beg to state that the time has 
now arrived when the autocratic rule of Chiefs 
should be dispensed with. The march of 
civilisation demands it. Our White Guardians, 
the English Nation for hundreds of years, has 
recognised the justice and right of this. His 
Majesty the King, the White Chief, does not rule 
England autocratically but is bound to the 
decisions of his legotla or Parliament. Our own 
great white Chief the Prime Minister does not 
govern South Africa but is bound to the decisions 
of his legotla or Parliament. Why then must we 
be placed under a Chief in whom we have no faith 
and trust owing to misrule? It may be said that 
we have not yet advanced far enough to receive 
the benefit of the white system, but we submit 
that this is not so, and at any rate the 
Department of Native Affairs should at least 
recognise that this is the position which will 
have to be achieved in the future and should 
march on that road, rather than, give increased 
power to the Chief ...”(165)
The Fokeng 'rebels' never threatened abolition of the tribal system 
as such. As a result, the ideological forms of the challenge to 
August Mokgatle facilitated an alliance between groupings with 
different material interests, in opposition to the chief. For tne 
leadership, however, if their challenge was successful, it offered 
them a foot in the door of tribal government and consequently a 
greater degree of control over material resources, and the ability 
to thereby advance their own private interests.
The 'rebels' found a great deal of support in the evidence lea by 
Sol Plaatje, a former chairperson of the South African National 
Native Council. Apart from explicitly supporting their specific
248
claims in regard to the legal standing of the legotla in tribal 
politics, Plaatje also made a plea for the democratisation of the 
system of chiefly authority. Plaatje asserted that 'native 
government' was traditionally democratic and had become disfigured 
and deformed under white rule.^*^ This demand for democracy 
was, however, gaining momentum amongst educated 'natives', claimed 
Plaatje.
"As the young man gets educated and comes into 
contact with modern development of the white man, 
and how the governor would be advised by his 
ministers, the young man wants his chief to rule 
his people so that the people can have a say and 
elect their representatives. That is the 
tendency."(167)
However, the terms in which Plaatje's evidence was dealt with by the 
court, reflected the decision which Judges Tindall and Curlewis 
seemed destined to arrive at. Both judges ruled that Plaatje's 
evidence was exceptional due to his being a 'civilized and educated 
native'. It was therefore suggested that he was projecting 
unconsciously his desire for democratic tribal government into the 
sphere of customary law where it did not really a p p l y . T h e  
court passed judgement for the defendant and ruled for the defendant 
on all the issues placed before it, despite the uncertainty which 
Judge Tindall acknowledged. On June 26, 1926, the 9 leaders left 
Phokeng and 351 of their followers voluntarily joined them.^b^
The court decision, however, is itself less significant than the 
fact that the Supreme Court had become a vehicle of struggle between 
different fractions within the Fokeng chiefdom whose competing
interests had found ideological expression in conflicting
interpretations of customary political and legal processes. The 
complex expressions of ’civilized' or 'detribalized' aspirations, 
interwoven with ideological appeals to 'traditional* law and custom, 
which characterised the appeal of the 'rebels' did not simply 
express particular material concerns. They signalled the insertion 
of negotiated jural authority, reflective of historically
overlapping political claims, into the highest white court in the 
land. Despite the fact that the rebel faction lost their claim, the 
dispute in the Supreme Court offered the potential for challenging 
not just the legal authority of August Mokgatle, but the political 
authority of the Supreme Chief. Neither could be tolerated by the 
N.A.D. The crisis of control within the Fokeng chiefdom reflected a 
wider crisis of control for the N.A.D. It was indicative of the 
bankruptcy of the existing administration through tribal
authorities. In order to understand the subsequent attempts by the 
central state to revamp its programme of 'retribalisation' and to 
rearm its ideological and administrative machinery, it is necessary 
to examine in some detail the more general relationships between the 
rural African population, their chiefs and the N.A.D.
IV 'All Things to All Men' - Chiefs, The 'Tribes' and the Native 
Affairs Department
In the second half of the 1920s the state strategy of 
retribalisation was explicitly rooted in the vindication and 
bolstering of 'traditional forms of tribal government’ ana 
especially the institution of the chieftaincy. The Report of the
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Native Economic Commission of 1930 - 32, which throughout supported 
the trend towards segregation, stressed the advantages of this 
approach and criticized attempts to break down customary 
institutions.
"The object should therefore be to use their 
institutions as far as this is possible ... The 
fact that there can be such a thing as 
non-capitalist, non-individualist economic 
organisation hardly seems to have been 
recognised. Whether we look at the question from 
the point of view of utilizing existing 
institutions as the stock on which to graft the 
scion of progress, or whether we are merely 
concerned with the task of carrying out the 
measures thought necessary for the welfare of the 
Natives in the least costly manner possible, it 
is uneconomical to disregard the institutions 
which they understand, which they prize, which 
can be used with the least friction and cost to 
achieve this end. Where the native chief carries 
out the commands of the Supreme Chief, he is 
honouring himself by so doing : where the white 
man carries them out he is often regarded merely 
as an instrument of a frequently unwanted rule. 
By using Native institutions as part of the 
administration of the country, we shall give the 
native a pride in the administration ... By 
disregarding their point of view, it even at 
times stirs up their active opposition."( )
On the basis of these arguments the Commission Report recommended 
that the political authority and administrative duties of tribal 
chiefs be further bolstered and expanded. in particular, the 
Commission identified the centrality of chiefly jural authority in 
the exercise of legitimate political power and strongly supported 
the measures of the 1927 Native Administration Act which provided 
for the recognition of autonomous chiefly courts with both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction^^ and which formally recognised 
'customary law' although it did not stipulate its codification.
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The Native Administration Act of 1927 represented the triumph of 
segregationalist ideology and gave an indication of the methods to 
be applied in attempting to resolve the crisis of control/173  ^
Hie primary object of the legislation was to co-ordinate ’Native 
administration' throughout the four provinces.
"It was said of the bill when introduced into 
parliament that there was little in its ambit 
which was more than a general application of 
principles which had been found to work 
satisfactorily in one or the other of the 
provinces and that it might be described as a 
'selective synthesis of existing conditions' 
designed to facilitate and harmonise Native 
Administration throughout the Union."(174)
Prior to the passage of the Act there had been a great deal of 
confusion within the Native Affairs Department over various aspects 
of chiefly political and legal jurisdiction as witnessed in the 
Fokeng disputes. Hiis especially related to uncertainty on the part 
of local officials over where the legal jurisdiction of chiefs ended 
and where that of the N.A.D. began. From the Rustenburg district, 
questions from local state officials about the exercise of 'Native 
law' were flooding into the desks of both the Secretary of Native 
Affairs and the Secretary of Justice throughout the period prior to 
the passage of the 1927 Act. These confusions related to a wide 
variety of legal issues including uncertainty about the recourse and 
procedure for appeals against chiefly legal judgements, conflicting 
interpretations of whether the application of customary law was 
contrary to the principles of civilization or not, and the blurring
of the fine lines between civil and criminal jurisdiction within
(175)African customary law.
This confusion also led to a considerable degree of dislocation in 
the administrative and political functions not only within the 
N.A.D. but between the N.A.D. and the 'white* legal institutions of 
the Department of Justice. Despite the agreement reached by the two 
departments in 1923, which stipulated that magistrates appointed by 
the Department of Justice in areas with a large African population 
would only be appointed after consultation with the N.A.D.,^^) 
the unco -ordinated operation of these different branches of the 
state continued as has been perfectly demonstrated in the Fokeng 
case.
In fact, the main sources of dislocation within the state rested in 
the conflicting political and administrative concerns of local as 
opposed to central administrators. In particular, this was 
reflected in the tendency for legal decisions taken in chiefs courts 
and upheld in magistrates courts to be overturned in the higher 
courts of the land. Ihe strategic political and ideological concern 
to uphold the judgements and legitimacy of chiefly jurisdiction 
which was so vital to local native administrators, was hardly the 
priority in the Supreme and Appellate divisions of the judiciary 
where the autonomy of legalistic principles defined the mode of 
operation. Although there was no guarantee that on appeal the 
decisions of chiefs would necessarily be overturned, the fact that 
'Native customary law' was never codified in the Transvaal meant 
that this potential always existed. This fact was unquestionably a 
central stimulus to the strategy of educated 'rebels' such as those 
at Phokeng of resorting to white civil courts
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in order to challenge chiefly control on the Rustenburg district. 
Not only did these contradictions manifest themselves between 
different branches of the state, but within the N.A.D. itself. Here 
again, the dislocation within the Department was rooted in the 
frequently distinct priorities of local as opposed to central N.A.D. 
officials. Local officials who were in everyday contact with local 
communities were by definition more accessible to the African 
population which they administered. The nature of their positions 
demanded a greater sensitivity to local grievances both on the part 
of the chiefs and their subjects. Local officials of the N.A.D. 
were particularly aware of the delicate position of the chiefs 
through whom they ruled the African population. The fact that 
chiefs had to command a degree of popularity amongst their subjects 
in order to be effective, whilst simultaneously remaining subject to 
the overriding authority of the N.A.D., demanded a high degree of 
flexibility and elasticity in their administrative methods and 
particularly in their intepretation and application of customary 
law. In the Rustenburg district the existence of a very large 
mission-educated, Christian community, which expressly aspired to 
’civilized' status, further emphasized the imperative of such 
flexibility in administration.
However, whilst local N.A.D. officials could make administrative 
adjustments to suite local requirements, they had little control 
over centralized legislative measures which often tied their hands. 
Not only were they confronted with a legal hierarchy in the central 
state which tended to apply customary law in its most legalistic 
forms, but they were also confronted with the predetermined
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political imperatives of African Administration and control at a 
national level. It would be misleading to suggest that local N.A.D. 
officials were constantly at logger heads with the central 
administration. Rather, the object of this discussion has been to 
identify the potential for such conflict which explains the often 
contradictory strategies adopted by different members of the N.A.D. 
in mediating the disputes in the Rustenburg chiefdoms during the 
1920s and (as will be demonstrated) the 1930s. This analysis offers 
some explanation of the limitations often imposed on local 
officials’ materially (rather than purely ideological) based 
strategies for resolving tribal disputes. Thus in the Rustenburg 
district, the frequent demands for individual ownership of land or 
for 'private money' as Chief Mamogale put it, were constantly 
refused, despite regular representations from local officials that 
some space had to be provided within the tribal body-economic from 
'progressive', 'civilized' 'natives'.
As Rogers pointed out, segregationalist ideology, tribalism and the 
preservation of the migrant labour system rested firmly on the 
entrenchment of the 'traditional system of Native 
Communalism' Thus, despite the emphatic recommendations by 
the Native Economic Commission in 1932 that individual land tenure 
be encouraged in the reserves ,(^ 8 ) and despite the rhetoric of 
the N.A.D. which proclaimed itself as the vehicle for advancing the 
'native population from barbarism to c i v i l i z a t i o n ' a n d  slowly 
'teaching natives the advantages of individual ownership of land', 
private land ownership was actively prohibited in the Transvaal 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s and beyond.
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The Native Administration Act, Number 38 of 1927, in attempting to 
systematize the administration and control of African communities, 
was explicitly concerned with an attempt to resolve some of the 
dislocated and contradictory features of this administrative system, 
the practical implications of which have been demonstrated in the 
Fokeng disputes/181  ^ This Act defined in detail the role of the 
N.A.D. in relation to the African population. Rogers summarized the 
political rhetoric behind the Act when he stated:
"The essential function of the Native Affairs 
Department is to assist, guide, protect and 
generally to subserve the interests of a large 
underdeveloped and, for the most part, 
inarticulate Native population, which is rapidly 
emerging from barbarism and is in the process 
faced with the necessity of accommodating itself 
to a novel and highly complex environment, while 
at the same time its own tribal organisation, 
control, discipline, customs and. traditions are 
rapidly and inevitably breaking down with the 
ever-increasing impact of European ways and 
standards of life ... It (the N.A.D.) is 
concerned to safeguard large masses of ignorant 
and untutored Natives, who are rapidly developing 
a sense of race consciousness, against the 
extravagances of fanatical agitators on the one 
hand, and to protect them from exploitation for 
personal profit and gain by unscrupulous persons 
- whether black or white - on the other."(182)
In a more prctical administrative sense, Rogers summarized the terms 
in which the 1927 Act defined the responsibility of the N.A.D.
"It must in the widest sense govern the Native 
population in their own areas; it must provide 
special tribunals for the determination of 
disputes according to their own laws and customs 
in so far as such are recognised by the law of 
the land; it must regulate the ownership and 
occupation of land in Native locations and
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reserves and must inculcate among the people 
improved methods of agriculture and stock raising 
so as to ensure beneficial occupation of Native 
areas; ... it is concerned to secure for the 
people such educational facilities as are best 
suited to their state of development; ..."(183)
Rogers went on to list the duties of the N.A.D which included the 
administration of land tenure, contractual relationships with 
European farmers, regulations pertaining to the residence and 
employment of Africans in the urban areas, the pass laws and the 
regulations concerned with the fiscal affairs of the African 
population.(1®^ From his conclusion, Rogers made it clear that 
under the 1927 Native Administration Act, the N.A.D. was expected to 
function in a manner which would ultimately be so broadly defined as 
to by-pass the often contradictory operation of other branches of 
the state.
"Embraced within the purview of the Native 
Affairs Department are those activities in 
relation to the Native population, which in so 
far as Europeans are concerned, absorb the 
energies of separate and specific departments.
In a word, in its relation to the Native 
population, the Department of Native Affairs must 
as nearly as possible be 'all things to all
The extraordinary legislative and executive powers of the N.A.D. were 
entrenched in the central clauses of the 1927 Native Administration 
Act. Firstly, section one of the Act (as amended by Act Number 9 of 
1929) stipulated that :
The Governor-General shall be the Supreme Chief 
of all Natives in the Provinces of Natal, 
Transvaal and Orange Free State, and shall in any
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part of the said Provinces be vested with all 
such rights, immunities, powers and authorities 
in respect of all Natives as are or may be from 
time to time vested in him in respect of Natives 
in the Province of Natal."(186)
This section was of particular significance to African communities in 
the Transvaal where, unlike Natal, 'customary law' was not codified. 
In Natal, however, the rigid codification of 'customary law' vested 
in the paramount chief absolute and autocratic powers. These powers 
had never been clearly defined in the Transvaal where, as a 
consequence, the administration was frequently faced with the 
necessity of establishing them in the courts. This was becoming 
increasingly difficult for the N.A.D. as rural communities were being 
transformed through the development of capitalist relations and the 
breakdown of 'customary' mechanisms of political and legal control. 
These developments were clearly in evidence in the Fokeng dispute and 
in the challenge to the supreme Chief's right to remove the rebels.
Indeed, the establishment of the Supreme Chief's powers and absolute 
authority thus accorded to the Governor-General and the Minister of 
Native Affairs, were explicitly designed to inhibit the resort to 
'white' legal institutions on the part of 'tribal' Africans. in 
pointing this out, Rogers may easily have been referring to the 
African communities of the Rustenburg district specifically:
"Natives are notorious for their love of 
litigation and, in the past, more particularly in 
the Transvaal, thousands of pounds have been 
dissipated in, and tribes have been financially 
ruined by, the institution by dissatisfied 
sections against their chiefs or tribes of legal 
proceedings of a frivolous or merely vexatious 
nature."(187)
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Finally, section five of the 1927 Act specifically accorded the 
Minister or the Governor-General in his capacity as Supreme Chief, 
the power over the 'fusion and fission of tribes' and the removal of 
'whole tribes of individual natives' Ihis clause could as 
easily have been designed to meet the exigencies of administration 
in the Rustenburg district, and indeed it was frequently involved in 
the district in order to remove rebels, for at least thirty years 
after the passage of the 1927 Act.^®^
If these conferred 'customary' powers were not sufficient, the Act 
also conferred on the Governor-General the power to legislate by 
proclamation'. In fact, it was even possible for him to modify the 
'customary' legal practices enshrined in the Natal code. However, 
if the powers conferred on the Supreme Chief provided a rigid and 
centralized means of political control which was made up in the garb 
of 'customary authority', then the system of edictal legislation 
offered a flexibility and adaptability which was utterly 
indispensable to local N.A.D. officials .(^O) These measures, 
combined with those contained in the Native's Taxation and 
Development Act number 41 of 1925 (which regulated all 'tribal' 
finances through general and tribal trust funds and effectively 
removed all control over fiscal administration from the hands of 
chiefs and placed it in the hands of N.A.D. officials),(191) 
effectively did establish the N.A.D. as 'all things to all men' in 
relation to the African rural population.
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However, in the Rustenburg district, even prior to the passage of 
the 1927 Act, it was the very overriding power of the N.A.D. which 
in many respects undermined the authority of chiefs who were 
ostensibly indispensable to the maintenance of tribal unity and to 
the ideological control of the rural population. Ihe historical 
cohesion of tribal government in the district throughout the process 
of colonisation, combined with the prolonged access to land in many 
of these chiefdoms, meant that these strong chieftaincies persisted, 
into the twentieth century and that chiefly control remained at the 
centre of rural political and economic relations. However, as rural 
resources became more scarce in these communities so the control of 
chiefs over the allocation and distribution of these resources was 
challenged. The ideological authority of Tswana chiefs in the 
district was also inreasingly susceptible to popular challenge as 
chiefs were structurally incapable of distributing resources which 
they did not have.
In its clumsy attempt to bolster the apparently dwindling 
ideological popularity of chiefs in the district, whilst entrenching 
their subservience to the central authority of the N.A.D., the white 
administration merely exacerbated the developing crisis of chiefly 
legitimacy within the chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district. By 
subjecting Tswana chiefs to the veto of the paramount chief, by 
incorporating them within the lowest ranks of the N.A.D. 
bureaucratic machinery and by entrenching their dependence on the 
sanction of white officials for their very incumbency, the state 
administration did more to undermine their ideological resilience 
than it did to bolster it. In this light, it is hardly surprising
260
that during the 1920a and 1930s longstanding succession disputes 
began to re-emerge within the chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district. 
As Henige points out, the establishment of 'indirect rule' in 
British colonial Africa brought about an increased concern on the 
part of the colonial administrators with regard to 'paramountcy, 
seniority, succession' and the like. ' From the perspective of 
rural subjects in the Rustenburg district, the ability to 
demonstrate genealogical seniority or ideological primacy offered 
both the potential of winning the support of the administration in 
its appointment of chiefs and headmen as well as securing 
preferential positions in the allocation of shrinking rural 
resources. Thus, although it was seldom (if ever) conscious, views 
of the past were reworked, manipulated and remoulded to suit the 
particular political interests of various groupings within each 
chiefdom. The chieftaincies, perhaps more so than previously, were 
up for grabs.
The passage of the 1927 Native Administration Act did nothing to 
curb these resilient ideological struggles within the chiefdoms of 
the Rustenburg district in the period which followed. Members of 
the Rustenburg Chiefdoms, who unlike the 'rebels' at Phokeng, could 
make no vaguely legitimate claims to the chieftaincy itself 
continued to reshape and reconstitute perceptions and 
interpretations of the past systems of tribal government, to 
legitimise either demands for the democratisation of control within 
the chiefdoms or the right to collectively secede from the control 
of a particular chief.
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Through entrenching the Rustenburg chiefs in the lower eschelons of
the state bureaucracy, the colonial government ironically
contributed to undermining these chiefs' ideological popularity
amongst their subjects, which was to have provided the basis for
'retribalisation'. This was clearly represented in virtually every
community in the district by the progressive dwindling of chiefly
access to an income derived from support by members of the
chiefdoms, and the consequent increasing reliance on a salary
provided by the s t a t e . ^ ^  Even in the attempt to breathe
greater legitimacy into the African customary legal system (through
the establishment of Native Appeal Courts and the granting of
criminal jurisdiction to some chiefs) the administration further
undermined the legal authority of chiefs whose courts now
represented not the highest source of appeal in the land, but the
(194)lowest rung on the hierarchical legal ladder.
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FOOTNOTES
(1) The struggles in the Fokeng chiefdom provide the basis of my 
earlier work, See: Simpson, G.N., 'The Political and Legal 
Contradictions in the Preservation and Dissolution of the 
Precapitalist Mode of Production : The Fokeng Distributances, 
1921 - 6 '. B.A. (Hons.) dissertation, University of the
Witwatersrand (Johannesburg), 1981.
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CHAPTER FIVE ’WE ARE ONLY ONE TRIBE* - DIVISION AMONGST THF.
KWENA BA MOGOPA
The dispute within the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom spanned almost the 
entire period of the 1920s and 1930s. In the process, despite any 
machinations of the N.A.D., the dispute found its way to the Supreme 
Court and ultimately posed the most fundamental threat to the state 
stategy of ’retribalisation' through the development of a 
secessionist movement attempting to assert the independence of the 
outlying branches of the chiefdom from the control of Chief J.O.M. 
Mamogale. As in the case of the Fokeng dispute, the demands of the 
opposition section of the chiefdom and their multiple material 
aspirations were expressed through the appropriation and remoulding 
of 'customary' political and legal procedures. Yet unlike the 
Fokeng rebels, the opposition leadership in the Kwena ba Mogopa 
chiefdom could make no 'legitimate* claim to the chieftaincy itself 
with the result that their appeals to traditional law and custom 
were significantly distinct from those discussed and warrant 
detailed discussion in their own right.
I. 'Bethanie belongs to Bethanie' - Communal Purchase and Sectional 
Control : The Conflict Over Land
The Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom was one of the largest in the district 
and the chief at the time was Johannes Otto More (J.O.M.) Mamogale. 
This chiefdom was divided into five different sections, spread over 
four magisterial districts. Only one section, the Bethanie 
'location', was situated in the Rustenburg magisterial district.
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Bethanie was the headquarters of chief Mamogale. The other sections
of the chiefdom were in the Pretoria, Britz and Ventersdorp
districts.^ The two largest sections outside of the Rustenburg
district were at 'Hebron' and 'Jericho' in the Pretoria district,
each of which were about twenty miles from Bethanie and
approximately twenty miles apart. These three main sections of the
( 2)chiefdom were separated by privately owned 'white' farmland,v
The origins of the dispersed settlement pattern of the Ifc/ena ba
Mogopa are to be found during the period of the difaqane. In 1868
when the Rwena ba Mogopa began to regroup after being scattered by
Mzilikazi, they settled at Bethanie, Hebron and Jericho, all under
(3)the aegis of the Hermannsburg Mission Society. ' The Bethanie
section was later reserved as a 'native location', but this was not
the fate of the Hebron and Jericho sections, which were never
(4)formally reserved as such.
"Thus the tribe has automatically become split up 
into three distinct groups, though the tribal 
headquarters are at Bethanie and the natives of 
all three sections have always recognised that 
they owe allegiance to one and the same
chief."(5)
At all three 'locations' access to land was originally through the 
purchases of the Hermannsburg Mission Society. In 1926 the
Sub-Native Commissioner for Hammanskraal estimated the combined 
population of Hebron and Jericho to be approximately 20 000, nearly 
five times the population of Bethanie.^ At this time, the 
Bethanie section controlled almost 21 000 morgen of land^^ as 
compared to 16 437 morgen controlled by the Hebron section and 9 260
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morgen by the Jericho section. ^  It is therefore apparent that 
the latter two sections of the chiefdom suffered from a much greater 
population density in relation to land than was the case at Bethanie.
These conditions do not appear to have given rise to much open
conflict during the reign of Jacobus Mamogale, who was father of
(9)J.O.M. Mamogale and preceded him as chief. Jacobus was
described as a powerful chief ...
”... who ruled his people with an iron hand, 
exacted implicit obedience and when he embarked 
on matters of land purchase, saw that funds were 
forthcoming to complete the transactions."CIO)
However, the conflicting interests in control over land, which later 
punctuated the reign of J.O.M. Mamogale and which took the form of 
conflict between the various sections of the tribe and the chief, 
were prefigured in the course of land purchases under Jacobus 
Mamogale.
"It would seem that in most instances, if a farm 
was required by one of the sections it was 
acquired and paid for by that section though 
ultimately registration might have been effected 
in favour of the tribe as a whole. ”0-1) 
(author's emphasis)
In contrast to Jacobus, J.O.M. Mamogale was described by N.A.D. 
officials as a 'weak and dissolute' man who was 'inept' and who, as 
chief, exercised 'no real discipline or authority over his 
people. J In spite of this J.O.M. Mamogale appears to have 
maintained the full support of his legotla at Bethanie, which, when 
their chief was convicted of being in possession of alcohol, sent a
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petition of support for him to the Minister of Native Affairs. Ihey 
claimed that:
"... the whole of the Bakwena tribe are greatly 
attached and devoted to their hereditary Chief 
Johannes Otto More Mamogale who has hitherto 
carried on the affairs of the Bakwena tribe in an 
able and satisfactory manner and under whose 
guidance the said tribe has made considerable 
progress in civilization and other things."(13)
Ihey went on to warn that:
"His (Mamogale's - G.S.) deposition would very 
seriously affect the unity and tribal 
organisation of the Bakwena people as your 
petitioners consider him, their hereditary chief, 
to be the tie which not only holds the Bakwena 
tribe together but also induces the Bakwena 
people to behave as faithful and law abiding 
subjects of His Majesty th King."^)
The Bethanie legotla's petition was endorsed by the Hermannsburg 
missionary, Behrens, who suggested that chief Mamogale. be pardoned 
and that 'educated natives' should be allowed to possess one or two 
bottles of liquor.
Chief J.O.M. Mamogale was considerably less popular with his 
subjects at Hebron and Jericho. The early tensions relating to 
Mamogale's assertions of control over these outlying branches have 
been briefly documented in Chapter t h r e e . S i m i l a r  tensions, 
particularly manifest in the process of land purchases, gave rise to 
political dissension within the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom throughout 
J.O.M. Mamogale's reign and beyond.
In May 1927, a group of 'headmen' from Jericho wrote a petition to 
the Prime Minister listing their grievances against J.O.M.
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Mamogale/1^  They accused him of 'misruling and misgoverning' 
and claimed that he had 'become unbearable' and that the chiefdom 
was in danger of being 'totally ruined'. 1 The petitioners 
accused Mamogale of embezzling at least £700 since 1903, when he had 
independently contracted to lease a trading site at Jericho at a 
rate of £30 per annum.v J The petitioners further alleged that a 
levy of 10/- per head, which was paid in 1907 to effect the transfer 
of the farm Jericho from the Hermannsburg Mission Society, was never 
used to this end an that the money collected had
'disappeared' ,^2^  In 1908 the money collected from a further £1
(21}levy for the same purpose allegedly suffered a similar fate.'-4- 
Hie petitioners claimed that in 1917 £300 was collected for the 
purpose of a land deal. No land was bought and the money was never 
accounted for/22'* They also claimed that in the following year a 
tax of £3.10.0 was levied at Jericho and £3 at Hebron without any 
reason being given and without the money ever being accounted 
ior.<23>
However, the primary source of conflict between Jericho and Chief 
Mamogale during this period was rooted in the purchase of the farm 
Elandsfontein 204. 2^^* This farm was attached to the Jericho 
'location' and was presumed, by both the people of Jericho and some 
Native Affairs Department officials, to have been bought 'for the 
Jericho Section'^25* Hie farm was purchased in June 1921, after 
members of the Jericho community had approached the Sub-Native 
Commision complaining of a shortage of grazing land.'- J Prior to 
the purchase a meeting was held at Jericho at which those present 
voted to purchase the farm. This meeting was attended by Chief
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( 27)Mamogale. The malcontents at Jericho claimed, however, that 
the Jericho section were never consulted as to the price to be paid 
for the farm. They went on to suggest that Mamogale, who had 
independently contracted to purchase the farm, had agreed to a 
purchase price of more that three times the value of the land. They 
also accused the chief of misappropriating funds which were accrued 
from a £6 levy paid by members of the Jericho section in order to 
meet the purchase price. 1
The purchase of Elandsfontein 204 was also a major source of 
complaint from members of the Hebron section of the chiefdom, many 
of whom refused to contribute to a tribal levy for the purpose of 
paying off the farm. Their objections had fundamental implications 
for 'tribal* forms of land purchase.
"Their attitude is that the Hebron section paid 
for their own farms and that it is unjust and 
unfair that they should be taxed to meet a 
liability incurred in the first instance for the 
purchase of a farm for the Jericho section of the 
tribe."(29)
Elandsfontein 204 was not the only land deal which elicited these 
objections from members of the Hebron section. The purchase of the 
farm Nooitgedacht 384 in November 1929 which was adjoined to the 
Bethanie s e c t i o n , e v o k e d  a similar response.
The branch at Bethanie also voiced their complaints over the 
purchase of Elandsfontein 204. At the pitso held at Bethanie they 
complained that the chiefdom was already heavily indebted through 
land purchases, (most notably Nooitgedacht 384) and that they could
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not afford to contribute to the purchase price of any other 
lands/315
The tensions between the various sections of the Kwena ba Mogopa 
chiefdom over the issue of land purchase, and the refusal of large 
numbers of its people to contribute to the financing of ’tribal* 
purchases, posed substantial problems for the N.A.D.. Implicit in 
the demands of the various groupings, was the assumption that each 
section was responsible for purchasing its own land. Ihis posed 
immediate problems of how land purchased was to be registered and 
also raised questions over the right of sections of a tribe to claim 
exclusive access to tracts of land attached to their respective 
branch. The resulting confusion over these issues was acknowledged 
by Sub-Native Commissioner Harries, who had represented the N.A.D. 
in the course of the Elandsfontein purchase. He admitted that:
"Where a section of a tribe like that buys land, 
the Native Affairs Department has given no 
instructions as to what procedure we have to 
adopt.”(32)
Not least of the problems facing both the Native Affairs 
administration and Chief Mamogale, was the fact that the chief's 
inability to collect the requisite funds in order to complete these 
land transactions, had resulted in the tribal finances becoming 
heavily indebted. By February 1924 the chiefdom had twice been on 
the losing end of litigation in the Supreme Court in connection with 
land transactions, and the immediate danger was that other 'tribal
farms' might be confiscated in lieu of the outstanding
(33)payments. These circumstances prevailed despite concerted
attempts to raise the necessary finances.
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In May 1923 two meetings were held at Bethanie and were attended by
the Sub-Native Commissioner, J.O.M. Mamogale and all his
'responsible councillors', including representatives from the Hebron
and Jericho sections. J At the second of these meetings a
resolution was passed imposing a levy of £6 per annum on each male
(35)of nineteen years and over throughout the chiefdom. In the
year which followed the levy collections were described as 'most 
disappointing'.^*^ Hie Secretary of Native Affairs identified 
three reasons for the failure of the levy. Firstly, he noted that
it was 'impractical' to impose a criminal sanction for those who 
(37)failed to pay. Secondly, he pointed to the fact that
Goverment Notice No. 382 of 1921, under which the tribal resolution 
had been published, was in the process of being challenged in the 
Supreme Court and this eliminated the chief's ability to resort to 
civil proceedings in the case of defaulters Finally, and of
most significance, the Secretary of Native Affairs, stated that:
"Hie Natives have shown themselves most unwilling 
to meet the levy, each group strongly advancing 
the view that it is only responsible for its own 
particular transactions and not those of the 
other sections. For instance, the Hebron section 
is very much opposed to subscribing money to meet 
the liabilities in respect of 'Elandsfontein' 
which lies in the Jericho area, and requests that 
any monies paid by Hebron natives be utilised for 
the purposes of meeting expenses arising out of 
the transfer of the Hebron location farms. 
Similarly the Bethanie section acknowledge 
liability in respect of the farm 'Nooitgedacht' 
No. 384, Rustenburg, but are unwilling to 
contribute towards the 'Elandsfontein' 
transaction."(39)
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From this it is apparent that by 1923, large groupings within the 
Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom were reneging on their 'traditionally 
defined tribal responsibilities' and were attempting to assert 
greater control over available material resources, both in the form 
of money and land.
As far as the N.A.D. was concerned, the affairs of the Kwena ba
Mogopa chiefdom were further complicated by an exchange of land in
the Rustenburg district in terms of Act No. 32 of 1914.^^ This
involved an exchange between the government on the one hand and the
Kwena ba Mogopa on the other, in connection with the Hartebeestpoort
Irrigation Scheme, and the question arose as to how the land to be
given to the chiefdom should be allocated and how the trust should
(41)be worded in the Deed of Grant. ' In a letter to the Secretary
of Native Affairs, the Reverend Behrens, the Hermannsburg missionary
at Bethanie, made very strong representations that the farms should
be granted "not to the Minister in trust for the Bakwena tribe as a
whole, but to the Minister in trust for the Natives of the Bakwena
(42)tribe living in the Bethanie Location under Chief Mamogale”v ' 
Behrens' reasoning was that the land to be transferred to the 
government had been acquired exclusively by the Bethanie section and 
that "it would be most inequitable for the grant to be made in 
favour of the tribe as a whole” In motivating this point of
view, Behrens noted that each of the three main sections of the 
chiefdom had separately attained the land on which they resided. He 
claimed that each grouping expected to pay all their own costs, such 
as farm taxes, fencing costs and the like. He continued ...
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"So if one group decides to buy a new farm, the 
other two groups are not called upon to assist to 
buy such a farm, and in consequence they have no 
rights whatever on it, neither do they want any.
And as each group is buying land by itself, the 
three groups are dead against being held liable 
for the debts of one of the groups.(^4)
Behrens did warn against any farms being registered to the chief 
alone - "he has his private farms” - but maintained that farms 
should not be registered to the tribe as a whole. He acknowledged 
that there were two farms (Leeukop 501 and the farm Olievenpoort) 
which had been purchased by "the tribe as a whole", but claimed that 
these were the only truly "tribal farms". *
To add to the nightmares of the N.A.D. officials, by 1923, after 
fifteen years of wrangling, the Hermannsburg Mission Society was in 
a position to pass transfer of the Hebron and Jericho farms to the 
residents on these land.^*^ This posed the obvious question of 
whether these farms would be registered in favour of the Minister in 
trust for the whole tribe or for the specific section concerned in 
each instance. Inextricably linked to these questions were the 
problems of whether or not the tribal finances and liablities could 
be treated as the responsibility of the chiefdom as a whole, when 
the land purchases involved affected only a specific section.
In 1908 the Transvaal Supreme Court had handed down a judgement 
which stated that:
"... according to Native law and custom no 
section of a tribe could hold land as apart from 
the tribe and remain an integral portion of the 
tribe.":(47)
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This decision clearly conflicted with the intentions and aspirations
of the various sections of the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom. It also
appeared legally to dictate the terms in which the Native Affairs
administrators were able to handle the situation. In a later case,
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court handed down another
judgement in which it was definitely stipulated that the property of
individual members of a chiefdom, (such as stock) was not executable
in respect of general 'tribal' l i a b i l i t i e s . T h e s e  two legal
decisions were of particular interest to the chiefdom's creditors in
respect of the farms Nooitgedacht and Elandsfontein, as it left them
no option but to attach 'tribal assets' such as land. The N.A.D.
could not resist such claims to land which was registered to the
(49)chiefdom 'as a whole'.
The combined effect of these circumstances, meant that the sections 
of the chiefdom which had refused to contribute to the purchase of 
lands from which they did not see themselves as benefiting, were 
threatened with losing their own farms if the chiefdom did not meet 
its liabilities. The Secretary of Native Affairs, concerned both 
with safeguarding the lands due to be transferred to the Kwena ba 
Mogopa under the Hartebeestpoort Irrigation Scheme and from the 
Hermannsburg Mission Society, as well as with defusing the tensions 
over this issue within the chiefdom, identified a potential loophole 
in the legal precedents which, he suggested, offered a solution to 
these problems.
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In the case of Mathibe versus the Lieutentant-Governor in 1907, the 
court found that the status of a chief was dependent upon his 
recognition as such by the government. This ruling was 
reapplied in the case of Matope Matope versus Day (1923), which 
dealt with a section of the Bakubung chiefdom which had separated 
itself from the central chiefdom in 1890 and which had remained 
separate thereafter. When the leader of the Bakubung offshoot 
attempted to buy some land on behalf of himself and his followers, 
the government recognised them as a 'tribal entity' for the purpose 
of this purchase:
"... this is a recognition by the government of 
the defendant as a chief for the purpose of the 
purchase of this land ... He is ... not invested 
with the full powers ordinarily possessed by 
Native Chiefs; nevertheless it was sufficient for 
the purpose of enabling him to acquire the land 
in question as tribal land and to bind the 
community of natives under his leadership ... The 
truth of the matter is that when the community, 
of which he was the head became a recognised 
tribal entity or tribe, he at the same time, by 
whatever title he might be known, became ipso 
facto its chief.”(52)
On the basis of these legal precedents, the Secretary of Native 
Affairs suggested a possible method of both safeguarding the lands 
to be transferred to the Kwena ba Mogopa, as well as defusing the 
conflict between the various sections of the chiefdom. He suggested 
that the Bethanie, Hebron and Jericho sections of the chiefdom be 
recognised as constituting separate 'tribal entities' and that the 
relevant farms be registered in favour of the Minister in trust for 
the particular sections immediately concerned. J Quite apart 
from the legal intricacies of the situation, the Secretary suggested
that ...
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"... from an administrative point of view the 
time is ripe to recognise these groups as 
separate and distinct the one from the other. 
Mamogale is inefficient, commands little respect 
and has mismanaged the tribal affairs; the three 
sections ... have from a practical point of view 
been more or less distinct the one from the other 
for many years, and are united as a tribe only 
sentimentally in that they render allegiance to a 
common chief.”(54)
He went on to recommend that for administrative purposes Mamogale's 
jurisdiction should be limited to his headquarters at Bethanie, and 
that the existing sub-chiefs at Hebron and Jericho should be 
recognised by government as chiefs of their sections and as far as 
possible be made responsible for their own transactions
A series of meetings were consequently called in the three sections 
of the chiefdom, to discuss both the failure of the tribal levies to 
date, as well as the potential of formally splitting the chief dom 
into three. On the 27th of March 1924, meetings were called by the 
Sub-Native Commissioner at Hebron and Jericho. Ihe object of these 
meetings was primarily to get both the Hebron and Jericho sections 
to send representatives to a later meeting of the entire chiefdom to 
be held at Bethanie on the 11th of April. However, the Sub-Native 
Commissioner Hemsworth acknowledged that he had attempted to achieve 
more than this through, in particular, the Hebron meeting.
"My own idea was to force their hands - to get to 
the bottom of this antagonism to the main tribe 
... I told them that ... it appeared to me their 
idea was to regard themselves as 
independent."(56)
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At the meeting Hemsworth explained the fiscal crisis facing the 
chiefdom and stated that the cause was the refusal of members of the 
different sections to contribute to the tribal levies. He explained 
that it was up to the various sections of the chiefdom to decide if 
they wanted to be a part of the chiefdom or n o t . ^ ^  The main 
objections which emerged from the approximately seventy five 
'Hebronites' present were in fact over the intervention of the 
N.A.D. in the affairs of the chiefdom. Levi Ntoane, one of the 
leading figures of the Hebron opposition asserted that the problems 
being experienced could only be resolved if they were sorted out 
within the chiefdom through the proper customary channels. He 
suggested that the root of the conflict amongst the Kwena ba Mogopa 
lay in the chief's failure properly to consult the various sections 
of the chiefdom.
"When a man has bitten a piece of iron he never 
opens his mouth. Have our chiefs bitten a piece 
of iron? Since 1903 we are waiting for our
chiefs. Now we are told we will meet white 
chiefs at Rustenburg ... we don't believe 
anything will be done for us ... we are afraid 
power will be taken from our chief. Let us first 
speak to our chief before meeting at Rustenburg 
... we must first discuss it amongst
ourselves."(58)
Implicit in Ntona's statements was both a degree of suspicion of the
N.A.D.'s intentions as well as a loyalty to the customary methods of
tribal government. He suggested that it was the abuse of these
methods which were the source of the conflict. His concern was
definitely not that the chieftaincy should be deprived of its
institutional authority, but rather that this authority should be
(59^correctly exercised. '
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These sentiments were echoed by other members of the opposition. 
Johannes More, directing his comments to Sub -Native Commissioner 
Hemsworth stated:
"We are the servants of our chief ... What you 
have said to us today are 'grand words'. That is 
how things should have been told to us from the 
beginning. The Bakwena are not against their 
chief only he must treat us properly ... We want 
to know how it is we are still fighting with this 
debt ..."(60)
Another of the malcontents, Nicodemus Masilo further corroborated 
these views;
"Our chiefs today are under another government. 
We want our chief to call us together. We know 
nothing about the farms of Bethanie and Jericho. 
Our chief should tell us. If he tells us we will 
stand by him."(61)
To the surprise of the Native Affairs officials there was at this 
stage no apparent demand on the part of the Hebron malcontents for a 
formal division of the chiefdom. The sentiments of the meeting on 
the central issues placed before them were summed up by Ephraim 
Mogapi, another prominent member of the opposition. He said:
"Jericho belongs to Jericho, Bethanie belongs to 
Bethanie and Hebron belongs to Hebron. We don't 
want to be forced into anything, that is not 
clear to us. We agree for all land to be made 
into one, but Bethanie and Jericho must first 
finish what they have done."(62)
At the Bethanie meeting which followed on the 11th of April 1924, 
approximately 130 representatives of all the sections of the
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C63^chiefdom attended. There was still no lobby at tnis meeting
for formal division of the chiefdom. Nonetheless, chief J.O.M. 
Mamogale made a strenuous plea that the chiefdom remain unified. 
His main concern, was that the various sections of the chiefdom be 
in a position to contribute jointly to eliminate the tribal debt. 
He suggested that this was as much in the interests of the hebron 
grouping as any other section of the chiefdom.
"One section can appeal to another section of the 
tribe for assistance. We have the right to call 
on the other sections to assist ... Hebron are 
hopeless as they are in debt ... If the
government wish to split us up then these three 
sections cannot assist each other and 1 ask. the 
government not to split us u p ."(64)
Ihe only other suggestion to come out of the Bethanie meeting was 
that 'the government' play more of an active role in providing
financial support thereby proving its good intentions instead of 
only 'assisting us by word of mouth. '(65) ^  ^act appears that
suspicion of the intervention of the N.A.D. in the 'affairs of the 
tribe' was the primary motivating concern of the Hebronites and the 
delegates from Jericho.
The effect of these meetings was that the chiefdom would remain 
unified. The Bethanie meeting ended with a tribal resolution 
stating that all the farms in question be registered in trust for 
the whole chiefdom.(®^ At this stage it appeared that the 
opposition groupings in Jericho and Hebron were either unconcerned 
or unaware about the legal implications of this resolution. 
However, if the legal formalities of land registration were of
little concern to them, the practicalities of financial 
responsibility for these farms certainly were not. Although the 
formal division of the chiefdom appeared not to be of strategic 
importance to the malcontents at this point, they most definitely 
were concerned with establishing a degree of independent control 
over their sectional resources. Finally, if the leadership of the 
Hebron and Jericho opposition expressed themselves as loyal to 
customary forms of tribal government, this did not soften their 
resentment of the 'abuse' of his chiefly authority by J.O.M. 
Mamogale.
Ultimately the concerns of the Hebron opposition in particular, were 
very practical. Hiey were unwilling to contribute extremely scarce 
financial resources to ventures which offered them few or no 
material benefits. Neither the spate of 'tribal' meetings, nor the 
tribal resolutions which resulted, nor the interventions of N.A.D. 
officials, effectively offered any solutions which promised to 
resolve these grievances. The passive resistance of the Hebron ana 
Jericho section, thus continued to express itself through widespread 
refusal to contribute to tribal levies. A £.6 levy endorsed by the 
chief and the 'full tribal council' at Bethanie on the 26th June 
1924, had by March 1925 resulted in the collection of just 'a few 
hundred pounds' This suggests widespread popular support in 
the households of Jericho and Hebron for the levy boycott.
In January 1925, John Reid, the seller of the farm Elandsfontein, 
obtained judgement in the Supreme Court against Chief J.O.M. 
Mamogale who was held liable for the debt of £.11 0 0 0 .^**) By the
291
end of February 1925, as a result of the continued failure of the 
tribal levy, Reid's lawyers threatened to execute tribal land in 
lieu of the outstanding part of the purchase price for the
farm.^^ At this point the chief appealed to the N.A.D. to
extend a loan to the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom in order to off-set
the debt.^^ The N.A.D., on discovering that none of the 
location land was legally inalienable nor protected against sale in 
execution, negotiated a loan from the African Board of Executors and 
Trust Company Limited for £11 500 on the first mortgage of ten
'tribally owned' f a r m s . A l l  of the Hebron and Jericho farms 
were amongst the ten put up for mortgage.
All this loan achieved was to replace one creditor with another and 
to buy time for the Kwena ba Mogopa. The repayment of the loan at
£500 per annum with interest, depended on the payment of yet another
( 72')tribal levy which was duly promulgated. y Furthermore, the 
farms of the Hebron and Jericho sections, appeared to be under 
greater threat than had previously been the case. Once again the 
N.A.D. proved itself to be either oblivious to, or disinterested in 
the material grievances which underlay the discontent within the 
chiefdom. However, if the Native Affairs officialdom had previously 
been indecisive about the most appropriate strategy of dealing with 
the dissension in the chief dom, at this point they devised an 
assertive approach which was to prevail for the rest of the period 
under review. Native Commissioner, Howard Rogers claimed:
"It has in the past been made very clear to the 
natives that in the opinion of the Department the 
legal position is that the Bakwena as a whole are
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responsible for each of these transactions and no 
one section can disclaim responsibility. Under 
the law as it stands at present, it would appear 
competent for the chief of a tribe, without 
reference to the tribesmen, but with the approval 
of the Executive Council under Law 3 of 1898 
(which was granted in respect of Elandsfontein 
and Nooitgedacht purchases) to bind the tribe as 
a whole."C/3)
In view of the decision not formally to divide the chiefdom, the 
N.A.D. clearly undertook to uphold the 1908 decision of the Supreme 
Court (Petlele versus Minister of Native Affairs), which stipulated 
that according to 'Native law and custom', no section of a chief dom 
could independently hold land whilst remaining an integral part of 
the chiefdom.
These developments in early 1925, flew directly in the face of 
Mamogale's opponents at Hebron. In February 1926 they took John 
Reid and Chief J.O.M. Mamogale to the Supreme Court in an attempt to 
have the sale of the farm Elandsfontein set aside.
In the final analysis, the national priorities of N.A.D. policy 
prevailed in dictating the proposed solutions to local
circumstances. The earlier suggestions of dividing the chiefdom as 
a solution to local fiscal and political problems were quickly 
shelved (mainly due to the fact that once this option had been 
rejected by members of the chiefdom, it no longer offered a 
solution) and were replaced with the 'priorities' of segregation : 
'tribal unity' and 'tribally-based' communal ownership of land.
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II 'The Tribe is the Government of the Tribe* - Democracy and 
Autocracy in ’Customary Law'
The basis on which the Hebron plaintiffs attacked the sale of 
Elandsfontein is particularly significant. They alleged that 
according to 'Native' law and custom, before a chief could buy any 
fixed property and purport to bind his followers, certain 
formalities had to be complied with. They claimed that the chief 
was obliged to consult not only his legotla, but the 'whole 
chiefdom' assembled in pitso. Hie plaintiffs claimed that this had 
not been done in the case of Elandsfontein and that therefore they 
could not be bound by the contract of sale between J.O.M. Mamogale 
and John Ormiston Reid.^^ Alternatively, the Hebron members 
claimed that the chief failed to comply with all the conditions of 
the customs of chiefdom in that he only called together a pitso of 
one section of the chiefdom, at Jericho. On this basis the 
plaintiffs alleged not only that the contract was not binding on the 
Hebron section, but that the contract was entered into on behalf of 
the Jericho section only. Furthermore, they claimed that the 
potential sale in execution of Hebron farms by John Reid, 
constituted an 'interference with the rights' of the Hebron section 
from which they stood to suffer 'irreparable loss'.^^
Mamogale as defendant alleged that the chief of the Kwena ba Mogopa 
had, according to well-established custom of the chiefdom, full 
power and absolute discretion to enter into and to bind the whole of 
his tribe by a contract for the purpose of land transactions. He 
claimed that it was not necessary to summon or to obtain the 
approval of a pitso or each of any section of the tribe.^ “0
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As in the case of the Fokeng trial, the court was required to rule 
on how customary tribal law was properly constituted. However, in 
this instance, apart from having to deal with voluminous conflicting 
evidence on the relationship between the chief, the legotla and the 
pitso, the court was also called upon to define which were the 
legitimate 'customary processes' for land transactions. Ultimately 
the central issue at stake was the chief's right to bind members of 
the chiefdom to financial commitments about which they had not been 
consulted. For the Hebron plaintiffs, this question over their 
democratic rights within the government of the chiefdom, was 
inextricably linked to their quest for independent control over the 
material resources of their particular section.
Despite the initial confusion within the N.A.D. over the best
solutions to the financial crisis in the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom,
it is still somewhat, surprising that, in contrast to the Fokeng
trial, members of the Department led evidence for both the
plaintiffs and the d e f e n d a n t . T h e  first N.A.D. official to
(79)lead evidence for the plaintiffs was Ernest Thomas Stubbs.v *
Stubbs began his evidence by outlining the historical autocracy of 
African chiefs. He suggested that this was based on the military 
forms of political organisation of chiefdoms in a state of almost 
perpetual w a r f a r e . H o w e v e r ,  he went on to point out the 
'disintegrating influence' of white civilization and colonisation on
tribal government, and in particular on the autocratic authority of
(81)chiefs. 1 As a consequence, within African chiefdoms ...
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"... Ever since we have had a civilized 
government operating within the Union of South 
Africa, there has been a steady modification in 
the direction of a greater democracy"(82)
Stubbs went on to assert that:
"This tendency has been since Republican times. 
The tendency of administrations has been to 
encourage a form of autocratic control among the 
Natives, because it simplified administration as 
far as the Europeans are concerned."(83)
He concluded by contrasting this 'convenience of native 
administration' with 'the reality' of "a steady whittling away of 
the chief’s powers and a greater move towards democracy - that is, 
the will of the tribe" ^8^  Stubbs suggested that the 'will of the 
tribe' was represented through the legotla ('men of royal blood') 
and especially the pitso, which he defined as a meeting of the whole
/ O C )tribe summoned through the headmen or petty chiefs.'1 J He went 
on to assert that one of the fundamentals of customary law in 
'modern times', was consultation of the tribe through the 
pitso.<86>
On the central queston of land purchase, Stubbs asserted that the 
"acquisition of fixed property is a modern development" amongs 
Africans , ^8^  and that the purchase of land "is a very modern 
growth”/ 88  ^ On this basis, he expressed the view that a chief 
... "cannot possibly buy (land) without the consent of the 
tribe.”(8^^ in fact, Stubbs claimed that virtually every
financial transaction within a chiefdom required the approval of the
pitso, and that there could be no question in this regard over an
(90)£11 000 land deal.
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"Purchase of farms without a pltso being called, 
in my opinion, would be contrary to native law 
and custom."(91)
Stubb's evidence in principle advanced the case of the plaintiffs.
He did not, however, acknowledge the Hebronite's rights as a section
of the chiefdom, and stated that he had never heard of a section of
(92)a ’tribe' holding porperty apart from 'the tribe itself. *
Stubbs' views were supported in the evidence of both Henry Aston 
Key, the Sub-Native Commissioner for Johannesburg, and Clifford 
Harries who was the Sub-Native Commissioner for Hammanskraal and who 
had been directly involved with both the Hebron and Jericho sections 
over the purchase of Elandsfontein.
Both Harries and Key supported the view expressed by Stubbs, that
the past autocracy of chiefs was subject to the modification of
customary law through its subjection to 'civilized government' and
the cessation of inter-tribal wars.^^ Both witnesses suggested
that there was a resultant 'tendency to democracy' within African
(94)chiefdoms in the 1920's. Key went on to suggest that this was
even more the case in Christianised communities as "Christianity is 
democratic". He noted that the Kwena ba Mogopa was a
predominantly Christian community and claimed that this factor, 
amongst others, influenced the methods of tribal government within 
the chiefdom.
"From my dealings with these people, I gathered 
the fact that Mamogalie's people were much more
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advanced that others, and Mamogalie (sic) was 
also much more advanced in his administration ...
I think it is a well known thing that the headmen 
of the chief's kraal are appointed to that place 
by the people of Mamogalie. This chief is less 
autocratic than others."(96)
Clifford Harries, in comparing the administration of Isang Pilane
amongst the Kgatla with that of Mamogale, asserted that there were
substantial differences in the customs prevalent in these two
chief doms. This was based on the fact that the 'precedent of
consultation' established amongst the Kwena ba Mogopa had not been
(97)'laid down' in the Kgatla experience.
Harries, like Stubbs, claimed that the processes involved in land 
transactions had only become established during the period after 
white colonisation.^®^ He went on to suggest that within the 
Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom, the precedent of 'consultation' over land 
transactions was firmly established.
"... it seems to me native custom is a series of 
precedents and when, through the advent of 
civilization, land had to be purchased,; and not 
taken, it was necessary to establish a precedent, 
and the chief established that precedent by 
saying 'I consult my people on the question of 
land,' and the natives have accepted his 
precedent that the tribe shall be consulted and 
they have acted upon it."(99)
Both Harries and Key also pointed out that the N.A.D. encouraged 
this process of consultation.
"The policy of the Native Affairs Department is 
to get the chief to consult his tribe. I agree 
with Major Harries on that point; we have 
instructions to do it. In matters of buying land
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they told us they would not accept the sale 
unless it was signed by the chief and headmen - 
signed by as many as we could get to sign."(100)
The two N.A.D. officials differed slightly over what form this 
consultation ought to have taken. Key claimed that the established 
customary precedent dictated, that for the purpose of buying 
immovable property, the chief was obliged to call a pitso of the 
people and that "the pitso was the deciding factor as to whether the 
land was bought or not".^®^ Harries, on the other hand, claimed 
that "with his legotla, prima facie, the chief can do
a n y t h i n g . H e  continued:
”... supposing Mamogalie (sic) consulted his full 
legotla, including the bana ba legotla and the 
Kgosana (headmen - G.S.), there would be no 
necessity to consult a pitso on the purchase of a
farm."(103)
On the specific purchase of the farm Elandsfonteln, Harries 
acknowledged that a pitso of the Jericho section had been held in 
June 1921. At this pitso a vote was taken to buy the farm.^^^ 
However, no discussion took place at this pitso over who would be 
responsible for paying for the farm.
"It was taken for granted that the Jericho people 
were in need of a farm and would buy the 
farm."(105)
Immediately after the Jericho pitso the chief Mamogale went to sign
the deed of sale.
For Harries, the implications of this series of events in the Kwena 
ba Mogopa Chiefdom were particularly serious. As Sub-Native 
Commissioner for Hammanskraal both the Hebron and Jericho sections 
of the chief dom fell under his jurisdiction. He asserted that the 
two sections each had their own legotlas and their own pitsos and 
that they were identifyiably separate entities which were linked 
within the chiefdom through the chief.^106  ^ On this basis, 
Harries claimed that the failure by Mamogale to consult the Hebron 
section excluded them from the purchase of the farm and therefore 
from the resultant financial liability. In this regard Harries 
asserted tha there had been insufficent consultation over the 
purchase of Elandsfontein.
The evidence given by the N.A.D. officials was broadly corroborated 
by several members of the Hebron community. The first of these to
was that the chief was obliged to consult the pitso before embarking 
on any land deal. He quoted an example during the reign of Johannes 
Mamogale where the pitso had refused to approve a proposed land 
purchase on the basis that the cost of the farm in question was
"So far as I know neither the whole council, nor 
' ' ' otla nor the whole pitso was
give evidence was Willem Monaisi.^^®^ Monaisi’s central claim
Monaisi was also emphatic that the chief could not bind members of 
the chiefdom without consulting them. By contrast, he claimed that 
a particular section of the chiefdom could buy land for itself
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without necessarily consulting the chief. The only precondi­
tion in such a case was that a local pitso had to beheld in the 
branch of the chiefdom c o n c e r n e d . M o n a i s i  claimed that under 
these circumstances a branch of the chiefdom could appeal to other 
branches for assistance to meet its debts, but that such an appeal 
could legitimately be refused.
Monaisi was followed by a string of witnesses from Hebron, all of 
whom described a simple but uniform process of consultation which 
they claimed necessarily preceded any land transaction. All of 
these witnesses outlined a procedure which dictated that first the 
chief had to consult the bana ba legotla and headmen or sub-chiefs 
representing the outlying branches of the chiefdom. Thereafter, the 
'sub-chiefs’ of each section of the chiefdom would be informed and 
through a local legotla meeting, a pitso had to be called in each 
branch. Without exception these witnesses claimed that the 
pitso, as the general assembly of the chiefdom or sections of the 
chiefdom, had the right under customary law to veto any decision to 
purchase immovable property. Thus Simon Makoena, a headman from 
Hebron, stated that:
If the pitso decides not to buy, there is no 
purchase. If the chief and legotla wish to buy 
and the pitso does not wish to buy, there is no 
purchase."(11^)
Similarly, Joseph Motsepe claimed that ”... the final decision to 
buy or not to buy rests with the tribe ... the decision of the tribe 
is final” Motsepe added that if 'all sections of the tribe'
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are not consulted via the pitso, then they were not obliged to pay 
for land purchased and nor could their property be confiscated in 
lieu of payment.
The main thrust of the Hebronite's evidence was the assertion that 
under customary law, the power and authority of the chief was 
subject not only to the legotla, but especially to the 'will of the 
tribe' constituted through the pitsos of the various branches of the 
chiefdom.^1^  On this basis it was claimed that chief 
J.O.M. Mamogale had been guilty of a breach of customary law. This 
was alleged, in the first instance, because of his failure to 
consult the Hebron section of the chiefdom over the purchase of 
Elandsfontein; in the second instance because of his subsequent 
insistance that Hebron be held responsible for paying off the debt; 
and finally because he had jeopardised the Hebron farms by involving 
them in a mortgage bond which left them in risk of being confiscated 
in lieu of payment. On the basis of Mamogale's breaches of 
customary law, the plaintiffs charged that the sale of Elandsfontein 
be declared null and void. As Gideon Thipe, a resident of Hebron, 
claimed:
"The chief of the tribe is not above the laws of 
the tribe. If the chief breaks the laws of the 
tribe he is tried by the tribe (and can be) ... 
punished.”(118)
Fanuel Maseke, a headman from Hebron, summed up the sentiments of 
the plaintiffs when he said in evidence that:
"The laws remain the same, but the chiefs make 
the trouble, the customs are the same."(H9)
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In backing up both Maseke's statement quoted here, as well as the 
charges against J.O.M. Mamogale, several witnesses referred to land 
purchases in the past, (particularly under the chieftainship of 
Johannes Mamogale) where the correct 'customary' procedure of 
consultation had been followed. They claimed that as a result, all 
the sections of the chiefdom had contributed to quickly eliminating 
the debts resulting from land purchases which had been approved by 
'the tribe’.(120)
Further evidence was led for the plaintiffs by Micha Seleitse a 
former resident of Jericho. Seleitse claimed to ”... have left 
native rule ... I now live under the White man's rule."^121  ^ He 
said that he 'left the chiefdom' in 1911:
”1 did not care to remain under native rule; they 
(the chiefs - G.S.) were getting too autocratic 
... I did not like native rule ..."^22)
Seleitse confirmed the traditional procedure of consultation 
outlined by other witnesses and contrasted it with the increasingly 
autocratic behaviour of chief Mamogale. He asserted that the pltso 
was the ultimate decision making body within the chiefdom and that 
through the pitso ...
"The tribe is the government of the tribe."(123)
Seleitse identified the pitso as a means through which the chief 
gained the consent of the people, as opposed to a forum through 
which he merely informed them of his own decisions.^2^  In order 
to prove this point, Seleitse quoted examples where the pitso had
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thwarted chief Johannes Mamogale's attempts to buy land, on the 
grounds that the farms proposed for purchase, either had too little 
water on them, or too little arable land.^12"^  Seleitse did add 
that only the chief and the legotla had the right to call a pitso 
together/126^
When questioned about the Elandsfontein purchase, Seleitse noted 
that only one pitso was held (in Jericho) prior to the purchase of 
the farm. On this basis he said that Jericho was responsible for 
meeting the purchase price of the farm and that none of the other 
sections of the chiefdom could be compelled to pay for the 
land/107  ^ Seleitse strongly emphasized the democratic 'rights' 
of sections of the chiefdom, and suggested that at very least the 
headmen of outlying branches of the chiefdom had at all times to be 
consulted.(128)
The final source of support for the Hebron plaintiffs came from two
'civilized natives', Dr. Modini Molema and Solomon Plaatje. Molema
simply asserted that according to customary law, the chief and the
legotla would always submit to the 'will of the people'. A wise
chief would not impose his will on the majority if the majority were
opposed to him, and the chief was "not above the law of the tribe"
f 129)and could be tried and punished. Plaatje's evidence was
considerably more detailed and warrants further discussion.
Plaatje began by noting the extent to which customary processes had 
been modified by the advent of colonisation. He also pointed out 
that the influence of white 'civilization' was inconsistent and thus
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resulted in substantial differences in local conditions and 
prevalent customary practices within different chiefdoms/130  ^ He 
went on to reproduce much of the evidence which he had led in the 
trial of the Fokeng 'rebels'. He suggested that all Tswana 
chiefdoms were governed jointly through the chief and the legotla, 
but emphasised that the chief was accountable not only to the 
legotla, but to the members of the chiefdom as a whole. Plaatje 
claimed that within 'native custom' it was entirely legitimate for a 
chief to be tried and punished by a legotla and he could even be 
deposed by the 'tribe as a whole'.(^l) ^  conciu(ie(i that:
"A wise chief deferred to the wishes of the 
tribe. It would not be constitutional for him to 
go contrary to their wishes: there would be 
something like a revolution."(132)
Plaatje launched a tirade against undemocratic and autocratic 
methods of tribal government and insisted that these methods were 
incompatible with Tswana custom.
"When a man acts as an autocrat, he is an 
autocrat on his own according to Bechuana 
custom."(133)
Plaatje extended his understanding of customary government to the 
sphere of land transactions. He claimed that whilst the chief and 
the legotla could independently take any actions which represented a 
'continuation of tribal policy', they could not undertake any 
innovative measures without consulting the pitso.
"Hie buying of farms in an innovation ... as far 
as I have seen, they have always consulted the 
people."(134)
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On this basis Plaatje asserted that:
"The necessity of the chief and legotla getting 
consent of the pitso before buying something for 
the tribe has always been native law and 
custom."(135)
He went on to corroborate the evidence of the previous witnesses who 
had outlined the consultative procedures which had to be undertaken 
before the chief could contractually bind members of his 
chiefdom.^^^ On this basis Plaatje supported the plaintiff's 
central contention that they could not be compelled to contribute 
towards the purchase of a farm over which they had not been 
consulted.
"... there can be no taxation without 
representation - no money obtained from 
individual members of the tribe unless they have 
a say in the matter ... You cannot consult them 
individually, but as a pitso. They must be 
consulted as a pitso, before any fresh tax is 
levied."(137)
Plaatje affirmed the specific sectional claims of the Hebron 
malcontents. He stated that no section of a chiefdom could be 
expected to fund land transactions about which it had not been 
consulted. Furthermore, he strongly asserted the political and 
administrative independence of the Hebron and Jericho branches.
"Every offshoot of every big tribe becomes an 
independent unity. It is for that purpose that 
they separate from the main branch, in order to 
establish their own kingdom."(138)
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Plaatje was also explicit in his acknowledgement of the material 
interests of these independent sections of the chiefdom. He said 
that ’tribal property' could only be defined as such, if the entire 
tribe had been consulted over its purchase and had contributed to 
the purchase price. On this basis he suggested that groups of 
individuals or sections of the chiefdom, which had purchased land 
independently, had the right to exculsive use and control of these 
resources. Plaatje concluded that the principles of 
consultation, as well as consultative procedures for both the 
acquisition and allocation of 'tribal resources', were implicit in 
the African customary legal system. Furthermore, he suggested that 
it was only adherence to these procedural rules which obviated the 
danger of confusion and conflict over who had access to what 
resources. (^0)
Plaatje concluded his evidence by rejecting suggestions that the 
demands of the plaintiffs were either indicative of an attempt to 
undermine the power of the chief or of a 'growing individualism'. 
He reiterated the point which he asserted during the trial of the 
Fokeng rebels, that 'native government' was traditionally 
democratic. Plaatje suggested that the actions and 
declarations of the Hebron malcontents, rather than being classified 
as reflecting a 'tendency to democracy', were better understood as a 
return to 'customary law' in its original form.^1^ ^
If Plaatje's evidence reflected a somewhat romanticized 
interpretation of customary l a w , ^ ^  it nonetheless gave 
expression to both the ideological and material aspirations of the
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Hebron opposition. For them, an interpretation of Tswana law and 
custom which asserted democratic processes as fundamental, was an 
ideological vehicle through which they expressed their challenge to 
centralized control over locally available resources. The 
Hebronites' challenge to chiefly authority, rooted in the familiar 
issues of control over land and available funds, was in many 
respects more fundamental than that of the Fokeng dissidents. None 
of the Hebron opposition leaders were members of the royal family 
and none sat on chief Mamogale’s bana ba legotla. As a consequence 
no opposition leadership figure emerged who legitimately stood to 
gain control over the chieftaincy itself. It is therefore not 
surprising that the challenge to centralized chiefly control went 
beyond an assertion of the rights of the bana ba legotla, or even 
the legotla, in relation to the chief. Unlike the Fokeng example, 
no succession disputes emerged, and the ideological challenge to 
chiefly control was expressed in terms of the rights of 'ordinary 
tribesmen' who were represented in the local pitso of outlying 
branches of the chiefdom. Nonetheless, as in the Fokeng experience, 
these materially rooted challenges and aspirations, found 
ideological expression in the contestation of customary rules and 
processes.
It was on a different interpretation of these rules and processes 
that Mamogale’s defence was grounded. The first witness for the 
defence, John Glen Leary, a former magistrate in the Transvaal, set 
the tone by presenting a static and formalistic interpretation of 
customary law. He claimed that there was no difference between the 
right of chiefs in different chlefdoms, and defined "native custom"
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as "the custom before they were annexed by us."(144)
"Ihe power of the chief was autocratic ...
Talking of custom before the advent of the white 
man, I say the power of the chief was absolute 
... The chief is not to my knowledge under the 
native law."(145)
Leary asserted that the chief could not be tried or punished and 
that he was in no way accountable to the legotla which was merely an 
advisory body.^^^
On the question of land purchase Leary claimed that there was no 
established custom which dictated that the chief had to consult 
anyone. He rejected the notion that 'a precedent established a
custom' and claimed that the process of consultation over land 
purchase was a requirement of the N.A.D. and not a 'native 
custom'
"If the Native Affairs Department require certain 
formalities before the Governor-General will 
approve of a purchase of a farm by a tribe, I do 
not think that would be modification of native 
custom in any way. The customs would remain, but 
in order to meet the requirements of the Native 
Affairs Department he would carry out their
instructions. It would not be a modification of
(148)the chief's power • • •
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Leary claimed that the chief was in no way obliged to consult the 
pitso over anything, and suggested that pitsos were held to inform 
people, rather than to consult them. He denied that votes were ever 
taken in a pitso and was emphatic that:
"You do not consult every Dick, Tom and Harry in 
the tribe ... the people ... means the chiefs and 
headmen of the tribe. "(-^9)
Leary claimed that just as the legotla merely advised the chief, so 
the pitso acted as a reference point for the legotla. If the chief 
consulted his legotla over a land purchase then that would satisfy 
both the prerequisites of the N.A.D. and any customary law/1^
"It is not the majority who prevail; it is the 
chief’s will."(151)
Leary concluded his evidence by asserting that the objections to 
chief J.O.M. Mamogale's rule were indicative of a challenge to the 
customary powers of the chief on the part of an educated minority 
within the chiefdom.
”... there has been a tendency on the part of the 
educated native to try .to do away with the power 
of the chief - a kind of Bolshevik spirit amongst 
them or a spirit of insubordination that 
prevails. They want their little parliament. 
The idea of not desiring to acknowledge the 
chief's power is mostly due to the educated 
natives, who realise they have certain rights of 
their own and cannot be bound down by ancient 
custom, and they try to adapt themselves to our 
mode of government. But the custom is still 
there."(152)
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Leary along with Donald Hunt, the S.N.C. for Rustenburg, and Harry 
Denton Hemsworth, the S.N.C. for Pretoria, had all testified against 
the Fokeng ’rebels' in May 1925. Once again both Hunt and Hemsworth 
corroborated Leary's evidence. Both N.A.D. officials reiterated 
points concerning the arbitrary and autocratic powers of 
chiefs/153  ^ Hemsworth was especially emphatic that these powers 
pertained to the processes of acquisition and distribution of landed 
property.
"The administrative power is vested in the 
chief. It is competent for him to bind his tribe 
acting on his own initiative, he can do as he 
likes. It makes no difference whether it is an 
important or unimportant matter. If a chief 
wanted to buy a farm for his tribe, there would 
be no necessity for him to consult and get the 
consent of anybody - not according to their 
custom; it might be expedient for him. If the 
tribe consists of various sections I do not know 
of any custom that it is necessary for him to 
obtain the consent of the various sections by 
means of a pitgo before he enters into any 
transaction." C^^T-
He continued:
"A present day chief can dispose of his land as 
he pleases, according to native custom; if he is 
an autocrat he can do as he likes. He has the 
power according to native custom."(155)
Hunt related numerous examples of land purchase without 
consultation. He suggested that pitsos were called to inform the 
people rather than to consult them/1-*6) and Hemsworth claimed 
that both in practice and within customary law, "voting was unknown 
amongst the natives'*/157  ^ Both officials did acknowledge that
311
the N.A.D. itself stipulated that "no land transaction is allowed to 
go through ... unless a meeting is held or the chief’s councillors 
sign a resolution"/158  ^ However, they suggested that at most it 
was expected to gain the approval of the chief s legotla. 
Furthermore, both witnesses noted that these regulations were 
imposed by government rather than being established principles of 
customary law.
"Ihe Government requires certain formalities to 
be complied with. But the native custom remains
the same.
On the question of the rights and claims of specific branches within 
the chiefdom, Hunt denied completely that any of the five sections 
of the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom could be identified as a distinct 
'tribal entity'/160  ^ On this basis he asserted that all land, 
whether registered in favour of one or all sections of the chiefdom, 
was in reality 'tribal property'.
"No matter where property is bought it belongs to 
the tribe ... If Jericho section were to buy a 
farm the whole tribe is liable; it is a tribal 
debt."(161)
Hunt- pointed out that because all land was 'tribal property' the 
chief, as 'father of the tribe', could dictate who was responsible 
for meeting the cost of land purchase. No member of the chiefdom 
could claim immunity.
"His (the chief's - G.S.) discretion is not 
limited in any way. In buying a piece of ground 
adjoining the Southern end of his tribal ground 
the chief, in finding the people living near
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there not being able to pay for it, can tell the 
others to pay for it or assist to pay for it.
The mere fact that a section paid for land does 
not mean they own the land - the tribe 
does."(162)
Both Hunt and Hemsworth described the series of meetings which took 
place in the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom concerning the purchase of the 
farm Elandsfontein. Both claimed that the process of consultation 
had been adequate on the basis that the central legotla at Bethanie 
had approved the transaction. They went on to point out that 
both the Hebron and Jericho sections were represented on the legotla 
by some of their respective headmen. In the case of the Hebron 
section, they pointed out that Abraham Mamogale, the twin brother of 
the chief and sub-chief at Hebron, was amongst those who had signed 
the various tribal resolutions concerned with the purchase of the 
farm and subsequent tribal l e v i e s . H e m s w o r t h  went on to 
describe further meetings relating to the state of the tribal 
finances, claiming that at no stage had the Hebron malcontents 
challenged the legitimacy of the purchase itself, but had only 
expressed their opposition to having to contribute to meeting the 
debt incurred.
Hemsworth concluded by suggesting that the resentment of 
'traditional' chiefly authority expressed by the Hebron section, was 
the product of the prevalence of ”a large number of educated 
natives” who "have a fairly good idea of mental figures”
When it was suggested to him under cross-examination that his 
particular interpretation of 'tradition and custom' was little more 
than guesswork, Hemsworth responded by saying:
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"I suppose all tradition is surmise."(167)
Chief J.O.M. Mamogale was a lot less willing to concede to any 
ambiguity over his customary powers as chief. When questioned about 
what power he had to enter into the deed of sale for Elandsfontein, 
he answered:
"My power as chief."(168)
Mamogale was the first to admit that no pitsos had been called over 
the purchase of the farm. He claimed that there was no necessity,
according to customary law, for him to get the consent of members of
the chiefdom before buying land on their behalf.
”1 notify them; I do not ask them.”^ 6^
Mamogale claimed that his only responsibility was to 'inform* 
members of his legotla of his decisions and actions. He said that 
the councillors and headmen on the legotla represented all the
sections of the chiefdom. He also claimed that it was entirely up 
to his own discretion to choose who should pay for any property 
purchased, but asserted that irrespective of who paid for the 
property, "all land belongs to the t r i b e " . x t i i s  latter point 
was central to the chief's evidence to the court. Mamogale was
clearly conscious that his authority as chief rested in no small 
measure on his control over the acquisition and allocation of land. 
He defended most vehemently his 'customary rights' to allocate these
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resources and claimed that as 'father of the tribe' he was only 
bound by what he interpreted to be "the best interests of the 
tribe".(171)
J.O.M. Mamogale was supported by the evidence of his uncle Daniel 
More. More agreed that the chief was not obliged to consult the 
pitso over land transactions.
"It is not our custom for a chief to call all his
people together before buying a farm."(172)
He also provided an alternative set of procedural rules governing 
these land transactions to that described by the plaintiffs. More 
claimed that prior to signing a deed of sale, the chief would inform 
his headmen and his legotla. However, More insisted that this was 
not obligatory. Furthermore, the chief only treated the opinions of 
legotla members as 'advice' and despite the fact that they 
represented all sections of the chiefdom, he was not obliged to 
conform to their views.
Once the transaction was formally completed, the chief had merely to 
inform headmen and legotla members of the purchase price and the 
amount members of the chiefdom were expected to pay. It was then up 
to these 'under-chiefs' to inform the members of their respective 
sections.(174) More went on to claim that Mamogale had informed 
his legotla at Bethanie of the purchase of Elandsfontein, but that 
even if he had not done so, the customary legality of the purchase 
was unchallengable.^'^
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More also disputed the notion that any section of a chiefdom could 
claim exclusive control over a piece of land. He suggested that 
theoretically all sections and members of the chiefdom had the right 
to utilize 'tribal land'. He gave some hypothetical examples to 
prove his point.
"I have forty head of cattle. If I wish to move 
with my cattle to Jericho (from Bethanie - G.S.)
I must ask permission from the chief; if he gives 
me permission 1 can go. He does not consult 
anyone before giving me that permission."(176)
In another example he remarked that if locusts destroyed the grazing 
in one part of the chiefdom, all the cattle would be moved to 
another section ...
"... Hie Hebron cattle may be turned onto our 
ground and graze there, at Bethanie."(177)
Without exception, the witnesses for the defendant identified the 
customary rights of the chief as providing absolute control over 
both the acquisition and distribution of land. They provided an 
alternative interpretation of customary legal procedures, which was 
rooted in the rigidly defined, non-negotiable authority of the 
chieftaincy. On this basis, they attempted to rebuke the
Hebronites' claims, not only to a degree of political and 
administrative autonomy, nor even just to exclusive control over 
vital material resources, but also to the ideological legitimacy 
which the Hebronites had attempted to assert via a 'democratized' 
interpretation of customary tribal government.
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The ideological dispute over customary politico-legal procedures had 
become a vehicle for the expression of conflict over the purchase of 
Elandsfontein, which at origin reflected a contest over control of 
scarce material resources, This ideological dispute was fought out 
not only within the Rrena ba Mogopa chiefdom, but within the N.A.D. 
as well. The resultant difficulties which this posed for Supreme 
Court Judge De Waal were acknowledged by him in his judgement. He 
quoted extensively from the judgement of Tindall and Curlewis in the 
Fokeng case^^®^ repeating the Judge President's dissatisfaction
at the court having to decide what 'native law and custom
is.,(179) De Waal reiterated Curlewis ’ appeal that 'native law
and custom' be codified in the Transvaal as it was in Natal "... in 
a hard and fast law, and not left to the unsatisfactory proof ... of 
native evidence.
Nonetheless, after summarising the evidence led, De Waal concluded 
that:
”.. there has been a steady and ever growing 
tendency towards democracy due to the influence 
of the presence of the educated native tribesman 
on the one hand and to the contact with European 
civilization and its established democratic forms 
of government on the other ... But even in 
respect of tribes where democratic influences 
have been longest at work, the chiefs authority 
is still supreme in the sense, at all events, 
that there is no obligation on him, in carrying 
out governmental functions - judicial, 
legislative and executive - to consult his people 
assembled in pitso. At most he consults his 
legotla, composed of his blood relations, wise 
men of his tribe and other headmen. That he is 
guided by the advice and counsel of his legotla 
is certain and, in the nature of things 
inevitable. Whether, however, he is obliged to 
act on that advice is doubtful, to say the least 
of it."(181)
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De Waal suggested that 'referendum type' consultation of the pltso 
was Impractical, that Mamogale had duly consulted his 'supreme 
legotla' and that the purchase of Elandsfontein had received the 
sanction of the Governor-General. On these grounds, he passed 
judgement that the purchase of Elandsfontein had been legally 
completed and that ...
"... the persons who have ultimately to pay the 
purchase price and for whose benefit and use the 
farm was bought, the tribesmen, have no legal 
cause for complaint."(182)
De Waal dismissed any 'sectional' claims of the Hebronites by 
stating that the chief’s legotla represented "not only the Bethanie 
section', but all the sections of the tribe."(183) Finally De 
Waal noted that the evidence showed that Mamogale as well as his 
father had previously purchased land without reference to either the 
pltso or the legotla. Predictably, the plaintiffs’ action was 
dismissed with costs.^®^
Ill From Protest to Challenge - The Secessionist Movement
Whilst the Supreme Gourt judgement of February 1926 formally 
compelled the malcontents at Hebron and Jericho to comply with the 
levies imposed by chief J.O.M. Mamogale, in practice it appears only 
to have strengthened their resolve to resist the demands placed upon 
them. The period subsequent to the Supreme Court case witnessed the 
development of new and distinct oppositional strategies particularly 
on the part of the Hebron branch of the chiefdom.
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Initially the malcontents took to petitioning the Prime Minister. 
In February 1927, members of the Hebron community, claiming to be 
'headmen and members of the legotla at Hebron', sent a petition 
restating their grievances with J.O.M. Mamogale.^1®5  ^ At this 
point, the central complaint of the Hebron section was that seven 
farms, for "the exclusive use and benefit of Hebron ... from time 
immemorial", were in danger of being executed as a result of the
/I O C \
Elandsfontein debt. J The Hebronites reasserted the fact that 
they were not liable for this purchase on the basis that they had 
not been consulted. They called for a commission of enquiry into 
the chiefdom's affairs and requested that Mamogale be restrained 
from handling the chiefdom's finances.
In response to the petition, chief Mamogale denied all the claims of 
the Hebron headmen. He reasserted that "all tribal land is 
communal" and that the mortgaged properties therefore belonged to 
the chiefdom and he denied that the petitioners "have any but a 
tribal interest in them."'' ' However, Mamogale acknowledged
that the only farms threatened under a mortgage bond, were those at 
Jericho and Hebron. He suggested that this was justified by the
fact that the Hebron section of the chiefdom was responsible for the 
tribal debt as a consequence of their consistent litigation in the 
courts,
Of particular significance was the fact that Mamogale challenged the 
credentials of the petitioners, claiming that few of them were 
actually members of the Hebron legotla. It was at this point that
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it first appeared that a ’rebel' legotla had been established at 
Hebron.(^90) Furthermore, Mamogale claimed that the leaders of 
the Hebron opposition, as well as many of their followers, had taken 
to absenting themselves from meetings called by him.
As far as the N.A.D. was concerned, the refusal of the petitioners 
requests was a forgone conclusion. On the basis of the findings of 
Judge De Waal, the Secretary of Native Affairs asserted that:
"... the interests of the tribe are sufficiently 
safeguarded under the existing law which provides 
that no contract or obligation entered into by a 
chief on behalf of his tribe shall be valid 
unless sanctioned by the Executive council." 
(Author’s emphasis).(192)
Sub-Native Commissioner Hemsworth responded to the petition by 
claiming that:
"It is quite obvious that the petitioners, who 
represent a small minority of the tribe and who 
are quite insubordinate, are attempting to obtain 
something which has been denied them by all the 
tribunals, from the lowest to the highest in the 
Union."(193)
The Jericho petitioners replied to the Secretary of Native Affairs 
through their attorney. They claimed that their views represented 
the majority feeling of both Jericho and Hebron. They strongly
protested at being referred to as 'recalcitrant' and claimed that 
despite the findings of the Supreme Court it was they who were 
preserving 'tribal law and custom' in the face of J.O.M. Mamogale's 
abuse of it.^^^ The Jericho complainants defended members of 
the Hebron opposition, claiming that the latter had undertaken to
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"Look after the tribe's well-being where neither the chief or the 
N.A.D. did s o . " ^ )  Attorney Kleyn concluded his letter by 
writing that:
"My clients wish me especially to say that they
are peaceful and law abiding subjects and have
not the slightest intention of creating unrest or
a disturbance in the tribe, but only desire that
justice should be done to them as members of the
tribe and that where they have a just grievance
the government as their Paramount Chief should
come to their assistance and give them theN 
, ..(199)necessary relief.
Throughout this period widespread resistance to the payment of 
tribal levies continued. By February 1927 the combined tribal debt 
on the farms Elandsfontein and Nooitgedacht had increased to 
£16 850.0.0.^^^ Within two years of the Supreme Court's
decision it was clear that the debt had reached such proportions 
that the mortgaged land would not have realised the necessary cost 
and further land in the Bethanie section was consequently 
endangered.^01) was gqudly dear to members of the N.A.D.
that the government would have to come to the assistance of the 
Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom. As a result it was suggested that a long 
term loan be extended to the chiefdom from the Native Development 
A c c o u n t . H o w e v e r ,  this resolved nothing as the resolution of 
the financial crisis was still dependent on the payment of levies by 
the members of the chiefdom.
321
Indeed, opposition resulting from the imposition of the tribal
levies had, by May 1927, begun to take on new and (as far as the
N.A.D. officials were concerned) startling forms. By this date
several members of the chiefdom, who had for a number of years
previously refused to list J.O.M. Mamogale as their chief when
filling out their tax receipts, claimed the right to individually
secede from his rule. These individuals claimed to be
'detribalized' and insisted that they could not be held responsible
(203)for the payment of any tribal dues.
Of particlar concern to N.A.D. officials was the fact, witnessed by 
the Jericho petition, that this secessionist tendency was not merely 
an individualized response. At Hebron as well, the secessionist 
movement was gaining momentum. The opposition to Mamogale's control 
over Hebron was initially focused on his delegated sub-chief, 
Abraham Mamogale.(204) on tjie twenty fifth of October 1928, the 
leaders of the Hebron opposition wrote to J.O.M. Mamogale demanding 
Abraham's removal.
"... for we as a tribe are worried of his ruling 
and therefore do not want him in Hebron anymore.
This the word from the tribe and their headmen 
... 15 days are being allowed to him for a period 
of notice."(205)
N.A.D. officials saw this letter as being rather threatening, but 
were reluctant to intervene because
"... The direct request for Abraham's removal, 
having been made to the Head Chief, is evidence 
that tribal law is being followed."(206)
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On these grounds it was strongly recommended to the chief that he go 
to Hebron to 'sort out the differences'.(207) Mamogale refused to 
go to Hebron and instead summoned the author of the letter, Seth 
Molefe, to appear before the Bethanie legotla. ^ ^ ^  Molefe in
turn refused to appear at Bethanie despite a warning from the
Additional Native Commissioner, that he was defying Mamogale's
customary chiefly powers.v y Ihe N.A.D. official was still
insistent that customary procedures be applied to resolve the
situation and refused once again to intervene on the grounds that 
this would play into the hands of the malcontents and would
"Alienate the prestige of the department in the 
eyes of the chief and the council and the loyal 
members of the tribe."(210)
By this stage the 'rebel' legotla at Hebron was holding regular
meetings in defiance of both Abraham and J.O.M. Mamogale. It
was in the name of this legotla that the Hebron opposition finally
responded by asserting their full independence of J.O.M. Mamogale.
"The Legotla of Morula and its headmen say that 
you must know that from this day 15/1/29 we are 
out of your rule, Chief, do not look to us 
anymore."(212)
Complete division of the chiefdom, an option which had been turned 
down by the malcontents in 1924, had at this point become the 
explicit objective of the Hebronites.
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In February 1929 the secessionists sent a delegation to the 
Additional Native Commissioner to request a N.A.D. appointed chief 
at Hebron. Their request was turned down and the Additional Native 
Commissioner suggested that the delegation approach Mamogale 
instead. He restated the fact that he was unwilling to intervene in 
any way "until their own law and custom had been observed."(213) 
Yet it was precisely because of the rigid and autocratic definition 
of 'customary law' which the N.A.D. and courts upheld, that the 
malcontents had become disillusioned with this path of action. 
Furthermore, the manipulative intentions of the N.A.D. officials 
involved were explicit in the departmental correspondence.
"The disintegration of the BaKwena tribe is much 
to be deplored and it is felt that in the light 
of past experience that the authority of
hereditary chieftainship must be upheld and that 
official cogniscance cannot be taken of sectional 
grievances ..."(214)
Dissatisfied with the intransigence of the Additional Native 
Commissioner, the Morula delegation turned to the Secretary of 
Native Affairs. The initial response from Secretary Garthorne was 
somewhat more realistic than that of his local subordinates, if not 
more concessionary. He suggested that an estimate of the relative 
liabilities of the various sections of the chiefdom should be framed 
with 'some view to parity of collection on these lines *.(216) 
Garthorne also criticized the local N.A.D. officers suggesting that 
whilst "following tribal procedures first is correct", it had to be 
remembered that "Hebron evolved as a mission station rather than as 
a location and therefore close official supervision is 
needed.”(217) Finally, Garthorne mooted the possibility of a
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'native council' being established at Hebron which, "in addition to
its administrative functions will constitute a tangible and
( 218)authoritative organ of representation".v '
However, if Garthorne was more sophisticated than his subordinates
in his approach to the N.A.D.'s handling of the problem, then he
certainly was not any more sensitive to the fundamental material
grievances which underpinned the political strife within the
chiefdom. In this respect he offered the "Morula section" nothing
tangible. Within six months the 'rebel legotla' submitted yet
another petition, this time with over eight hundred signatures
attached, restating their demands for their rights to secede and to
elect their own chief. They also demanded the division of the
( 219)chiefdom's immovable property and division of the tribal debt.
By this time, several reports had filtered through to the Secretary 
of Native Affairs documenting the continued failure of levy 
collections not only in Hebron, but also amongst the Kwena ba Mogopa
in the urban areas. These reports indicated active 'obstruction' of
(220)the levy collections, in particular, in Johannesburg. This
development is especially significant in as much as it suggests a
significant level of involvement of migrants in the Hebron 
( 2 2 1 )resistance.v Whilst it has proved difficult to trace any
evidence of particular individual interests in the 'sectional' 
manoeuvering for control over 'tribal lands', the refusal on the part 
of wage earners to contribute to the 'collective purchase' of land 
is strongly suggestive of an assertion of individual or household 
control over hard-won migrant earnings. The active involvement of
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migrants also to some extent explains the perceptions of those 
witnesses, (notably N.A.D. officials Leary, Hemsworth and Hunt) who 
blamed the dissension within the chiefdom on 'educated natives 
coming from the towns'.
By February 1930 the situation at Hebron was described by the
f 222)additional N.C. as 'intolerable . ' As a consequence of the
continual disregard for Mamogale's authority and the refusal by 
opposition leaders to attend his legotla when summoned to do so, the 
chief informed the N.A.D. of his intention to 'take action' against 
the Morula leaders in order to
”... once and for all quash the ' rebellious' 
movement and bring to their senses those members 
who are being led astray ... (original
emphasis)"C223)
No 'action' transpired, and after a further four months of conflict 
and dissent, Mamogale appealed to the Additional Native Commissioner 
to prohibit the Morula section from holding meetings without his or
Abraham Mamogale's permission. Two meetings were
subsequently convened at Hebron by the Additional Native
Commissioner at which the malcontents were warned about the
illegality of their meetings and the seriousness of the impending
(225)bankruptcy of the chiefdom.
By early 1931 there was no improvement in the situation and chief
Mamogale was becoming increasingly insecure about his ability to
( 226}control developments independently. The N.A.D. finally
stepped in, threatening the leaders of the Morula section with
326
removal and warning them that the N.A.D. was "not prepared under any 
circumstances to countenance a breakaway of the section of the 
Bakwena tribe".(227) -j^ e secretary of Native Affairs also warned 
the Morula section that legislation had finally been enacted 
providing for criminal charges and punitive measures to be 
instituted against those defaulting on tribal levies.(228) These 
threats by the N.A.D. had no effect whatsoever, and in November 1931 
it was finally decided to intervene directly in an attempt to 
discipline the 'rebels'.
On the thirteenth of November a contingent of six African constables
was sent to Hebron with instructions to arrest twelve levy
(229)defaulters "as an example to all others" After receiving a
list of all the defaulters from sub-chief Abraham Mamogale, the 
police proceeded to arrest several leaders of the Morula section. 
The immediate consequence was that the police patrol was attacked by
"a number of Native women” and was forced to release the
(230)prisoners. A further party of white policemen then went to
Hebron and rearrested the twelve defaulters, who were duly tried and
( 2 3 1 )convicted under the Native Tax and Development Ac t.v J On the
seventeenth of November it was reported that:
"The secessionist section of the tribe, in
consequence of the arrest of 12 of their number, 
announced that they would permit no ploughing to 
be carried out by the loyalist section until the 
convicted natives had been released from gaol and 
cattle had actually been outspanned by force and 
several minor clashes had taken place in the
lands."(232)
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The direct involvement of Abraham Mamogale in the arrests of the 
twelve levy defaulters, and the resultant intensification of the 
conflict at Hebron, tended to establish an immediate focal point of 
opposition for the Morula section, in the person of the sub-chief. 
On the twentieth of November the Additional Native Commissioner 
convened a meeting at Hebron which was attended by approximately 500 
members of the chiefdom. He reported that he was 'surprised' to
find that at least half of theoe present supported the Morula 
(233)leaders. At the meeting the 'single-minded' objective of the 
'rebels' was the removal from Hebron of Abraham Mamogale. Ihe 
Additional Native Commissioner suggested that as Abraham was a 
drunkard anyway, the chief should be instructed to remove him in an 
attempt to appease the Morula section.(234)
J.O.M. Mamogale was not convinced.
"... in his opinion the action suggested by your 
department would not only strike a fatal blow at 
the institution of the chieftainship and 
demoralise the whole system of tribal rule, but 
would also fail to remove the present impasse and 
would, he fears, only intensify it ... the 
secessionists are only out to break away entirely 
from existing rule and have a division of tribal 
territory, thereby causing an absolute and 
irrevocable rupture of the tribe with the 
creation of a new ruling house."(235)
Ihe chief assured the N.A.D officials that he was anxious to assist 
the government, but he could not accept the removal of his delegated 
representatives who were not responsible for the 'deplorable state 
of affairs'. Ihe chief pointed out that Abraham had denied any 
involvement in the arrest of the twelve defaulters, and suggested
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that an enquiry be instituted so as to give Abraham a chance to 
defend himself.(236)
Although the situation at Jericho remained relatively calm during 
this period, there emanated similar demands from there for the
removal of Obed More, Mamogale's delegated headman from 
(237)Bethanie.v The demands for the removal of Obed and Abraham
were dealt with simultaneously in the N.A.D correspondence and were
supported by the Additional Native Commissioner as the 'only way of
appeasing the secessionists at Hebron and Jericho'.(238) ^
suggested that the removal of these two delegated authorities would
be 'trouble-free' as Abraham was 'completely partial and fed into
(239)division' whilst Obed was 'simply apathetic'. ' Nonetheless, 
Mamogale still refused to carry out the Department's instruction, 
and was rapidly losing favour in the eyes of the departmental 
officials.
"Ihis disintegration of the Bakwena tribe, its 
heavy liabilities and the general unsatisfactory 
position is attributable entirely to 
mismanagement by the Head chief and the Sub-chief 
and Headman referred to."(240)
In so saying, the Additional Native Commissioner virtually 
acknowledged all the claims of the Hebronites which had regularly 
been denied.
Within a week the S.N.A. wrote to Chief Mamogale instructing him to 
remove both Obed More and Abraham Mamogale. He condemned J.O.M. 
Mamogale's previous refusal to do so in particularly threatening
terms:
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"... your reply not only Indicates either 
contumacy or inability to carry out the 
responsibilities demanded from a recognised 
chief, but also appeals to the government for 
intervention into a matter which should be 
settled by the tribe itself. I have to inform 
you that it seems necessary for the government to 
review the position of yourself in relation to 
those natives.”(241)
The Secretary of Native Affairs warned the chief that the government 
viewed the secessionist movement as the product of the latter's 
mismanagement. The chief again appealed for a full investigation 
but was instructed that this would simply 'backfire on him'.^^^
The Lutheran missionary, Behrens, who had consistently acted as 
Mamogale's adviser, was requested by the N.A.D. to intervene. 
Behrens met with the chief and convinced him that a departmental 
investigation would probably lead to his deposition. On this basis 
he received a reluctant assurance from the chief that the latter 
would ensure the resignations of Obed More and Abraham Mamogale. 
J.O.M. Mamogale remained adamant, however, that the resignations 
would result in "discrediting those of Royal Blood"(243) 
Nonetheless, within a week, Mamogale had received letters of 
resignation from both headmen.(244) ^t this stage Mamogale 
insisted that it was not possible for him merely to accept the 
resignations before 'consulting the tribe'. He claimed that, 
'according to Native custom' he had to call meetings, first of the 
bana ba legotla, then of the headmen and finally of 'the tribe', 
before he could replace the two men concerned.(2^-0
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It seems evident at this point that J.O.M. Mamogale had developed an 
altogether different interpretation of 'customary law' to that 
presented in his evidence to the Supreme Court. Indeed, disputed 
customary legal norms had become so malleable in the Kwena ba Mogopa 
chiefdom as to be entirely adjustable to meet the circumstances. In 
his complete reversal, Mamogale revealed the political expediency 
which served his own localised material aspirations.
This was further exposed when Mamogale insisted that the replacement 
for Abraham be Daniel More, who had been instrumental in the 
purchase of the farm Nooitgedacht (for the Bethanie 
section). When the Additional Native Commissioner suggested 
alternatives and pointed out to Mamogale that Daniel More would be 
even more controversial than Abraham, the chief simply refused to 
co-operate and the Additional Native Commissioner concluded that "he 
wishes to see his own brothers in exalted positions."^47)
After nearly six months of wrangling the chief eventually accepted 
the N.A.D.'s recommendations and 'pushed through' the proposals 
despite 'the tribe's disapproval'. The continuation of 
resistance at both Hebron and Jericho resulted in the further 
replacement of these new headmen within just four months. In April 
1933 Charles More was appointed to Jericho and Aaron Mamogale at 
Hebron. Both headmen were to serve a probationary period of one 
y.ar.<2« >
By this time it was dawning on the N.A.D. officials that the 
exchange of headmen was not having the effect of 'appeasing' the
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opposition, factions at Jericho or Hebron. The department, 
displaying a degree of schizophrenia, reverted to the more 
conventional practise of bolstering the authority of the chief. The 
central factor limiting Mamogale's power was the limitation of his 
criminal jurisdiction to the Bethanie section of the chiefdom under 
the Native Administration Act of 1927. It was immediately suggested 
by the Additional Native Commissioner that Mamogale's criminal 
jurisdiction be extended to include the outlying sections at Hebron 
and Jericho.
"I am very anxious that Mamogale should have this 
jurisdiction in as far as the Hebron and Jericho 
locations are concerned, particularly the former 
where the 'rebel' element ... constantly causes 
trouble and with which up to the present the 
chief has had inadequate power to deal."(251)
(252)This request was duly granted. It was further recommended
that similar criminal jurisdiction be granted to the headmen Charles 
More and Aaron Mamogale, on the basis that:
"It is essential that the man on the spot should 
have jurisdiction to settle disputes arising out 
of distribution of lands, grazing, water 
etc."(253)
These recommendations were also approved.(^^ However, by 1935 
there appears to have been little improvement in relations within 
the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom. There were further attempts to switch 
Charles More and Aaron Mamogale, but the former refused to swop his 
position at Jericho for one at H e b r o n . O p p o s i t i o n  to Aaron 
at Hebron merely Intensified and the tribal levy boycott lost none
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of its momentum. Threats to prosecute defaulters simply evoked an 
agressive response from the 'Morula section'. Aaron Mamogale was 
involved in a fight with the messenger of the 'rival' legotla, and 
wrote to the Additional Native Commissioner claiming that the 
'Morula Section' were 'on the w a r p a t h ' T h e  Moruia ieg0tla 
continued to hold meetings and continued to boycott the meetings of 
both J.O.M. Mamogale and Aaron Mamogale. By the end of February 
1935, the police at De Wildt had been warned of the 'danger of 
bloodshed' at Hebron.(257) oscillated between blaming 
Aaron Mamogale for being "weak, indifferent, inefficient and 
unreliable",(258) an(j blaming J.O.M. Mamogale.
"The Chief of Bethanie Location, although an 
educated native has lost all control over his 
tribe. He is a proper weakling - has no backbone 
or power of control over his tribe, hence the 
reason for his Headmen and tribe being slack and 
in such poor circumstances with heavy financial 
liabilities. I have done everything possible to 
shake up this Chief during the past 5 years but 
without avail, and I have come to the one and 
only conclusion, and that is that Mamogale should 
be replaced by a suitable person as Chief of the 
Bakwena. This is the only way in which this 
tribe can be saved.”(259)
The often-threatened prosecutions of the Morula leadership for 
failure to contribute to the levies never materialised, at least in 
part due to the strategies adopted by the boycotters.
"Mamogale's followers, as soon as they heard of 
the proposed tax collection tour, all left the 
location in search for work, except the old men 
and those suffering from ’flu*."(260)
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Despite all attempts, (Aaron Mamogale even offered the Manila 
section seats on his legotla,)(2^1) by the end of 1935 the 
political and financial crisis within the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom 
had still not been resolved.
It appears that in the following five years little was achieved by 
either the N.A.D. or the members of the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom to
resolve the conflict which had punctuated at least the past fifteen 
years (262 In 1939 there was a further spate of applications by 
individuals wishing to secede from J.O.M. Mamogale's rule.(^^ 
These attempts to secede were identified by N.A.D. officials as 
being a direct response to continued attempts to enforce the 
implementation of tribal levies(264) and were regarded as being 
indicative of the impending danger of the ’disintegration of the 
tribe’/ 265'
In 1940 it was noted by the Acting Secretary of Native Affairs that 
the bonds on the farms Elapdsfontein and Nooitgedacht had not been 
reduced since 1924, and that in the preceding nine years only 
£1 625.14.7 had been collected through tribal levies/266  ^ The 
continued drain on the Chiefdom's finances and the consequent 
’impoverishment', was seen to have left members of the chiefdom 
'disheartened and dissatisfied’.
"These liabilities have been the cause of much 
dissension in the tribe as many members resent 
the idea of having to contribute towards the 
liquidation of debts incurred in repsect of land 
in which they have no personal interest and the 
knowledge that the burden will continue 
indefinitely is a festering sore which is 
inevitably undermining the confidence of the 
tribe."(267)
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Furthermore, the Secretary of Native Affairs noted that:
"It is abundantly evident that under the existing 
conditions the tribe can never hope to free 
itself from the heavy burden of debt."C268)
He concluded that it had definitely become necessary for the 
chiefdom to dispense with some of its land in order to eliminate the 
debt.<269>
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that as late as 1940 
"disharmony and recriminations, involving the chief" were 
'rife'/22*^ At this stage it was reported that the "weak and 
sick old chief was virtually destitute due to the complete refusal 
by members of the chiefdom to contribute to his upkeep. ^22^  In 
November 1939 J.O.M. Mamogale was 'retired* as chief. He was 
replaced by Daniel More who took over as 'acting chief'.^222^
In the course of Daniel More's regency, the dissension within the 
chiefdom appears to have intensified. Hie resignation of J.O.M. 
Mamogale immediately posed the question of who would succeed him and 
the period 1939 to 1941 witnessed intense and often violent conflict 
most notably at Bethanie where the chief had his headquarters. 
Breutz noted that the disruptive effect of J.O.M. Mamogale’s 
'weakness' and his subsequent resignation ... "was all the more 
serious as his people were much influenced by life in European 
towns."(2'r3) Even prior to J.O.M. Mamogale's resignation, a group 
of young people led by two teachers formed a "Vigilance Committee" 
and offered to assist the chief in maintaining order in the
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chiefdom. Mamogale had agreed to the establishement of such a 
group, but even prior to his resignation, it became apparent that 
this group was "stirring up the people against the chief".^27^  
This 'rebel' section called themselves the "Voortrekkers” or 
"Ma-Voor" and labelled those loyal to Mamogale "the Agtertrekkers" 
or "Ma-Agter".(275)
After Mamogale's death in 1940 the cleavage within the Bethanie 
section spread to the Lutheran church. This is not surprising as 
many of the 'rebel' section had joined the Bakwena Lutheran Church, 
a separatists sect/27*^  whilst the Hermannsberg Lutheran mission 
had for almost seventy years played the classical role of 'state 
church' within the chiefdom.^277  ^ The conflict at Bethanie proved 
to be of the most violent witnessed in the district throughout the 
period under review. In 1941 the 'Ma-Voor' went on the rampage and 
burnt down the Hermannsburg Church building. This was followed by a 
number of assaults on the missionary who for years had been the 
closest advisor to Chief Mamogale, and attacks on police and 
government officials who were sent to Bethanie in an attempt to 
bring the conflict under control.^27®)
It is significant that the first time the question of succession 
came to the fore as a source of conflict, it was at the tribal 
headquarters, Bethanie. Apart from the fact that there was a large 
Christianized and educated grouping in opposition to the chief, 
there seems to be little evidence to suggest that the Bethanie 
disturbances were in any way an extension of the specific grievances 
experienced at Hebron and Jericho between 1921 and 1939. Whilst the
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Bethanie conflict appeared to be a struggle over control of the 
chieftaincy initiated by a group of 'progressive natives' who were 
frustrated with the archaic rule of the chief and his supporters 
(the Agtertrekkers), the resistance at Hebron and Jericho had not 
displayed any pretensions to the chieftaincy itself.
However, the questions of chiefly authority and control remained 
central to all the disputes within the chiefdom. Opposition to the 
chief came from very different quarters. It reflected the interests 
of both migrants as well as established and successful peasant 
producers. It reflected the attempts of both individuals and 
collectives to claim exclusive control over both their earnings and 
their lands.
The involvement of urban based migrants within the rural struggles
of the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom stands out in comparason to many of
the other disputes discussed thus far. The refusal of migrant
workers in the urban areas to contribute to tribal levies, displays
the existence of urban/rural networks which are not as easily
discernable in any of the other disputes in the district, with the
possible exception of that in the Bakwena ba Modimosana ba Matlhaku
chiefdom, where, at the climax of the struggle, urban workers from
Johannesburg were bussed out to the rural area to bolster the forces
(279)opposed to Chief Moshume. However, the involvement of
migrant workers in the Kwena ba Mogopa struggles did not simply 
imply the transportation of urban-based ideologies or any 
'bolshevist spirit' into the rural disputes, as was suggested by 
some of the local N.A.D. officials. On the contrary, the alliance
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in opposition to chief Mamogale was welded together through in 
ideological assertion of alternative 'customary* political and legal 
procedures.
The Kwena ba Mogopa Supreme Court case provided a forum for the 
explicit competition of the various ideological formulations. 
Within the chiefdom itself, this took the form of a fundamental 
challenge to the assertion of the Chief's absolute powers over 
'tribal' land and law. Out of a material need to broaden the base 
of political control within the chiefdom, the malcontents shaped an 
ideological framework of democratic procedure in tribal government, 
which was rooted as much in their consciousness of the past as it 
was in the present. As in the case of the Fokeng dispute, this 
internally focussed challenge to chiefly autocracy spilled over into 
a challenge to the N.A.D.'s methods of administrative and political 
control.
Within the N.A.D. itself, a degree of open conflict over the most 
appropriate methods of local administration and control became 
apparent. To some extent this reflected the conflict between the 
N.A.D.’s rhetoric of acting as a 'civilizing' influence and its 
practical concerns with 'retribalisation' via 'customary native 
communalism and tribal law'. This tension within the N.A.D. is to 
some extent explained in the national context by the competing 
interests of liberal versus more reactionary administrators. * 
However, at the local level in the Rustenburg district, this 
conflict seems to be the product of a difficult balancing act 
between the co-optive and coercive functions which local officials
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were compelled to fulfil. This tension within the N.A.D. was 
exacerbated by the existence of a large, educated Christian 
community whose 'civilized' aspirations and demands have still to be 
analysed in their influence on the political struggles of rural 
Tswana chiefdoms in the Rustenburg district.
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CHAPTER SIX CHRISTIAN PEASANTS AND POLITICS
"Worm, how did you manage to enter the large body 
of an ox and cause it to rot? and the worm 
answered, 'Through a tiny piece of flesh', lhat 
was how the Christian church entered my tribe not 
to cause it to rot, but to cause it to become 
Christian. That is the way the Christian 
teaching and following became part and parcel of 
life in my tribe” (D
One of the most noteworthy features of the rural African communities 
of the Rustenburg district was the remarkably high proportion of 
Christian converts in every chiefdom in the 1920s and 1930s. This 
factor had a direct influence on the political struggles in the 
area. It was the Christian missions which in many instances 
provided the initial access to land and through which land was 
subsequently purchased. It was also the Christian missions which 
provided access to education within the rural reserves and the 
involvement of educated, 'civilized' Christians has been noted in 
almost all of the disputes discussed. Yet the exact nature of the 
Christian church's influence in the political and ideological 
conflicts in the district is not clear cut and it is the object of 
this chapter to try to interpret the roles played by the various 
mission groupings in the area.
In both the Fokeng and the Kwena ba Mogopa disputes, there is 
evidence that different mission groupings or missionaries played an 
active role in the political conflicts discussed.
In the Fokeng dispute the Lutheran missionary Penzhorn was seen to 
stand firmly behind the Chief, and indeed, it was suggested that his 
life was as much in danger as was that of the August Mokgatle during
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( 2 )the height of the unrest.' ' It is clear from the correspondence
that he was also supplying the chief, the police department and the
NAD with information on the machinations of the 'rebel' section. By
the same token, Spooner, a black Jamaican minister of the
Pentecostal Holiness Church, was continually being identified as the
(3)brains behind the dissenting section.' Ernest Stubbs, Native 
Commissioner and Magistrate of Rustenburg at the time, wrote the 
following somewhat conspiratorial report to the Secretary of Native 
Affairs:
"It has come to my notice that there is a certain 
Reverend Spooner, an American Negro carrying on 
mission work in the Phokeng stad. There is the 
suspicion that he is in the employ of some 
revolutionary society, possibly Red or Communist 
and that he is at the bottom of the Phokeng 
dissensions.
It has been suggested to me that, but for the 
machinations of this gentleman, the rebel faction 
would have negotiated peace with the Chief August 
Mokgatle. I am not in a position to say whether 
the suspicions are well founded but from the 
surrounding circumstances, it is just possible 
that there may be a great deal more in this 
business than meets the eye ... I think the 
suspicions are worth investigating ... we may 
quite possibly happen upon a deep laid plot, 
hatched and engineered by the astute, adroit 
Reverend gentleman in conjunction with his white 
brothers. One never knows I”(4)
Again, in the unrest amongst the Kwena under Mamogale it was the 
Lutheran church and its missionary which bore the brunt of the 
violent attacks by the rebellious section of the chiefdom.^ 
Although the Pentecostal Holiness Church did not have a substantial 
following in the chiefdom, the Bakwena Lutheran Church, a separatist
offshoot of the Lutheran mission, appears to have been centrally
(6)involved.
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Before it is possible to assess and evaluate the role of the church 
in tribal politics, it is necessary to examine the historical 
context of mission activity in the district, with particular 
sensitivity to the ideological contradictions engendered by the 
penetration of Christianity in these peasant communities.
I Missionaries from Germany - The State Church
It was noted in chapter two, that as early as 1853, the Kwena Chief 
Setshele asked President Pretorius to send him a missionary. In 
response, the government invited the Hermannsburg Lutheran Mission 
to establish itself in the area. Until then, the bulk of the 
Mission's work had been in Natal.^ As the Kwena were still not 
permanently settled In the wake of the Difaqane, the missionaries 
were forced to trek with various groupings from farm to farm. The 
first permanent mission station was established 'by invitation’ in 
1864 at Bethanie. ' Breutz has pointed out that in all except 
one of the chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district, the missionaries 
who first set up missions had been invited to do so by the 
respective chiefs of the district. In the case of the Fokeng this 
amounted to sending some tribesmen to Natal in order to secure a 
missionary to settle in the district.
"The legend is that a group of ox wagons drawn by 
teams of oxen with a large group of men and women 
left our tribe for Durban to interview the German 
missionaries ... They picked one for themselves 
and asked him to consent to become their teacher 
of the Christian doctrine and priest. His name 
was Penzhorn. Having been chosen Mr. Penzhom
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and his family agreed to accompany my people on 
the long journey back to Phokeng ... Since they 
were brought to the tribe, the building of a home 
for them became the tribe's duty"(9)
Naboth Mokgatie’s description of this process is corroborated by 
Setswammung Mokgatie who, when interviewed, described how the chief 
set off on an ox*wagon to fetch the missionaries from 
G e r m a n y . C o n t r a r y  to Breutz, Mokgatle claimed that when 
Penzhorn settled in Phokeng he was the first Lutheran missionary to 
settle in the district. He went on to claim that the nearby 
chiefdoms looked to the Fokeng for guidance and as a result embraced 
the ^ame denomination. Both Breutz and Mokgatle agree, 
however, that Penzhorn set up mission in Phokeng in 1867. y By 
1885 there were twelve fully-fledged Hermannsburg Lutheran mission 
stations established in the district.
The incorporation of Christianity into the communities of the 
Rustenburg district in the half century following Penzhorn's 
arrival, appears to have undermined much of the existing ideological 
practice in these Tswana societies. Both polygamy and initiation 
ceremonies were formally declared incompatible with Christianity and 
were openly condemned by the missionaries However, the 
impact of Christianity on polygamy and circumcision ceremonies is 
difficult to assess. Despite formal conversions and despite 
Eknmett's claim that by the 1920s initiation rites were all but 
extinguished there is evidence which demonstrates that well 
into the 1930s, Christian parents in the Rustenburg chiefdoms were 
sending their children to initiation schools outside the 
district.^6  ^ Indeed, Breutz suggests that initiation ceremonies
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continued to take place amongst the three chiefdoms in the 
north-western corner of the district until at least the late 
1940s.(17)
Polygamous practices likewise tended to d i m i n i s h b u t  appear
on occasion to have continued amongst some of the wealthier men who
(19)were not prepared to give up one or more of their wives. '
By the 1920s, however, polygamy was almost completely non-existent 
in the chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district. This was widely 
identified as being the result of a combination of the impact of 
Christian ideology and an increasing inability of most men to afford 
more than one wife.^^ The -condemnation of both polygamous 
practices and circumcision ceremonies posed a potential challenge to 
established control over both land and labour, especially in the 
case of chiefly rights to labour services and household access to 
land. This is not to suggest that polygamy or circumcision ceased 
overnight, but as the popularity and influence of the Christian 
church increased, so the ideological basis of these practices was 
increasingly challenged. Ihe practice of polygamy as well as 
initiation ceremonies, represented fundamental institutional 
expressions of elder, household head and chiefly ideological 
control, and Naboth Mokgatle described both as historically central 
to 'tribal cohesion I
Mokgatle suggested that men were provided with fields for 
agricultural and pastoral production according to the number of 
wives they had: each male would be granted a plot of land for each
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of his wives. According to Mokgatle, polygamous practices were 
therefore Integral to the system of land allocation.
Mokgatle also claimed that ’traditionally’ the chief could call on 
the labour of the ’circumcision’ battalions to perform a wide range 
of tasks, from the fighting of wars, to the cultivation of the 
chiefs' fields.
"... The battalions of circumcised boys or men 
belong in law to the chief."(22)
Evidence that chiefs in the Rustenburg district had the power to
(23)order their subjects to go to work on the diamond mines, as 
well as the continued claims of many chiefs’ to tribute in the form 
of migrant wages, would appear to bear Mokgatle out. Women were 
also on occasion forced to allocate their labour time according to 
the wishes of the chief. In the Fokeng chiefdom, for example, chief 
Mokgatle Mokgatle ordered Fokeng women to go to work on neighbouring 
white farms.
”... a certain white man who ruled over the 
people of Mokgatle ... called Piet Kruger, came 
to our village and asked chief Mokgatle to 
provide him with women and children who could 
work on his farms ... Our mothers worked in those 
fields ... Kruger did not pay them. The old man 
Mokgatle called the Bafokeng to the Kgoro and 
told them that the following morning they should 
go and weed Kruger's farms."(24)
Such occurrences continued after the establishment of mission 
stations in the district, indicating that any challenge to chiefly 
control over male or female labour was by no means the immediate or
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exclusive effect of the influence of Christian ideology. However, 
the formal abolition of circumcision does appear to have at least 
potentially threatened the ideological basis of chiefly rights to 
these services.
The Christian churches also directly challenged the legitimacy and
practices of ’diviners’ or 'doctors' and in so doing, undermined
another tenet of prevailing tribal i d e o l o g y . H o w e v e r ,  Naboth
Mokgatle asserted that the 'mystical' respect for medicine-men
remained deep-seated amongst mission-educated and uneducated
Africans alike, well into the second half of the twentieth
century. J In particular, the curbing or outlawing of
rainmaking procedures, in which doctors were central and at which
chiefs officiated, met with widespread resentment throughout the
period under review, especially during periods of drought. Ihus one
chief complained that due to the undermining of the ideological
authority of the doctors (who then left the rural areas for the
( 0 7 )towns) ... "it only rains in the towns. J As late as 1949 the 
Fokeng chief performed a rain dance which resulted in tension 
between himself and the missions of the area.^®^
Similar ambiguities were evident in the church's influence on the 
payment of bogadi (brideprice). In the Kwena ba Mogopa chiefdom, 
bogadi payment was abolished 'by law’, much to the approval of the 
local Lutheran missionary.
"The community of Bethanie has set the law that 
no Christian father may take cattle for his 
daughter. This is an example of how the 
community is eradicating its heathen ways through 
setting up new customs and habits."(29)
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However, it is clear that in many instances the system of bogadi 
payment was not seriously challenged. Both Revs. Penzhom and 
Stegmann in evidence to the Native Economic Commision of 1930-2, 
acknowledged that the missions turned a blind eye to the maintenance 
of this practice. When questioned about Christian converts
paying bogadi1, Penzhorn responded that:
"The attitude is that the parent cannot ask for 
it, it must be a present. It must be a present 
by the young man or his father, which he gives to 
the parent of the girl. They do not ask for it 
... It is the father of course who is after the 
cattle. It puts him in a better position and if 
he had a number of girls he will become a rich 
man ... originally it was not a matter of trade 
at all, it was a matter of gift - pure and 
simple, and that is what all the old natives
The Pentacostal Holiness Church missionary, Rev. Kenneth Spooner, 
was more frank in his assessment of continued bogadi payment:
"It is a well known fact that the father of the 
girl expects to receive some compensation for her 
when giving her in marriage."(32)
Spooner continued:
"The dowry is something that neither Christianity 
nor civilization has been able to change. In 
fact, Christianity has only made the burden 
heavier to a certain extent, for besides the 
dowry, the young man has to bear all the expenses 
of the wedding."(33)
While the growing influence of Christian churches did not have the 
effect of immediately transforming the existing ideological
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practices within the Tswana chiefdoms of the Rnstenburg district, 
through the challenge which it posed to polygamy, circumcision 
ceremonies and bogadi payment, Christianity potentially unsettled 
the customary sources of ideological and material control within 
these chiefdoms. Many of the institutions created by the Christian 
missions also potentially provided an alternative locus of 
authority. Schapera shows how, in the case of the Tswana more 
generally, the establishment of a number of institutions, such as 
church councils, school committees and the magistrates' courts, 
often rivalled the chiefs' courts and other institutions of tribal 
authority
Under these circumstances - where the Christian church displayed the 
potential to undermine many of the existing sources of ideological 
control within the chiefdoms of the district - it remains to be 
answered why these Tswana chiefs solicited the services of the 
missionaries? Hie first answer to this question lies in the access 
to land which the white missionaries were able to guarantee.
As noted in chapter two, possibly the most significant aspect of the 
co-operative relationship between the Chiefs and the Lutheran 
mission during the nineteenth century, was the extent to which this 
facilitated the purchase of land on behalf of the various 
chiefdoms. ' It was also pointed out in chapter two that most 
of the smaller chief doms in the district, such as the Kwena ba 
Modimosana ba Maake and the Kwena ba Modlmosana ba Mmtau, were 
entirely reliant on mission purchased land as the only land of which 
they were able to secure ownership. J The larger chiefdoms were
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also heavily dependent on mission purchased land. In the period 
1868-9 the Lutheran mission bought substantial tracts of land on 
behalf of chief Mosome of the Kwena ba Modimosana ba
Matlhaku.^^ Rev. Penzhom described how he bargained with white 
landowners on behalf of Chief Mokgatle Mokgatle of the Fokeng and he 
eventually secured the purchase of certain farms on their
(38^behalf. 1 Similarly, the Lutheran missionary at Bethanie
described how the Kwena ba Mogopa secured the purchase of several
(39)farms through the missionary's mediation.
The purchase of land on behalf of these chiefdoms contributed 
greatly to the maintenance of chiefly authority by maintaining the 
material basis of the chiefs' ability to distribute land amongst 
members of the chiefdoms.
More generally, the 'usefulness' of the missionaries to the Tswana 
chiefs in the context of white colonisation, was noted by the 
Lutheran missionary at Bethanie. He was particularly aware of the 
ambiguity of the chiefs' position as 'rulers' of their people while 
being subject to the overiding authority of the white government, 
and noted the mediating role played by himself and other
missionaries in this regard.
"Now the natives had two lords and had to see how 
they coped with that. In this difficult 
situation the chiefs were glad when a missionary 
settled down with the tribe. This was of great 
significance for them as regards the government 
and the white population and they would listen to 
the missionaries' advice and words."(40)
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The close association between the various chiefs and the mission 
appears to have operated to bolster the political standing and 
authority of the chiefs within their communities. This is another 
essential factor in explaining the origins of the missions 
establishment in the district on the basis of chiefly invitation.
Pauw describes how, in Taung communities, the church which had been 
settled in a particular chiefdom for the longest period tended to 
become most closely associated with the chief and tribe - that is, 
'a state church’.
"The traditional social structure of the Tswana 
has undoubtedly been favourable to the formation 
of tribal churches. The concentration of the 
population in large towns and their highly 
centralised form of government were connected 
with a high degree of tribal solidarity, and 
these factors must have caused reluctance to 
accept missionaries of different denominations 
within a single tribe, since it would weaken 
tribal solidarity and thus endanger the chief's 
influence over the tribe".(41)
Pauw goes on to suggest that later the waning influence of chiefs 
tended to facilitate the multiplication of denominations. Yet it is 
equally clear that chiefly authority had come to operate, to a 
certain extent, through the state church. The close association 
between chiefs and the church in these societies contributed to 
maintaining chiefly control over the Christian population. Quite 
obviously, developing mission influence was not simply controllable 
by the chiefs, but control over the establishment of the Christian 
church and close association with its expansion (the establishment 
of a 'state church' in Pauw's terms), served to enhance chiefly 
power in the face of colonisation.
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There is considerable evidence of these processes having taken place 
in the communities of the Rustenburg district. Rev. Behrens pointed 
out that the early years of the Lutheran mission's involvement at 
Bethanie witnessed the development of a co-operative relationship 
between the missionaries and the chief.
"Right throughout the relationship between the 
missionary and the chief was a good one and the 
consequences showed immediately."(42)
The rapid integration of the Christian church into the Tswana 
chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district was facilitated by the fact 
that many of the chiefs themselves were amongst the first converts.
"It is probably rare in mission history that a 
people accepted the gospel as quickly as these 
Bechuana tribes - almost too quickly for a 
healthy and constant development. Many of the 
chiefs let themselves be baptised and it is thus 
no wonder that his subjects followed in huge 
masses."(43)
A similar process appears to have occurred in the Fokeng Chiefaom. 
Naboth Mokgatle notes the rapid conversion of many of the most 
influential men in Fokeng society - they were, he claims, 'all rich 
but simple Africans'.
Amongst the Fokeng, the close association between tribal authority 
and the Lutheran church was often made explicit. When Rev. Penzhorn 
met with some opposition from members of the Fokeng chiefdom, Chief 
August Mokgatle was quick to step in and defend the missionary.
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"Those who don't want this Moruti anymore can go 
where they want to go, because I want to keep 
him. The church belongs to me and the community 
and the Moruti remains with me and the 
congregation in the church."(45)
Partial dependence on the chiefs was also acknowledged by some of 
the missionaries. The missionary at Bethanie, when reviewing the 
history of the Lutheran mission, stated that:
"the missionaries relied on the help of the 
chiefs in the development of the missions, for 
example, the building of churches ... and the 
congregation affairs became the concern of the 
people. "(4f>)
However, the mutual reliance of chiefs and missionaries upon each
other, did not imply an entirely unproblematic relationship. Whilst
August Mokgatle, chief of the Fokeng, had claimed that "The church
belongs to me", Rev. Penzhom had offered a slightly different
interpretation. He suggested that "... in practice it is the church
(47)order which rules." This tension centred on the chief’s
attempts to advance their control and further their authority 
through the church. In particular, the Lutheran missionaries
complained that the second generation of chiefs after the
establishment of the missions, unlike their fathers (who had a
"thankful reverent relationship with the missionaries") wanted to be 
"the masters of the church.
The missionary at Bethanie expressed his reservations about this 
development:
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"As long as the chief remained under the 
influence of the missonary everything was fine 
... Yes, great things were achieved, startling 
things, especially in Bethanie. But the picture 
changed sometimes [when] ... the young chiefs 
took the oar ...
It is sometimes forgotten that the missionaries 
helped the people to land ownership through great 
effort. Yes, they are even attempting to claim 
the land which is under mission ownership, as the 
property of the people ...
Amongst other tribes, [outside the Rustenburg 
district] where their chief remained a heathen or 
belonged to another religious order, the 
congregation developed normally and peacefully - 
not so dazzling on the outside, but healthier on 
the inside."(49)
Ultimately, the Lutheran missionaries in the district were 
determined to maintain the autonomy of the church and resisted the 
more overt presumptions of chiefs to control the jurisdiction of the 
missions/50  ^ As reported by Behrens, there were many occasions 
on which the Lutheran missionaries entered into open conflict with 
the chiefs, usually on the basis of the latter's misconduct/5^  
It has already been noted that the ideology and ritual of the 
Christian church often conflicted with that of dominant customary 
ideological practices such as initiation or rainmaking in which were 
vested much of the chiefs' ideological authority.
Nonetheless, the apparent development of 'state churches', 
(witnessed by the rapid conversion of chiefs and influential members 
of chiefdoms, the flood of converts which followed and the quick, if 
slightly ambiguous, integration of Christian norms into the 
practices of Tswana societies) offered chiefs of the district a 
political initiative which potentially enabled them to extend their
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influence and authority. Thus the establishment of Christian 
missions by 'chiefly invitation' is partially explained as a 
creative response to the undermining effects of colonisation on both 
the ideological and material bases of chiefly authority.
One further advantage which the Christian missions offered to the 
Tswana chiefdoms in the Rustenburg district was access to 
education. It is impossible to speculate as to whether or not this 
advantage was consciously anticipated, inspiring the invitation 
extended to the Lutherans to settle in the district. What does 
become clear, however, is that from the late nineteenth century 
onwards, access to education, (especially literacy and numeracy 
skills) was a vital asset in the changing material circumstances 
which characterized the expansion of capitalist relations of 
production in the country. The issue of mission education, its 
nature and its content, was highly conflictual in these communities 
during the twentieth century. This is not surprising as formal 
education potentially offered one of the most explicit ideological 
challenges to 'traditionally' constituted 'tribal' authority. These 
conflicts in the sphere of education will be dealt with more fully 
in the following pages.
The penetration of Christian ideology unquestionably posed a series 
of indirect threats to ideological authority of chiefs and elders 
within the in the peasant communities of the Rustenburg district. 
However, the development of a close association between a 'state 
church' and chiefly authority, contributed substantially to the 
resilience of this authority under changing material conditions in
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these societies. Die development of an alternative source of 
religious identification, within more politically active separatist 
churches, can equally be seen to have posed a significant challenge 
to these transformed mechanisms of political control.
II Education and Authority - The Challenges of the New Missions
The Lutheran missions throughout the district flourished prior to 
the turn of the century. Mokgatle claims that once prominent 
members of the chiefdoms had converted, commoners felt free to do so.
"Nearly every family before my birth (1911) found 
itself divided in the middle, into Christians and 
non-Christians."(52)
By 1930 Penzhom could claim five thousand Lutheran church members
in Phokeng a l o n e . I n  1940, Penzhorn's successor boasted that
"Saron is the largest mission station of our mission in Africa ..."
(54)He claimed just under six thousand members at Phokeng alone. 
Breutz claims that by 1947 in the two missions amongst the Fokeng 
there were over ten thousand Lutheran converts. Of the thirteen 
mission stations established in the district, only one had less than 
1500 members by this time and most had well over two thousand 
converts
The mission schools set up by the Lutherans also showed consistent 
growth in the decades after the mission stations were established. 
At Bethanie it was reported that as early as 1868, thirty children 
were attending catechism classes. In April 1894 there were
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already four 'schools' (actually four classes - students were 
promoted from one 'school' to another) in operation with well over a 
hundred children in each/57  ^ In 1904 the missionary at Bethanie 
claimed that Bethanie boasted the "most organised school system" in 
the district/58  ^ He reported that 1 100 children were being 
taught at ten 'schools', by one 'qualified' male teacher, eight 
seminary-trained teachers and two 'women teachers'. The
report claimed that 7 283 children in the district had attended the 
Lutheran's schools.
Nevertheless, even prior to the turn of the century new missions
began to make their presence felt in the district. Amongst these
were certain separatist sects such as the African Methodist
Episcopal Church (AME). During the last decade of the nineteenth
century, a black American missionary by the name of Morrison
established an AME mission amongst the Fokeng. He drew a handful of
converts from the Lutheran church but apparently did not recruit any
of the 'influential' or 'respected' members of the Phokeng
communityS 81  ^ In Luka, however, a village larger than Phokeng,
where the Lutherans had had only limited success, the headmans'
children joined the AME. This resulted in the church developing
something of a following in the village. 1 The new mission did
not, however, seriously rival the Lutheran’s wider popularity. The
most significant aspect of Morrison's involvement in the area, was
the day-school he set up teaching the English language. The broad
appeal of this school even prior to the Anglo-Boer war was such that
most of Morrison's students were not members of his church, but
(63)Lutherans - many of them from Phokeng.
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The establishment of these new missions was resented and resisted by 
both the Lutheran missionaries and some of the chiefs. At Bethanie, 
Behrens complained that:
"Ethiopianism is trying to gain ground and many 
of the bad people turn to it when one won't 
tolerate their sins and disrespectful ways.
Solomon Masuloane (sic) ... separated himself 
from community in Bethanie, was ordained by the 
Ethiopians and is trying to break back into our 
congregation. He tries by all means to find some 
entry into Bethanie. He tried to get official 
permission from the chief's council, but this was 
denied him. Now he is trying to get a clique of 
Godless and those that have something on their 
conscience to gain entry for him."(64)
In the Fokeng chiefdom it was the arrival of Rev. Kenneth Spooner 
late in 1914, and his establishment of the Pentecostal Holiness 
Church at Phokeng, which provided an immediate challenge to the 
'state church's' monopoly of control over the growth and direction 
of Christian doctrine. Spooner's Baptist method immediately 
attracted large numbers - especially women - due in part to its 
greater and more enthusiastic emphasis on congregational 
participation. Within a short time two prominent Mokgatle 
families were in his congregation and the competition for the 
Christian souls of the Phokeng community was on. The immediate 
effect of the establishment of the new church, was that it served to 
draw substantial numbers of its congregation from the Lutheran 
mission, amongst them some of the more prominent and wealthy 
members. Equally rapid was the development of animosity between 
Spooner and Penzhorn. Penzhorn was quick to express his disapproval 
of Spooner, complaining that members of Saron had
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"... elected a pitchblack American preacher. 
This man does not belong to any church order, he 
is not committed to any church discipline ... He 
only speaks English and makes use of an
interpreter. He lets himself be paid £14 church 
money a year and demands 2 shilling sixpence for 
each christening. And the people in their 
enthusiasm pay this, even though they weren’t 
willing to pay us 5 shillings a year - and that 
to enjoy all the rights of the church
order.”(66)
Nkwapa Ramorwesi, a woman living in Phokeng when Spooner arrived in 
1914, said that Penzhorn hated Spooner for settling there. This was 
apparently because Spooner ...
"should have gone to areas that were backward and 
still unchristian."(67)
Penzhorn was by no means the only one who appears to have resented 
Spooner's presence. Thomas Rangaka, the son of one of the most 
prominent Lutherans to convert to Spooner's church described the 
early opposition of the chief to the Pentecostal Holiness Church. 
He went on to suggest that opposition to the Pentecostal Holiness 
Church was so great, that
"... but for the prayers and the staunch support 
of his few adherents (it) would have effected 
Spooner's expulsion."(68)
On one occasion the church building was besieged until Spooner, 
disinclined to rely any longer on 'prayers and staunch support', 
elected to cycle into Rustenburg to call the p o l i c e . R a n g a k a  
recalled that sorcery was also resorted to in an attempt to frighten 
Spooner off. He bore witness to a number of occasions when Spooner
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found his schoolroom covered with bloodstains and littered with 
feathers and pieces of raw meat.^®^ At the height of the
opposition to Spooner, Ahasia Mokgatle, one of the Chief's Lekgotla 
members, had his jaw broken by a rock thrown into the church during 
an evening service.
Spooner was no less outspoken against 'heathen customs' such as
polygamy and circumcision than were the Lutherans, and went even
further in condemning the brewing and drinking of beer, and even 
(72)smoking. He did, however, recognise that "many of the
converts still cling to their superstitious i d e a s . T h i s  did
not appear to inhibit the growth of his church.
From its establishment in 1914 and despite initial opposition in
Fhokeng, the Pentacostal Holiness Church grew throughout the
district and beyond, establishing missions in six districts in the
(7 4 }Transvaal and also in Natal. ' While this was not exclusively
the result of Spooner's influence, he was identified within the
church structures as one of the leading figures in the church's work
in South Africa. By 1930 there were forty two Pentacostal Holiness
mission stations, thirty preachers, eight teachers and fourteen
(75)church buildings. By Spooner's death in 1937, there were
sixty churches, seven schools, twenty three secondary schools and 
two youth societies. J
Spooner appears to have had a particular appeal to the youth in the 
communities of the Rustenburg district. At Phokeng Spooner set up 
sporting facilities, not only for boys, but for women as well which,
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according to Mokgatle, was an unprecedented idea in Phokeng 
s o c i e t y . S o o n  afterwards, Penzhom followed suit. From 1922, 
Spooner organised an annual 'youth camp meeting’ involving religious 
and social activities. According to Spooner, these were
instrumental in a 'religious youth revival' in Phokeng. As late as
1933 he claimed that 94 young men and women converted immediately
(78)after the camp of that year.
The secular social benefits which Spooner organised are of
particular significance. He initiated and organised a number of
'Native agriculture and craft shows' in Rustenburg in the three
(79)years before his death, was instrumental in establishing a
branch of the Joint Council of Europeans and Africans in
R u s t e n b u r g a n d  through his involvement in the Joint Council,
(81)established a medical clinic in Phokeng. 1 He also attempted to
(82)establish an 'industrial school for g i r l s * which will be 
discussed more fully below. The most appealing aspect of Spooner's 
church was, however, the day-school which he ran, which taught 
reading and writing in English.
There was considerable controversy between the two missions over the 
medium and method of education. Penzhorn believed that teaching 
should only be in the vernacular and that the education provided 
should be primarily religious in content. Thomas Rangaka reported 
that in Penzhom's school
"... the only medium of instruction was the 
vernacular. The most important books were the 
catechism and Bible history ... education ... was 
therefore in its elementary stage."(83)
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Hie education provided in the schools at Bethanie, like that at 
Phokeng, was almost exclusively religious in character. Thus, when 
Behrens reported on the achievements in the sphere of education, he 
proudly claimed that:
"The small people of this school have learnt 
well. They know nearly all the five main pieces 
of catechism but without being able to explain 
them."(84)
He rejected teaching in English on the basis that it threatened to 
restrict the religious character of the Lutheran education 
system.
Penzhom was also openly opposed to teaching in English and 
suggested that Spooner, who could neither read nor write Sotho, 
would lead the people astray from their 'culture and 
tradition'. 1 Penzhorn's school provided a primarily religious 
training and at the end point of schooling there was confirmation. 
Spooner, on the other hand, was seen as 'the first man to introduce 
western civilization'. J He was regarded as an educator as well 
as a preacher. Penzhorn's objections to Spooner's approach were 
vehement. He used to
"... hunt for us, to search for those who were 
going to Mr. Spooner’s place. We used to hide 
from Penzhom and hid paper and pens from him too 
... he did not want western civilization. He 
wanted us to remain ignorant ... he gave us no 
time at improving our level of education ... to. 
Spooner wanted to educate his fellow 
brothers."(88)
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Despite Penzhom, the obvious appeal of secular education grew as
the local community at Phokeng became increasingly incorporated into
the wider society. The appeal of Spooner's school, offering lessons
in English and basic industrial skills, grew accordingly. By 1917
the school had grown from six to one hundred children and it became
necessary for Spooner to employ another teacher. 1 In 1923 the
school building had to be extended to cater for the increased number
of pupils and by 1933 the school had classes up to standard six.
ftie following year Spooner gained permission to open a boarding
school. Much to the irritation of Penzhom, some of the
staunchest Lutherans in the area used to send their children to
Spooner's school. In fact, Naboth Mokgatle claims that Pedi
children from as far as the eastern Transvaal came to learn at the
s c h o o l . I n d e e d ,  it appears that it was only the actions of
the Education Department which prevented the school from developing 
(92)even further.
It is particularly noteworthy that at both the Lutheran schools, as 
well as at Spooner's school, the pupils were predominantly female. 
As early as 1894, the missionary at Bethanie reported that the
(93)majority of his pupils were young girls. Although the classes
were mostly sexually segregated, the girls classes were considerably 
larger than the boys'. He went on to note that generally the girls 
were also better achievers at school and were less often absent from 
either school or examinations. In contrast, he pointed out
that
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"The achievements of the boys were often only 
slight ... The boys do not care as much about the 
school as the girls do. They have other things 
in their heads and often prove themselves 
reluctant to learn."(95)
In explaining this situation, the missionary suggested that 
generally boys attended school less regularly due mainly to the fact 
that their time was allocated to cattle hearding and 'other jobs for 
their parents'.
The preponderance of women in the schools appears to have been part
of a more general pattern as there tended to be a preponderance of
(97)women within the churches as well.' 7 Pauw points out that this
was also the case in Taung churches. He suggests that the 
preponderance of women in the churches was due mainly to their 
inferior positions in 'traditional society', and the potential 
offered within church organisation for female leadership and
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relatively uninhibited social association. 7 Naboth Mokgatle
identified similar trends in Phokeng and noted the establishment, 
from an early date, of a 'women's union' within the churches. If 
one considers the restrictions on women's active participation at a 
public level in tribal affairs, the relative freedom to preach in
church ceremonies can be seen as having had a particular attraction 
(99)for women.
Penzhom noted the almost fanatical involvement of women in the
churchI
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"Our womens' unions are very quiet in some 
respects. But they don't know how to keep things 
in moderation. At the moment they have an hours 
singing practice after the evening service. 
Without question it would be better if they went 
home and looked after their children."(100)
On this basis it could be argued that womens' involvement in the 
church and their relative freedom of religious affiliation provided 
a potential escape from otherwise vigilant patriarchal 
control.(^01) It appears that women were often inclined and free 
to affiliate to different churches from those of their husbands or 
fathers, even when the latter were not Christians.
"Daar is baie gevalle waar die vrou 'n Kristen is 
maar nie die familie nie; of liewer waar die 
vader nie 'n Kristen is nie."(102)
Mokgatle too noted the relative freedom of women to affiliate to the 
church of their choice irrespective of whether their husbands did so 
or not. His own mother was a Lutheran Christian whilst his father 
was not. His parents were married according to both Christian and 
customary rites.(103) goth male and female children were 
encouraged to join the church and families were often divided into 
Christians and non-Christians, or Lutheran and separatist 
members.(10^^
This is not to suggest that the conversion of young women was always 
encouraged. On occasion the question of female church affiliation 
proved to be the source of considerable conflict between young women 
and their parents. Spooner himself quoted an example of this which 
is reproduced in detail here:
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"The class began the next day, the Devil also
began, one girl is taken out by force by her
unbelieving parents, but the class goes on, in 
about two weeks time another mother comes:- 
'Moruti, I do not want my daughter to be
baptized.’ Well mother, I replied, if you are
prepared to give God an answer for the soul of 
your girl, you can take her away, this mother 
goes away but the daughter continues to attend 
class. The day of the baptismal service came off 
which was the 17th December, 1933. Now see what 
takes place - Thirteen candidates are lined up on 
the brink of the river, your brother is standing 
in the midst of a big pool, one after another is 
being baptized, crowds of people are lined up on 
either side of the river, the saints are singing 
and praising God, suddenly there is a great 
commotion, one of the girls rushes into the water 
'Moruti, baptize me q u i c k H e r  mother who by 
this time had got to the river, rushed right into 
the water - 'Moruti, do not baptize this girl, 
her father will kill me, he does not know 
anything about her being baptized today,' The 
girl at this time is holding on to me and the 
mother holding on to the girl. One of the men 
enters the water to carry off the mother, the 
girl is baptized and goes off shouting. and 
praising God. To make a long story short, that 
afternoon, the father, mother and uncle of the 
girl all heathen, gave the girl a severe beating, 
when I saw her some time afterwards, she told me 
how badly they had treated her, but said she, 
'While they were all beating me, I never cried, I 
never felt angry, I was only glad that I was able 
to suffer for Christ's sake.' But mind you they 
really meant to kill her, it was only God who 
helped her. They have never permitted her to 
attend church since, but we are praying for her 
and them as well."(105)
In addition to providing young women with a degree of 'freedom', the 
church offered greater practical opportunities through education and 
for young women as much as for men, this was possibly the most 
important area of mission activity. A great many parents, 
irrespective of their sentiments about Christianity, were extremely 
enthusiastic about their children, both male and female attending
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the various mission schools. As labour migration became more 
common) (even amongst women), so education, and in particular basic 
literacy skills, were seen as a means of material advancement. Once 
again, on the question of education for women the different 
missionaries amongst the Fokeng had very different outlooks. 
Penzhom had his perspective on education for women firmly rooted 
within his notion of maintaining their specific 'culture and 
tradition'.
"We are teaching them the real and proper 
domestic science; not to make the young girls 
suitable as servants for the whites, but to make 
the young girls suitable as assistants in the 
house, and as future wives for their husbands, 
and domestic science of that kind teaches them to 
sweep in the corners and to build walls and to 
make a floor. They have to cook pap and fetch 
water and go to the gardens. That is domestic 
science, and the object is to make the girl a fit 
wife for her future husband.”(106)
Beyond this notion of domestic science, Penzhom was openly opposed 
to secular education in the mission schools. For some who attended 
Penzhorn's school, this limited the usefulness of the education they 
received. Evelyn Rakola who attended Penzhorn's school commented:
"Nothing really caused me to drop out (of 
school), but I felt that ... here was no progress 
in as far as education is concerned at that 
time.”(107)
Spooner's perspective on the subject was clearly different. Thomas 
Rangaka, one of his first pupils, described Spooner's approach to 
education. He pointed out that from the outset Spooner and his wife 
prioritized an 'industrial training' for their students; woodwork
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construction for men and, of special significance here, needlework, 
laundry work and cooking for the women.(1^8) aiso encouraged 
the development of home industry amongst women, assisting in the 
sales of decorated clay pots and baskets.
Eventually, due to the demand from local women for this training, 
the Spooners could no longer cope with the increasing numbers. As a 
result Spooner attempted to establish an 'industrial school' for the 
women of the district, specifically designed to provide them with 
marketable skills as domestic wage labourers. The school was to 
offer an 18 month course training 'servants' in cooking, laundry 
work, mending and darning, and household duties. Hiis 
project was seen by Spooner as being valuable to both the 'European 
ladies' of the Rustenburg district, and the local black female 
population.
"Such a school would be of great benefit to the 
poor ignorant native girl who has no possible 
insight into European customs or culture, and 
who, when she goes to work, finds herself in this 
new environment ..."(HD
In 1936, a year before Spooner's death, the Native Affairs 
Department turned down his application for a loan in order to set up 
the school. The benefit to 'the natives' was seen as being limited 
and, most importantly, the department was concerned at the 
likelihood of being flooded with similar requests. Despite
this setback, it is claimed that until his death the white
population of Rustenburg always applied to Spooner for 'intelligent'
(113)domestic servants
384
At a time when young men and women from the district were
increasingly migrating to the major industrial centres, the
'secular' education which Spooner offered had a very tangible 
material appeal for them. In particular, women who were migrating 
and who were almost exclusively taking up jobs In domestic 
e m p l o y m e n t b e n e f i t t e d  considerably from the advantages of the 
'industrial' and literacy skills provided in Spooner's school.
Undoubtedly there were many who preferred to get their training 
through experience in domestic service locally, before migrating to 
the cities, and who did not see the value of formal education in 
this area. Nkwapo Ramorwesi, who worked in Kroondal as a domestic 
servant for six months before migrating to Johannesburg, was one of 
these.
"Kroondal was like a university of domestic
work."(H5)
The advantages of education which women were able to secure were not 
so much ideological as material. The practical education which they 
received at Spooner's school equipped women with the skills and 
confidence which facilitated a degree of independence. It certainly 
contributed to broadening of the choices available to women, who 
otherwise had an extremely limited degree of control over their own 
lives and labour. Hiis, more than any other single factor, explains 
the popularity of Spooner's school amongst women of the district.
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The end point in education was generally confirmation. This applied 
as much to those women who attended Spooner's school, as those of 
the Lutheran school. The result of this was, that of the women 
interviewed, few advanced beyond standard two or three. (By the 
time of his death, Spooner's school had classes up to standard 
seven).
"It was common practice to leave school at a 
certain age and attend confirmation classes. 
During those days one simply took it for granted 
that once one had been confirmed in church, then 
school days were over ... we were matured and old 
enough to look for a job in the white 
area ..."(H&)
This woman also expressed the feeling that, although she had only 
attained a standard three level of education, the crucial advantage 
was in having learned some English. Anyone who reached standard 
four or five was considered educated.
Penzhorn directed tirades against the dangers of moral decay 
inherent in these attitudes and in the education fostered in the 
Pentacostal Holiness school.
’’The unbridled, undisciplined and unruly life of 
the youth tends to increase rather than decrease, 
almost all the virgins are throwing away their 
honour ... As soon as the children are confirmed, 
they move to the towns and are left to their own 
devices. Each girl has her own man, and each man 
his woman. Even the young girls admit 
this."(118)
By contrast, some of the perceived advantages of Spooner's education 
over that of the Lutherans were summarised by Thomas Rangaka:
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"From the very onset he (Spooner) determined to 
give his people the education that would make 
them take their place among other races with open 
minds. It was an educational policy that aimed 
at making of the black men Christian citizens of 
South Africa and the world. It was not a cramped 
education only for the particular church doctrine 
and the immediate environs of P h o k en g ."(H 9 )
The main appeal of Spooner's school appears to have been the 
practical utility of the education offered there, especially the 
skills of reading and writing in English. However, the ideological 
content of this education was also clearly distinct from that 
presented by other missions of the district.
Ill Christian Peasants and Politics
The educational conservatism of the Lutheran missionaries was rooted 
in parternalistic religious and political attitudes. This is 
evident in the statement of the missionary at Bethanie:
"... we will need much love and patience, a wise 
sense and a firm hand, since the blacks are so 
unruly and freedom greedy ... We need to pray ... 
so that the Lord may instill in them, the spirit 
of strength, love and discipline."(120)
It was in this light that the issue of tuition in English met with 
the disapproval of the Lutheran missionaries.
"Amongst the native population the drive to 
social and political equality goes together with 
the longing for English tuition and European 
education ... they are expecting great things 
from the new school system and drive and force 
the missionaries forward so that it will hardly 
be possible to keep the school system in the old 
way."(121)
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Hie Lutheran mission education was tailored to suit a 'subject 
people' who could not 'rule themselves, whether in regard to church 
or state'(^22) jhe perceived political responsibilities and 
priorities of the Lutherans informed the education which they 
provided and the prevalent viewpoint during this time was outlined 
by the missionary at Bethanie.
"The mission in Africa still faces difficult 
tasks; she has to go to work very carefully so 
that she may not be reproached that she aided the 
natives in their revolutionary efforts through 
injudicious work ... The Europeans are the Lords 
of the lands and have the ability to govern in 
them. It is not our business to help the natives 
to political rights or to put unripe political 
ideas into their heads. We must teach the people 
that it is the Christian's duty to obey the laws, 
for God's sake, and that you can only obtain the 
benevolence of the almighty through good 
behaviour and loyal, honest work ..."(123;
Spooner's approach was in direct contrast to that of the Lutherans. 
Naboth Mokgatle noted the distinctive ideological content to 
Spooner's lessons especially through the contemporary application of 
biblical lessons such as that of Moses and the Israelites in Egypt.
"He then posed a question to all of us: where is 
Africa? how can you get to Africa? The trick 
nature of the question caught us all unawares and 
none of us knew the answer. He repeated the
question but no hand went up. He looked at us 
with amazement and asked, 'Don't you know where 
Africa is?' Angrily he said, 'You stupid 
children1, stand up.' He lined us up against the 
wall, ordered us to stretch out our hands, and 
each one of us got a beating with a stick. 
Afterwards he stamped hard with his foot on the 
floor and said, "Oils is Africa you are standing 
on.' He made us stamp hard three times on the 
floor shouting, 'This is Africa'.
From that day I never forgot that Egypt was in 
Africa, not elsewhere as the Bible seemed to 
suggest to us,"(124)
Even more overtly political topics were discussed in these classes. 
Mokgatle recalls introducing a debate in the debating class on 
"whether the Europeans should leave Africa and go back to Europe or 
whether they should stay?”, (although he claimed he was unaware of 
the political significance of the question until his later 
involvement in African politics in the towns ).(125) Not 
surprisingly, Penzhorn was openly opposed to this kind of education, 
drawing attention to the 'dangers' of over-hasty, educational 
advancement amongst the people not yet developed or 'civilized' 
enough to cope responsibly with it.^^^ Naomi Setshedi who grew 
up in Phokeng during Spooner’s time there, suggests that those who 
had been taught by him coped more than adequately.
"Most of the people around here who were taught 
by the Rev. Spooner ... are fluent in English and 
they know the history of this village ... many of 
those who went to Rev. Spooner's school are 
leaders, they are very active in the community 
and seem to be interested in the welfare of the 
community."(127)
However, it would be misleading to infer too much about Spooner's 
political influence in the district. The fact that he was a West 
Indian and appears to have had Garveyite contacts and an American 
background, should not lead to an oversimplification of his 
political influence. Such misinterpretations have characterized 
recent works on the subject. Both Pirio^^®^ and Hill^^^ have 
attempted to demonstrate the influence of American Garveyite 
theology in the development of South African nationalism. Although
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neither deal specifically with Spooner, both attempt, in rather 
crude terms, to explain the foreign influence of black Americans or 
West Indians, and the 'Africa for the Africans' slogan emanating 
from Marcus Garvey's movement, in the formative development of 
African resistance, both nationalist and local.
”... the mass appeal of Garvey's movement in 
South Africa rested on not merely its 
identification with Afro-Americans, but, more 
importantly, its connection with America."(130)
By contrast, Rich argues that the direct Garveyite influence of 
American origins, was limited. He suggests that the 
particular strains of Garveyite ideology only expressed themselves 
in South African Ethiopianist churches to the extent that this 
ideological content served as a means of articulating local 
grievances. Despite this, Rich suggests that the local millenarian 
character of Ethiopianism was informed by foreign movements and 
particularly Afro-American ideology. Commenting on the African 
Methodist Episcopal Church, a church movement with a substantial 
following in the Rustenburg district during the 1920s, Rich suggests 
that the support which these churches mobilised in the Transvaal was 
due to the growing threat of land dispossession to rural African 
communities. Nonetheless, Rich notes that
"Some of this appeal seems to have been of a 
millenarian nature at the popular level '... 
informing into the Native mind the feeling that 
some day with the help of their Ethiopian 
brothers in America, they will become the 
possessors of South Africa 1'"(132)
However, the evidence of millenarian influence in instances such as 
the Bulhoek massacre in 1920, cannot be generalised in the Transvaal 
or elsewhere. This was often a somewhat alarmist tendency of the 
commercial press in the decade after Bulhoek. In 1922 the Sunday 
Times ran an article entitled: "Bolshevism for African Natives - 
World-wide Plot - Red Missionaries Coming from Russia", in which it 
was claimed
"... that at a conference of Russian Soviets held 
in Moscow ... it was decided to send Bolshevist 
missionaries to forment revolution among the 
negroes of America and the Native races of South 
Africa."0-33)
More specifically, an article in The Star in January 1928 entitled 
"The Natives - Spread of Unsettling Propaganda - Garveyism in 
Africa", claimed not only that Garveyism was 'capturing the 
imagination of the black people of Africa', but that:
"Garveyism as preached today advocates the use of 
force to accomplish its ends, and is therefore 
incompatable with European control over 
Africa".(134)
These alarmist reports must be read in the context of the Transkeian 
experience during the early 1920s outlined by both Edgar^^^ and 
Beinart and B u n d y . H o w e v e r ,  these views were also expressed 
in relation to the Rustenburg district. As soon as the disturbances 
at Phokeng became public knowledge in 1924, there were 
sensationalist cries of "Another Bulhoek". Again, The Star was 
responsible for this headline to an article on the subject. The
article went on to say
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"... there Is Imminent danger of bloodshed which 
may not be entirely confined to the warring 
factions. The position has existed for some 
time, and in the opinion of men familiar with 
native tribal matters in the district, it may 
lead to a tragedy similar to that which occurred 
at Bulhoek.”(lj7)
The similarities between the events in the Rustenburg district and 
those at Bulhoek are, however, extremely difficult to identify, 
especially in relation to the influence of Ethiopian and Garveyite 
millenarianism. In fact there appears to have been a notable 
absence of any of the millenarian rhetoric characteristic of 
Garveyite influence. What is more, Spooner, who was identified in 
the early years as central to the unrest, could not under any 
circumstances have been accused of stirring up racial hatred. On 
the contrary, his role in the Joint Council of Europeans and 
Africans in Rustenburg was devoted to diffusing 'racial tensions and 
misunderstanding' and he was described by the Rustenburg Herald as
”... a mediator between two races in South 
Africa, a good citizen who was held in esteem by 
Europeans and loved and respected by all natives 
who knew him."(138)
His own son-in-law and later successor as the leader of the 
Pentacostal Holiness Church in Phokeng, made clear Spooner's concern 
'to make his people law abiding and peaceful citizens'.v ' It
therefore seems that Spooner's concern and motivation was 
theocentric rather than explicity political, his influence in the 
disputes of the district, material rather than simply ideological, 
was based on the practical material benefits which he was able to
offer.
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Hie ideological influence of separatist churches in the Rustenburg 
district was essentially defined by the localised struggles and 
material conditions. This is especially evident in the subtle 
challenge which these churches posed to the influence and authority 
which chiefs were attempting to assert via the established 'state 
churches'. In this respect, the evidence suggests that the 
contradictory effects of Christian influence, resulted in the 
Christian church becoming a vehicle for the expression of political 
and ideological conflicts which had concrete material origins in the 
struggle for control of rural resources. this is particularly 
evident in the way that the varied content of mission education 
qualitatively served the particular material needs of different 
sectors of these Rustenburg communities.
Even prior to the turn of the century, the missionary at Bethanie 
had noted the influence of the Christian church in transforming the 
material lifestyle of Tswana peasant farmers.
"The life and ways (of Christians) here are 
becoming more and more like Europeans ... After 
having first learned to hold dear Christianity, 
they are now learning to value and appreciate the 
culture.
However, the missionary was also aware of the subversive potential 
of these developments.
"Now it has got to the stage, where the 
indigenous people, especially the Christians, 
find that they can use everything that is 
available in the shop. For example, years ago,
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nobody here knew what a petroleum lamp was. Now 
we find one burning in every hut and house at 
night. The people feel that they can no longer 
manage without a pertroleum lamp ... The people 
are learning to use the world and are nearly 
living like whites. Progress is in such giant 
steps, that one gets scared and must ask oneself, 
'where will it end?' It is imminent that luxury 
will become widespread and it takes much effort 
to work against that in the community. Each one 
now thinks he is justified in buying and wearing 
what he wishes and can pay for. And since one 
doesn't find such class differences here as one 
does in Germany, there is nothing much one can do 
in that direction. The best thing would be for 
me as preacher and teacher to prohibit any 
noticeable luxury items, without discrimination. 
In this case it is, however, difficult to find 
the limit since the whites set the example in 
their lifestyle and the blacks feel themselves 
justified in following their example. How long 
one can contain corruption, the Lord alone 
knows. The prosperity is after all a blessing 
from the Lord. But the misuse of earthly things 
will lead the people into corruption."(141;
There are a number of additional factors which serve to explain the 
manner in which Christian mission influence inserted itself into 
local politics. These factors are best exposed by reference to the 
experiences described by William Beinart in Pondoland during this 
same period. Beinart has noted that in Pondoland, where there was a 
high degree of direct state intervention in peasant society, the 
missions were generally associated with the state. The result, in 
the context of extensive resistance to state intervention, was the 
very limited success of the conventional Christian missions in 
securing a popular following. Beinart estimates the overall figure 
of affiliation to these missions in Pondoland at only five per 
cent.^^^ The Rustenburg district, however, was relatively 
cushioned from similar direct state intervention in the early 
decades of the century, and established chiefs were less directly
394
associated with the state. Urns early chiefly support for the 
missions resulted in a much higher degree of Christian church 
popularity than was the case in Pondoland. Breutz suggests that by 
the 1940s there was a Christian majority in every tribe in the 
district and in most this was well above fifty per cent. In some 
chiefdoms he claims that almost the entire population was 
Christian.(143)
Beinart demonstrates that the effect of conventional missions in 
Pondoland was to complement the power of chiefs in the 
district. ^ 44  ^ This he suggests was due to mission educated 
Christians adopting a 'progressive' and 'westernized' material 
culture much in keeping with that being fostered by the chiefs. As 
a result Beinart concludes:
"The wealthier chiefly and Christian families in 
Pondoland were, to some extent, able to entrench 
their position through their political power, 
their cash Income, their access to education and 
rural resources."(145)
This, Beinart continues, brought them into considerable conflict 
with 'traditionalists' who sought to defend their own culture and 
material existence.^4®^ In this context, Beinart identifies the 
expansion of Ethiopian church movements in Pondoland as being 
encouraged by chiefs who were struggling to maintain or extend their 
positions of control^4^
Beinart identifies the role of education, provided by the missions, 
as one of the means of avoiding migrancy^34®^ He suggests that
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this factor was central to the alliance between 'progressive' 
educated Christians and chiefly families, as it was the state 
administrative system in Pondoland, which, under the auspices of the 
Council system, provided salaried jobs in the rural areas. Jobs as 
clerks, interpreters, police, prison orderlies, dipping assistants, 
agricultural demonstrators and teachers all demanded education up to 
standard four and this education was provided, if not always funded, 
by the missions .^^9)
"It was the very fact that the wealthier peasants 
and petty entrepreneurs had, by the 1920s and 
1930s, become dependent on education and salaried 
jobs that diffused conflict between them and the 
chiefs. As in the case of the chiefs, they had 
become a group more dependent on the
state."(150)
The Rustenburg experience differs considerably from that of 
Pondoland. The relative absence of direct state intervention and 
the failure of the council system to take root prior to the late 
1930s, meant that there was a dearth of salaried job opportunities 
within the rural reserves. Even those African entrepreneurs 
enterprising enough to attempt to establish local businesses, seldom 
survived for more than a couple of y e a r s . T h o s e  few who did 
succeed in establishing a trade, generally returned to agricultural 
production after a few years a n y w a y . R ev. stegmann, in 
evidence to the NEC (1930-2) suggested that in fact those educated 
Africans living in the reserves were frustrated by the lack of job 
opportunities consonant with their levels of education.(-^3) 
Therefore, the practical value of education appears to have been its 
usefulness in securing the most favourable jobs in the urban areas.
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Even Penzhorn noted that most of the local inhabitants saw education 
as a means of securing a better regular income in wage 
labour.(154) This has been further corroborated in interviews 
with women from the area. Mission education was readily available 
to most children in the district. Breutz points out that by the end 
of the 1940s at least fifty percent of all eligible children were 
attending school and in many chiefdoms this figure was considerably 
higher. As early as 1930 Penzhorn claimed that there were 
fifty three Lutheran schools alone in the district. it was 
even suggested that many younger members of the chiefdoms were 
migrating to the towns in order to secure a better education and 
this argument was reflected in the report of the NEC.^^^
However, the position of educated Christians who were not 
necessarily engaged in regular labour migration, needs to be 
elaborated on. In the Rustenburg district, where established chiefs 
were fighting to protect their traditional control over tribute (in 
this period in the form of migrant earnings) and the distribution of 
land, and where state intervention was relatively limited, the 
material basis for any alliance between chiefs and 'progressive' 
peasant agriculturalists was simply non-existant. Indeed, these 
chiefly 'traditional privileges' flew directly in the face of both 
migrants who sought to assert their independent control over their 
earnings, and 'progressive' farmers who were concerned to develop or 
expand their productive base and who protested against 'archaic' 
forms of land distribution.
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Hie result of these trends was that by 1930, the missionaries who 
had historically been seen to bolster chiefly authority, were being 
blamed for tribal divisions.(1^8) Furthermore, the chiefs of the 
district demanded that the responsibility for education be removed 
from the missions and some even motivated for the 
establishment of 'tribal s c h o o l s ^^0) Even Penzhom 
acknowledged that mission rivalry, particularly in the field of 
education, exacerbated factionalism within the chiefdoms.^*^
It therefore appears that the different functions performed by 
different mission groupings in the area become a site of struggle 
which gave expression to the more fundamental conflicts in these 
Rustenburg chiefdoms. The activities of Rev. Spooner in Phokeng; 
who taught English as opposed to the vernacular, provided a secular 
rather than exclusively religious school curriculum, established 
'Native' agricultural shows and the Joint Council of Europeans and 
Natives and who campaigned to get individuals exempted from poll tax 
or pass laws;^1* ^  all directly served the material interests of 
'progressive and westernized' peasants and in many instances of 
migrants as well. This explanation also gives materialist content 
to the role played by separatist church movements in the area, (in 
particular the Pentacostal Holiness Church) in their challenge to 
the ideological authority of 'state churches' associated with the 
chiefs. Rather than defusing conflicts between chiefs and 
'progressives' as identified by Beinart,^*^ these church 
movements served to exacerbate them.
398
CHAPTER 6 FOOTNOTES
1. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography of An Unknown South African,
London: Hurst and Co. (1971), p. 57.
2. 371, 3/1105/23, Divisional C.I. Officer Tvl. to Deputy 
Commissioner S.A.P. (30/10/24).
3. ibid., and NTS, 316, 15/55, Confidential letter: Ernest Stubbs to
Garthome (SNA) (15/10/1924).
4. ibid.
5. Breutz, P.L., The Tribes of Rustenburg and Pilansberg
Districts, Pretoria : Department of Native 
Affairs Ethnological Publications, No. 28 (1953), 
p. 94.
6. ibid., p . 100.
7. ibid., p. 42.
8. ibid., pp. 42-3.
9. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, pp. 56-7. Naboth Mokgatle was 
grandson
to Chief Mokgatle Mokgatle. August Mokgatle was 
his uncle. Naboth was born in Phokeng in 1911 
and lived there until the early 1930s.
10. Interview with Setswammung Mokgatle (17/3/83), p. 4. All of the 
interviews cited in this chapter are with elderly women who grew 
up in Phokeng. I owe thanks to Belinda Bozzoli who drew my 
attention to these resources, as well as to the African Studies 
Institute under the auspices of which the interviews were 
conducted, and which made the interviews available to me.
11. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p. 16.
12. The Lutherans were not the first missionaries to set foot in the 
district. Mokgatle refers to a Dutch Reformed missionary who 
approached Mokgatle Mokgatle, chief of the Fokeng at the time, 
to request that he be permitted to establish a mission station 
in the village. The chief refused him permission, responding in 
the following way:
"We cannot accept your religion and the God 
you urge us to accept and believe in. We 
have our own way of worshipping God and the 
way we think we can reach him. We think 
that our dead ancestors are the way we can 
speak to God. Through them we firmly 
believe he can speak to us, by accepting our 
humble requests to him or rejecting them.
We, therefore, think that it would serve no 
useful purpose for you or ourselves, to join 
together and worship the God you have spoken 
to us about.' The best thing we think is 
that you pass on to try elsewhere.”
399
ibid., p. 55.
It was just a few years later that Penzhom was invited to the 
district.
13. Breutz, P.L., Ihe Tribes, p. 43. Apart from the stations at
Phokeng and Bethanie some of the others 
established were:
1867 at Kana on the farm Reinskoyalskraal amongst the
Fokeng;
1869 at Ratsegaestad on the farm Hartbeesfontein (Sichar 
station; Rev. Fuhls) amongst the Kwena ba Modimosana 
ba Maake under Chief Legwale;
1871 at Pella Location amongst the Kwena ba Modimosana ba 
Matlhaku under Chief Mosome (Rev. Springhora);
1872-4 at Tlolwe's Location on the farm Grootwagendrift
(station Mahanaim) amongst the Tlokwa ba ga Bogatsu 
under Chief Tlolwe;
1874 at Mogale's Location on the farm Boshfontein (station 
Ebenezer) amongst the Ba Pd ba Mogale under Chief 
Mogale;
1882 at Selonskraal (Rev. Penzhom) amongst the Kwena ba
Modimosana ba Mmatau under Chief Maselwane.
14. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, pp. 5; 9-10; 58-60; S.A.B.A.,
K/26, Emmett to NEC., P. 1075; Spooner, K.E.M.,
A Sketch of Native Life in South Africa, pp. 
15-6 (i owe thanks to Belinda Bozzoli who
provided me with this pamphlet. No publisher or 
date were listed in this publication.); S.A.B.A. 
K/26, Stegmann to NEC., p. 1058.
15. S.A.B.A., K/26, Emmett to NEC., pp. 1072-5.
16. Interview with Mmamatlakala Moje (1/10/1982), p. 6. Moje 
pointed out that well into the 1920s young men and women were 
going to circumcision schools at Mabieskraal.
17. Breutz, P.L., The Tribes, p. 136.
18. The Lutheran missionary at Bethanie quoted an example as early 
as February 1867, when a ’sub-chief' named 'Koors' was married 
by Christian rites. He gave up five of his six wives and 
remained married only to his first wife. The missionary noted 
seven other similar cases. Hermannsburger Missionblatt 
(February 1867), pp. 23-4.
19. Setswammung Mokgatle suggested that occasionally, male converts 
would do this clandestinely by marrying only one wife whilst 
the others remained outside the church and were married by 
traditional rites. She quoted the example of chief Mokgatle 
Mokgatle himself who, having invited the Lutherans to settle in 
Phokeng, was only prepared to give up two of his five wives. 
Interview with Setswammung Mokgatle (17/3/83), p.3.
400
20. This Is stated by Breutz for every chiefdom in the district. 
Also, Spooner, K.E.M., Sketches, p. 15; and S.A.B.A. K/2b, 
Emmett to NEC., p. 1075.
21. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p.12. There is a considerable 
body of anthropologically oriented work, both on the Tswana and 
other groups, which situates both polygamy and circumcision 
within 'precapitalist' African communities. Some of these 
articles focus on the family unit, locating polygamy, 
circumcision and brideprice practices within localised 
relations of social, ideological and economic control. Amongst 
those read are: Breutz, P.L., The Tribes, Shapera, I., 'The 
Old Bantu Culture', in Schapera, I., (ed) Western Civilization 
and the Natives of South Africa, London : Routledge and Kegan 
Paul Ltd., (1967), pp.3-35; Schapera, I., 'Present Day Life in 
the Native Reserves’, in Shapera, I., Western Civilization, 
pp.39-61; Shapera, I., Tribal Legislation amongst the Tswana~of 
the Bechuana Protectorate, London School of Economics and 
Science, Monographs on Social Anthropology No. 9., London : 
Percy Lund, Humphries and Co. Ltd. (1943); Shapera, 1., 'The 
Nature and Sources of Tswana Law', in Cohen, D.L., and Parsons, 
J.P., (eds) Politics and Society in Botswana, U.B.L.S. 
Readings, Vol. II, Department of Government and Administration, 
University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (1974), 
pp.137 *154; Kinsman, M., 'Notes on the Southern Tswana Social 
Formation', History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand 
(1981); Comaroff, J.L., and Roberts, S., Rules and Processes. 
The Cultural Logic of Dispute in an African Context, Chicago : 
University ol Chicago Press (l981); Harries, FT*, ' Kinship, 
Ideology and the Origins of Migrant Labour', Centre of 
Interaatlnal and Area Studies Conference : Class Formation, 
Culture and Consciousness : Ihe Making of Modern South Africa, 
University of London (January 1980); Harries, P., 'Migrants 
and Marriage : The Role of Chiefs and Elders in Labour 
Movements from Pre-Colonial Southern Mozambique to South 
Africa', Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town 
(4th May 19^9); and Beinart, W., and Delius, P., 'The Family 
and Early Migrancy in Southern Africa', Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies Paper, School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London (9th May 1979).
22. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p.6.
23. See Chapter II above, footnote (65).
24. Interview with Setswammung Mokgatle, p.2.
25. In retrospect Naboth Mokgatle viewed the ’collaboraion of the 
church and colonial administration in this regard as a clear 
part of the 'colonial strategy of subjugation.' Mokgatle, N., 
Autobiography, p.25*8.
401
26. ibid., p.26. In 1908 the Lutheran Missionary of Bethanie 
complained about the widespread 'practices of witchcraft', 
claiming that "the sins particularly against the sixth 
commandment are more on the increase than on the decrease." 
Hermannsburger Misslonblatt (December 1908), pp.374-5.
27. S.A.B.A., K/26, Chief Pilane to NEC., p. 1115.
28. Breutz, P.L., The Tribes, pp. 71-2.
29. Hermannsburger Misslonblatt (February 1867), p.24.
30. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to NEC., p.1003; Stegmann to NEC., 
p.1030.
31. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to NEC., State Archives, K/26,
p.1002-3.
32. Spooner, K.E.M., A Sketch, p.18.
33. ibid.
34. Schapera, I., 'Present Day Life in the Native Reserves', in
'Schapera, I., (ed) Western Civilization and the 
Natives of South Africa, London : Routledge and 
Regain Paul Ltd. (1967), pp. 59 -60. One example 
of such conflict was recounted by Penzhorn. 
Chief Tumagole of the Fokeng became engaged in a 
lengthy dispute with the church council over who 
organised the functioning of the local mission 
school. Hermannsburger Misslonblatt (January 
1897), pp.9-12.
35. See Chapter II above, pp.87-8.
36. ibid., p.16.
37. Breutz, P.L., Ihe Tribes, p. 128.
38. Hermannsburger Misslonblatt (December 1868), pp.226-31.
39. ibid., (February 1867), Pp.27'8; and (October 1868), p.196.
40. ibid., (July 1910), p.195.
41. Pauw, B.A., Religion in a Tswana Chiefdom, Cape Town : Oxford 
University Press (1964), p.60.
42. Hermannsburger Misslonblatt (July 1910), p. 195.
43. ibid.
44. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p.60. One example mentioned by 
Mokgatle was his uncle Mogaie, an old man who was 'an expert in 










somewhat cryptic, they do reflect the contradictory influence 
of 'mission imperialism' as defined by Dachs. Dachs, A.J., 
'Mission imperialism : The Case of Bechuanaland', in Cohen, 
D.L., and Parson, J.P., (eds) Politics in Botswana, pp.48-60. 
Dachs pointed out that the Christian missions simultaneously 
undermined customary forms of ideological control whilst 
developing and reinforcing transformed sources of political 
authority. Mogale's views quoted below, reflect both concern 
at the breakdown of 'tribal discipline' resulting from the 
influence of the Christian church, as well as the expediency of 
'moving with the times'.
"Though Mogale was delighted with the system of 
Christianity, he said that it had brought with it 
liberal ideas which brough the breakdown of 
tribal discipline. He cited the fact that in the 
days of his boyhood we could not be sitting there 
with him listening to what he had to tell us.
Boys, he said, would have been grouped together 
in the clan being told stories about discipline, 
respect for elders, tribal traditions, customs 
and all they were expected to know. He went on 
to say that when we grew up to be men and women 
we would have nothing to tell our children about 
our background and its things which kept our 
tribe together. Then I asked him why he became a 
Christian, and he replied by making an 
illustration that when you swim in the river with 
other people, you must see which way they are 
swimming, and swim that way too. If, he
explained, you decide to swim in the opposite 
way, you will drown."
Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p.ll.
Hermannsburger Missionblatt (October 1914), p.313.
ibid. (July 1910), p.195. 
ibid. (January 1910), p.17. 
ibid.
ibid. (July 1910), pp. 195-6.
This was clear in the conflict between Penzhorn and Chief Tumagole 
over the issue of control over the church schools. see footnote 
number 34 above.
Hermannsburger Missionblatt (July 1910), p.196.
Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p. 65.
53. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to NBC., p. 987
403
54. Hermannsburger Missionblatt (July 1940), p.76.
55. Breutz, P.L., The Tribes, p. 43.
56. Hermannsburger Missionblatt (October 1868), p.195.




61. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p. 68.
62. ibid., p. 67. It is difficult to offer a satisfactory explanation
of why the Lutheran church failed to gain a following at Luka. It
can only be speculated that the relative autonomy of this outlying 
branch of the Fokeng, served to 'dilute' the effect of the chief's 
close association with the Lutheran mission resulting in its less 
pervasive popular appeal.
63. ibid., pp. 67 - 9. Mokgatle's account of the AME's establishment and
of Morrison's influence, is the only one I have been able to trace. 
As a result this account is somewhat subjective. The later
responses to Spooner's school and the education in English provided 
there, would appear to bear out the trends outlined by Mokgatle.
However, these trends are more easily explained for the 192Us and 
1930s than for the earlier period. Mokgatle's explanation does, 
however, bear repetition:
"The people were aware that the white man's rule 
was spreading all over the country and therefore 
it was essential to get prepared and to learn his 
language. Ihose men of my tribe who had been to 
Kimberley to work for money in the claims had had 
contact with the English people there and were 
impressed by them and found them very clever; 
they found no comparison between them and the 
Dutch people they knew. Although the Anglo-Boer 
war had not broken out, they could sense that 
eventually the Englishman, with his cleverness, 
was bound to make an impact on the whole country."
64. Hermannsburger Missionblatt (December 1908), pp.375-6.
65. Mokgatle makes specific mention of the appeal of outdoor 
baptismal ceremonies. Also he noted
"that in his church the priest did not have to 
pray for all the congregation; when the time for 
prayer came, everyone must make his or her own 
appeal to God.”
404
Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p.74.
66. Hermannsburger Mlssionblatt (October 1914), pp.313-5.
67. Interview with Nkwapa Ramorwesi, (undated), pp. 30-31.
68. Rangaka, T., in Mrs. K.E.M. Spooner, A.E. Robinson, Dr. P.F.
Beacham, (eds), Sketches of the Life of K.E.M. 
Spooner, p. 60, (undated). Once again 1 owe a 
debt of gratitude to Belinda Bozzoli who gave me 
this article. Also Spooner, K.E.M. A Sketch of 
Native Life in South Africa, pp. 12 - 13
(Undated).
69. ibid.
70. Tom Rangaka, in Mrs. K.E.M. Spooner, et.al. (eds.) Sketches,
p. 61.
71. ibid., p. 78.
72. Spooner, K.E.M., A Sketch of Native Life, pp. 20, 30.
73. ibid., p. 30.
74. Spooner to Rev. P.F. Beacham, Greenville, U.S.A., (17/10/1955), 
in
Spooner K.E.M. (Mrs.), et.al., P.F., (eds.) 
Sketches, p. 84.
75. ibid., p.101.
76. Rev. J.W. Brooks, 'Rev. Spooner as I knew him', in ibid., p. 49.
77. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p. 145.
78. K.E.M. Spooner and Wife to Prayer Helper (22/1/1934). This 
correspondence was given to me by Belinda Bozzoli. Its origin 
is unclear.
79. 'The Late Reverend Kenneth E.M. Spooner', The Rustenburg Herald 
(5/3/1937).
80. References to Spooner's central involvement in this area in 
Mrs. K.E.M. Spooner et.al (eds.) Sketches, by G. Thackeray 
(then resident Rustenburg Magistrate), p. 10; Mrs. E. McGregor 
(chairperson of the Rustenburg branch of the Joint Council), 
pp. 17-18; and Thomas Rangaka, p. 65; also pp. 38; 70.
81. Mrs. E. McGregor in ibid., p. 17.
82. N.T.S. 28/5, 182/302, Native Industrial School for girls :
Rustenburg (1935-6).
405
83. Thomas Rangaka in Sketches Mrs. K.E.M. Spooner et.al. (eds.), 
p. 55.
84. Hermannsburger Misslonblatt (April 1894), pp. 58*9.
85. ibid., Report (1904), p.22.
86. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p. 78.
87. Interview with Emestina Mekgwe (undated), p. 8.
88. ibid., pp. 9 * 10.
89. Thomas Rangaka in Mrs. K.E.M. Spooner et.al. (eds.) Sketches, 
p. 59.
90. ibid., p. 60.
91. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p. 141
92. Thomas Rangaka described this in somewhat conspiratorial terms:
"His educational policy being in striking 
contrast to that of other missions working in the 
same place, aroused great antagonism. This was 
the inevitable result of keen competition on the 
educational field. He was accused of teaching
English at the entire exclusion of the
vernacular. The department and the local
authorities were influenced by those who had easy 
access to the powers that be. In 1917, his
school was nearly closed down. His policy,
however, justified itself on the social life of 
the Bafokeng people. In this agitation and
maneuvering he stood his ground with Christian 
fortitude. But he was handicapped by the fact of 
being classed as a native * the fact of his 
colour. From those at the head of affairs, 
attacks which caused him physical and mental 
unrest came to his school. Perhaps one of the
greatest blows was that which came in 1936. The 
Education Department found some little excuse to 
deprive his school of its Standard VI class.
This cut at the root of his high school scheme.
It was the unkindest cut of all. It literally 
sent him to the grave. He was promised, however, 
that as soon as he was able to put up additional 
classrooms the Standard VI would be restored. He 
started on these so that he was still busy when 
sickness seized him. Even on his deathbed he was 
still enquiring after the progress of this 
building operation upon which hung the 




















Thomas Rangaka in Mrs. k .E.M. Spooner et. al. (eds.) sketches,
pp. 61 - 2.
Hermannsburger Missionblatt (April 1894), p.35. 
ibid., pp. 3 6 - 7 .  
ibid., p.38. 
ibid., p.39.
S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to NEC., pp. 987 - 8.
Pauw, B.A., Religion, pp. 62; 70; 76; 85 - 94.
Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p.63.
Hermannsburger Missionblatt (May 1933), pp. 67 - 68.
There is very little evidence within the correspondence of 
womens' formal involvement in the disputes and political 
processes within the Tswana chiefdoms of the district. 
However, this should not be taken to suggest that women were 
inactive in less formal forms of resistance to parental and 
chiefly control. Unfortunately the methodology needed to 
further explore this area is somewhat inconsistent with that 
adopted in the rest of this thesis, so that these issues cannot 
be pursued further here.
S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to NEC., p.987 .
Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p.l.
ibid., pp. 6 4 - 5 .
K.E.M. Spooner and Wife to Prayer Helper (22/1/1934). once 
again this correspondence by courtesy of Belinda Bozzoli.
S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to NEC., p.1006 .
Interview with Evelyn Rakola, p.12.
Phillip Nameng in Mrs. K.E.M. Spooner et. al. (eds.) sketches, 
pp. 105 - 6. Nameng was also one of Spooner's pupils. Also, 
Thomas Rangaka in ibid., p.61.
Maria Tlabakoe in ibid., p.78.
"The making of claypots was inherited from my mother, I 
used to make some only for local supply. I did not think 
this could be developed into home industry that could pay 
me. The Rev. Spooner encouraged me to take some of the 
pots to the Native Agricultural show. These were almost 
all bought by interested Europeans and natives. Later I 
learned to take them around various places myself and 
thereby found the making of claypots to be a paying 
proposition. He bought some pots from other parts of the 
country and brought these to help me improve the designs of 
the pots."
N.T.S., 2815, 182/302; K. Spooner to G. Thackwaray (Magistrate 
of Rustenburg) (27/7/1935).
407
111. ibid., K. Spooner to G. Thackwaray (2/12/1935).
112. ibid., SNA to Add. NC. 13/2/1936.
113. Thomas Rangaka in Mrs. K.G.M. Spooner et. al. (eds.) Sketches, 
p.59.
114. Almost without exception, those women who migrated entered 
domestic wage labour. The operation of informal urban-rural 
networks among Fokeng women helped them to secure these types 
of jobs for each other in urban areas. As a result, a large 
number of women from the district used to work as domestics in 
Parkview and Parktown in Johannesburg and Robertsheights in 
Pretoria. This was described in an interview with Naomi 
Setshedi 24/11/81, pp.7-8.
115. Interview with Nkwapo Ramorwesi, p.18.
116. ibid., p.9.
117. ibid., p.10.
118. Hermannsburger Mlsslonblatt (April 1924), pp. 23 - 4.
119. Thomas Rangaka in Sketches, pp. 58 >9.
Thomas Rangaka was to become the principal of the Fhokeng 
School. His father, Tau Dan Rangaka, was a prominent 
member of the Lutheran church in Phokeng prior to Spooner's 
arrival. He converted to the Pentacostal Holiness Church 
and became Spooner's right hand person, interpreting for 
him and eventually controlling five mission stations 
himself. Thomas, following in his father's footsteps, 
became assistant superintendent of the Pentecostal holiness 
Church; in the Rustenburg and Brits districts.
120. Hermannsburger Missionblatt (January 1910), p.17.
121. ibid. Report (1904), pp. 22 - 3.
122. ibid., (July 1910), pp. 195 - 6.
123. ibid., pp. 196 - 7.
124. Mokgatle, N., Autobiography, p. 158.
125. ibid., p. 160.
126. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhorn to NEC., p. 993.
127. Interview with Naomi Setshedi, p. 42.
128. Pirio, G.A. 'The Role of Garveyism in the Making of the South
African Working Classes and Namibian 
Nationalism', Marcus Garvey Papers, SSEC Joint 
Committee on South African Studies Conference 
Paper, U.C.L.A. (Sept. 1982).
408
129. Hill, R.A. 'Africa for the Africans' : Marcus Garvey, the
UNIA and the struggle for African Nationalism in 
South Africa in the 1920s', SSRC Joint Committee 
on South African studies Conference Paper; south 
Africa in the Comparative Study of Class, Race 
and Nationalism, New York (8 - 12 Sept. 1982).
130. ibid., p. 40(a).
131. Rich, p., 'Black Peasants and Ethiopianism in south Africa:
1896-1915', Development Studies Group Conference 
on the History of Opposition in South Africa, 
Johannesburg : University of the Witwatersrand. 
(1978). [Subsequently published]
132. Quotation in ibid., p. 132.
133. The Sunday Times (10/12/1922). In a similar vein, Umteteli Wa 
Bantu took up the same issue just two days earlier. In an 
article simply entitled 'Communistic Atheism' the following was 
printed:
"A Russian merchant lately arrived in 
Johannesburg from Moscow is credited with inside 
knowledge of Trotsky's aims. He is reported to 
have said among other things that at a recent 
conference of soviet authorities in Moscow 'the 
proposal was actually made that south African 
Natives should be schooled in Bolshevist
principles, and that not only the urban 
populations, but also the country peoples, both 
white and black, should be urged to accept the 
belief that there is no God.' We fancy that Mr.
Trotzky would find himself up against a very 
tough proposition.
Our Russian friend is understood to feel 'that 
Russia will send missionaries to this country who 
will visit the farms and backveld districts 
charged to convey the message of Atheism and 
class hatred to the people.'" Umteteli Wa Bantu 
(8/12/1922)
134. The Star (5/1/1923) p. 9. See also Manoedi, M.M., Garvey and 
Africa, New York Age Press (undated), found in NTS, 1681, 2/276.
135. Edgar, R., 'The Strange Career of Wellington Buthelezi, or
Bantu Prophets in south Africa', Los Angeles :
U.C.L.A. (1975).
136. Beinart, W., and Bundy, C., 'State Intervention, and Rural
Resistance in the Transkei, 1900-1965' in Klein, 
M., (ed) Peasants in Africa, Beverly Hills 
(1980), pp. 270-315; esp. pp. 289-93.
409
137. The Star; (6/10/1924) p. 7.
138. The Rustenburg Herald, (5/3/1937).
139. A.S. Grootboom In Mrs. K.E.M. Spooner et. al (eds.) p. 41. (It 
was
only after Spooner's death that Grootboom married
Wilhemena, Spooner's adopted daughter).
140. Hermannsburger Misslonblatt (January 1891), p. 14.
141. Ibid., pp. 14 - 5.
142. Beinart, W., The Political Economy of Pondoland I860>1930,
Cambridge (1982), pp. 217-9.
143. These figures are for both conventional and separatist 
churches. Amongst the Fokeng he quoted that only twenty 
families were still heathen by the 1950s, but suggested that 
this was probably slightly underestimating the number of 
non-Christians. Breutz, P.L., Tie Tribes, p. 71; for the BaPo 
under Chief Mogale, Breutz simply states that 'practically the 
entire tribe is Christian', ibid., p. 191.
144. Beinart, W., The Political Economy of Pondoland, p. 238.
145. ibid., p. 234.
146. ibid., p. 237.
147. ibid., p. 239.
148. ibid., p. 220.
149. ibid., p. 217.
150. ibid., p. 240.
151. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhom to NEC. , pp. 992 - 3; Stegmann to
NEC., p. 1042.
152. S.A.B.A., Penzhom to NEC., P* 1020. This point was also
asserted by Rev. Behrens at Bethanie. Hermannsburger
Misslonblatt (December 1908), pp. 373*4.
153. S.A.B.A., K/26, Stegmann to NEC., p. 1047.
154. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhom to NEC., p. 988.
155. Breutz, P.L. The Tribes, pp. 45; 100; 118; 135-6; 156; 191.
156. S.A.B.A., K/26, Penzhom to NEC., p. 1013.
157. S.A.B.A., K/26, Chiefs to NEC., p. 1134; NEC. Report, U.G., 22 
(1932), p. 95.
410
158. S.A.B.A., K/26, Chiefs Shongoane, Mokgatle and Mamogale to
N.E.C., p. 1108.
159. S.A.B.A., K/26, Chiefs Mokgatle and Selon (Maselwane) to NEC., 
pp. 1095-6.
160. S.A.B.A., K/26, Chief Motzatsi to NEC., p. 1151.
161. Breutz P.L.', Hie Tribes, p. 45.
162. Rev. E. Siko (pastor in charge of two of two Pentacostal 
Holiness mission stations) Mrs. K.E.M. Spooner et. al. (eds.) 
in Sketches, p. 74.
163. Beinart, W., The Political Economy of Pondoland, p. 240.
411
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION
The political and ideological struggles within peasant communities in 
the Rustenburg district during the third and fourth decade of the 
twentieth century, display several apparently contradictory 
characteristics. Despite the common political challenge to chiefly 
control in each of the communities in the district, this resistance 
was expressive of varying material interests and was shaped by 
different ideological discourses. Not only was this the case in the 
district as a whole, but also within each of the chiefdoms.
In most of the disputes discussed, the evidence suggests a 
considerable degree of migrant involvement in the challenges to 
chiefly authority. This largely focussed on resentment of chiefly 
claims to tribute in the form of a part of migrant earnings, chiefs' 
roles in the administration of pass laws and various demands made by 
chiefs on the hard-won cash earned by migrants in wage lbaour. These 
expressions of opposition to 'tribal authority' were viewed by N.A.D. 
officials as indicative of a 'growing individualism' which threatened 
'tribalism and traditional African communalism' and which were the 
direct result of extensive contact with 'white civilization' and the 
transportation of urban ideologies into rural African politics.
The perceptions of N.A.D. officials in the district were further 
stimulated by the widespread opposition to chiefs from 'progressive' 
land -holders who aspired to expand their productive bases and secure 
individual control over larger tracts of land. This source of 
opposition was particularly evident in the Fokeng chiefdom, where
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chiefly control over the allocation of land was regarded by an 
aspirant farmer class as 'archaic' and 'un-progressive'. 
Furthermore, in virtually every chiefdom in the district, rural 
producers during the 1920s and 1930s were resisting 'traditionally 
defined' communal responsibilities and obligations. In some 
chiefdoms the majority of members were refusing to contribute to 
tribal levies for the purpose of purchasing land from which they did 
not see themselves as benefitting. Rural dwellers were refusing to 
perform labour services for their chiefs and many were deserting to 
the towns in order to avoid the imposition of tribal obligations in 
cash or kind. In most instances at least the leadership of these 
resistance movements were mission-educated Christians who often 
consciously identified their own 'civilized' aspirations or identity.
All of these forms of resistance to chiefly authority and' to the 
chiefly or 'tribal' appropriation of individual wealth have been 
discussed in detail in the preceding chapters. Whether they emanated 
from wealthy peasants or from impoverished and marginalised migrants, 
these forms of resistance contributed to the sense amongst N.A.D. 
officialdom, that 'traditional forms of tribal government' were 
threatened with disintegration, and along with them, the mechanisms 
of white administrative control. However, in stark contrast to tnis 
perception, was the fact that resistance to chiefly authority was 
almost exclusively expressed through ideological discourses which 
were rooted in the exercise of traditional Tswana law and custom, in 
almost every dispute discussed thusfar, popular support in opposition 
to chiefs was mobilised through the establishment of rival legotlas,
was expressed through the re -emergence of longstanding succession
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disputes and was contested in both the form and functions of the 
tribal pitso.
The ideological vehicles through which the political and material 
control of Tswana chiefs were challenged, were largely common to all 
the disputes in the Rustenburg district, despite variations in both 
the material conditions of the different chiefdoms and tne 
periodization of the struggles within them. However, there is little 
evidence to demonstrate any coordinated communication or 
organisation of resistance across the district and certainly no 
indication of any popular support for broader political organisations 
or movements.
Hie complex expressions of 'civilized' or 'detribalized' aspirations, 
interwoven with ideological appeals to 'traditional' law and custom, 
raise crucial questions about both the consciousness and the material 
concerns of peasant producers in the Rustenburg district during the 
period under review. These questions are even more significant in 
the light of the priorities and machinations of local and central 
state apparatuses during this period in which segregationalist 
ideology rose to dominance within the ruling classes. This formal 
segregationalist ideology gained momentum in the post-World War 1 
period as the domination of capital as a whole was increasingly being 
threatened by the expansion of an urbanized and occasionally militant 
black working class, potentially in alliance with radicalized 
elements of the emergent black petty bourgeoisie. The entire system 
of labour controls established in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, was effectively threatened by the massive influx
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of Africans from the rural reserves to the urban areas 
African worker organisation and the sporadic 
representatives of the black petty bourgeoisie for 
rights.^
, the growth of 
demands from 
more political
After the coming to power of the Pact government in 1924, one of the
key state strategies in response to these developments was an attempt
to revamp the whole system of African administration through a
deliberate policy of 'retribalization'. In terms of this policy
the 'native' administration systems of the four pre-union colonies
were to be centralized and made uniform. The proletarianization of
Africans was to be halted and 'surplus' Africans in the urban centres
were to be pushed back into the reserves where a system of control
through 'traditional' African authorities was to be 'revived', with
(3)the emphasis on cultural and ethnic separation. One of the
mechanisms central to this process of 'retribalisation' was the 
institution of the chieftaincy, through which local government of 
rural Africans was to be administered under the watchful eye of the 
N.A.D.
In the Rustenburg district the chieftaincy was therefore both the 
central strategic point of political and administrative control tor 
the white government, and was simultaneously the focal point of 
resistance within African rural communities. Despite the fact that 
the struggles in the chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district were 
localized and introverted, and despite the fact that any broader 
challenges to the state appear to have been more by accident than by 
design, these struggles necessarily threatened not only the prestige, 
but the very system of admipistration of the N.A.D.
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Ultimately, the crisis of legitimacy of the chieftaincies in the 
Rustenburg district after the turn of the century was rooted in 
changing material conditions consequent on the development of 
capitalist relations of production in the wider society. The slow 
process of transition within rural productive relations demanded that 
’customary* mechanisms of political and ideological control be 
creatively adapted if they were to maintain their ideological 
hegemony. However, the dominance of segregationalist ideology within 
the capitalist state and the imperatives of ’retribalisation' which 
defined the nature of state intervention in the area, served only to 
inhibit the resilience and flexibility of chiefly authority, leaving 
the tribal institutions of political control disfigured ana 
increasingly out of phase with changing relations of production.
In an attempt of resolve these fundamental material and political 
contradictions, the state offered only administrative and ideological 
solutions, which exacerbated rather than resolved the conflicts 
within the chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district. In the final 
analysis, the power, of chiefs in the district during the 1920s and 
1930s rested on their administrative authority as local functionaries 
of the Native Affairs Department, rather than on their independent 
political or ideological dominance. In the Rustenburg district 
where, unlike Pondoland or the Transkeian Territories, the local 
’Native' council system provided for in the Native Affairs Act Number 
20 of 1920^^ simply did not take root until 19 4 0 , ^  there was 
consequently no development of a local salaried bureaucratic strata 
with vested interests in the administration of the district. As a
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result, the chieftaincy was the only structured point of contact 
between the N.A.D. and the local population. This meant that once 
the chiefs of the district were entrenched in their positions of 
authority, they were virtually impossible to remove. In the final 
analysis, the incumbency of chiefs in the district had come to rely 
indirectly on the absolute authority of the Governor-General (or the 
Minister of Native Affairs) as Supreme Chief. In most chiefdoms in 
the Rustenburg district, the standing of chiefs by 1927 depended on 
the potential repressive power of the Supreme Chief rather than on 
any ideological legitimacy. Indeed, this status was signalled by the 
physical removal of opposition to chiefly authority in the form of 
the Fokeng rebels in late 1926, prior even to the passage of the 
Native Administration Act, and on the basis of the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of customary law.
The conclusions reached thusfar should not be misread as indicating a 
purely functionalist understanding of the role of chiefs in the 
Rustenburg district. Nor should they be taken to imply that the 
process of political and administrative control on the part of the 
N.A.D. was uncontradictory. Within their chiefdoms, chiefs continued 
to attempt to manipulate their 'customary' powers so as to maintain 
their political control and their priveleged access to material 
resources. The entrenchment of 'customary law' within the broader 
judicial system stimulated the challenges to rigid interpretations of 
traditional legal processes and it proved impossible to keep these 
disputes out of the 'white* courts, especially when white landowners 
were involved in the litigation as was the case in the Kwena ba 
Mogopa example. These legal disputes continued after the passage of
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the 1927 Native Administration Act, and provided the vehicle for the 
challenge to chiefly authority. In so doing, they also highlighted 
the potential for ongoing dislocation in the operation of the N.A.D. 
as opposed to the Department of Justice, as well as within the N.A.D. 
itself. It was these very contradictions which allowed the space in 
which the struggles concerning the chieftaincy in the Rustenburg 
district took place.
However, there are two essential points which emerge from the 
evidence, which are central to any conclusions about the nature of 
political and ideological resistance in the district. Firstly, 
although local African populations in the district displayed a 
considerable degree of suspicion of state intervention into the 
social relations within the various chiefdoms, opposition to chiefly 
authority did not as a rule extend to a conscious challenge to the 
authority of white government. Where such challenges did manifest 
themselves, they were rather the unconscious consequence of the 
spill -over of essentially introverted local disputes. In fact, in 
the Rustenburg district where popular struggles were being waged 
through conflicting interpretations of 'customary' authority, state 
officials were often viewed as a potential source of support in the 
quest for legitimacy. Both 'rebels' and chiefs alike, constantly 
appealed to N.A.D. and Department of Justice officials for the 'just' 
settlement of disputes.
Secondly, it would be misleading to assume that the challenges to 
chiefly control were simply the expressions of 'detribalization' or 
the permeating influence of 'urbanisation' or 'civilization'. The
complex spectrum of reasons for entering the urban wage labour market 
should not be reduced to a simplistic consequence of rural 
impoverishment or the diminished stake of migrants in the rural 
economy. Similarly, the political and ideological consciousness of 
migrant workers who were actively involved in the conflicts in the 
district, cannot be properly understood if it is analysed only in 
terms of migrants' political and economic marginalisation in the 
peasant community. As often as not, migrants remained rooted within 
the political -economy of the rural chiefdoms and sought to secure 
their tenure within the peasant economy and polity. Where 'urban 
ideologies' permeated the politics of the African chiefdoms, this 
appears rather to have been the product of Christian education than 
the organised transportation of these westernized views from the 
industrial centres.
The format and content of the struggles in the chiefdoms of the 
district during the 1920s and 1930s demonstrates that the challenges 
to chiefly control had their ideological foundations in conflicting 
interpretations of 'customary' political and legal processes. It was 
on the basis of this essentially 'tribal' consciousness that popular 
support was won and lost in opposition to the chiefs, and it was 
through 'customary' mechanisms of 'tribal' organisation, such as the 
legotla, the pitso and the law itself, that popular alliances between 
different material interest groups were cemented in opposition to the 
demands and controls of the chieftaincy. Ihe resurgence of 
succession disputes during the period under review suggests very 
strongly that in most chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district, the wave 
of opposition to particular chiefs was more the product of engineered
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attempts to gain control of the chieftaincy than any attempts to 
destroy it.
The introverted and localized nature of political dispute processes 
in the Rustenburg district is also potentially open to 
misinterpretation as an indication of the triumph of segregationalist 
state strategies. Was not, after all, one of the key political 
motivations for segregation the attempt to relocate African political 
resistance and 'race consciousness' within the geographical areas of 
the reserves and the political domain of tribal institutions? Such 
an assumption, however, belies the essential relience and autonomous 
dynamic of ideology within rural peasant communities, as well as the 
capacity for such ideological formulations to provide the vehicle for 
the realization of differing material interests within communities in 
the process of transition. Rather than being the product of 
segregationlist strategies, the particular struggles within the 
chiefdoms of the Rustenburg district reflect the centrality and 
resilience of tribal identity within the consciousness of rural 
Tswana communities during the 1920s and 1930s, in the face of hostile 
and increasingly difficult material conditions.
The political and ideological struggles in the Rustenburg chiefdoms 
in the 1920s and 1930s were not simply shaped by the dominance of tne 
capitalist state or the ruling classes. Nor were they a conscious 
challenge to them. These localized and introverted 'tribal' disputes 
can only be understood as an expression of complex and vibrant 
processes of concrete class formation and struggle wrought by the 
development of capitalist relations of production in the wider
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society. Rather than merely being 'ordered by capitalism' these 
struggles had a momentum and dynamic of their own within which it is 
possible to discern the embryonic shapes of formal racial 
segregation, which for several decades to come were to characterise 
the particular form of capitalist development in South Africa.
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January 1891, pp. 14*16.
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